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Supreme Court
No. 2011-316-Appeal.
(WC 07-533)
Fred M. Hazard et al.                                                 :
v.                                                                    :
East Hills, Inc.                                                      :
NOTICE:    This  opinion  is  subject  to  formal  revision  before
publication in the Rhode Island Reporter.  Readers are requested to
notify  the  Opinion  Analyst,  Supreme  Court  of  Rhode  Island,
250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone
222-3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published.




Supreme Court
No. 2011-316-Appeal.
(WC 07-533)
Fred M. Hazard et al.                                                                                    :
v.                                                                                                       :
East Hills, Inc.                                                                                         :
Present:  Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
O P I N I O N
Justice Goldberg, for the Court.      This case takes us to the picturesque Matunuck Hills
section of the Town of South Kingstown.   The plaintiff, Laurel Y. Hazard (plaintiff or Laurel
Hazard),1 appeals from the grant of a motion for summary judgment in favor of the defendant,
East Hills, Inc. (defendant or East Hills),2 declaring that the plaintiff is barred by the doctrine of
laches from prosecuting a claim of ownership to an undeveloped eight-acre tract of land (8-Acre
Parcel or disputed parcel) in South Kingstown, Rhode Island and finding that the defendant had
established ownership of the tract of land by adverse possession and in accordance with the
Rhode Island Marketable Record Title Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 13.1 of title 34.     On appeal, the
plaintiff, who is pro se, asserts that her claim should not be barred by the doctrine of laches, that
1 The original complaint listed four plaintiffs, all members of the Hazard family; however, only
one plaintiff was listed on the notice of appeal and only one filing fee was paid.   At a hearing on
June  24,  2011, the trial justice determined that Laurel Y. Hazard was the only remaining
appellant.   A judgment entered on July 8, 2011, indicating that Laurel Y. Hazard was the only
plaintiff who timely filed an appeal.
2 The defendant, East Hills, Inc., is a non-profit corporation chartered for the purpose of holding
26.5  acres of land situated at                                                                          2717P Commander Oliver Hazard Perry Highway in South
Kingstown, Rhode Island (Subject Lot)—for the benefit of the descendants of Reverend George
R. Hazard and Frances M. Hazard.
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the defendant failed to  satisfy the  requisite elements of adverse possession of the subject
property, and that a 1909 boundary agreement entered into by the defendant‟s predecessor in
interest was defective and was improperly relied upon by the special master as a title transaction
for purposes of establishing marketable record title.
This case came before the Supreme Court for oral argument on May 9, 2012, pursuant to
an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal
should not summarily be decided.    After reviewing the record and considering the written
submissions of the parties, we conclude that cause has not been shown and that this appeal may
be decided without further briefing or argument.3   For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we
affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
Facts and Travel
The property at the heart of this dispute is composed of approximately 26.5 acres of land
(Subject Lot), situated at 2717P Commander Oliver Hazard Perry Highway in South Kingstown,
Rhode Island, and is described as Lot 28 on Tax Assessor‟s Plat 74.   A portion of Lot 28,
allegedly consisting of the undeveloped 8-Acre Parcel, is in contention in this case; and it is that
8-Acre Parcel to which plaintiff claims to have rightful title.   The storied and intricate history of
this portion of Lot 28 has brought the parties to this Court.
In 1895, Violet Hazard (Violet), plaintiff‟s great-great-great grandmother and the widow
of Alexander P. Hazard, conveyed two parcels of land to Reverend George R. Hazard (Rev.
Hazard)  of  Newport,  Rhode  Island,  by  warranty  deed.    The  land,  conveyed  in  a  single
instrument, consisted of a fifteen-acre parcel (15-Acre Parcel) and a 7.5-acre parcel (7.5-Acre
3 The plaintiff did not appear for oral argument, despite written notice from the Supreme Court
clerk.   Accordingly, with the assent of counsel for defendant, we shall decide this case on the
basis of the memoranda submitted by the parties.
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Parcel).4  The defendant asserts record ownership of substantially all the land in that conveyance,
currently described as Lot 28.5     According to plaintiff, the disputed 8-Acre Parcel is situated
within Lot 28; however, unlike the evidence of the devolution of the 15-Acre Parcel and the 7.5-
Acre Parcel, there is no evidence in the record before us of any concrete devolution of the 8-Acre
Parcel that brings the title to the present day.
By  order  entered  on  June  8,  2010,  the  trial  justice  appointed  attorney  Charles  S.
Soloveitzik to serve as special master (Mr. Soloveitzik or special master).   Mr. Soloveitzik, in an
eloquent and comprehensive report (master‟s report), provided the trial justice with a complete
title analysis for the devolution of both the 15-Acre Parcel and the 7.5-Acre Parcel, from a point
of common ownership in 1862, to the time of his report.   However, he was unable to do so with
respect to the disputed parcel.
In  1809, the  8-Acre Parcel was acquired by Dr. George Hazard  (Dr. Hazard), who
plaintiff alleges was her great-great-great-great grandfather and who died intestate in 1829.6   It is
plaintiff‟s contention in this case that an interest in the disputed parcel passed to her ancestor,
Alexander P. Hazard, by intestate succession after Dr. Hazard‟s death, and therefore her family
holds title to the disputed parcel.   The plaintiff also alleges that the 1895 conveyance of the 15-
4  Notably, the                                                                                          7.5-Acre  Parcel  was  described  as  bounded  “southerly in  part by  [land of]
Dr. George Hazard, deceased.”
5 The record discloses that in 1956, “a 2 acre parcel of „marsh‟ (which was concluded to be
within the boundaries of the [Rev.] Hazard parcel depicted on the 1909 and 1915 surveys) was
conveyed to Edmund W. Kitteredge, thereby reducing the size of and reconfiguring the northerly
and easterly boundaries of the parcel.”
6 Doctor George Hazard (Dr. Hazard) and Reverend George R. Hazard (Rev. Hazard) are two
different individuals: Dr. Hazard, the putative father of Alexander P. Hazard (plaintiff‟s great-
great-great grandfather and Violet‟s husband), acquired plaintiff‟s 8-Acre Parcel in 1809 and
died intestate in  1829; Rev. Hazard, defendant‟s predecessor in interest, died in  1934.   The
plaintiff alleges that Alexander P. Hazard‟s father was Dr. Hazard, and that Alexander P. Hazard
was born out-of-wedlock; however, no documentation other than “family lore” and affidavits
submitted by plaintiff‟s family support such a contention.
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Acre Parcel and the 7.5-Acre Parcel by Violet was invalid, based on Violet‟s lack of capacity,7
thus defeating any claim defendant has to Lot 28, including the disputed parcel.
In 1909, a boundary agreement (boundary agreement) was created and recorded by Rev.
Hazard and William F. Price (who owned the abutting land), setting forth the boundaries of what
is now Lot 28.   The plaintiff contends that the boundary agreement improperly subsumed the
8-Acre  Parcel  into  one  of  the  lots  previously conveyed  by Violet  and  that  the  boundary
agreement was defective.
On August  20, 2007, plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment action in Superior Court,
requesting that the court declare: (1) the rights and interests of the parties with respect to the
Subject Lot; (2) that plaintiff is the true owner of all or part of the Subject Lot; (3) that the 1895
deed was null and void; and (4) that the boundary agreement was inaccurate and erroneously
included the 8-Acre Parcel, which belongs to plaintiff.  The plaintiff argued that Rev. Hazard did
not own that portion of the Subject Lot containing the 8-Acre Parcel and, therefore, could not
convey that land to his successors in interest, including defendant.    The defendant filed an
answer on September 6, 2007, asserting several affirmative defenses, including that plaintiff‟s
claim was barred by laches.   The defendant also filed a two-count counterclaim.   The first count
sought to quiet title to Lot 28 and additionally asserted adverse possession, asking the court to
adjudge defendant the owner in fee simple of the entire Subject Lot, including the 8-Acre Parcel.
The second count asserted that plaintiff acted in bad faith, and also sought money damages.
On December 9, 2009, defendant moved for summary judgment, contending that, from
the time that Rev. Hazard purchased the property in 1895, he and his successors in interest “have
been in actual, continuous, open, notorious, hostile [possession of the property,] under claim of
7 The plaintiff bases this claim on an 1880 census that listed Violet as insane, in addition to
having dropsy.   According to plaintiff, Violet‟s mental incapacity would have prohibited her
from executing a valid deed of conveyance, thereby rendering all subsequent transfers by
defendant‟s predecessors in interest void.
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right[, with] exclusive use and possession,” and thus held title to the property through adverse
possession.   The defendant argued that since the Subject Lot was purchased over a century ago,
defendant and its predecessors in interest had constructed and maintained permanent physical
structures  on  the  property,  had  installed  water  and  septic  systems,  and  had  openly  and
continuously  renovated  and  refurbished  the  structures.    The  defendant  again  raised  the
affirmative defense of laches in its motion for summary judgment, contending that plaintiff had
unreasonably and negligently delayed her claim to the disputed parcel for over 100 years, to
defendant‟s prejudice.
The plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to summary judgment on April 13, 2010,
asserting that there existed genuine issues of material fact sufficient to preclude summary
judgment.  The plaintiff argued that defendant failed to prove the elements of adverse possession
with respect to the easterly portion of Lot 28—the section in contention—as well as the area
where plaintiff claimed her family burial ground was located, which partially overlapped the
8-Acre Parcel.8   The plaintiff also argued that the affirmative defense of laches must fail because
defendant failed to demonstrate any prejudicial reliance on plaintiff‟s failure to assert their claim.
The  defendant  responded  with  a  supplemental  memorandum  that  set  forth  the  prejudice
defendant allegedly suffered as a result of plaintiff‟s over-a-century-long delay in bringing suit.
The defendant recounted the various substantial improvements that it had made on the property
and argued that defendant could have “invested in another piece of land for the benefit of the
[Rev.] George R. Hazard family had the [p]laintiff[] come forward in a reasonable time and
claimed title to the Subject [Lot].”   The defendant further argued that it suffered prejudice as a
8 The plaintiff contended that “[a]s regards the easterly stretches of the property there has been
no more sign of human occupancy, possession or control over the last century than of the vast
stretches of conservation area and forest * * * that extends beyond it.  There have been no fences
or improvements.   No gardening or farming.   Not even any „no trespassing‟ signs. * * * [N]o
occupancy or possession such as would place others on notice that defendant was acting as if it
owned the easterly stretches of the tract.”
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result of plaintiff‟s failure to bring the claim earlier because “[i]nvaluable evidence that could
support the [d]efendant‟s claim to title in the property has been lost.”
As noted, the trial justice appointed Mr. Soloveitzik as special master and directed him to
address the following question:
“WHAT  IS  THE  CHAIN  OF  TITLE  OF  THE  PARCELS  THAT  NOW
COMPRISE THE TRACT MORE PARTICULARLY DESCRIBE[D] AS LOT
[28] ON TOWN OF SOUTH KINGSTOWN TAX ASSESSOR‟S PLAT 74?”
The master‟s report was filed with the court on September 7, 2010, and contained extensive
findings with respect to the devolution of title to the parcels in question, as well as nine exhibits
and  additional  materials  submitted  by  the  parties,  which  enabled  the  special  master          “to
understand  their  respective  theories  of  title[.]”                                                  However,  the  parties‟  contentions
notwithstanding, his analysis required “extensive additional index searches and record review to
complete [the] charge in establishing fully supportable conclusions with respect to the relevant
chains of title.”
Mr. Soloveitzik‟s report established satisfactory chains of title to the 15-Acre Parcel and
the 7.5-Acre Parcel that were conveyed by Violet to Rev. Hazard in 1895, but Mr. Soloveitzik
was  unable to  set  forth  the devolution  of Dr. Hazard‟s  8-Acre Parcel,  which  Dr. Hazard
purchased in 1809.      The special master indicated “that an exhaustive review of all materials
supplied by the litigants and the materials uncovered in the supervised independent research
conducted [by the special master and his title examiner] could not demonstrate how Dr. Hazard‟s
8-acre woodlot [nor a separate and] adjacent 7-acre woodlot * * * have devolved to the present
time.”9    He further noted, that  “[o]wnership of both of those parcels appeared vital to our
9 The special master noted that Dr. George Hazard died intestate on September 29, 1829, and that
he had been married three times.  His first wife, Sarah, died in 1803, followed by Mary, in 1806,
and his third wife, Jane, survived him.   After Jane received the requisite one-third portion of his
estate “for life in dower,” the remainder was recorded in the probate records.   However, none of
the properties listed in the appraisal described the 8-Acre Parcel acquired by Dr. Hazard in 1809,
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analysis, because they would have been reasonably located, (at least in part) between Rev[.]
George Hazard‟s easterly line and William F. Price‟s westerly line when the 1909 boundary line
agreement was formed.”  He therefore concluded as follows:
“Unfortunately, in light of the vagaries of the 19th century
descriptions, the lack of any courses, angles or distances contained
in the descriptions of earliest described component parcels, the
apparent combination of most relevant properties into common
ownership to form differently described parcels, etc., we cannot
complete the chains of those 2 relevant parcels from 1807 to the
present as we did with the others.”
The  special  master  then  turned  to  several  pertinent  sections  of  the  Rhode  Island
Marketable Record Title Act, and he concluded that a liberal construction of the act “may allow
us to find that the 1909 boundary line agreement was an „instrument purporting to create…or
transfer an interest claimed and relied upon by the parties‟ as basis for the marketability of title
to the real estate affected” and that the boundary agreement could be  “construed as a „title
transaction‟ or a „transaction affecting title‟ and may fall within [the] scope of the [s]tatute.”
The trial justice heard oral argument on December 3, 2010, with respect to defendant‟s
motion for summary judgment.   On February 23, 2011, the trial justice, in a comprehensive
written  decision,  granted  defendant‟s  motion  for  summary  judgment  and  concluded  that
plaintiff‟s claims were barred by laches and, additionally, that defendant held title to Lot 28 by
adverse possession.   The trial justice also determined that the “factual findings and conclusions
unless, as the special master observed, “that woodlot was then included with others to form a
larger tract * * *.”   The special master also noted that “in addition to his widow, Dr. Hazard was
survived  by  several  children;”  however,  Alexander  P.  Hazard,  plaintiff‟s  great-great-great
grandfather was not listed among them.   According to plaintiff, Alexander P. Hazard was the
illegitimate son of Dr. Hazard.   This reported circumstance caused the trial justice to proceed to
address the question of plaintiff‟s standing to bring this action because, under the 1829 laws of
intestate succession, a child born out-of-wedlock was not capable of inheriting from his natural
father.   The trial justice remarked that defendant did not seek judgment in its favor on this
ground.   Based on our conclusion that plaintiff‟s claim is barred by the doctrine of laches, we
decline to address this issue.
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of law of the [s]pecial [m]aster suggest that [d]efendant is entitled to summary judgment on the
grounds that the Marketable Record Title Act recognizes the 1909 [b]oundary [a]greement as a
title transaction sufficient to reflect title to the property in [d]efendant.”
An order granting summary judgment entered on April 1, 2011, declaring that plaintiff‟s
complaint was barred by laches and that defendant established ownership of Lot 28 by adverse
possession.   The order granting summary judgment also confirmed and adopted the findings and
conclusions of the master‟s report that the boundary agreement was a title transaction sufficient
to quiet title in favor of defendant.
The appellate travel of this case, although not as complex as the history of the woodlot in
contention, was not without difficulty.   On May 31, 2011, defendant filed a motion to dismiss
plaintiff‟s appeal, alleging that plaintiff failed to order transcripts and failed to transmit the
record to this Court as required by Article I, Rules 10(b)(1) and 11(a) of the Supreme Court
Rules of Appellate Procedure.10   A hearing on the motion to dismiss was held in Superior Court
on June 24, 2011—the transcript of that hearing is the only transcript in this matter that has been
provided to this Court.   The trial justice denied, without prejudice, the motion to dismiss the
appeal, but ordered plaintiff to order any transcripts within thirty days from the date of the
hearing.   The trial justice also clarified that Laurel Hazard was the only plaintiff with standing at
this juncture, and the order, which entered on July 8, 2011, reflected Laurel Hazard‟s status as
the sole plaintiff to have timely filed an appeal in this case.11
10 The plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on March 31, 2011, which listed Fred M. Hazard as the
plaintiff and                                                                                            “Laurel Hazard pro se” as the filing attorney, with Laurel Hazard‟s signature
appearing on the notice.   The notice of appeal did not indicate whether transcripts would be
ordered, nor did it refer to an estimated cost or a court reporter‟s name.
11 The defendant filed a second motion to dismiss the appeal on July  25,  2011, based on
plaintiff‟s failure to transmit the record to this Court after being ordered to  do so.    The
defendant‟s motion to dismiss appears to have been denied, and the record reflects that an order
for transcripts was submitted on July 26, 2011, by Frederick Hazard, but that it was only for the
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Issues on Appeal
On appeal, plaintiff contends that she and her family did not delay in bringing this claim
such that her claim is barred by the doctrine of laches, that defendant did not satisfy the
requirements  necessary  to  prove  adverse  possession  of  the  subject  property,  and  that  the
boundary agreement entered into by defendant‟s predecessor in interest is defective and was
improperly relied upon by the special master as a title transaction for purposes of establishing
marketable record title.
Standard of Review
“In reviewing the Superior Court‟s judgment on a motion for summary judgment, we
examine the matter de novo and apply the same standards as those used by the trial court.”
Tavares ex rel. Guiterrez v. Barbour, 790 A.2d 1110, 1112 (R.I. 2002) (citing Delta Airlines, Inc.
v. Neary, 785 A.2d 1123, 1126 (R.I. 2001)).                                                            “We review the evidence in a light most favorable
to the nonmoving party and will affirm the judgment if there exists no genuine issue of material
fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”   Lynch v. Spirit Rent-A-
Car, Inc., 965 A.2d 417, 424 (R.I. 2009) (citing Cullen v. Lincoln Town Council, 960 A.2d 246,
248 (R.I. 2008)).
Analysis
The Special Master’s Report
Rule 53(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides for the appointment
and duties of special masters, including that the master shall “do all acts and take all measures
June 24, 2011 hearing transcript.   The defendant next submitted a motion to dismiss in this
Court, arguing that plaintiff had “repeatedly and categorically ignored the Rhode Island Rules of
Appellate Procedure,” resulting in substantial prejudice to defendant.   This motion was granted
on November 21, 2011, with the proviso that the appeal would “be automatically reinstated” if
plaintiff filed its Rule 12A statement on or before December 16, 2011, inclusive of a certification
indicating that plaintiff forwarded a copy of the 12A statement to defendant.  The plaintiff filed a
Rule 12A statement on December 7, 2011, thus breathing life back into the appeal.
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necessary or proper for the efficient performance of the master‟s duties * * *.”   Additionally,
Rule 53(e)(2) sets forth the following:
“In actions to be tried without a jury the court shall accept
the master‟s findings of fact unless clearly erroneous.   Within 10
days after being served with notice of the filing of the report any
party may serve written objections thereto upon the other parties.
Application  to  the  court  for  action  upon  the  report  and  upon
objections thereto shall be by motion and upon notice as prescribed
in Rule 6(d).   The court after hearing may adopt it or may reject it
in  whole  or  in  part  or  may  receive  further  evidence  or  may
recommit it with instructions.”
In this case, the special master was asked to report on the chain of title of the several parcels of
land comprising Lot 28.   The special master complied with this charge and issued his detailed,
fifteen-page report, complete with relevant exhibits.  Although there was some initial contention,
both parties agreed with the special master‟s findings of fact, and we shall proceed with this
opinion enlightened by his findings.   We pause to recognize Mr. Soloveitzik‟s efforts as the
special master; the master‟s report reflected a painstaking review of historical records and
materials—it was both thorough and detailed, particularly in light of the lack of clarity presented
by the issues at hand.   We are satisfied that the trial justice did not err in confirming the master‟s
report, nor is there a suggestion in the record that the special master‟s conclusions were clearly
erroneous.
Laches
The plaintiff contends that her claim is not barred by the doctrine of laches; plaintiff
argues that “[a]ny assertion that our family merely, „sat on [our] legal rights‟ and did nothing is
simply untrue.”   According to plaintiff, the prosecution of this action was delayed because the
family was unable to obtain legal representation.   In her memorandum to this Court, plaintiff,
recounting her family‟s rich oral tradition, avers that in 1911, her great-grandmother, Catherine
Hazard (Catherine), went to the old house on the woodlot to check on the property and the family
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graveyard, when she was approached by a man “who claimed to be the owner of the property.”
The plaintiff averred that the man “proceeded to show [Catherine] a deed and told her that Violet
lost [the property] to taxes and [Catherine] and our family could not come back there anymore.”
The plaintiff alleged that Catherine learned at the town hall that this was not the case, but was
informed that “it had been too long, ten years had passed, and there was nothing she could do
about it.”   The plaintiff declared that “[d]espite many attempts by Catherine, her son, Herbert E.
Hazard, and [plaintiff‟s] [f]ather [Frederick M. Hazard, Sr.] over all the past years, they just
could not get legal representation, as they were always told it had been too long.”   After our
careful review of the record before us, including the memoranda of the parties, the master‟s
report, the decision of the trial justice, and relevant case law, we conclude that plaintiff‟s claim is
barred by the equitable doctrine of laches.
“Laches  is  an  equitable  defense  that  precludes  a  lawsuit  by  a  plaintiff  who  has
negligently sat on his or her rights to the detriment of a defendant.”   O‟Reilly v. Town of
Glocester, 621 A.2d 697, 702 (R.I. 1993) (citing Fitzgerald v. O‟Connell, 120 R.I. 240, 245, 386
A.2d 1384, 1387 (1978)).   The defense of laches “involves not only delay but also a party‟s
detrimental reliance on the status quo.”  Andrukiewicz v. Andrukiewicz, 860 A.2d 235, 241 (R.I.
2004) (quoting Adam v. Adam, 624 A.2d 1093, 1096 (R.I. 1993)).   Because it is equitable in
nature, the applicability of the defense of laches in a given case generally rests within the sound
discretion of the trial justice.   See id. (citing O‟Reilly, 621 A.2d at 703).   In terms of legal
significance, laches “is not mere delay, but delay that works a disadvantage to another.”   Chase
v. Chase, 20 R.I. 202, 203-04, 37 A. 804, 805 (1897).  In Chase, this Court, faced with a disputed
deed of conveyance where the children of the devisees challenged the conveyance based on the
long-dead grantor‟s competency, described the nature of the delay that defeats a claim:
“So long as parties are in the same condition, it matters little
whether one presses  a  right  promptly or slowly,  within limits
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allowed by law; but when, knowing his rights, he takes no steps to
enforce them until the condition of the other party has, in good
faith, become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former
state, if the right be then enforced, delay becomes inequitable and
operates as an estoppel against the assertion of the right.    The
disadvantage may come from loss of evidence, change of title,
intervention of equities and other causes, but when a court sees
negligence on one side and injury therefrom on the other, it is a
ground for denial of relief.”  Chase, 20 R.I. at 204, 37 A. at 805.
Upon a finding that a party was negligent in bringing a claim and that there was injury to
the other party as a result of the delay, such negligence may give rise to the denial of relief.   See
id. When confronted with a defense of laches, a trial justice must apply a two-part test:                “First,
there must be negligence on the part of the plaintiff that leads to a delay in the prosecution of the
case. * * * Second, this delay must prejudice the defendant.”   School Committee of Cranston v.
Bergin-Andrews, 984 A.2d 629, 644 (R.I. 2009) (quoting O‟Reilly, 621 A.2d at 702).   This
Court “will not reverse the trial justice‟s decision on what constitutes laches on appeal „unless it
is clearly wrong.‟”  Id. (quoting Arcand v. Haley, 95 R.I. 357, 364, 187 A.2d 142, 146 (1963)).
In the case before us, most, if not all, of the potential harm enunciated by the Court in
Chase has been suffered by defendant.   Evidence has been lost, witnesses have died, and title to
these parcels has changed hands many times in the approximately 183 years since the death of
Dr. Hazard and during the roughly 112-year interregnum between Violet‟s conveyance to Rev.
Hazard and the institution of this suit.   We agree with the trial justice that plaintiff and her
predecessors, although aware of this claim and mindful that a wrong may have been perpetrated
against them, failed timely to prosecute the action, such that plaintiff is barred from doing so
now.
In reaching her decision, the trial justice relied on two cases demonstrating per se
unreasonable delays in bringing suit—a delay of nine years and a delay of 200 years were both
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declared per se unreasonable.12   We need not address the issue of per se negligence as it relates
to the doctrine of laches because we are satisfied that defendant otherwise is entitled to the
benefits of this equitable defense.   We are hard-pressed to conceive of a clearer example of the
proper application of laches than in the case before us, in which a party delays bringing a claim
for more than a century.
Additionally, we observe that it was incumbent upon plaintiff to come forth with a fair
explanation of the reason for the delay.   See Rodriques v. Santos, 466 A.2d 306, 311 (R.I. 1983)
(declaring that “time lapse alone does not constitute laches,” but that laches may be invoked
when there is an unexplained and inexcusable delay that caused the other party prejudice).   It is
plaintiff‟s very reason  for the delay—that  everyone from whom the  family sought  advice
informed them that too much time had passed—that gives rise to laches in this case.   The record
before this Court discloses no justifiable reason or excuse for plaintiff‟s protracted delay in
bringing suit.
We also are satisfied that defendant has suffered prejudice as a result of the delay in
bringing this claim.                                                                                    “[T]here is no hard and fast rule for determining what constitutes sufficient
prejudice to invoke the doctrine of laches * * *.”   Fitzgerald, 120 R.I. at 249, 386 A.2d at 1389.
“What constitutes the essential prejudice must depend upon the circumstances of each particular
case.”   Pukas v. Pukas, 104 R.I. 542, 547, 247 A.2d 427, 429 (1968) (citing Arcand, 95 R.I. at
364, 187 A.2d at 146).     Laches bars a stale cause of action when an unexplained or unjustified
delay in asserting the claim is “of such great length as to render it difficult or impossible for the
court to ascertain the truth of the matters in controversy and do justice between the parties * * *.”
12 The trial justice cited Womack v. San Francisco Community College District, 147 Cal. App.
4th 854, 865 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007), which concluded that a teacher‟s claim was barred by laches
because his nine-year delay in asserting his claim was per se unreasonable.   Additionally, the
trial justice referenced French v. Weld, 1995 WL 809563 *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1995), which held
that the “[p]ursuit of a claim for payment over two hundred years after maturity of an obligation
defeats sound fiscal planning and is per se unreasonable.”
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Fitzgerald, 120 R.I. at 246, 386 A.2d at 1387 (quoting Lombardi v. Lombardi, 90 R.I. 205, 210,
156 A.2d 911, 913 (1959)).   We are of the opinion that such is the case before us.   Simply put, a
delay of this magnitude, without question, has unduly prejudiced defendant‟s ability to produce
evidence and procure witnesses to rebut plaintiff‟s claims.   The record suggests that defendant
and its predecessors in interest expended significant funds over the years improving the land on
the good-faith belief that they held title to the Subject Lot, including the disputed parcel.
Indisputably, the evidence and witnesses to rebut plaintiff‟s claims no longer are available,
thereby causing defendant to operate at a significant disadvantage with respect to any defense.
Accordingly, we discern no error in the trial justice‟s conclusion that defendant proved
the requisite elements of laches as a matter of law—plaintiff negligently and unjustifiably waited
over a century to assert her cause of action and defendant was prejudiced as a result.   The
plaintiff‟s claim, therefore, is barred by the doctrine of laches.
Laches is a complete defense; if a party successfully prevails in asserting the defense, the
claim is barred.  Having reached this conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to address the merits of
the  trial  justice‟s  decision  as  it  pertains  to  adverse  possession  or  the  applicability of  the
Marketable Record Title Act to this case.   We reach this conclusion mindful that in prosecuting
an adverse possession claim, the claimant bears a heavy burden of proof—clear and convincing
evidence—in what is a fact-intensive inquiry.   See Gardner v. Baird, 871 A.2d 949, 954 (R.I.
2005) (vacating the grant of summary judgment in an action claiming a prescriptive easement
and concluding that fact-finding generally is necessary in such cases).   Accordingly, we are of
the opinion that summary judgment generally may not be appropriate in a claim for adverse
possession.  In any event, given our holding that this claim is barred by the doctrine of laches, we
need not reach this issue.   Likewise, we leave for another day the question of whether the
Marketable Record Title Act lends itself to a liberal interpretation.
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Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
The papers in this case may be returned to the Superior Court.
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RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT CLERK’S OFFICE
Clerk’s Office Order/Opinion Cover Sheet
TITLE OF CASE:                                          Fred M. Hazard et al. v. East Hills, Inc.
CASE NO:                                                No. 2011-316-Appeal.
                                                        (WC 07-533)
COURT:                                                  Supreme Court
DATE OPINION FILED:   July 6, 2012
JUSTICES:                                               Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia JJ.
WRITTEN BY:                                             Associate Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg
SOURCE OF APPEAL:    Washington County Superior Court
JUDGE FROM LOWER COURT:
Associate Justice Judith C. Savage
ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL:
For Plaintiff:  Laurel Y. Hazard, Pro Se
For Defendant:    Carol L. Ricker, Esq.

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Rhode Island Law