Preview:

Supreme Court
No. 2009-165-Appeal.
(PC 07-5103)
Generation Realty, LLC et al.                                                                        :
v.                                                                                                   :
Kristen J. Catanzaro et al.                                                                          :
DePasquale Brothers, Inc. (Intervenor).
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
O P I N I O N
Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court.   The issue presented in this appeal is one of first
impression for this Court and requires us to interpret G.L. 1956 § 45-24-53 of the Rhode Island
Zoning Enabling Act of 1991, which deals with the notice and hearing requirements for the
adoption, repeal, and amendment of zoning ordinances.   In essence, we are asked to decide
whether the defendants, the Town of North Providence  (North Providence or town) and its
representatives,1 complied with § 45-24-53 when they amended the town’s zoning ordinance in
1999.    The plaintiffs, Capital City Community Centers, Inc.  (Capital City) and Generation
Realty, LLC (Generation Realty), the owner and prospective purchaser of property in North
Providence, respectively, brought suit against the defendants, alleging that the town did not
provide adequate notice of the public hearing on the 1999 amendments.  The plaintiffs assert that
these amendments included specific changes, which, under § 45-24-53(c), required individual
1  On  February                                                                                      11,   2011,  we  granted  defendants’  motion  to  substitute  parties.    Per  the
substitution, the representatives of North Providence are now Kristen J. Catanzaro, in her
capacity as town council president; Mansuet Giusti, Stephen L. Feola, Joseph Giammarco, John
J. Lynch, Alice C. Brady, and Dino P. Autiello, in their capacities as members of the town
council;  Edward  Civito,  in  his  capacity  as  planning  and  zoning  director;  and  Mary  Ann
DeAngelus, in her capacity as town clerk.
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written notice, and that the lack of such notice rendered the amendments null and void.   The
hearing justice agreed with the plaintiffs and granted their motion for summary judgment.   The
defendants argue on appeal that the 1999 amendments were general and thus, under § 45-24-
53(b), required only public notice.   For the reasons set forth below, we vacate and reverse the
judgment of the Superior Court.
I
Facts and Procedural History
A short review of some Rhode Island legislative history may be helpful to place the
material issue at hand in its appropriate context.   In 1988, the General Assembly enacted the
Rhode Island Comprehensive Planning and Land Use Regulation Act2 as part of an effort “to
totally rewrite the major land use enabling legislation in Rhode Island,” which, prior to 1988,
consisted of  “an assortment of separately enacted and amended statutes, stretching over six
decades.” Andrew M. Teitz, How the Law Is Really Made: A Participant’s View of the Drafting
of a New Zoning Enabling Act, 41 R.I. Bar J. 11, 11 (1992).   The Comprehensive Planning and
Land Use Regulation Act “provided for each municipality to enact a real comprehensive plan,
with  state  government  review  of  such  plan,  and  carrot-and-stick  incentives  to  make  the
municipalities comply.” Id.
As part of that same effort to overhaul Rhode Island’s land use enabling legislation, in
1991 the General Assembly enacted the Rhode Island Zoning Enabling Act.3 Teitz, 41 R.I. Bar J.
at                                                                                                   11.   Among  other  things,  the  Zoning  Enabling  Act  set  forth  the  notice  and  hearing
requirements for the adoption, repeal, and amendment of zoning ordinances. Section 45-24-53.
Section 45-24-53(b) of that act mandates that “[w]here a proposed general amendment to an
2 General Laws 1956 chapter 22.2 of title 45, as enacted by P.L. 1988, ch. 601, § 1.
3 General Laws 1956 § 45-24-27 to § 45-24-72, as enacted by P.L. 1991, ch. 307, § 1.
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existing zoning ordinance includes changes in an existing zoning map,” only “public notice”4 is
necessary.    However,  “[w]here a proposed amendment to an existing ordinance includes a
specific change in a zoning district map, but does not affect districts generally,” § 45-24-53(c)(2)
additionally requires “[w]ritten notice * * * to all owners of real property whose property is
located in or within not less than two hundred feet (200′) of the perimeter of the area proposed
for change * * *.”   Section 45-24-53(c)(1) also instructs that public notice for such amendments
shall conform to the requirements of subsection  (a) and  “shall include a map showing the
existing and proposed boundaries, zoning district boundaries, and existing streets and roads and
their names, and city and town boundaries where appropriate.”
In compliance with both the Comprehensive Planning and Land Use Regulation Act and
the Zoning Enabling Act, North Providence adopted a comprehensive plan in 1998 and enacted
Ordinance 99-127Z in 1999, which amended the town’s zoning ordinance to conform to the
comprehensive  plan.     The  amendments  effectuated  by  Ordinance                                   99-127Z   (the   1999
amendments) eliminated one commercial zoning district and created seven new zoning districts;
set new dimensional regulations for all of the new zoning districts; deleted the existing table of
use codes and substituted a new table in its stead; changed zoning maps to reflect the locations of
the new zoning districts; and ultimately placed about 50 percent of the land area of the town into
a different zoning district.   Among the many properties affected by the 1999 amendments was
the property designated as Assessor’s Plat No. 22, lot No. 852.   This property, owned by Capital
City, was originally zoned as residential single family, but it was rezoned to open space by these
amendments.
4 Specific requirements for providing public notice are outlined in § 45-24-53(a).
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Approximately seven years after the 1999 amendments were adopted, Generation Realty
entered into an agreement to purchase the property in question from Capital City.5    The
agreement purportedly included a condition precedent that made the purchase expressly subject
to Generation Realty’s first obtaining the necessary permits to build residential dwellings on the
property.   Accordingly, in April 2007, plaintiffs filed an application to amend the town zoning
map and zoning ordinance to change the land in question from open space to residential general
or multi-household.   In the midst of this process, according to plaintiffs, they discovered that the
town “never followed the necessary and proper established procedures to legally change the zone
for this land from [residential single family] to [open space], as set forth by statute and law.”
On August 14, 2007, the North Providence Planning Board held a public hearing on
plaintiffs’ zoning amendment application.  At the hearing, plaintiffs alleged that, in attempting to
rezone the land in question from residential single family to open space in 1999, the town failed
to follow certain statutory procedures and requirements.   The board continued the hearing to
September  11,  2007, at which time it rejected plaintiffs’ contentions about the  1999 notice
procedures and voted to recommend to the North Providence Town Council that plaintiffs’
application for a zoning amendment be denied.  The town council scheduled a public hearing for
September  27,  2007,  to  address  plaintiffs’  application  for  a  zoning  amendment;  however,
plaintiffs filed a verified complaint in the Superior Court the day before the scheduled hearing.
The plaintiffs’ complaint asked the Superior Court to (1) declare defendants’ actions in
attempting  to  rezone  plaintiffs’  land  to  open  space  null  and  void;                            (2)  temporarily  and
5 The Superior Court record does not contain a copy of plaintiffs’ agreement.   In their appendix
submitted to the Supreme Court, however, plaintiffs did provide an “Amended and Restated
Purchase and Sale Agreement,” dated July 17, 2008, which recites that it “amends and restates”
an agreement dated April 28, 2006.   We take this opportunity to remind counsel that, under
Article I, Rule 17 of the Supreme Court Rules of Appellate Procedure, only documents that are
part of the record are appropriately included in an appendix.
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permanently enjoin and restrain defendants from proceeding with the scheduled public hearing
on  plaintiffs’  zoning  amendment  application;                                                           (3)  temporarily  and  permanently  enjoin  and
restrain defendants from preventing or prohibiting plaintiffs from proceeding with their pending
development proposal under a residential single family zone classification; (4) issue a writ of
mandamus ordering and directing defendants to consider and act upon plaintiffs’ development
plan and proposal under a residential single family zone classification; and (5) grant plaintiffs
such other and further relief as the court may see fit.
The  defendants  answered  the  complaint,  denying  plaintiffs’  allegations  and  raising
several affirmative defenses.   DePasquale Brothers, Inc., the owner of property abutting the
property in question, was allowed to intervene.
On October 15, 2008, plaintiffs filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that no
genuine  issue  of  material  fact  existed  and  requesting  that  the  hearing  justice  declare  that
plaintiffs’ property is zoned residential single family and not open space.   In support of the
motion, plaintiffs argued that rezoning the property from residential single family to open space
constituted                                                                                                “a specific change in a zoning district map” because  “[f]ewer than two dozen
individual properties were purportedly removed from various zoning districts and redesignated
as open space lots.”   The plaintiffs contended that, because it was a specific change, individual
written notice was required under § 45-24-53(c); they further contended that, because defendants
did not comply with this requirement, the 1999 amendments were invalid.   The plaintiffs also
argued that defendants’ failure to include the proposed zoning map as part of their notice by
publication and their failure to “put the effective date of enactment” of the 1999 amendments on
the map were further deficiencies that invalidated the amendments.
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On February 24, 2009, a hearing was held on plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment.
At the outset, the hearing justice indicated that she  “thought the motion  *  *  * ought to be
granted.”   She acknowledged that Ordinance 99-127Z “had elements of a general amendment,”
pointing out that it established open space districts,                                                  “created new residential districts, two
commercial  districts,  an  institutional  zone  and  a  historic  overlay  zone,”  eliminated  one
commercial district, and adopted new dimensional requirements for various zoning districts.  She
went on to say, however, that not all of the changes “universally and uniformly affected all
districts and properties of the same genre.”   Reasoning that “[s]pecific changes don’t become
general changes because they’re surrounded by many other specific changes, and ‘widespread’ is
not the same as ‘universal,’” the hearing justice ruled that, “[a]s a matter of law,” the rezoning of
plaintiffs’ property to open space was a specific, not a general, change.   The hearing justice then
ruled that the specific nature of that part of Ordinance 99-127Z entitled plaintiffs to “additional
notice”  and  that,  because  no  such  notice  was  provided,  plaintiffs’  property                   “remain[ed]
designated residential * * * and [was] only affected by the amendment to the extent that all other
such properties were universally affected by it.”
The intervenor, speaking for defendants generally, argued at the hearing that it was “hard
to imagine a [more comprehensive] change” than the one brought about by the ordinance in
question.   It pointed out that Ordinance 99-127Z created “seven new zoning classifications” and
rezoned “over a hundred properties” on Plat No. 22 alone, and that there were “probably a
thousand lots” rezoned in total.   The intervenor also argued that under the terms of the Zoning
Enabling Act, a defect in the form of notice would not “render the ordinance or amendment
invalid.”  The hearing justice rejected the intervenor’s arguments.
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An order granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, and a judgment on the order,
were entered on April  6,  2009.    The defendants and the intervenor timely appealed.    The
defendants also filed a motion to stay the judgment pending appeal, which was granted on April
15, 2009.
II
Standard of Review
This Court reviews a lower court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo,
“employing the same standards and rules used by the hearing justice.” Planned Environments
Management Corp. v. Robert, 966 A.2d 117, 121 (R.I. 2009).   We will affirm a lower court’s
decision “only if, after reviewing the admissible evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Air Distribution Corp. v. Airpro Mechanical
Co., 973 A.2d 537, 540 (R.I. 2009) (quoting Credit Union Central Falls v. Groff, 966 A.2d 1262,
1267 (R.I. 2009)); see also Kulawas v. Rhode Island Hospital, 994 A.2d 649, 652 (R.I. 2010).
Additionally, questions of statutory construction are reviewed de novo by this Court.
Ryan v. City of Providence, 11 A.3d 68, 70 (R.I. 2011); Rachal v. O’Neil, 925 A.2d 920, 924
(R.I. 2007).   When construing a statute, “our ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the
act as intended by the Legislature.” D’Amico v. Johnston Partners, 866 A.2d 1222, 1224 (R.I.
2005) (quoting Webster v. Perrotta, 774 A.2d 68, 75 (R.I. 2001)).                                      “We must ‘determin[e] and
effectuat[e] that legislative intent and attribut[e] to the enactment the most consistent meaning.’”
Ryan, 11 A.3d at 71 (quoting In re Almeida, 611 A.2d 1375, 1382 (R.I. 1992)); accord Downey
v. Carcieri, 996 A.2d 1144, 1150 (R.I. 2010).                                                          “When the language of the statute is clear and
unambiguous, it is our responsibility to give the words of the enactment their plain and ordinary
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meaning.” Kulawas,  994 A.2d at  652.    The plain meaning approach, however,  “is not the
equivalent of myopic literalism,” and  “it is entirely proper for us to look to ‘the sense and
meaning fairly deducible from the context.’” In re Brown,  903 A.2d  147,  150  (R.I.  2006)
(quoting In re Estate of Roche, 109 A.2d 655, 659 (N.J. 1954)); see also Ryan, 11 A.3d at 71.
Therefore,  we  must                                                                                     “consider  the  entire  statute  as  a  whole;  individual  sections  must  be
considered in the context of the entire statutory scheme, not as if each section were independent
of all other sections.” Sorenson v. Colibri Corp., 650 A.2d 125, 128 (R.I. 1994); accord Bailey v.
American Stores, Inc./Star Market, 610 A.2d 117, 119 (R.I. 1992); Stone v. Goulet, 522 A.2d
216, 218 (R.I. 1987).  Finally, under no circumstances will this Court “construe a statute to reach
an absurd result.” Kaya v. Partington, 681 A.2d 256, 261 (R.I. 1996).
III
Discussion
North Providence and its representatives argue before us that the hearing justice’s ruling
is “infused with reversible error” and “cannot withstand scrutiny” on appeal.   In particular, they
argue that the 1999 amendments “[did not] target a specific parcel for change, leaving districts
generally unaffected,” but rather they  “effected a sea change in the zoning scheme for the
community at large,” with an impact not only on plaintiffs’ property, but also on “all North
Providence parcels.”  Therefore, according to defendants, these amendments “spawned ‘changes’
(plural) to the existing zoning schemata — not ‘a change’ (singular) ‘in a zoning district map’
that otherwise did ‘not affect districts generally’”; for that reason, they contend that the only kind
of notice that was necessary was public notice.   The defendants argue that the hearing justice
failed to look at the 1999 amendments in their proper context and instead “[e]mploy[ed] tunnel
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vision” by “focus[ing] solely on the open-space piece” of the amendments and “ignoring the
* * * other parts.”
Furthermore, defendants argue that even the part of the 1999 amendments that rezoned
the town’s properties to open space, by itself, can be considered a “general” amendment because
“a multiplicity of properties on a multiplicity of maps” were rezoned to open space.    The
defendants also point out that the hearing justice’s ruling “reimpos[ed]” an individual written
notice requirement that the General Assembly had eliminated.6   Finally, defendants argue that
the hearing justice’s ruling violates the                                                                “anti-absurdity doctrine of statutory interpretation”
because, “under her theory, if part of an amendment passed to tailor a zoning ordinance with a
comprehensive plan affects [all but one of the] properties in the same zoning classification, it is
nevertheless a ‘specific’ amendment requiring personal notice to every landowner.”
The  plaintiffs  argue  in  response  that  the  town’s  rezoning  of  their  property  from
residential single family to open space constituted a “specific change” to a zoning district map
because it “affected some lots” on the map, but “did not affect the [residential single family]
district generally.”    The plaintiffs assert that, for an amendment to be considered general, “all of
the properties in a zoning district” need to be affected  “in the same way.”    According to
plaintiffs, because “[f]ewer than two dozen individual properties were purportedly removed from
various zoning districts and redesignated as open space lots,” individual written notice was
required, and because no such notice was given, the  “zone change is null and void, and
6 In Quigley v. Town of Glocester, 520 A.2d 975, 977, 979 (R.I. 1987), this Court held that § 45-
24-4, the predecessor to the current notice provision, required individual written notice even for
“general  ordinance[s]”  whenever  such  ordinances                                                      “include[d]  amendments  which  ma[d]e
changes  in  the  zoning  maps.”    The  defendants  point  out  that,  after  Quigley,  the  General
Assembly repealed § 45-24-4 (P.L. 1991, ch. 307, § 1) and enacted § 45-24-53 in its stead, which
permits notice by publication for “general” amendments that “include[] changes in an existing
zoning map.” See § 45-24-53(b).
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[plaintiff’s]  property  remains  zoned  residential.”    The  plaintiffs  also  contend  that  North
Providence’s failure to include a proposed zoning map along with its public notice and its failure
to depict the changes to the zoning map within ninety days of the authorized changes further
invalidate the 1999 amendments as they apply to plaintiffs.
The sole issue before us is whether the hearing justice erred in ruling that, under § 45-24-
53 of the Zoning Enabling Act, the 1999 amendments were “specific,” at least as far as they
related to the rezoning of plaintiffs’ property from residential single family to open space.
Whether the amendments were indeed specific, or whether they were general, is a question of
statutory construction.   This Court is “the final arbiter on questions of statutory construction”;
therefore, as discussed supra, we review a lower court’s ruling on such questions de novo. Ryan,
11 A.3d at 70.   A determination of this issue will dictate whether North Providence was required
to provide only public notice of the hearing on the amendments, or whether individual written
notice to all owners of real property within 200 feet was also necessary.
We now turn to the statute at issue.   Section 45-24-53 provides, in pertinent part, as
follows:
“(a)   No zoning ordinance shall be adopted, repealed, or amended
until after a public hearing has been held upon the question before
the city or town council.   The city or town council shall first give
notice  of  the  public  hearing  by  publication  of  notice  in  a
newspaper of general circulation within the city or town at least
once each week for three (3) successive weeks prior to the date of
the hearing, which may include the week in which the hearing is to
be held, at which hearing opportunity shall be given to all persons
interested to be heard upon the matter of the proposed ordinance.
* * *  The  newspaper  notice  shall  be  published  as  a  display
advertisement, using a type size at least as large as the normal type
size used by the newspaper in its news articles, and shall:
“(1)   Specify the place of the hearing and the date and time
of its commencement;
“(2)    Indicate that adoption, amendment, or repeal of a
zoning ordinance is under consideration;
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“(3)   Contain a statement of the proposed amendments to
the  ordinance  that  may  be  printed  once  in  its  entirety,  or
summarize and describe the matter under consideration;
“(4)   Advise those interested where and when a copy of the
matter  under  consideration  may  be  obtained  or  examined  and
copied; and
“(5)   State that the proposals shown on the ordinance may
be altered or amended prior to the close of the public hearing
without further advertising, as a result of further study or because
of the views expressed at the public hearing.   Any alteration or
amendment must be presented for comment in the course of the
hearing.
“(b) Where a proposed general amendment to an existing
zoning ordinance includes changes in an existing zoning map,
public notice shall be given as required by subsection (a) of this
section.
“(c)                                                                                          Where  a  proposed  amendment  to  an  existing
ordinance includes a specific change in a zoning district map, but
does not affect districts generally, public notice shall be given as
required  by  subsection                                                                      (a)  of  this  section,  with  the  additional
requirements that:
“(1)   Notice shall include a map showing the existing and
proposed  boundaries,  zoning  district  boundaries,  and  existing
streets and roads and their names, and city and town boundaries
where appropriate; and
“(2)    Written notice of the date, time, and place of the
public hearing and the nature and purpose of the hearing shall be
sent to all owners of real property whose property is located in or
within not less than two hundred feet (200′) of the perimeter of the
area proposed for change, whether within the city or town or
within an adjacent city or town. * * * The notice shall be sent by
registered or certified mail to the last known address of the owners,
as shown on the current real estate tax assessment records of the
city or town in which the property is located.
“ * * *
“(f)   No defect in the form of any notice under this section
shall render any ordinance or amendment invalid, unless the defect
is found to be intentional or misleading.” (Emphases added.)
Subsection (b) of § 45-24-53 deals with “general amendment[s].”   It states that where a
“general amendment” includes  “changes in an existing zoning map,” only public notice is
necessary. Id. (emphasis added).   The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language
731-32 (4th ed. 2000) defines “general” as
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“1.   Concerned with, applicable to, or affecting the whole or every
member of a class or category * * *.   2.  Affecting or characteristic
of the majority of those involved; prevalent  *  *  *.                                                   3.    Of or
affecting the entire body * * *.                                                                         4.   Being usually the case; true or
applicable in most instances but not all * * *.                                                          5a.   Not limited in
scope, area, or application * * *.  b.   Not limited to or dealing with
one class of things; diversified * * *.                                                                  6.   Involving only the main
features rather than precise details * * *.                                                              7.   Highest or superior in
rank * * *.”
Subsection (c) of § 45-24-53, on the other hand, deals with amendments that “include[] a
specific change in a zoning district map, but do[] not affect districts generally.”  (Emphases
added.)    It  sets  forth  additional  notice  requirements  for  such  amendments,  including  the
requirement of individual written notice.                                                                “Specific” is defined by Black’s Law Dictionary 1528
(9th ed. 2009) as “1.   Of, relating to, or designating a particular or defined thing; explicit * * *.
2.   Of or relating to a particular named thing * * *.                                                   3.   Conformable to special requirements
* * *.”                                                                                                  “Generally” is defined by The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language
732 (4th ed. 2000) as “1.  Popularly; widely * * *.   2a.  As a rule; usually * * *.  b.  For the most
part * * *.   3.  Without reference to particular instances or details; not specifically * * *.”
The plaintiffs’ argument on appeal focuses only on the part of Ordinance 99-127Z that
rezoned properties previously designated residential single family to open space.   Similarly, the
hearing justice, in granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, looked at the ordinance
piecemeal, differentiating between the parts of the ordinance that “universally and uniformly
affected all districts and properties of the same genre” and those that did not.  It is a fundamental
rule of statutory construction, however, that we must consider a statute in its entirety, “not as if
each section were independent of all other sections.” Sorenson, 650 A.2d at 128.   In addition,
this  Court  applies  the  same  rules  of  construction  when  interpreting  ordinances  as  when
interpreting statutes. Murphy v. Zoning Board of Review of South Kingstown, 959 A.2d 535,
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541 (R.I. 2008).   Therefore, in deciding whether Ordinance 99-127Z is general or specific, we
must consider the ordinance in its entirety, not individual sections of it divorced from the whole.
Ordinance 99-127Z, as a whole, was a far-reaching ordinance that did not single out a
specific property for revision, but rather completely overhauled the town’s zoning mosaic to
conform to the comprehensive plan.   It did much more than create a zoning district and assign
certain properties to that district.   We agree with defendants that it was a “wide-ranging proviso”
that was passed to conform North Providence’s zoning ordinance to its comprehensive plan, a
plan that North Providence was required to enact under the Comprehensive Planning and Land
Use Regulation Act.7   In essence, the amendments effectuated by Ordinance 99-127Z eliminated
one commercial zoning district and created seven new zoning districts; set new dimensional
regulations for all the new zoning districts; deleted the existing table of use codes and substituted
a new table in its stead; changed zoning maps to reflect the locations of the new zoning districts;
and ultimately placed about 50 percent of the land area of the town into a different zoning
district.   The plaintiffs do not dispute that, as a result of these amendments, “virtually all” of the
forty maps comprising Assessor’s Plat Nos. 1 through 26 were affected in some way.8
Given their extensive nature, we are of the opinion that the 1999 amendments did not
include a “specific change” that “[did] not affect districts generally.” See § 45-24-53(c).  Black’s
Law Dictionary 1528 (9th ed. 2009) defines “specific” as relating to a “particular” thing and
7 The Comprehensive Planning and Land Use Regulation Act required “Rhode Island’s cities and
towns” to  “[a]dopt, update, and amend comprehensive plans” and  “[c]onform [their] zoning
ordinance[s] and map[s] with [their] comprehensive plan[s] within eighteen (18) months of plan
adoption and approval.” Section 45-22.2-5(a)(2) and (3).
8 Even if we look only at those amendments that deal with the open space change, as plaintiffs
urge us to do, it is undisputed that plaintiffs’ property was not the only one affected by this
change.  Properties on twelve out of the forty maps comprising Assessor’s Plat Nos. 1 through 26
were rezoned to open space, and other properties on the same plat as plaintiffs’ property,
Assessor’s Plat No. 22, also were rezoned to open space.   Furthermore, because open space was
a new designation, every lot that is now so designated was included in the 1999 amendments.
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contemplates a relatively narrow proposed change.   The 1999 amendments, on the other hand,
affected a wide range of properties in North Providence in a variety of different ways; therefore,
they  were  not  specific.    Instead,  Ordinance                                                     99-127Z  was  “general.”    To  be  general,  an
amendment does not have to apply to every piece of property.   Although Ordinance 99-127Z
may  not  have  affected  all  of  North  Providence’s  properties,  it  clearly  constituted  a
comprehensive overhaul of the town’s zoning framework.
The hearing justice, in granting plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment, stated that, to
be general, a change has to be  “universal,” and that a change is specific when it does not
“universally and uniformly affect[] all districts and properties of the same genre.”   She reasoned
that  “[s]pecific changes don’t become general changes because they’re surrounded by many
other specific changes,” and that “widespread” change is not enough to be considered general.
We hold that, as a matter of law, the hearing justice erred in construing the Zoning Enabling
Act’s notice provision.   The language of § 45-24-53 does not include “universal.”   Rather, the
word “general” is used to describe the type of amendment that requires only public notice.   As
defined supra, “general” does not necessarily refer to all members of a class or category, but
rather implies a majority or a prevalence.   The hearing justice misconstrued the term “general”
by limiting its meaning to only one definition of that word.  She also failed to evaluate Ordinance
99-127Z in its entirety.
Our interpretation of  §  45-24-53 is consistent with our understanding of the General
Assembly’s intent in enacting the Zoning Enabling Act.   This Court held in Quigley v. Town of
Glocester, 520 A.2d 975, 979 (R.I. 1987), that § 45-24-4, the predecessor to the current notice
provision, required individual notice  “[w]henver a general ordinance include[d] amendments
which ma[d]e changes in the zoning maps.”   Subsequent to the Quigley decision, the General
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Assembly repealed § 45-24-4 and enacted § 45-24-53 in its stead, which, contrary to the old
provision, explicitly permits notice by publication for  “general” amendments that  “include[]
changes in an existing zoning map.”  We conclude that the General Assembly, by replacing § 45-
24-4 with  §  45-24-53, intended to confine the requirement of individual notice to specific
amendments that do not affect districts generally, and to allow public notice to suffice in cases of
general amendments, even when such amendments “include changes in an existing zoning map.”
Although the General Assembly required each city and town to adopt a comprehensive plan and
amend its zoning ordinance, it did so without imposing the additional burden of providing
individual notice to owners of all properties that may be affected in the process.   Therefore,
although Ordinance 99-127Z made changes to North Providence’s zoning maps, those changes
were part of a general overhaul of the town’s zoning ordinance and thus required only public
notice.
The plaintiffs also contend that North Providence’s failure to include a proposed zoning
map along with its public notice further invalidates the  1999 amendments as they apply to
plaintiffs.   This argument is without merit.  The plain language of § 45-24-53(a) does not require
public notice to include a map.   Such a requirement is present in § 45-24-53(c)(1); however,
§ 45-24-53(c) is only triggered if the amendment at issue “includes a specific change * * *, but
does not affect districts generally.”
Lastly, plaintiffs argue that the town failed to depict the changes to the zoning map within
ninety days of the authorized changes, as required by § 45-24-55.   In response, defendants assert
that                                                                                                   “uncontradicted  evidence  showed”  that,   “[w]ithin  sixty  days  of  the  enactment  of  the
ordinance amendments, the newly-adopted zoning maps were displayed and recorded in the
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Office of the Town Clerk and the Department of Planning.”9   Even if a defect in the form of
notice did exist, it would not have rendered the 1999 amendments invalid.   Section 45-24-53(f)
states that “[n]o defect in the form of any notice under this section shall render any ordinance or
amendment invalid, unless the defect is found to be intentional or misleading.”
After a de novo review of § 45-24-53 of the Zoning Enabling Act and of Ordinance 99-
127Z, we hold that the ordinance is a general amendment under the act, requiring only public
notice.  We further hold that the hearing justice erred in deciding that the ordinance was specific,
and therefore erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we vacate and reverse the judgment of the Superior
Court.   The record shall be remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
9 The defendants point to the affidavit of Leo J. Perrotta, then the director of planning and the
zoning enforcement officer for North Providence.   They assert, correctly, that plaintiffs never
explicitly questioned the veracity of the factual assertions contained in the affidavit, including
the assertion that the new zoning maps were displayed and recorded within sixty days of the
enactment of the 1999 amendments.
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