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Supreme Court
No. 2007-76-Appeal.
(PC 07-296)
Grasso Service Center, Inc., et al.                                                            :
v.                                                                                             :
Alan Sepe, in his capacity as Acting                                                           :
Director of the City of Providence
Department of Public Property et al.
Present:  Williams, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Suttell, and Robinson, JJ.
O P I N I O N
Justice Goldberg, for the Court.   This case came before the Supreme Court on
November 3, 2008, on appeal by the plaintiffs, eight automobile-tow operators authorized
to do business in the State of Rhode Island and the Rhode Island Public Towing
Association,  Inc.,  a  Rhode  Island  corporation  that  represents  the  majority  of  tow
operators in Rhode Island (collectively plaintiffs).   The plaintiffs appeal from a Superior
Court judgment denying their request for declaratory and injunctive relief and dismissing
their complaint against the defendants, Alan Sepe  (Sepe), in his capacity as acting
director of the City of Providence Department of Public Property, the City of Providence
Board  of  Contract  and  Supply  (Board  of  Contract  and  Supply),  Colonel  Dean  M.
Esserman, in his capacity as chief of police of the City of Providence, and David N.
Cicilline, in his capacity as mayor of the City of Providence (collectively defendants).   A
proposed modification to the police-instigated towing program in the City of Providence
(city or Providence) constitutes the genesis of this dispute.   For the reasons set forth in
this opinion, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court.
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Facts and Travel
Based on its Home Rule Charter, Providence enacted an ordinance that vested the
Providence Police Department with the authority to create a list of tow operators for
police-instigated towing and storage of vehicles and to adopt pertinent regulations for the
program.    See Providence Code of Ordinances  §§  15-231 and  15-25.2    In  2003, the
Providence Police Department proposed reforms of its procedures for towing, storing,
and disposing of illegally parked vehicles in the city, and, through the Board of Contract
and Supply, it issued a Request for Proposals (2003 RFP).   The 2003 RFP proposed
dividing the city into four zones and assigning two tow operators to each zone.   The tow
1 Section 15-23 of the Providence Code of Ordinances, entitled “Use of towing service
companies by police department,” provides:
“(a)   Agreement required.   The police department shall call only
upon  towing  service  companies  which  have  indicated  by  a  writing
deposited with the commissioner of public safety their agreement to abide
by the provisions of this article and the rules and regulations promulgated
hereunder, and have further agreed to remove vehicles as provided herein,
for storage if other than the premises of or under direct control of said
towing service companies only to suitable places in the city whose owners
or operators have also indicated by a writing deposited, as aforesaid, their
willingness to abide by the provisions hereof and the rules and regulations
promulgated hereunder. Towing service companies will be required to
release towed vehicles only during normal daylight hours of 8:00 a.m. to
6:00 p.m. for seven (7) days a week.
“(b)    Listing to be followed.  Towing service companies registered
as aforesaid, with the commissioner of public safety shall be listed in
alphabetical order and shall be called upon for their services by said police
department to the greatest possible extent in the order of their appearance
on said list.”
2 Section 15-25 of the Providence Code of Ordinances, entitled “Rules and regulations to
implement article,” provides:
“The commissioner of public safety may make further rules and
regulations not inconsistent herewith to implement the provisions of this
article.”
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operators would be selected after competitive bidding and for a period of three years,
with the possibility of two one-year extensions; the selected tow operators would be the
only two tow operators the city used in that zone.   To be considered for the program, a
tow operator was required to submit a bid proposal that included “a referral fee of no less
than  20  [percent] per tow and  10  [percent] per storage,” although higher bids were
anticipated.
The plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Superior Court challenging the 2003 RFP
and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.   On July 7, 2005, the trial justice granted
defendants’  motion  for  summary  judgment,  and  plaintiffs  appealed.     However,
Providence issued an amended RFP in June 2006 (2006 RFP), thus rendering the appeal
moot.   This Court dismissed that earlier appeal, but did so “without prejudice to * * *
plaintiff[s] raising a new challenge to the modified RFP and contracts.”   Rhode Island
Public Towing Association, Inc. v. Cicilline, No. 2005-273-A. (R.I., filed Nov. 17, 2006)
(mem.).
The 2006 RFP was virtually identical to the 2003 RFP in that it proposed to
divide the city into four zones with two tow operators designated as exclusive providers
in each zone.   The 2006 RFP required that each bidder be certified by the Public Utilities
Commission (PUC) and submit a bid promising to remit a referral fee to the city of no
less than 20 percent of each tow and 10 percent of the storage charges.   As in the 2003
RFP, higher bids were anticipated.   In response to the 2006 RFP, seventeen bids were
submitted, and Sepe then recommended two tow operators for each of the four zones.
The Board of Contract and Supply voted to accept Sepe’s recommendations.
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On January 22, 2007, plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Superior Court seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief.   The plaintiffs alleged (1) that the 2006 RFP unlawfully
infringed on the regulatory authority of the PUC, (2) that the referral fee constituted an
illegal tax, (3) that the 2006 RFP was an “unlawful confiscatory taking and an unlawful
denial and abridgment of the constitutional and statutory rights of [p]laintiffs and other
unsuccessful bidders similarly situated,” and (4) that the process by which the city sought
to implement the 2006 RFP was “arbitrary and capricious and a clear abuse of their
discretion.”    The  plaintiffs  also  asked  the  Superior  Court  to  enjoin  the  city  from
implementing the 2006 RFP and to stay any implementation until the Superior Court
made its ruling.  The trial justice denied this request.
The parties agreed, pursuant to Rule 65(a)(2) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil
Procedure, to consolidate the hearing on the prayer for a preliminary injunction with a
trial on the merits.   As their only witness, plaintiffs called Sepe, who was involved in
formulating both the 2003 RFP and the 2006 RFP.   He testified that the zones were
established based on the yearly average number of tows in those areas and, according to
the witness, the referral fees were imposed to offset the costs of administering the
program.    Significantly, Sepe offered no figures reflecting the actual administrative
expenses and gave a generalized explanation that the program utilized the services of
dispatchers, police officers, and clerks.   Mr. Sepe also testified that to his knowledge
contracts were awarded to those companies deemed qualified by the city that were the
highest bidders in their respective zone.
On March 1, 2007, the trial justice issued a written decision denying all relief.  He
found that the PUC never has sought to regulate municipal tow lists and that the city’s
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administration of the towing program did not infringe on the PUC’s authority.   The trial
justice determined that the referral fee would not increase the rate charged to customers;
he concluded that, under a plain reading of the statute, it was clear that “the [General
Assembly’s]  mandate  concerning  the  rates  charged  and  prohibition  of  rebates  or
remissions in reference to the transaction between the tow company and the customer.”
(Emphasis added.)   The trial justice declared that because a tow operator did not have a
constitutionally protected right to be included on a tow list, the 2006 RFP did not create a
franchise.   Additionally, the trial justice concluded that plaintiffs had failed to prove that
the referral fee was an illegal tax because plaintiffs made no showing that the fees were
revenue measures and were not designed to offset the costs of administering the towing
program.   Finally, the trial justice rejected plaintiffs’ argument concerning irregularities
in the bid process.  On March 19, 2007, plaintiffs timely appealed, and this Court issued a
stay of the judgment while the appeal was pending.
Before this Court, plaintiffs challenge the trial justice’s finding that the 2006 RFP
and the resulting contracts do not unlawfully infringe on the PUC’s power to regulate tow
operators.    The plaintiffs also argue that the trial justice erred when he found that
awarding exclusive contracts to the successful bidders would not constitute an illegal
franchise.   Additionally, plaintiffs contend that the trial justice erred when he ruled that
the referral fees were allowable because the General Assembly’s prohibitions against
refunds and remittances applied to the vehicle owner and not the city.   Finally, plaintiffs
contend that the referral fees constitute an illegal tax.
The defendants respond that the General Assembly, through the Towing Storage
Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 12.1 of title 39 (act), has delegated the authority to administer
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towing  programs  to  municipalities  and  that  the                                               2006  RFP  is  not  preempted  by  or
otherwise in conflict with state law.  The defendants also argue that G.L. 1956 § 39-12-12
only prohibits a carrier from refunding or remitting any portion of the rates to the
customer; they contend that the statute does not prevent payment of a referral fee to a
municipality.   Finally, defendants contend that creating an exclusive towing list does not
create a franchise and that plaintiffs failed to prove that the referral fees constituted a tax.
Standard of Review
“A Superior Court decision granting or denying declaratory relief is reviewed
with great deference by this Court.”   Providence Lodge No. 3, Fraternal Order of Police
v. Providence External Review Authority, 951 A.2d 497, 502 (R.I. 2008) (citing Fleet
National Bank v.  175 Post Road, LLC,  851 A.2d  267,  273  (R.I.  2004)).   Similarly,
“[w]hen called upon to review the determination of a trial justice to grant or deny a
permanent injunction, this Court will overturn the justice’s findings of fact only when
those findings are ‘clearly wrong’ or when the justice has ‘overlooked or misconceived
material evidence.’”   Providence Teachers’ Union Local 958, AFL-CIO, AFT v. City
Council of Providence, 888 A.2d 948, 952 (R.I. 2005) (quoting Retirement Board of the
Employees’ Retirement System of Providence v. City Council of Providence, 660 A.2d
721,  724  (R.I.                                                                                   1995)).    However, questions of law  and  statutory interpretation are
reviewed de novo by this Court.   Rhode Island Depositors Economic Protection Corp. v.
Bowen Court Associates, 763 A.2d 1005, 1007 (R.I. 2001).
Analysis
We begin by noting that this appeal is properly before the Court.   In the Superior
Court, defendants argued that the action should be dismissed based on the law of the case
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doctrine.3   In light of the travel of this dispute, we must ask: what law in what case?
Although in a similar action filed in 2003 judgment was entered against plaintiffs, the
issues on appeal never were decided by this Court because subsequent events rendered
the controversy moot.   See Associated Builders & Contractors of Rhode Island, Inc. v.
City of Providence, 754 A.2d 89, 90 (R.I. 2000) (“This Court has consistently held that a
case  is  moot  if  the  original  complaint  raised  a  justiciable  controversy,  but  events
occurring  after  the  filing  have  deprived  the  litigant  of  a  continuing  stake  in  the
controversy.”).   Additionally, when we dismissed the first action, we did so “without
prejudice to * * * plaintiff[s] raising a new challenge to the modified RFP and contracts.”
Cicilline, at No. 2005-273-A. (mem.).   The plaintiffs mounted such a challenge and now
properly appeal from the trial justice’s decision in this case.
Delegation
The bifurcation of authority between the PUC, a statewide regulatory body, and
the city to regulate police-instigated tows within the city is a point of contention in this
case.4   Under § 39-12-4(a)(1), the PUC is vested with exclusive authority to “regulate
common carriers by motor vehicle,” a classification that includes, but is not limited to,
tow operators.    Additionally, in performing this function, the PUC is governed by
standards  confining  that  power.5    This  Court  has  acknowledged  that  the  General
3 “The law of the case doctrine provides that, after a judge has decided an ‘interlocutory
matter in a pending suit, a second judge, confronted at a later stage of the suit with the
same question in the identical matter, should refrain from disturbing the first ruling.’”
Balletta v. McHale, 823 A.2d 292, 295 (R.I. 2003) (quoting Leone v. Town of New
Shoreham, 534 A.2d 871, 873 (R.I. 1987)).
4 We note that the PUC is not a party to the present action, nor has it sought to intervene.
5 General Laws 1956 § 39-12-1 provides in pertinent part:
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Assembly may elect to delegate legislative power to a municipality as long as “it is
limited by standards sufficient to confine the exercise of that power for the purpose for
which the delegation was made.”   Metals Recycling Co. v. Maccarone, 527 A.2d 1127,
1129 (R.I. 1987); see also Thompson v. Town of East Greenwich, 512 A.2d 837, 842
(R.I. 1986) (deeming it a sufficient statutory restriction on the power of a local liquor-
licensing board to require that the conditions it established to obtain a liquor license be
reasonable).  Before a tow operator may transport property on a public highway, the PUC
must, in accordance with the standards established by the General Assembly, issue a
certificate of public convenience, § 39-12-6, and the tow operator must file its rates with
the PUC, § 39-12-12.
In  chapter                                                                                   12.1  of  title   39,  the  General  Assembly  recognized  that  police
departments have the legal duty to remove certain vehicles from the public roadways and
that a municipality may select tow operators for those services.   Although the city argues
“It is hereby declared to be the policy of the state to regulate transportation
of property by motor carriers upon its publicly used highways in such
manner  as  to  recognize  and  preserve  the  inherent  advantages  of
transportation, and to foster sound economic conditions in transportation
and  among  carriers  engaged  therein  in  the  public  interest;  and  in
connection therewith to:
“(1) Promote adequate, economical, and efficient
service by motor carriers and reasonable charges therefor
without  unjust  discriminations,  undue  preferences,  or
advantages or unfair or destructive competitive practices;
“(2) Improve the relations between, and coordinate
transportation by and the regulations of motor carriers and
other carriers;
“* * *
“(4)  Promote  safety  upon  its  publicly  used
highways in the interest of its citizens.”
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that this statute contains                                                                     “a specific legislative delegation of authority,” our careful
review of the statutory scheme compels a different conclusion in this case.   Section 39-
12.1-3(a) provides that “[a]ny member of any police department * * * may order the
removal of any abandoned or unattended vehicle * * *.”   This is the sole delegation of
authority to a municipality in the act.
Additionally, the responsibility for supervising, regulating, and enforcing the
provisions of the act rest with the Division of Public Utilities and there has been no
transfer or delegation of that authority to the cities and towns.   We note that the act
contains a long and detailed declaration of legislative purpose and policy in its preamble;6
6
General Laws 1956 § 39-12.1-1 recognizes that the involuntary removal of automobiles
from public and private property affects the rights of the vehicle owner, the property
owner, and the overarching concern for public safety.   Section 39-12.1-1 provides in
pertinent part:
“The legislature hereby finds the following legislation to be in the public
interest for these reasons:
“WHEREAS,  A  tow  truck  in  the  hands  of  an
incompetent operator is a dangerous instrumentality; and
“WHEREAS,  The  public  has  an  inherent  right  to
ready access to the name, location, and telephone number of
certificated towers; and
“* * *
“WHEREAS, The motoring public has a right, when
delegating to law enforcement the selection of an operator in
the  towing-storage  business,  to  expect  that  the  operator
selected and responding will be competent; and
“WHEREAS, The motoring public has a right when
delegating to law enforcement the selection of an operator in
the towing-storage business, to expect that the charges for the
services to be rendered will be reasonable and compensatory,
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however, such declarations are aspirational and based upon findings made by the General
Assembly.   Although “[p]reambles may be used to clarify ambiguities, * * * they do not
create rights that are not found within the statute.”                                         73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 110 at 320
(2001).
The substantive provisions of the act describe the circumstances under which a
police officer lawfully may order the removal of a vehicle by a certificated tower, § 39-
12.1-3(a), and identify the person who is liable “for all reasonable costs of recovery,
towing, and storage in accordance with the certificated towers’ tariff.”   Section 39-12.1-
and that the operator is physically equipped in his or her
business to function properly; and
“WHEREAS, The towing and storage of a vehicle
without the owner’s consent, as is the case in most police
instigated  tows,  requires  certain  procedures  to  assure  the
owner that rights of due process of law are not violated; and
“WHEREAS,  The  owner  or  person  in  control  of
private property of real estate has a right to be free from
trespass by vehicle on the private property; and to have any
such trespassing vehicle removed at the owner’s expense;
and
“WHEREAS,  The  police  powers  delegated  by  the
legislature of the state include the power of the police, even
without the owner’s consent, to have public ways cleared of
conditions which, in the opinion of the officer, creates a
hazardous condition to the motoring public; to have removed
abandoned,  abandoned  and  of  no  value,  and  unattended
vehicles;  to  have  removed  and/or  relocated  vehicles  in
violation of parking ordinances; and to have removed any
vehicle under control of any person arrested for any criminal
offense; and
“WHEREAS, The process of selection of the operator
of a towing-storage business for police work is unique in that
law enforcement, though having the legal duty to order the
work, has no legal duty to pay costs and charges connected
therewith, the same being the duty of the vehicle owner.”
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3(b).   Further, the act specifically grants the person possessing the vehicle “the right to
have any certificated tower of his or her choice attend to the removal[.]”   Section 39-
12.1-3(d).   The act also includes uniform procedures under which a certificated tower
possessing a vehicle must provide notice to the local police department, as well as to the
last registered owner of the vehicle and all lienholders of record.  Section 39-12.1-4.  Any
certificated tower lawfully possessing a vehicle in accordance with the act is granted a
possessory lien on the vehicle and its registration plates in an amount consistent with its
published tariff.   Section 39-12.1-6.   The statute also provides for a waiting period with
notice requirements for enforcement and foreclosure of the tower’s lien.   Sections 39-
12.1-7 and 39-12.1-8.
Thus, with the exception of authorizing “[a]ny member of any police department”
to order the removal of a vehicle, § 39-12.1-3(a), the provisions of the act are silent with
respect to the cities and towns.  Indeed, enforcement of the provisions of the statute is the
responsibility of the public utilities administrator, who “shall supervise, regulate, and
enforce [its] provisions.”   Section 39-12.1-15.   Consequently, we are of the opinion that
the act does not contain a specific delegation of legislative authority to the city to enter
into contracts with certificated towers based on competitive bids for a percentage of the
tower’s tariff.   The city may exercise its discretion in administering its police-instigated
towing program and may divide the city into zones and select the tow operator or
operators it wishes to use within those zones, but it may not do so on the basis of the
2006 RFP in this case.  Additionally, the General Assembly has determined that the tower
may not refund or remit a portion of its rate.
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Preemption
After careful review of the record in this case, we are satisfied that the city’s
discretion to administer its police-instigated towing program is not unfettered.   Not only
is the PUC vested with exclusive authority to license and regulate tow operators, but also
§ 39-12-12 contains language that prohibits a tow operator from refunding or remitting
“in any manner” any portion of its fee.   Section 39-12-12.   To determine whether this
state law preempts a local ordinance, we must consider whether the General Assembly
“intended that its statutory scheme  completely  occupy the field of regulation on a
particular subject.”   Providence Lodge No. 3, Fraternal Order of Police, 951 A.2d at 504
(quoting Town of Warren v. Thornton-Whitehouse, 740 A.2d 1255, 1261 (R.I. 1999)).
This determination is more complicated when, as has occurred in the present case, “there
has  been  limited  delegation  of  regulatory  authority  to  the  cities  and  towns.”    Id.
Nevertheless, despite a limited delegation of authority, “[o]rdinances * * * will be found
unenforceable and invalid when they are in contravention of the city charter or the
general laws of the state.”   Providence City Council v. Cianci, 650 A.2d 499, 501 (R.I.
1994) (citing Wood v. Peckham, 80 R.I. 479, 98 A.2d 669 (1953), and State v. Berberian,
80 R.I. 444, 98 A.2d 270 (1953)).
Section 39-12-12 provides that “no carrier shall refund or remit in any manner or
by any device, directly or indirectly, or through any other person, any portion of the rates
or charges so specified[.]”                                                                       (Emphases added.)   When interpreting a statute, this Court’s
task is to give effect to the expressed intent of the General Assembly.  Champlin’s Realty
Associates,  L.P.  v.  Tillson,                                                                   823  A.2d                                                       1162,   1165   (R.I.   2003)   (citing  Thornton-
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Whitehouse, 740 A.2d at 1259).   “[W]e presume that the [General Assembly] intended to
attach a significant meaning to every word, sentence, or provision of a statute.”  Id.
By  its  plain  and  unambiguous  language,                                                     §  39-12-12  prohibits  all  common
carriers, including tow operators, from refunding or remitting any portion of their tariff to
any person, directly or indirectly.   The terms refund and remit are distinct words that
have independent meaning and significance.                                                      “Refund” means “to give back or restore
(esp. money); repay.”  Random House Unabridged Dictionary 1622 (2d ed. 1993).  A tow
operator is prohibited from giving back or restoring the fee to the person who paid the
towing or storage charges―usually the vehicle owner.   See § 39-12.1-1.   In contrast,
“remit” is defined as “to transmit or send (money, a check, etc.) to a person or place,
usually in payment.”   Random House Unabridged Dictionary 1630 (2d ed. 1993).   Thus,
the term “remit” does not imply giving back or restoring the fee, but rather relates to a
transfer of a portion of the tariff to a person in payment, not repayment.   We are satisfied
that this definition includes a prohibition against payment to the police department that
instigates the tow.7   Accordingly, state law explicitly prohibits tow operators from both
refunding money to a customer and from transmitting  “any portion of the rates or
charges” to anyone “in any manner,” including the person or entity that selects the tow
company.  Section 39-12-12.
In his decision the trial justice declared that “[i]t is clear from the plain language
in the statute that the [General Assembly’s] mandate concerning the rates charged and
prohibition of rebates or remissions is in reference to the transaction between the tow
7 The term also embraces the pejorative practice of paying a “kickback” to the person
who selects the tow operator or, as the city suggests, demanding political contributions
from tow operators in exchange for towing work in the city.
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company and the customer.”   We respectfully disagree and discern no language in the
statute that supports this holding.8   The statute prohibits a tow operator from remitting a
portion of the rates, regardless of the recipient.   Section 39-12-12.   There is no language
that indicates the General Assembly intended to exempt municipalities from the statutory
prohibition against splitting a portion of the rate.9   Accordingly, we are of the opinion
that a tow operator may not pay or agree to pay a remittance to a municipality, and we
equally are satisfied that Providence may not require such a payment in exchange for a
position on a tow list.
Moreover, we conclude that participation in the 2006 RFP, in violation of § 39-
12-12, would expose the carrier to the sanctions set forth in § 39-12-37:
“Any person, whether carrier, shipper, consignee, or any
officer, employee, agent, or representative thereof who:
“(1) Shall knowingly offer, grant, or give or solicit,
accept, or receive any rebate, concession, or discrimination
in violation of any provisions of this chapter; or * * * shall
be guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof,
8 We deem the trial justice’s interpretation particularly unconvincing in the context of
police-instigated tows when the vehicle owner is a stranger to the transaction.   Because
there is no relationship between the tow operator and the vehicle owner before the tow,
we are hard-pressed to envision a situation in which the tow company would refund a
portion of its fee to a member of the public who is attempting to gain possession of his or
her vehicle.
9 Both the trial justice and defendants focus on the intent of the General Assembly to
protect vehicle owners and consumers through regulation of tow operators, but this
analysis ignores the broader impact of chapters 12 and 12.1 of title 39.   Although § 39-
12.1-1 clearly reflects the intent of the General Assembly to protect the motoring public
in the context of police-instigated tows, the reach of chapter  12 of title  39 is more
expansive.   Section 39-12-1 expresses the intent of the General Assembly “to regulate
transportation of property by motor carriers” and “foster sound economic conditions.”
One  way  the  General  Assembly  chose  to achieve these goals was to prohibit tow
operators  from  paying  a  portion  of  their  fee  to  any  other  party,  thus  preserving
competition among the carriers.    There is no indication that the General Assembly
considered fee-sharing with a city to be less invidious than a refund or remittance to an
individual vehicle owner.
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be fined not more than three hundred dollars ($300) or by
imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or both.”
Section 39-12-37.
The defendants argue that § 39-12-37 does not apply because a municipality is not listed
as an entity that must comply with the statute.   However, our concern is not that the city
would violate the statute, but rather that compliance with the terms of the 2006 RFP
would require tow operators, including plaintiffs in this case, to disregard the statute.
Accordingly, although Providence may develop a uniform procedure for selecting
certificated towers for police-instigated tows, it may not enter into exclusive contracts
that require a tow operator to remit a portion of the rates or charges to the city in
exchange for the contract.   Thus, because Providence may not implement the 2006 RFP
as written, we need not address the plaintiffs’ remaining contentions.
Conclusion
For the above reasons, we vacate the judgment in this case and remand the record
to the Superior Court with directions to enter a new judgment consistent with this
opinion.
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Supreme Court
No. 2007-76-Appeal.
(PC 07-296)
Grasso Service Center, Inc., et al.                                   :
v.                                                                    :
Alan Sepe, in his capacity as Acting                                  :
Director of the City of Providence
Department of Public Property et al.
NOTICE:    This  opinion  is  subject  to  formal  revision  before
publication in the Rhode Island Reporter.  Readers are requested to
notify  the  Opinion  Analyst,  Supreme  Court  of  Rhode  Island,
250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone
222-3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published.




COVER SHEET
TITLE OF CASE:   Grasso Service Center, Inc., et al v. Alan Sepe, in his capacity
as Acting Director of the City of Providence Department of Public Property, et al
DOCKET SHEET NO :       SU-07-0076
COURT:                                                                              Supreme Court
DATE OPINION FILED:   January 14, 2009
Appeal from
SOURCE OF APPEAL:    Superior                                                                                                                       County:    Providence
JUDGE FROM OTHER COURT:    Associate Justice Gilbert V. Indeglia
JUSTICES:                                                                           Williams, CJ., Goldberg, Flaherty, Suttell, and Robinson, JJ.
WRITTEN BY:                                                                         Justice Maureen McKenna Goldberg
ATTORNEYS:
For Plaintiff:                                                                      Michael F. Horan
ATTORNEYS:
For Defendant:    Anthony F. Cottone

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