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Supreme Court
No. 2008-153-Appeal.
(KM 08-469)
Harold Curtis                                                         :
v.                                                                    :
State of Rhode Island.                                                :
NOTICE:    This  opinion  is  subject  to  formal  revision  before
publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to
notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250
Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 222-
3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published.




Supreme Court
No. 2008-153-Appeal.
(KM 08-469)
Harold Curtis                                                                                          :
v.                                                                                                     :
State of Rhode Island.                                                                                 :
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, and Robinson, JJ.
O P I N I O N
Chief Justice Suttell, for the Court.   This case presents the issue: Is a prisoner released
on parole entitled to receive credit toward his or her full sentence of imprisonment for time
served while on community confinement?   The state appeals from a Superior Court judgment
granting a motion to correct the sentence1 of the defendant, Harold Curtis, which awarded him
credit toward the completion of his full sentence for time served as a parolee on community
confinement.   This case came before the Supreme Court for oral argument pursuant to an order
directing the parties to show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not summarily be
decided.   After examining the written and oral submissions of the parties, we conclude that this
appeal may be resolved without further briefing or argument.   For the reasons set forth in this
opinion, we vacate the judgment of the Superior Court.
1 Mr. Curtis filed an application for postconviction relief pro se, but the hearing justice found it
more appropriate to treat the application as a motion for a corrected sentence under Rule 35 of
the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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I
Facts and Procedural History
On July 30, 2003, Mr. Curtis pled nolo contendere to breaking and entering a dwelling
with felonious intent and was sentenced to ten years imprisonment, with five years to serve and
five years suspended, with probation.   His sentence was made retroactive to December 10, 2002.
The defendant was released on parole in March 2006, a special condition of which was that he
cooperate with the electronic monitoring program (EMP) for a minimum of ninety days.2   Before
being released from the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI) on parole, Mr. Curtis signed a
document setting forth the terms and conditions of his parole.  One of the terms provided:
“I agree that when this permit has been revoked as herein provided,
or there is probable cause for such revocation, the Parole Board
may issue an order authorizing my arrest an[d] my return to the
place  of  confinement  pending  a  hearing,  and  that  I  shall  be
detained therein according to the terms of my original sentence;
and in computing the period of my confinement, the time between
my release upon said permit and my return to the place of my
original confinement shall not be considered as any part of the
term of my original sentence.” (Emphasis added.)
On June 1, 2007, defendant returned to the ACI as a parole violator.  He thereafter was scheduled
for early release on July 14, 2008, as a result of his accrued good-time credits.
On April 7, 2008, Mr. Curtis filed an application for postconviction relief in Superior
Court.   Hearings were held on June 4, 2008 and June 11, 2008, during which defendant sought
immediate  release  from  the  ACI,  asserting  that  the  ninety  days  he  spent  on  community
2 The electronic monitoring program requires a parolee to wear an electronic ankle bracelet.  The
Department  of  Corrections’  Electronic  Monitoring  Parole  Agreement,  an  agreement  that,
according to the state, is executed by all electronic monitoring program participants, states that a
parolee may leave his or her residence only  “for work, education, training, court, medical,
counseling services relating to transition of offenders in the community as determined by [his or
her parole] officer, * * * religious services[,]” or to other locations approved by his or her parole
officer.
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confinement when he first was paroled in March 2006 should be credited toward the time he had
left to serve after his parole was revoked.
On June 11, 2008, the hearing justice ruled from the bench, and an order entered granting
defendant’s  request  to  receive  credit  for  time  spent  on                                        “electronic  monitoring/community
confinement” toward the completion of his full sentence.   On June 17, 2008, judgment was
entered, and the state filed an appeal.3   The state thereafter sought and obtained an order of this
Court staying the effect of the Superior Court order until the issue could be resolved on appeal.
Because  of  this  Court’s  stay,  defendant  was  not  immediately  released,  and  ultimately  he
completed his sentence in the ACI without credit for time served on community confinement.
II
Standard of Review
As a general matter, “our review of a motion justice’s ruling on a motion to correct
pursuant to Rule 35 is limited.” State v. Goncalves, 941 A.2d 842, 847 (R.I. 2008).  A ruling on a
motion to correct sentence is committed to the sound discretion of the hearing justice, and his or
her decision will normally be disturbed “only when the sentence is without justification.” State v.
Brown, 755 A.2d 124, 125 (R.I. 2000) (quoting State v. Brigham, 666 A.2d 405, 406 (R.I.
1995)).
The issue in this case, however, requires us to construe several provisions of G.L. 1956
chapter 8 of title 13.   This Court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo. State v.
Greenberg, 951 A.2d 481, 489 (R.I. 2008).   When construing a statute, we “look to the plain and
ordinary meaning of the statutory language.” Id. (quoting Henderson v. Henderson, 818 A.2d
3 The state prematurely filed notices of appeal on both June 13, 2008 and June 16, 2008.   This
Court, however, will treat a premature notice of appeal as timely as long as a final judgment is
entered thereafter. See State v. Espinal, 943 A.2d 1052, 1057 n.4 (R.I. 2008).
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669, 673 (R.I. 2003)).   It is generally presumed that the General Assembly “intended every word
of a statute to have a useful purpose and to have some force and effect.” LaPlante v. Honda
North America, Inc., 697 A.2d 625, 629 (R.I. 1997) (quoting Defenders of Animals v. Dept. of
Environmental Management, 553 A.2d 541, 543 (R.I. 1989)).   Further, when construing the
meaning of statutes, this Court must consider “individual sections [of a statute] * * * in the
context of the entire statutory scheme, not as if each section were independent of all other
sections.” Planned Environments Management Corp. v. Robert, 966 A.2d 117, 122 (R.I. 2009)
(quoting In re Brown, 903 A.2d 147, 149 (R.I. 2006)).
III
Discussion
On appeal, the state sets forth a number of arguments supporting its position that
defendant should not receive credit for time served as a parolee on community confinement.
First, the state contends that the hearing justice was incorrect in her interpretation of the relevant
statutes.   The state argues that, according to their plain meanings, §§ 13-8-94 and 13-8-19(b)5
contemplate parole as inclusive of all attendant terms and conditions.   As a result, the state
4 General Laws 1956 § 13-8-9 states:
“The parole board, in the case of any prisoner whose sentence is
subject  to  its  control,  unless  that  prisoner  is  sentenced  to
imprisonment for life, and unless that prisoner is confined as a
habitual criminal under the provisions of § 12-19-21, may, by an
affirmative vote of a majority of the members of the board, issue to
that prisoner a permit to be at liberty upon parole, whenever that
prisoner has served not less than one-third (1/3) of the term for
which  he  or  she  was  sentenced.  The  permit  shall  entitle  the
prisoner to whom it is issued to be at liberty during the remainder
of his or her term of sentence upon any terms and conditions that
the board may prescribe.”
5 Section 13-8-19(b) states: “The time between the release of the prisoner under the [parole]
permit and the prisoner’s return to the  [ACI]  *  *  * under order of the board shall not be
considered as any part of the prisoner’s original sentence.”
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reasons, the meaning of the term “liberty” should not be considered in its absolute sense, but
rather within the parole context as indicated by the modifying phrase “upon parole,” as set forth
in § 13-8-9.   The state also highlights that Mr. Curtis signed an agreement setting forth the terms
and conditions of his parole; that agreement specifically excluded time spent on parole from
being credited toward his full sentence.   Furthermore, the state avers that the General Assembly
views community confinement and time spent in the ACI as qualitatively different, highlighting
the divergent statutory treatment of credit for time served while awaiting trial in the ACI as
opposed to on community confinement.
Mr. Curtis counters that the hearing justice correctly interpreted this Court’s precedent as
establishing that community confinement is a form of imprisonment and that, by definition,
defendant could not have been “at liberty” while he was imprisoned.   The defendant further
contends that his parole agreement, which purportedly waived his right to receive credit for any
time served on community confinement, is null and void as a contract of adhesion.   He also
argues that such a waiver of his liberty would constitute a usurpation of legislative power by the
parole board.
In her bench decision, the hearing justice considered the plain and ordinary meanings of
the  phrase                                                                                            “at  liberty”  and  the  word   “confinement”  and  found  them to  be  fundamentally
contradictory.   Because, in her view, the two words are at odds with one another, the hearing
justice reasoned that a parolee on community confinement could not be considered at liberty
upon parole, as required by § 13-8-16.6   The hearing justice noted that, given this contradiction,
6 Section 13-8-16(a) states:
“Every permit issued by the parole board under this chapter shall
entitle the prisoner to whom it is issued to be at liberty upon parole
during the remainder of the term which he or she is under sentence
to serve, upon any terms and conditions that the board may see fit
in its discretion to prescribe, and the acceptance of the permit by
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it would be incumbent upon the General Assembly to clarify § 13-18-19(b) to expressly preclude
parolees from receiving credit for time spent on community confinement toward the completion
of their full sentence.  Therefore, the hearing justice concluded that the time Mr. Curtis had spent
on community confinement should be credited toward his full sentence.
The issue presented on appeal concerns the interplay of three statutes, viz., §§ 13-8-16(a),
13-8-19(b), and 13-8-9.    Section 13-8-19(b) generally precludes a prisoner from receiving credit
toward his or her full sentence for time spent on parole.   Section 13-8-9 grants the parole board
the authority to issue a permit to a qualified prisoner “to be at liberty upon parole” that “entitle[s]
the prisoner * * * to be at liberty during the remainder of his or her term of sentence upon any
terms and conditions that the board may prescribe.”   Section 13-8-16(a) has similar language,
stating that a parole permit entitles a parolee “to be at liberty upon parole during the remainder of
the term which he or she is under sentence to serve, upon any terms and conditions that the board
may see fit in its discretion to prescribe * * *.”
We focus our analysis on the “permit” that the parole board is authorized to grant within
the statutory framework.   Under § 13-8-9, the parole board may issue to a qualified prisoner “a
permit to be at liberty upon parole,” which “permit shall entitle the prisoner to whom it is issued
to be at liberty during the remainder of his or her term of sentence upon any terms and conditions
that the board may prescribe.”   The conditional nature of the parole permit is reemphasized in
§ 13-8-16(a).   The statutory language not only repeats the board’s authority to prescribe “any
terms and conditions” that it  “may see fit in its discretion,” but also it provides that  “the
acceptance of the permit by the prisoner shall constitute an agreement on the part of the prisoner
to abide by and conform to those terms and conditions.” Section 13-8-16(a).  Thus, it is clear that
the  prisoner  shall  constitute  an  agreement  on  the  part  of  the
prisoner to abide by and conform to those terms and conditions.”
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a permit “to be at liberty on parole” is subject to whatever reasonable conditions the parole board
may prescribe. See Rondoni v. Langlois, 89 R.I. 373, 376, 153 A.2d 163, 164-65 (1959) (holding
that the defendant was bound by the conditions of his parole agreement).   This is also consistent
with our previous cases concerning parole, in which we have characterized parole as a privilege
to which the parolee assents. See Bishop v. State, 667 A.2d 275, 278 (R.I. 1995) (“[T]here is no
‘constitutional or inherent right’ to parole                                                             *  *  *.”)  (quoting Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal
Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979)).
We next consider  §  13-8-19(b), which states:  “The time between the release of the
prisoner under the [parole] permit and the prisoner’s return to the [ACI] under order of the board
shall not be considered as any part of the prisoner’s original sentence.”   In the case at bar,
cooperation with the EMP for a minimum of three months was manifestly a special condition of
Mr. Curtis’s parole permit.   A second condition of his permit was that in the event his parole
should be revoked “the time between [his] release upon said permit and [his] return to the place
of [his] original confinement shall not be considered as any part of [his] original sentence.”   It is
clear to us under the plain meaning of the statutory language, as well as by Mr. Curtis’s assent to
the terms of his permit, that the ninety days he spent on community confinement may not be
credited against his original sentence.
Thus, we need not examine contemporary notions of liberty and contrast them with the
realities of community confinement.   Clearly, the meaning of liberty within the parole context
cannot be construed as an absolute liberty or an absolute freedom.   Rather, liberty within the
parole context is qualified by such terms and conditions as the parole board sees fit.
Mr. Curtis argues that time spent in community confinement on the electronic monitoring
program is imprisonment, citing State v. Quattrocchi, 687 A.2d 78, 79 (R.I. 1996) (“We are
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persuaded that home confinement is a form of imprisonment during which an employee’s liberty
is significantly restrained.”) and State v. Desjarlais, 731 A.2d 716, 718 (R.I. 1999) (stating that
“sentencing a person to [community] confinement as opposed to incarceration in a correctional
facility is merely a ‘change in the place where he or she is confined’”) (quoting State v. Mariano,
648 A.2d 803, 804 (R.I. 1994)).   Neither of these cases, however, concerns a prisoner who is
released from incarceration pursuant to a permit to be at liberty upon parole, nor do they alter the
plain meaning of § 13-8-19(b), which precludes a prisoner from receiving credit for any time
served on parole under a permit.   Therefore, we hold that defendant was “at liberty upon parole”
within the meaning of §§ 13-8-16(a) and 13-8-9, notwithstanding the condition that he cooperate
with the EMP, and thus, under § 13-8-19(b), defendant is not entitled to receive credit for time
spent on community confinement toward the completion of his full sentence.
We note that this conclusion is further supported by this Court’s reluctance to grant credit
for time served when such credit has not been explicitly provided for by statute, as is the case
here. See State v. Murphy,  692 A.2d  335,  336  (R.I.  1997)  (mem.)  (“The absence of  [legal
authority mandating or permitting credit toward the completion of a sentence] is dispositive of
the defendant’s appeal, especially since there are no equities present in this case that would serve
to support the development of new legal precedent.”).
Additionally, defendant was put on notice when he signed his parole agreement, which
explicitly stated that he would not receive credit for the time he was on parole.   This condition
generally referred to the time between “release upon said permit” and his return to the ACI.  We,
however, need not reach the issue of whether this parole agreement was a contract of adhesion
because, as we have previously noted, parole is a privilege and not a right of the prisoner. See
Bishop, 667 A.2d at 278.
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Finally, the defendant’s argument that the waiver of credit for time spent on community
confinement would constitute a usurpation of legislative power by the parole board is without
merit.   Section 13-8-9 explicitly authorizes the parole board to issue parole permits to qualified
prisoners “upon any terms and conditions that the board may prescribe.”   Therefore, we are
satisfied that the parole board was not acting beyond the parameters of the General Assembly’s
authorization.
IV
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate the judgment granting the defendant’s
motion to correct sentence.  The papers in the case shall be returned to the Superior Court.
Justice Indeglia took no part in the consideration or decision of this appeal.
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RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT CLERK’S OFFICE
Clerk’s Office Order/Opinion Cover Sheet
TITLE OF CASE:                                    Harold Curtis v. State of Rhode Island.
CASE NO:                                          No. 2008-153-Appeal.
                                                  (KM 08-469)
COURT:                                            Supreme Court
DATE OPINION FILED:   June 4, 2010
JUSTICES:                                         Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, and Robinson, JJ.
WRITTEN BY:                                       Chief Justice Paul A. Suttell
SOURCE OF APPEAL:    Kent County Superior Court
JUDGE FROM LOWER COURT:
Associate Justice Netti C. Vogel
ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL:
For Plaintiff:     Michael J. Pisaturo, Esq.
For Defendant:  Lauren S. Zurier
Department of Attorney General

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