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Supreme Court
No. 98-560-Appeal.
(94-232-01)
In re Dennis P.                                                                                                 :
Present:  Weisberger, C.J., Lederberg, Bourcier, Flanders, and Goldberg, JJ.
O P I N I O N
PER CURIAM.   This case came before the Court for oral argument on April 3, 2000,
pursuant to an order that directed both parties to appear in order to show cause why the issues raised
by the appeal should not be summarily decided.   After hearing the arguments of counsel and examining
the memoranda filed by the parties, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and that the
issues raised by this appeal should be summarily decided.   The facts pertinent to this appeal are as
follows.
The  respondent  mother  (respondent or mother) appeals from a Family Court judgment
terminating her parental rights.   Dennis, respondent’s sixth child, was born on February 19, 1994.
Shortly thereafter, he was detained in the care, custody, and control of the Department of Children,
Youth and Families  (DCYF) on an ex parte petition based on delayed prenatal care and previous
terminations of respondent's parental rights to her other children.1   Both respondent and the child’s
1  The respondent’s parental rights to her five older children had been involuntarily terminated before the
instant petition was filed; four children pursuant to Rhode Island law, one pursuant to the laws of the
State of California.   The trial justice took judicial notice of a Rhode Island Family Court decree termi-
nating respondent’s parental rights to three of those children.  In an earlier evaluation with respect to the
older children, a clinician at the Kent County Mental Health Clinic observed that respondent had a
chronic substance abuse problem and that she was unable to care for her children.
- 1 -




Supreme Court
No. 98-560-Appeal.
(94-232-01)
In re Dennis P.                                                                                                 :
Present:  Weisberger, C.J., Lederberg, Bourcier, Flanders, and Goldberg, JJ.
O P I N I O N
PER CURIAM.   This case came before the Court for oral argument on April 3, 2000,
pursuant to an order that directed both parties to appear in order to show cause why the issues raised
by the appeal should not be summarily decided.   After hearing the arguments of counsel and examining
the memoranda filed by the parties, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and that the
issues raised by this appeal should be summarily decided.   The facts pertinent to this appeal are as
follows.
The  respondent  mother  (respondent or mother) appeals from a Family Court judgment
terminating her parental rights.   Dennis, respondent’s sixth child, was born on February 19, 1994.
Shortly thereafter, he was detained in the care, custody, and control of the Department of Children,
Youth and Families  (DCYF) on an ex parte petition based on delayed prenatal care and previous
terminations of respondent's parental rights to her other children.1   Both respondent and the child’s
1  The respondent’s parental rights to her five older children had been involuntarily terminated before the
instant petition was filed; four children pursuant to Rhode Island law, one pursuant to the laws of the
State of California.   The trial justice took judicial notice of a Rhode Island Family Court decree termi-
nating respondent’s parental rights to three of those children.  In an earlier evaluation with respect to the
older children, a clinician at the Kent County Mental Health Clinic observed that respondent had a
chronic substance abuse problem and that she was unable to care for her children.
- 1 -




Supreme Court
No. 98-560-Appeal.
(94-232-01)
In re Dennis P.                                                                                                 :
Present:  Weisberger, C.J., Lederberg, Bourcier, Flanders, and Goldberg, JJ.
O P I N I O N
PER CURIAM.   This case came before the Court for oral argument on April 3, 2000,
pursuant to an order that directed both parties to appear in order to show cause why the issues raised
by the appeal should not be summarily decided.   After hearing the arguments of counsel and examining
the memoranda filed by the parties, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and that the
issues raised by this appeal should be summarily decided.   The facts pertinent to this appeal are as
follows.
The  respondent  mother  (respondent or mother) appeals from a Family Court judgment
terminating her parental rights.   Dennis, respondent’s sixth child, was born on February 19, 1994.
Shortly thereafter, he was detained in the care, custody, and control of the Department of Children,
Youth and Families  (DCYF) on an ex parte petition based on delayed prenatal care and previous
terminations of respondent's parental rights to her other children.1   Both respondent and the child’s
1  The respondent’s parental rights to her five older children had been involuntarily terminated before the
instant petition was filed; four children pursuant to Rhode Island law, one pursuant to the laws of the
State of California.   The trial justice took judicial notice of a Rhode Island Family Court decree termi-
nating respondent’s parental rights to three of those children.  In an earlier evaluation with respect to the
older children, a clinician at the Kent County Mental Health Clinic observed that respondent had a
chronic substance abuse problem and that she was unable to care for her children.
- 1 -




Supreme Court
No. 98-560-Appeal.
(94-232-01)
In re Dennis P.                                                                                                 :
Present:  Weisberger, C.J., Lederberg, Bourcier, Flanders, and Goldberg, JJ.
O P I N I O N
PER CURIAM.   This case came before the Court for oral argument on April 3, 2000,
pursuant to an order that directed both parties to appear in order to show cause why the issues raised
by the appeal should not be summarily decided.   After hearing the arguments of counsel and examining
the memoranda filed by the parties, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and that the
issues raised by this appeal should be summarily decided.   The facts pertinent to this appeal are as
follows.
The  respondent  mother  (respondent or mother) appeals from a Family Court judgment
terminating her parental rights.   Dennis, respondent’s sixth child, was born on February 19, 1994.
Shortly thereafter, he was detained in the care, custody, and control of the Department of Children,
Youth and Families  (DCYF) on an ex parte petition based on delayed prenatal care and previous
terminations of respondent's parental rights to her other children.1   Both respondent and the child’s
1  The respondent’s parental rights to her five older children had been involuntarily terminated before the
instant petition was filed; four children pursuant to Rhode Island law, one pursuant to the laws of the
State of California.   The trial justice took judicial notice of a Rhode Island Family Court decree termi-
nating respondent’s parental rights to three of those children.  In an earlier evaluation with respect to the
older children, a clinician at the Kent County Mental Health Clinic observed that respondent had a
chronic substance abuse problem and that she was unable to care for her children.
- 1 -




Supreme Court
No. 98-560-Appeal.
(94-232-01)
In re Dennis P.                                                                                                 :
Present:  Weisberger, C.J., Lederberg, Bourcier, Flanders, and Goldberg, JJ.
O P I N I O N
PER CURIAM.   This case came before the Court for oral argument on April 3, 2000,
pursuant to an order that directed both parties to appear in order to show cause why the issues raised
by the appeal should not be summarily decided.   After hearing the arguments of counsel and examining
the memoranda filed by the parties, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and that the
issues raised by this appeal should be summarily decided.   The facts pertinent to this appeal are as
follows.
The  respondent  mother  (respondent or mother) appeals from a Family Court judgment
terminating her parental rights.   Dennis, respondent’s sixth child, was born on February 19, 1994.
Shortly thereafter, he was detained in the care, custody, and control of the Department of Children,
Youth and Families  (DCYF) on an ex parte petition based on delayed prenatal care and previous
terminations of respondent's parental rights to her other children.1   Both respondent and the child’s
1  The respondent’s parental rights to her five older children had been involuntarily terminated before the
instant petition was filed; four children pursuant to Rhode Island law, one pursuant to the laws of the
State of California.   The trial justice took judicial notice of a Rhode Island Family Court decree termi-
nating respondent’s parental rights to three of those children.  In an earlier evaluation with respect to the
older children, a clinician at the Kent County Mental Health Clinic observed that respondent had a
chronic substance abuse problem and that she was unable to care for her children.
- 1 -




Supreme Court
No. 98-560-Appeal.
(94-232-01)
In re Dennis P.                                                                                                 :
Present:  Weisberger, C.J., Lederberg, Bourcier, Flanders, and Goldberg, JJ.
O P I N I O N
PER CURIAM.   This case came before the Court for oral argument on April 3, 2000,
pursuant to an order that directed both parties to appear in order to show cause why the issues raised
by the appeal should not be summarily decided.   After hearing the arguments of counsel and examining
the memoranda filed by the parties, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and that the
issues raised by this appeal should be summarily decided.   The facts pertinent to this appeal are as
follows.
The  respondent  mother  (respondent or mother) appeals from a Family Court judgment
terminating her parental rights.   Dennis, respondent’s sixth child, was born on February 19, 1994.
Shortly thereafter, he was detained in the care, custody, and control of the Department of Children,
Youth and Families  (DCYF) on an ex parte petition based on delayed prenatal care and previous
terminations of respondent's parental rights to her other children.1   Both respondent and the child’s
1  The respondent’s parental rights to her five older children had been involuntarily terminated before the
instant petition was filed; four children pursuant to Rhode Island law, one pursuant to the laws of the
State of California.   The trial justice took judicial notice of a Rhode Island Family Court decree termi-
nating respondent’s parental rights to three of those children.  In an earlier evaluation with respect to the
older children, a clinician at the Kent County Mental Health Clinic observed that respondent had a
chronic substance abuse problem and that she was unable to care for her children.
- 1 -




Supreme Court
No. 98-560-Appeal.
(94-232-01)
In re Dennis P.                                                                                                 :
Present:  Weisberger, C.J., Lederberg, Bourcier, Flanders, and Goldberg, JJ.
O P I N I O N
PER CURIAM.   This case came before the Court for oral argument on April 3, 2000,
pursuant to an order that directed both parties to appear in order to show cause why the issues raised
by the appeal should not be summarily decided.   After hearing the arguments of counsel and examining
the memoranda filed by the parties, we are of the opinion that cause has not been shown and that the
issues raised by this appeal should be summarily decided.   The facts pertinent to this appeal are as
follows.
The  respondent  mother  (respondent or mother) appeals from a Family Court judgment
terminating her parental rights.   Dennis, respondent’s sixth child, was born on February 19, 1994.
Shortly thereafter, he was detained in the care, custody, and control of the Department of Children,
Youth and Families  (DCYF) on an ex parte petition based on delayed prenatal care and previous
terminations of respondent's parental rights to her other children.1   Both respondent and the child’s
1  The respondent’s parental rights to her five older children had been involuntarily terminated before the
instant petition was filed; four children pursuant to Rhode Island law, one pursuant to the laws of the
State of California.   The trial justice took judicial notice of a Rhode Island Family Court decree termi-
nating respondent’s parental rights to three of those children.  In an earlier evaluation with respect to the
older children, a clinician at the Kent County Mental Health Clinic observed that respondent had a
chronic substance abuse problem and that she was unable to care for her children.
- 1 -




father pled to an amended petition alleging dependency, and the child was committed to the care,
custody, and control of DCYF.
Lisa Kolek (Kolek), the social worker assigned to the case, prepared four case plans for the
parents.    Each plan was designed to address similar objectives  (to maintain a safe, stable home
environment, parenting and care for the child, and to maintain a substance-free lifestyle and avoid illegal
activities), and had the goal of reunification.  Kolek also referred the parents to Haven Miles (Miles) at
the Providence Center for a parent-child evaluation, followed by a referral to the Kent County Mental
Health Reunification Program and then followed up by a reevaluation by Miles.   Janet  Marquez
(Marquez), a clinician at the Kent County Mental Health Clinic, worked with the family throughout the
reunification program.
At trial, both Miles and Marquez testified concerning the parents’ interaction with the child and
their participation and progress in the reunification program.   Miles testified that she met and observed
mother, father, and child when the child was three months old.   At that time, she observed almost no
interaction between the parents and the child.  She recommended that the parents talk extensively to the
child during visits and repeat his sounds, that they hold the child facing them, and that they take a child
development course.  In her reassessment of the parents and child five months later, Miles noted that the
parents had learned to repeat the child’s sounds and to properly hold the child, and had many hours of
contact with the child over the previous sixteen weeks, but that no relationship had developed between
the parents and child.   Marquez testified that although the parents’ attendance during the first sixteen
weeks of the reunification program was good, no improvement in the mother’s performance was
observed by the end of the first phase of the program.  Rather, respondent was able to learn the course
- 2 -




father pled to an amended petition alleging dependency, and the child was committed to the care,
custody, and control of DCYF.
Lisa Kolek (Kolek), the social worker assigned to the case, prepared four case plans for the
parents.    Each plan was designed to address similar objectives  (to maintain a safe, stable home
environment, parenting and care for the child, and to maintain a substance-free lifestyle and avoid illegal
activities), and had the goal of reunification.  Kolek also referred the parents to Haven Miles (Miles) at
the Providence Center for a parent-child evaluation, followed by a referral to the Kent County Mental
Health Reunification Program and then followed up by a reevaluation by Miles.   Janet  Marquez
(Marquez), a clinician at the Kent County Mental Health Clinic, worked with the family throughout the
reunification program.
At trial, both Miles and Marquez testified concerning the parents’ interaction with the child and
their participation and progress in the reunification program.   Miles testified that she met and observed
mother, father, and child when the child was three months old.   At that time, she observed almost no
interaction between the parents and the child.  She recommended that the parents talk extensively to the
child during visits and repeat his sounds, that they hold the child facing them, and that they take a child
development course.  In her reassessment of the parents and child five months later, Miles noted that the
parents had learned to repeat the child’s sounds and to properly hold the child, and had many hours of
contact with the child over the previous sixteen weeks, but that no relationship had developed between
the parents and child.   Marquez testified that although the parents’ attendance during the first sixteen
weeks of the reunification program was good, no improvement in the mother’s performance was
observed by the end of the first phase of the program.  Rather, respondent was able to learn the course
- 2 -




father pled to an amended petition alleging dependency, and the child was committed to the care,
custody, and control of DCYF.
Lisa Kolek (Kolek), the social worker assigned to the case, prepared four case plans for the
parents.    Each plan was designed to address similar objectives  (to maintain a safe, stable home
environment, parenting and care for the child, and to maintain a substance-free lifestyle and avoid illegal
activities), and had the goal of reunification.  Kolek also referred the parents to Haven Miles (Miles) at
the Providence Center for a parent-child evaluation, followed by a referral to the Kent County Mental
Health Reunification Program and then followed up by a reevaluation by Miles.   Janet  Marquez
(Marquez), a clinician at the Kent County Mental Health Clinic, worked with the family throughout the
reunification program.
At trial, both Miles and Marquez testified concerning the parents’ interaction with the child and
their participation and progress in the reunification program.   Miles testified that she met and observed
mother, father, and child when the child was three months old.   At that time, she observed almost no
interaction between the parents and the child.  She recommended that the parents talk extensively to the
child during visits and repeat his sounds, that they hold the child facing them, and that they take a child
development course.  In her reassessment of the parents and child five months later, Miles noted that the
parents had learned to repeat the child’s sounds and to properly hold the child, and had many hours of
contact with the child over the previous sixteen weeks, but that no relationship had developed between
the parents and child.   Marquez testified that although the parents’ attendance during the first sixteen
weeks of the reunification program was good, no improvement in the mother’s performance was
observed by the end of the first phase of the program.  Rather, respondent was able to learn the course
- 2 -




father pled to an amended petition alleging dependency, and the child was committed to the care,
custody, and control of DCYF.
Lisa Kolek (Kolek), the social worker assigned to the case, prepared four case plans for the
parents.    Each plan was designed to address similar objectives  (to maintain a safe, stable home
environment, parenting and care for the child, and to maintain a substance-free lifestyle and avoid illegal
activities), and had the goal of reunification.  Kolek also referred the parents to Haven Miles (Miles) at
the Providence Center for a parent-child evaluation, followed by a referral to the Kent County Mental
Health Reunification Program and then followed up by a reevaluation by Miles.   Janet  Marquez
(Marquez), a clinician at the Kent County Mental Health Clinic, worked with the family throughout the
reunification program.
At trial, both Miles and Marquez testified concerning the parents’ interaction with the child and
their participation and progress in the reunification program.   Miles testified that she met and observed
mother, father, and child when the child was three months old.   At that time, she observed almost no
interaction between the parents and the child.  She recommended that the parents talk extensively to the
child during visits and repeat his sounds, that they hold the child facing them, and that they take a child
development course.  In her reassessment of the parents and child five months later, Miles noted that the
parents had learned to repeat the child’s sounds and to properly hold the child, and had many hours of
contact with the child over the previous sixteen weeks, but that no relationship had developed between
the parents and child.   Marquez testified that although the parents’ attendance during the first sixteen
weeks of the reunification program was good, no improvement in the mother’s performance was
observed by the end of the first phase of the program.  Rather, respondent was able to learn the course
- 2 -




father pled to an amended petition alleging dependency, and the child was committed to the care,
custody, and control of DCYF.
Lisa Kolek (Kolek), the social worker assigned to the case, prepared four case plans for the
parents.    Each plan was designed to address similar objectives  (to maintain a safe, stable home
environment, parenting and care for the child, and to maintain a substance-free lifestyle and avoid illegal
activities), and had the goal of reunification.  Kolek also referred the parents to Haven Miles (Miles) at
the Providence Center for a parent-child evaluation, followed by a referral to the Kent County Mental
Health Reunification Program and then followed up by a reevaluation by Miles.   Janet  Marquez
(Marquez), a clinician at the Kent County Mental Health Clinic, worked with the family throughout the
reunification program.
At trial, both Miles and Marquez testified concerning the parents’ interaction with the child and
their participation and progress in the reunification program.   Miles testified that she met and observed
mother, father, and child when the child was three months old.   At that time, she observed almost no
interaction between the parents and the child.  She recommended that the parents talk extensively to the
child during visits and repeat his sounds, that they hold the child facing them, and that they take a child
development course.  In her reassessment of the parents and child five months later, Miles noted that the
parents had learned to repeat the child’s sounds and to properly hold the child, and had many hours of
contact with the child over the previous sixteen weeks, but that no relationship had developed between
the parents and child.   Marquez testified that although the parents’ attendance during the first sixteen
weeks of the reunification program was good, no improvement in the mother’s performance was
observed by the end of the first phase of the program.  Rather, respondent was able to learn the course
- 2 -




father pled to an amended petition alleging dependency, and the child was committed to the care,
custody, and control of DCYF.
Lisa Kolek (Kolek), the social worker assigned to the case, prepared four case plans for the
parents.    Each plan was designed to address similar objectives  (to maintain a safe, stable home
environment, parenting and care for the child, and to maintain a substance-free lifestyle and avoid illegal
activities), and had the goal of reunification.  Kolek also referred the parents to Haven Miles (Miles) at
the Providence Center for a parent-child evaluation, followed by a referral to the Kent County Mental
Health Reunification Program and then followed up by a reevaluation by Miles.   Janet  Marquez
(Marquez), a clinician at the Kent County Mental Health Clinic, worked with the family throughout the
reunification program.
At trial, both Miles and Marquez testified concerning the parents’ interaction with the child and
their participation and progress in the reunification program.   Miles testified that she met and observed
mother, father, and child when the child was three months old.   At that time, she observed almost no
interaction between the parents and the child.  She recommended that the parents talk extensively to the
child during visits and repeat his sounds, that they hold the child facing them, and that they take a child
development course.  In her reassessment of the parents and child five months later, Miles noted that the
parents had learned to repeat the child’s sounds and to properly hold the child, and had many hours of
contact with the child over the previous sixteen weeks, but that no relationship had developed between
the parents and child.   Marquez testified that although the parents’ attendance during the first sixteen
weeks of the reunification program was good, no improvement in the mother’s performance was
observed by the end of the first phase of the program.  Rather, respondent was able to learn the course
- 2 -




father pled to an amended petition alleging dependency, and the child was committed to the care,
custody, and control of DCYF.
Lisa Kolek (Kolek), the social worker assigned to the case, prepared four case plans for the
parents.    Each plan was designed to address similar objectives  (to maintain a safe, stable home
environment, parenting and care for the child, and to maintain a substance-free lifestyle and avoid illegal
activities), and had the goal of reunification.  Kolek also referred the parents to Haven Miles (Miles) at
the Providence Center for a parent-child evaluation, followed by a referral to the Kent County Mental
Health Reunification Program and then followed up by a reevaluation by Miles.   Janet  Marquez
(Marquez), a clinician at the Kent County Mental Health Clinic, worked with the family throughout the
reunification program.
At trial, both Miles and Marquez testified concerning the parents’ interaction with the child and
their participation and progress in the reunification program.   Miles testified that she met and observed
mother, father, and child when the child was three months old.   At that time, she observed almost no
interaction between the parents and the child.  She recommended that the parents talk extensively to the
child during visits and repeat his sounds, that they hold the child facing them, and that they take a child
development course.  In her reassessment of the parents and child five months later, Miles noted that the
parents had learned to repeat the child’s sounds and to properly hold the child, and had many hours of
contact with the child over the previous sixteen weeks, but that no relationship had developed between
the parents and child.   Marquez testified that although the parents’ attendance during the first sixteen
weeks of the reunification program was good, no improvement in the mother’s performance was
observed by the end of the first phase of the program.  Rather, respondent was able to learn the course
- 2 -




material by rote memorization only, and she was unable to apply what she had learned, ignoring the
child and disregarding his needs.
Furthermore, in October 1994, respondent also underwent a psychiatric evaluation.   It was
determined that respondent was mildly mentally retarded and that there was no reason for optimism
regarding her ability to modify her pattern and behavior.   It was also noted that recurrent concerns
about respondent included
“inadequate  parenting  skills,  neglect,  substance  abuse,  unstable  or
inadequate  housing  or  lack  of  housing,  multiple  suicide  attempts,
domestic  violence,  poor  judgment,  non-compliance  with  parent
education programs, frequent moves due to fear of physical harm by
significant others, reported physical abuse by the father of her last baby,
and threats to kill herself on more than one occasion.                                                          [Respondent had
also] been treated for cocaine abuse * * *.”
Based on these observations and reports, as well as the previous history of services, the Kent County
Reunification Program did not recommend reunification and did not recommend advancement to Phase
II of the reunification program.
Pursuant to a Family Court order, Kolek requested an additional parenting assessment at the
Spurwink School (Spurwink) parenting skills program.   Loretta Jones (Jones), a former social worker
at Spurwink, testified that she met mother, father, and child four times beginning in August 1995 to
make the assessment.  She testified that although mother and father attempted to establish a relationship
with the child, the child did not interact with his parents.  Jones observed that the child refused to engage
his natural parents in any activity and that he avoided eye contact with them, but that he was more
animated when in contact with his foster parents.  Jones testified that the child’s avoidance of his natural
parents and his contentment with his foster parents, and the fact that mother and father ended their
- 3 -




material by rote memorization only, and she was unable to apply what she had learned, ignoring the
child and disregarding his needs.
Furthermore, in October 1994, respondent also underwent a psychiatric evaluation.   It was
determined that respondent was mildly mentally retarded and that there was no reason for optimism
regarding her ability to modify her pattern and behavior.   It was also noted that recurrent concerns
about respondent included
“inadequate  parenting  skills,  neglect,  substance  abuse,  unstable  or
inadequate  housing  or  lack  of  housing,  multiple  suicide  attempts,
domestic  violence,  poor  judgment,  non-compliance  with  parent
education programs, frequent moves due to fear of physical harm by
significant others, reported physical abuse by the father of her last baby,
and threats to kill herself on more than one occasion.                                                          [Respondent had
also] been treated for cocaine abuse * * *.”
Based on these observations and reports, as well as the previous history of services, the Kent County
Reunification Program did not recommend reunification and did not recommend advancement to Phase
II of the reunification program.
Pursuant to a Family Court order, Kolek requested an additional parenting assessment at the
Spurwink School (Spurwink) parenting skills program.   Loretta Jones (Jones), a former social worker
at Spurwink, testified that she met mother, father, and child four times beginning in August 1995 to
make the assessment.  She testified that although mother and father attempted to establish a relationship
with the child, the child did not interact with his parents.  Jones observed that the child refused to engage
his natural parents in any activity and that he avoided eye contact with them, but that he was more
animated when in contact with his foster parents.  Jones testified that the child’s avoidance of his natural
parents and his contentment with his foster parents, and the fact that mother and father ended their
- 3 -




material by rote memorization only, and she was unable to apply what she had learned, ignoring the
child and disregarding his needs.
Furthermore, in October 1994, respondent also underwent a psychiatric evaluation.   It was
determined that respondent was mildly mentally retarded and that there was no reason for optimism
regarding her ability to modify her pattern and behavior.   It was also noted that recurrent concerns
about respondent included
“inadequate  parenting  skills,  neglect,  substance  abuse,  unstable  or
inadequate  housing  or  lack  of  housing,  multiple  suicide  attempts,
domestic  violence,  poor  judgment,  non-compliance  with  parent
education programs, frequent moves due to fear of physical harm by
significant others, reported physical abuse by the father of her last baby,
and threats to kill herself on more than one occasion.                                                          [Respondent had
also] been treated for cocaine abuse * * *.”
Based on these observations and reports, as well as the previous history of services, the Kent County
Reunification Program did not recommend reunification and did not recommend advancement to Phase
II of the reunification program.
Pursuant to a Family Court order, Kolek requested an additional parenting assessment at the
Spurwink School (Spurwink) parenting skills program.   Loretta Jones (Jones), a former social worker
at Spurwink, testified that she met mother, father, and child four times beginning in August 1995 to
make the assessment.  She testified that although mother and father attempted to establish a relationship
with the child, the child did not interact with his parents.  Jones observed that the child refused to engage
his natural parents in any activity and that he avoided eye contact with them, but that he was more
animated when in contact with his foster parents.  Jones testified that the child’s avoidance of his natural
parents and his contentment with his foster parents, and the fact that mother and father ended their
- 3 -




material by rote memorization only, and she was unable to apply what she had learned, ignoring the
child and disregarding his needs.
Furthermore, in October 1994, respondent also underwent a psychiatric evaluation.   It was
determined that respondent was mildly mentally retarded and that there was no reason for optimism
regarding her ability to modify her pattern and behavior.   It was also noted that recurrent concerns
about respondent included
“inadequate  parenting  skills,  neglect,  substance  abuse,  unstable  or
inadequate  housing  or  lack  of  housing,  multiple  suicide  attempts,
domestic  violence,  poor  judgment,  non-compliance  with  parent
education programs, frequent moves due to fear of physical harm by
significant others, reported physical abuse by the father of her last baby,
and threats to kill herself on more than one occasion.                                                          [Respondent had
also] been treated for cocaine abuse * * *.”
Based on these observations and reports, as well as the previous history of services, the Kent County
Reunification Program did not recommend reunification and did not recommend advancement to Phase
II of the reunification program.
Pursuant to a Family Court order, Kolek requested an additional parenting assessment at the
Spurwink School (Spurwink) parenting skills program.   Loretta Jones (Jones), a former social worker
at Spurwink, testified that she met mother, father, and child four times beginning in August 1995 to
make the assessment.  She testified that although mother and father attempted to establish a relationship
with the child, the child did not interact with his parents.  Jones observed that the child refused to engage
his natural parents in any activity and that he avoided eye contact with them, but that he was more
animated when in contact with his foster parents.  Jones testified that the child’s avoidance of his natural
parents and his contentment with his foster parents, and the fact that mother and father ended their
- 3 -




material by rote memorization only, and she was unable to apply what she had learned, ignoring the
child and disregarding his needs.
Furthermore, in October 1994, respondent also underwent a psychiatric evaluation.   It was
determined that respondent was mildly mentally retarded and that there was no reason for optimism
regarding her ability to modify her pattern and behavior.   It was also noted that recurrent concerns
about respondent included
“inadequate  parenting  skills,  neglect,  substance  abuse,  unstable  or
inadequate  housing  or  lack  of  housing,  multiple  suicide  attempts,
domestic  violence,  poor  judgment,  non-compliance  with  parent
education programs, frequent moves due to fear of physical harm by
significant others, reported physical abuse by the father of her last baby,
and threats to kill herself on more than one occasion.                                                          [Respondent had
also] been treated for cocaine abuse * * *.”
Based on these observations and reports, as well as the previous history of services, the Kent County
Reunification Program did not recommend reunification and did not recommend advancement to Phase
II of the reunification program.
Pursuant to a Family Court order, Kolek requested an additional parenting assessment at the
Spurwink School (Spurwink) parenting skills program.   Loretta Jones (Jones), a former social worker
at Spurwink, testified that she met mother, father, and child four times beginning in August 1995 to
make the assessment.  She testified that although mother and father attempted to establish a relationship
with the child, the child did not interact with his parents.  Jones observed that the child refused to engage
his natural parents in any activity and that he avoided eye contact with them, but that he was more
animated when in contact with his foster parents.  Jones testified that the child’s avoidance of his natural
parents and his contentment with his foster parents, and the fact that mother and father ended their
- 3 -




material by rote memorization only, and she was unable to apply what she had learned, ignoring the
child and disregarding his needs.
Furthermore, in October 1994, respondent also underwent a psychiatric evaluation.   It was
determined that respondent was mildly mentally retarded and that there was no reason for optimism
regarding her ability to modify her pattern and behavior.   It was also noted that recurrent concerns
about respondent included
“inadequate  parenting  skills,  neglect,  substance  abuse,  unstable  or
inadequate  housing  or  lack  of  housing,  multiple  suicide  attempts,
domestic  violence,  poor  judgment,  non-compliance  with  parent
education programs, frequent moves due to fear of physical harm by
significant others, reported physical abuse by the father of her last baby,
and threats to kill herself on more than one occasion.                                                          [Respondent had
also] been treated for cocaine abuse * * *.”
Based on these observations and reports, as well as the previous history of services, the Kent County
Reunification Program did not recommend reunification and did not recommend advancement to Phase
II of the reunification program.
Pursuant to a Family Court order, Kolek requested an additional parenting assessment at the
Spurwink School (Spurwink) parenting skills program.   Loretta Jones (Jones), a former social worker
at Spurwink, testified that she met mother, father, and child four times beginning in August 1995 to
make the assessment.  She testified that although mother and father attempted to establish a relationship
with the child, the child did not interact with his parents.  Jones observed that the child refused to engage
his natural parents in any activity and that he avoided eye contact with them, but that he was more
animated when in contact with his foster parents.  Jones testified that the child’s avoidance of his natural
parents and his contentment with his foster parents, and the fact that mother and father ended their
- 3 -




material by rote memorization only, and she was unable to apply what she had learned, ignoring the
child and disregarding his needs.
Furthermore, in October 1994, respondent also underwent a psychiatric evaluation.   It was
determined that respondent was mildly mentally retarded and that there was no reason for optimism
regarding her ability to modify her pattern and behavior.   It was also noted that recurrent concerns
about respondent included
“inadequate  parenting  skills,  neglect,  substance  abuse,  unstable  or
inadequate  housing  or  lack  of  housing,  multiple  suicide  attempts,
domestic  violence,  poor  judgment,  non-compliance  with  parent
education programs, frequent moves due to fear of physical harm by
significant others, reported physical abuse by the father of her last baby,
and threats to kill herself on more than one occasion.                                                          [Respondent had
also] been treated for cocaine abuse * * *.”
Based on these observations and reports, as well as the previous history of services, the Kent County
Reunification Program did not recommend reunification and did not recommend advancement to Phase
II of the reunification program.
Pursuant to a Family Court order, Kolek requested an additional parenting assessment at the
Spurwink School (Spurwink) parenting skills program.   Loretta Jones (Jones), a former social worker
at Spurwink, testified that she met mother, father, and child four times beginning in August 1995 to
make the assessment.  She testified that although mother and father attempted to establish a relationship
with the child, the child did not interact with his parents.  Jones observed that the child refused to engage
his natural parents in any activity and that he avoided eye contact with them, but that he was more
animated when in contact with his foster parents.  Jones testified that the child’s avoidance of his natural
parents and his contentment with his foster parents, and the fact that mother and father ended their
- 3 -




relationship in October  1995,2 were obstacles to reunification.   Indeed,  Kolek testified that  after
respondent broke up with the child’s father, her visits with the child became very inconsistent.   During
those visits, respondent had very little interaction with the child, and the child would play independently.
On April 29, 1998, after a trial in Family Court, the trial justice delivered a decision terminating
respondent’s parental rights.   The trial justice specifically found that DCYF had proven by clear and
convincing evidence that respondent lacked the ability to respond to services that would rehabilitate her,
that she was not able to achieve an understanding of homemaking, safety issues, child care and
parenting, and that she had no condition that would be responsive to treatment or which could be
modified to improve her ability to care for her children or manage her life and household.  He also found
that nothing further could be done for respondent, that she suffered from a mental deficiency which
made it improbable that she would be able to care for the child in the foreseeable future, and that it was
improbable that any additional program would result in reunification within a reasonable period.  Finally,
he concluded that DCYF had proven by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was unfit and
that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the child.
The respondent then filed the instant appeal arguing that the Family Court justice erred when he
concluded that DCYF had made reasonable efforts to reunify her with her son.  The respondent argues
that, in light of her limited cognitive abilities, DCYF should have done more than send her to Spurwink
for an evaluation. The respondent also argues that DCYF should have provided Dennis with services
that might have helped him overcome his resistance to his mother.                                              “Parents  enjoy  a  fundamental
2  Jones testified that the parents’ separation was an obstacle to reunification because she had assessed
them as a family and felt that they were able to lend support to each other.
After the breakup, respondent began living with another man, with whom respondent had two more
children.   One child was placed under the guardianship of relatives.   The putative father has custody of
the other child, but respondent is not allowed to be left alone with the child.
- 4 -




relationship in October  1995,2 were obstacles to reunification.   Indeed,  Kolek testified that  after
respondent broke up with the child’s father, her visits with the child became very inconsistent.   During
those visits, respondent had very little interaction with the child, and the child would play independently.
On April 29, 1998, after a trial in Family Court, the trial justice delivered a decision terminating
respondent’s parental rights.   The trial justice specifically found that DCYF had proven by clear and
convincing evidence that respondent lacked the ability to respond to services that would rehabilitate her,
that she was not able to achieve an understanding of homemaking, safety issues, child care and
parenting, and that she had no condition that would be responsive to treatment or which could be
modified to improve her ability to care for her children or manage her life and household.  He also found
that nothing further could be done for respondent, that she suffered from a mental deficiency which
made it improbable that she would be able to care for the child in the foreseeable future, and that it was
improbable that any additional program would result in reunification within a reasonable period.  Finally,
he concluded that DCYF had proven by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was unfit and
that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the child.
The respondent then filed the instant appeal arguing that the Family Court justice erred when he
concluded that DCYF had made reasonable efforts to reunify her with her son.  The respondent argues
that, in light of her limited cognitive abilities, DCYF should have done more than send her to Spurwink
for an evaluation. The respondent also argues that DCYF should have provided Dennis with services
that might have helped him overcome his resistance to his mother.                                              “Parents  enjoy  a  fundamental
2  Jones testified that the parents’ separation was an obstacle to reunification because she had assessed
them as a family and felt that they were able to lend support to each other.
After the breakup, respondent began living with another man, with whom respondent had two more
children.   One child was placed under the guardianship of relatives.   The putative father has custody of
the other child, but respondent is not allowed to be left alone with the child.
- 4 -




relationship in October  1995,2 were obstacles to reunification.   Indeed,  Kolek testified that  after
respondent broke up with the child’s father, her visits with the child became very inconsistent.   During
those visits, respondent had very little interaction with the child, and the child would play independently.
On April 29, 1998, after a trial in Family Court, the trial justice delivered a decision terminating
respondent’s parental rights.   The trial justice specifically found that DCYF had proven by clear and
convincing evidence that respondent lacked the ability to respond to services that would rehabilitate her,
that she was not able to achieve an understanding of homemaking, safety issues, child care and
parenting, and that she had no condition that would be responsive to treatment or which could be
modified to improve her ability to care for her children or manage her life and household.  He also found
that nothing further could be done for respondent, that she suffered from a mental deficiency which
made it improbable that she would be able to care for the child in the foreseeable future, and that it was
improbable that any additional program would result in reunification within a reasonable period.  Finally,
he concluded that DCYF had proven by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was unfit and
that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the child.
The respondent then filed the instant appeal arguing that the Family Court justice erred when he
concluded that DCYF had made reasonable efforts to reunify her with her son.  The respondent argues
that, in light of her limited cognitive abilities, DCYF should have done more than send her to Spurwink
for an evaluation. The respondent also argues that DCYF should have provided Dennis with services
that might have helped him overcome his resistance to his mother.                                              “Parents  enjoy  a  fundamental
2  Jones testified that the parents’ separation was an obstacle to reunification because she had assessed
them as a family and felt that they were able to lend support to each other.
After the breakup, respondent began living with another man, with whom respondent had two more
children.   One child was placed under the guardianship of relatives.   The putative father has custody of
the other child, but respondent is not allowed to be left alone with the child.
- 4 -




relationship in October  1995,2 were obstacles to reunification.   Indeed,  Kolek testified that  after
respondent broke up with the child’s father, her visits with the child became very inconsistent.   During
those visits, respondent had very little interaction with the child, and the child would play independently.
On April 29, 1998, after a trial in Family Court, the trial justice delivered a decision terminating
respondent’s parental rights.   The trial justice specifically found that DCYF had proven by clear and
convincing evidence that respondent lacked the ability to respond to services that would rehabilitate her,
that she was not able to achieve an understanding of homemaking, safety issues, child care and
parenting, and that she had no condition that would be responsive to treatment or which could be
modified to improve her ability to care for her children or manage her life and household.  He also found
that nothing further could be done for respondent, that she suffered from a mental deficiency which
made it improbable that she would be able to care for the child in the foreseeable future, and that it was
improbable that any additional program would result in reunification within a reasonable period.  Finally,
he concluded that DCYF had proven by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was unfit and
that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the child.
The respondent then filed the instant appeal arguing that the Family Court justice erred when he
concluded that DCYF had made reasonable efforts to reunify her with her son.  The respondent argues
that, in light of her limited cognitive abilities, DCYF should have done more than send her to Spurwink
for an evaluation. The respondent also argues that DCYF should have provided Dennis with services
that might have helped him overcome his resistance to his mother.                                              “Parents  enjoy  a  fundamental
2  Jones testified that the parents’ separation was an obstacle to reunification because she had assessed
them as a family and felt that they were able to lend support to each other.
After the breakup, respondent began living with another man, with whom respondent had two more
children.   One child was placed under the guardianship of relatives.   The putative father has custody of
the other child, but respondent is not allowed to be left alone with the child.
- 4 -




relationship in October  1995,2 were obstacles to reunification.   Indeed,  Kolek testified that  after
respondent broke up with the child’s father, her visits with the child became very inconsistent.   During
those visits, respondent had very little interaction with the child, and the child would play independently.
On April 29, 1998, after a trial in Family Court, the trial justice delivered a decision terminating
respondent’s parental rights.   The trial justice specifically found that DCYF had proven by clear and
convincing evidence that respondent lacked the ability to respond to services that would rehabilitate her,
that she was not able to achieve an understanding of homemaking, safety issues, child care and
parenting, and that she had no condition that would be responsive to treatment or which could be
modified to improve her ability to care for her children or manage her life and household.  He also found
that nothing further could be done for respondent, that she suffered from a mental deficiency which
made it improbable that she would be able to care for the child in the foreseeable future, and that it was
improbable that any additional program would result in reunification within a reasonable period.  Finally,
he concluded that DCYF had proven by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was unfit and
that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the child.
The respondent then filed the instant appeal arguing that the Family Court justice erred when he
concluded that DCYF had made reasonable efforts to reunify her with her son.  The respondent argues
that, in light of her limited cognitive abilities, DCYF should have done more than send her to Spurwink
for an evaluation. The respondent also argues that DCYF should have provided Dennis with services
that might have helped him overcome his resistance to his mother.                                              “Parents  enjoy  a  fundamental
2  Jones testified that the parents’ separation was an obstacle to reunification because she had assessed
them as a family and felt that they were able to lend support to each other.
After the breakup, respondent began living with another man, with whom respondent had two more
children.   One child was placed under the guardianship of relatives.   The putative father has custody of
the other child, but respondent is not allowed to be left alone with the child.
- 4 -




relationship in October  1995,2 were obstacles to reunification.   Indeed,  Kolek testified that  after
respondent broke up with the child’s father, her visits with the child became very inconsistent.   During
those visits, respondent had very little interaction with the child, and the child would play independently.
On April 29, 1998, after a trial in Family Court, the trial justice delivered a decision terminating
respondent’s parental rights.   The trial justice specifically found that DCYF had proven by clear and
convincing evidence that respondent lacked the ability to respond to services that would rehabilitate her,
that she was not able to achieve an understanding of homemaking, safety issues, child care and
parenting, and that she had no condition that would be responsive to treatment or which could be
modified to improve her ability to care for her children or manage her life and household.  He also found
that nothing further could be done for respondent, that she suffered from a mental deficiency which
made it improbable that she would be able to care for the child in the foreseeable future, and that it was
improbable that any additional program would result in reunification within a reasonable period.  Finally,
he concluded that DCYF had proven by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was unfit and
that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the child.
The respondent then filed the instant appeal arguing that the Family Court justice erred when he
concluded that DCYF had made reasonable efforts to reunify her with her son.  The respondent argues
that, in light of her limited cognitive abilities, DCYF should have done more than send her to Spurwink
for an evaluation. The respondent also argues that DCYF should have provided Dennis with services
that might have helped him overcome his resistance to his mother.                                              “Parents  enjoy  a  fundamental
2  Jones testified that the parents’ separation was an obstacle to reunification because she had assessed
them as a family and felt that they were able to lend support to each other.
After the breakup, respondent began living with another man, with whom respondent had two more
children.   One child was placed under the guardianship of relatives.   The putative father has custody of
the other child, but respondent is not allowed to be left alone with the child.
- 4 -




relationship in October  1995,2 were obstacles to reunification.   Indeed,  Kolek testified that  after
respondent broke up with the child’s father, her visits with the child became very inconsistent.   During
those visits, respondent had very little interaction with the child, and the child would play independently.
On April 29, 1998, after a trial in Family Court, the trial justice delivered a decision terminating
respondent’s parental rights.   The trial justice specifically found that DCYF had proven by clear and
convincing evidence that respondent lacked the ability to respond to services that would rehabilitate her,
that she was not able to achieve an understanding of homemaking, safety issues, child care and
parenting, and that she had no condition that would be responsive to treatment or which could be
modified to improve her ability to care for her children or manage her life and household.  He also found
that nothing further could be done for respondent, that she suffered from a mental deficiency which
made it improbable that she would be able to care for the child in the foreseeable future, and that it was
improbable that any additional program would result in reunification within a reasonable period.  Finally,
he concluded that DCYF had proven by clear and convincing evidence that respondent was unfit and
that termination of her parental rights was in the best interests of the child.
The respondent then filed the instant appeal arguing that the Family Court justice erred when he
concluded that DCYF had made reasonable efforts to reunify her with her son.  The respondent argues
that, in light of her limited cognitive abilities, DCYF should have done more than send her to Spurwink
for an evaluation. The respondent also argues that DCYF should have provided Dennis with services
that might have helped him overcome his resistance to his mother.                                              “Parents  enjoy  a  fundamental
2  Jones testified that the parents’ separation was an obstacle to reunification because she had assessed
them as a family and felt that they were able to lend support to each other.
After the breakup, respondent began living with another man, with whom respondent had two more
children.   One child was placed under the guardianship of relatives.   The putative father has custody of
the other child, but respondent is not allowed to be left alone with the child.
- 4 -




liberty interest in the ‘care, custody, and management’ of their children. * * * [B]efore the state may
permanently sever the rights of a parent in his or her natural children, the state must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent is unfit.”  In re Nicole B., 703 A.2d 612, 615 (R.I. 1997).   Once a
parent has been adjudicated unfit, “the balance shifts so that the ‘best interests of the child outweigh all
other considerations.’”  Id. (quoting In re Kristen B., 558 A.2d 200, 203 (R.I. 1989)).  In reviewing the
ruling of the Family Court, we must examine the record to determine whether legally competent
evidence exists to support the trial justice’s findings.                                                       “A Family Court justice’s findings are entitled to
great weight and will not be disturbed absent a showing that the trial justice was clearly wrong or that
material evidence was overlooked or misconceived.”  In re Nicole B., 703 A.2d at 615.
In its petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 15-7-7, DCYF
alleged that respondent was unfit for three reasons:                                                           (1)   because of the previous terminations of her
parental rights to her other children, id. at (a)(2)(iv), (2) because of respondent’s emotional illness,
mental illness, or mental deficiency, id. at                                                                   (a)(2)(i), and (3) because of allegations that respondent
abandoned or deserted the child, id. at (a)(4).   The trial justice granted the petition on the basis of the
first two allegations, and denied and dismissed the third allegation because DCYF had not proven by
clear and convincing evidence that respondent had abandoned or deserted the child.   Accordingly, we
will examine the propriety of the termination of parental rights on the basis of the first two allegations.
Pursuant to the Termination of Parental Rights statute, § 15-7-7(a)(1), (a)(2)(i), or (a)(2)(iii),
“the petitioning agency, as a condition precedent [to the termination of parental rights], must satisfy the
trial court by clear and convincing evidence that ‘reasonable efforts’ were undertaken to ‘encourage and
strengthen the parental relationship.’”   In re Nicole B., 703 A.2d at 617 (quoting  § 15-7-7(b)(1)).
However, “[i]n the event that a petition is filed pursuant to subsection  (a)(2)(ii), (a)(2)(iv), (a)(2)(v),
- 5 -




liberty interest in the ‘care, custody, and management’ of their children. * * * [B]efore the state may
permanently sever the rights of a parent in his or her natural children, the state must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent is unfit.”  In re Nicole B., 703 A.2d 612, 615 (R.I. 1997).   Once a
parent has been adjudicated unfit, “the balance shifts so that the ‘best interests of the child outweigh all
other considerations.’”  Id. (quoting In re Kristen B., 558 A.2d 200, 203 (R.I. 1989)).  In reviewing the
ruling of the Family Court, we must examine the record to determine whether legally competent
evidence exists to support the trial justice’s findings.                                                       “A Family Court justice’s findings are entitled to
great weight and will not be disturbed absent a showing that the trial justice was clearly wrong or that
material evidence was overlooked or misconceived.”  In re Nicole B., 703 A.2d at 615.
In its petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 15-7-7, DCYF
alleged that respondent was unfit for three reasons:                                                           (1)   because of the previous terminations of her
parental rights to her other children, id. at (a)(2)(iv), (2) because of respondent’s emotional illness,
mental illness, or mental deficiency, id. at                                                                   (a)(2)(i), and (3) because of allegations that respondent
abandoned or deserted the child, id. at (a)(4).   The trial justice granted the petition on the basis of the
first two allegations, and denied and dismissed the third allegation because DCYF had not proven by
clear and convincing evidence that respondent had abandoned or deserted the child.   Accordingly, we
will examine the propriety of the termination of parental rights on the basis of the first two allegations.
Pursuant to the Termination of Parental Rights statute, § 15-7-7(a)(1), (a)(2)(i), or (a)(2)(iii),
“the petitioning agency, as a condition precedent [to the termination of parental rights], must satisfy the
trial court by clear and convincing evidence that ‘reasonable efforts’ were undertaken to ‘encourage and
strengthen the parental relationship.’”   In re Nicole B., 703 A.2d at 617 (quoting  § 15-7-7(b)(1)).
However, “[i]n the event that a petition is filed pursuant to subsection  (a)(2)(ii), (a)(2)(iv), (a)(2)(v),
- 5 -




liberty interest in the ‘care, custody, and management’ of their children. * * * [B]efore the state may
permanently sever the rights of a parent in his or her natural children, the state must prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the parent is unfit.”  In re Nicole B., 703 A.2d 612, 615 (R.I. 1997).   Once a
parent has been adjudicated unfit, “the balance shifts so that the ‘best interests of the child outweigh all
other considerations.’”  Id. (quoting In re Kristen B., 558 A.2d 200, 203 (R.I. 1989)).  In reviewing the
ruling of the Family Court, we must examine the record to determine whether legally competent
evidence exists to support the trial justice’s findings.                                                       “A Family Court justice’s findings are entitled to
great weight and will not be disturbed absent a showing that the trial justice was clearly wrong or that
material evidence was overlooked or misconceived.”  In re Nicole B., 703 A.2d at 615.
In its petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights, pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 15-7-7, DCYF
alleged that respondent was unfit for three reasons:                                                           (1)   because of the previous terminations of her
parental rights to her other children, id. at (a)(2)(iv), (2) because of respondent’s emotional illness,
mental illness, or mental deficiency, id. at                                                                   (a)(2)(i), and (3) because of allegations that respondent
abandoned or deserted the child, id. at (a)(4).   The trial justice granted the petition on the basis of the
first two allegations, and denied and dismissed the third allegation because DCYF had not proven by
clear and convincing evidence that respondent had abandoned or deserted the child.   Accordingly, we
will examine the propriety of the termination of parental rights on the basis of the first two allegations.
Pursuant to the Termination of

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