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Supreme Court No. 2005-255-Appeal. (PC 03-2155)

Marguerite Andreoni et al. v. Aaron Ainsworth et al.

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Present: Williams, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Suttell, and Robinson, JJ. OPINION Chief Justice Williams, for the Court. In this negligence suit stemming from an automobile accident, the plaintiffs, Marguerite Andreoni (Marguerite), Lauren Andreoni (Lauren), and Candace Dufresne (Candace) (collectively plaintiffs), appeal from an entry of summary judgment in the Superior Court in favor of two of the defendants, Carolyn Ainsworth (Carolyn) and Volvo Finance North America (Volvo) (collectively defendants). This case came before the Supreme Court for oral argument on March 1, 2006, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not summarily be decided. After hearing the arguments of counsel and examining the memoranda filed by the parties, we are of the opinion that this appeal may be decided at this time, without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we reverse the entry of summary judgment.

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I Facts and Travel On February 16, 2001, at the intersection of Dorrance and Washington Streets in Providence, an automobile operated by Aaron Ainsworth (Aaron),1 the son of Carolyn, collided with another automobile owned by Marguerite and operated by Lauren, in which Candace was a passenger. The automobile operated by Aaron was owned by Volvo and leased to Carolyn, who registered it in her name.2 The plaintiffs brought suit against defendants asserting that Aaron's negligent operation of the automobile caused property damage to Marguerite's car and physical injuries to both Lauren and Candace. Pointing to Carolyn's deposition testimony and a sworn affidavit, in which Carolyn stated that Aaron did not have her permission to use her leased automobile, defendants moved for summary judgment. The motion justice characterized Carolyn's assertion that Aaron used her automobile without permission as "insistent and consistent," and he found fault with plaintiffs' failure to locate and depose Aaron in order to contradict his mother's statements, or to make a motion pursuant to Rule 56(f) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. In opposition to defendants' motion, plaintiffs argued first that Carolyn had given Aaron implied consent to use the car, and second, that plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case of consent pursuant to a Rhode Island statute because the automobile was registered in Carolyn's name.

Aaron Ainsworth is also a named defendant in this dispute. The Superior Court entered default against him after he failed to answer plaintiffs' complaint and, therefore, he is not a party to this appeal. 2 Although the record appears to be silent on this precise fact, it is uncontroverted that the automobile in question was leased to Carolyn. At oral argument before this Court, defendants did not contest the fact that the automobile was registered in Carolyn's name. See infra note 4. -2-

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The motion justice granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, finding that plaintiffs had failed to create an issue of fact as to whether Aaron had permission to use Carolyn's automobile. The plaintiffs now appeal. II Analysis "This Court reviews the granting of summary judgment de novo and applies the same standards as the motion justice." DeCamp v. Dollar Tree Stores, Inc., 875 A.2d 13, 20 (R.I. 2005). "The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as matter of law." Super. R. Civ. P. 56(c). As we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, that party must demonstrate "`by competent evidence the existence of a disputed material issue of fact and cannot rest on allegations or denials in the pleadings or on conclusions or legal opinions.'" DeCamp, 875 A.2d at 20. Contesting the motion justice's entry of summary judgment, plaintiffs ground their appeal on the statutory language of G.L. 1956

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