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Supreme Court No. 2011-327-Appeal. (NM 10-412)

Miguel Camacho v. State of Rhode Island.

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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Tel. 222-3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is published.

Supreme Court No. 2011-327-Appeal. (NM 10-412) Miguel Camacho v. State of Rhode Island. : : :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ. OPINION Justice Flaherty, for the Court. Miguel Camacho appeals to this Court from the Superior Court's denial of his application for postconviction relief. Camacho previously was convicted of two counts of second-degree child molestation. Before this Court, Camacho

contends that his application for postconviction relief should have been granted based on an unconstitutional and insufficient colloquy at his plea hearing. This case came before the

Supreme Court on December 5, 2012, pursuant to an order directing the parties to show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not summarily be decided. After considering the parties' written and oral submissions and after reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been shown and that this case may be decided without further briefing or argument. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court denying the application for postconviction relief.

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I Facts and Travel On November 30, 1989, Camacho was indicted on two counts of second-degree child molestation. On January 15, 1991, he was found guilty by a jury on both charges, and he was sentenced to twelve years, with six years to serve and six years suspended, with probation. Camacho appealed his conviction to this Court, and on December 18, 1992, in an unpublished order we vacated the convictions, holding that the state had attempted to influence or intimidate witnesses. The case was remanded to the Newport County Superior Court for a new trial. However, instead of proceeding with a new trial, applicant entered an Alford plea 1 on June 4, 1993, to both of the indictment's counts of second-degree child molestation. The trial justice2 sentenced applicant to the same sentence he received at the trial: twelve years, with six years to serve and six years suspended, with probation. 3 On July 23, 2010, more than seventeen years after entering the Alford plea, Camacho filed an application for postconviction relief, seeking to vacate his plea and his sentence based on what he alleged was a plea colloquy that failed to satisfy constitutional mandates and on Rule 11 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. 4 Specifically, he argued that he was not fully

Under the holding in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 (1970), a court may accept a defendant's plea of guilty or nolo contendere if the court is satisfied that there is enough factual evidence to support a verdict. 2 For clarity, we will refer to the judge who presided over applicant's trial as the "trial justice," and the judge who heard applicant's motion for postconviction relief as the "postconvictionrelief justice." 3 The applicant was credited for the time already served, satisfying the six-year sentence to serve. 4 Rule 11 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that "[a] defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept such plea or a plea of nolo contendere without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of -2-

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apprised of the charges against him because the prosecutor and trial justice omitted both important facts and elements of the charges to which he was pleading. As a result of those omissions, he alleged that the trial justice could not have been satisfied that his plea was made voluntarily and intelligently, and the trial justice never received an assurance that Camacho actually understood the charges against him. The state responded that there was sufficient evidence to support a conclusion that applicant understood both the nature of the charges and the consequence of the plea. The applicant waived an evidentiary hearing on his postconviction-relief application, and on May 20, 2011, oral arguments were heard in the Superior Court. Relying on the parties' memoranda, arguments, and the record, the postconviction-relief justice issued a decision, dated August 3, 2011. When considering applicant's argument that there was no mention of two of the elements of second-degree child molestation, the postconviction-relief justice found that the mere absence of these two elements did not in and of itself undermine the validity of the plea. He articulated that the proper standard to review a plea's validity was the totality of the circumstances; and, after a review of the record, he concluded that there was a sufficient factual and legal basis to find that applicant's plea was voluntary and intelligent and that he understood the nature of the charges against him. On August 22, 2010, applicant timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court. Before this Court, applicant argues that the postconviction-relief justice violated his state and federal

the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea. If a defendant refuses to plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea of guilty or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty. The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea." -3-

constitutional rights to due process, as well as Rule 11, by ruling that applicant had entered his plea knowingly and by accepting insufficient facts to support the charges. II Standard of Review "General Laws 1956

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