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Supreme Court
No. 2010-218-Appeal.
(PM 09-108)
Randy Anderson                                                        :
v.                                                                    :
State of Rhode Island.                                                :
NOTICE:    This  opinion  is  subject  to  formal  revision  before
publication in the Rhode Island Reporter.  Readers are requested to
notify  the  Opinion  Analyst,  Supreme  Court  of  Rhode  Island,
250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone
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corrections may be made before the opinion is published.




Supreme Court
No. 2010-218-Appeal.
(PM 09-108)
Randy Anderson                                                                                          :
v.                                                                                                      :
State of Rhode Island.                                                                                  :
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
O P I N I O N
Justice Indeglia, for the Court.   Randy Anderson (Anderson or applicant) appeals from
a judgment of the Superior Court dismissing his application for postconviction relief.  On appeal,
Anderson contends that the hearing justice erred by  (1) deeming his claim of prosecutorial
misconduct to be procedurally barred; (2) finding no discovery violation on the part of the state
for failing to produce certain medical records; and (3) determining that the medical records
would have been “of little or no value to the factfinder in the context of [Anderson’s] trial.”  This
case came before the Supreme Court for oral argument on January 24, 2012, pursuant to an order
directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be
summarily decided.   After carefully considering the written and oral submissions of the parties,
we are satisfied that this appeal may be resolved without further briefing or argument.1   For the
reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.
1 We note that, at the conclusion of oral argument on this matter, Anderson’s counsel requested
that his appeal be assigned for full argument and briefing.
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I
Facts and Travel
In 1981, Anderson pled nolo contendere to charges of robbery, breaking and entering,
and assault on a person over the age of sixty in Superior Court case number W1/81-138A, for
which he was sentenced to thirty years, twelve years to serve and eighteen years suspended, with
probation.   Following his release from incarceration, Anderson was arrested and charged with
first-degree child molestation stemming from incidents alleged to have occurred in February and
March 1995.2   As a result of this arrest, Anderson was presented in May 1995 as a purported
violator of his probation imposed in the 1981 case.   Over a three-day violation hearing held in
June 1995, the complaining witness testified to three incidents of alleged sexual molestation.
During the hearing, the prosecutor, in a sidebar discussion that was on the record, informed the
hearing justice and defense counsel that the complaining witness had just informed the state that
“she [underwent] a physical exam” that produced “no evidence of scarring or damage to the
areas that the [s]tate [alleged] there was a criminal offense.”3   The prosecutor explained that he
did not have the reports, given the recentness of the complaining witness’s disclosure.4   After
that hearing, Anderson was found to be a violator of his probation, which adjudication was
upheld by this Court in State v. Anderson, 705 A.2d 996 (R.I. 1997) (mem.).
In October 1998, following a Superior Court jury trial on the underlying first-degree child
molestation charges, Anderson was convicted on one count of fellatio and acquitted on one count
2 Ultimately, Anderson was indicted on two counts of first-degree child molestation based on
allegations of forced fellatio and digital penetration.
3 The record reveals that the medical examination at issue was completed on June 15, 1995, at
Women  &  Infants  Hospital,  three to four months  after the time period during  which the
complaining witness alleged that Anderson had molested her.
4 It is the state’s alleged failure to disclose to Anderson, prior to trial, the medical records
referred to during the sidebar that forms the foundation of this appeal.
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involving digital penetration.   Anderson moved for a new trial on his conviction, which was
denied on October 30, 1998.  Thereafter, he was sentenced to fifty years, thirty years to serve and
twenty  years  suspended.    He  also  received  an  additional  ten-year  sentence  upon  being
adjudicated as a habitual offender pursuant to G.L.  1956  §  12-19-21.    This Court upheld
Anderson’s conviction on June 8, 2000, in State v. Anderson, 752 A.2d 946 (R.I. 2000).
Soon after this Court affirmed his conviction, Anderson petitioned the Superior Court for
postconviction  relief,  alleging  the  ineffective  assistance  of  his  counsel  during  trial.5    He
contended that his defense counsel was ineffective by failing, inter alia, to locate the complaining
witness’s medical records concerning the physical examination to which the prosecution alluded
at Anderson’s violation hearing.6   In his postconviction-relief application, Anderson claimed the
records would have shown that no evidence existed of any physical injury to the complaining
witness.                                                                                                   “The hearing justice, who also was the trial justice, denied the petition on the ground
that Anderson had failed to satisfy the requirements of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 *
* * (1984).”7   Anderson v. State, 878 A.2d 1049, 1049 (R.I. 2005) (mem.).   In regard to the
5 Anderson’s first application for postconviction relief was denied by the Superior Court without
a hearing.   On appeal, this Court remanded the case for further proceedings in accordance with
Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000), which proceedings took place in June 2003. After a
hearing on the matter, the Superior Court again denied Anderson’s application.
6 Additionally, Anderson contended that his trial attorney failed to (1) request records from the
Department of Children, Youth and Families;  (2) fully exploit opportunities to impeach the
complaining witness’s credibility; and (3) object, on hearsay grounds, to the testimony of another
witness.   Anderson further “contended that defense counsel should have moved to admit, as a
full exhibit, a page of the [complaining witness’s] police statement, which had been edited by a
police officer.”  Anderson v. State, 878 A.2d 1049, 1049 (R.I. 2005) (mem.).
7 This Court implements the two-prong test set forth by the United States Supreme Court in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), when assessing whether an applicant should be
granted relief from a conviction because of ineffective assistance of counsel.   See Page v. State,
995 A.2d 934, 942 (R.I. 2010).                                                                             “To satisfy this two-part inquiry, an applicant must prove that:
‘(1) counsel’s performance was deficient and  (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense.’”   Brown v. State, 32 A.3d 901, 904 n.3 (R.I. 2011) (quoting Torres v. State, 19 A.3d
71, 76 (R.I. 2011)).
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medical records, the hearing justice found that the probative value of such records “prepared a
month  after  the  incident,  offered  to  prove  that  no  molestation  had  occurred,  was            ‘highly
speculative.’”  Id. at 1050.8  The hearing justice also “pointed to the acquittal on one count of the
indictment as testament to the effective representation that defendant received at trial.”   Id.   On
appeal, this Court affirmed the Superior Court’s order denying Anderson’s application for
postconviction relief.  See id.
In September 2001, during the pendency of his first postconviction-relief application,
Anderson filed an additional application for postconviction relief, this time in regard to his
probation violation.   In that application, he alleged ineffective assistance rendered by his counsel
during his probation-violation hearing in 1995.   Specifically, he argued that his counsel was
ineffective for his lack of effort “to continue the [violation hearing] and seek [a] subpoena for the
medical records in [his] case, rather than relying on the statement of the [s]tate’s counsel at the
time that the medical records indicated no apparent evidence of trauma.”   Because the medical
records indicated what Anderson alleged to be “physiological evidence that could have been
helpful  to                                                                                             [the]     [c]ourt  in  deciding  the  matter  of  the  violation  proceeding[,]”  Anderson
maintained that his counsel’s failure to “investigate [the reports] and produce [them] in court”
amounted to ineffective assistance and not “trial strategy.”   That application for postconviction
relief was likewise denied by the Superior Court in February 2008.9
8 We note that the medical records at issue were, in fact, prepared approximately three months
after the alleged molestations.
9 The Superior Court docket sheet in Anderson’s postconviction-relief case challenging his
probation violation indicates that a timely notice of appeal was filed on February 13, 2008.   That
appeal, however, appears to have been withdrawn since then.
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On July 25, 2005, Anderson filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254, with the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island.10   In his
petition,  Anderson  challenged  his  conviction  based  on  the  alleged  denial  of  his  Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.   The district court ordered the state to file copies of transcripts for
three  prior  state  court  proceedings,  including  Anderson’s  trial;  and,  after  reviewing  those
transcripts,  in  conjunction  with  the  parties’  arguments,  recommended  that  the  petition  be
dismissed with prejudice as lacking legal merit.   See Anderson v. A.T. Wall¸ 2006 WL 1451555
(D.R.I. May 22, 2006).
Undiscouraged by the results in all relevant appeals, the denials of his prior applications
for postconviction relief, and the dismissal of his habeas corpus petition, Anderson filed the
present  postconviction-relief  application  on  January                                                 8,   2009,  in  Superior  Court.    In  this
application, Anderson alleged that the state possessed the June 1995 medical records regarding
the complaining witness’s physical examination, but had deliberately failed to provide them to
trial counsel in response to pretrial requests for discovery under Rule 16(a)(5) of the Superior
Court Rules of Criminal Procedure11 and for exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 373
10 Anderson set forth six grounds upon which he contended that his trial counsel was deficient,
one of which involved his claim that his counsel failed to obtain the medical records here at
issue.
11 Rule 16(a)(5) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
“(a)  Discovery  by  Defendant.  Upon  written  request  by  a
defendant, the attorney for the State shall permit the defendant to
inspect or listen to and copy or photograph any of the following
items within the possession, custody, or control of the State, the
existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence
may become known to the attorney for the State:
“* * *
“(5)  all  results  or  reports  in  writing,  or  copies  thereof,  of
physical  or  mental  examinations,  and  of  scientific  tests  or
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U.S.  83  (1963).12    In response to Anderson’s allegations,13 the state, in its memorandum,
maintained  that  G.L.                                                                                1956  §  10-9.1-814  served  as  a  procedural  bar  to  his  prosecutorial-
misconduct claim because this issue could, and should, have been raised in his first application
for postconviction relief.   The state further argued that Anderson failed to show that the medical
records in question would have had an effect on the outcome of the trial.
A hearing on the instant postconviction-relief application occurred on May 17, 2010.   At
that hearing, Anderson argued that his claim was not barred by § 10-9.1-8 because the state’s
alleged withholding of the medical records was a clear discovery violation that fell within the
statute’s exception for permitting claims to proceed “in the interest of justice.”   According to
Anderson, he did not receive the June 1995 medical records until November 2006, at which time
experiments  made  in  connection  with  the  particular  case  and,
subject to an appropriate protective order under paragraph (f), any
tangible objects still in existence that were the subject of such tests
or experiments[.]”
12 “In addition to the requirements imposed by Rule 16 and this Court’s rulings as to discovery
obligations, the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 * * * (1963), and its progeny,
‘requires that the state provide a criminal defendant with certain information.’”   DeCiantis v.
State, 24 A.3d 557, 570 (R.I. 2011) (quoting State v. McManus, 941 A.2d 222, 229 (R.I. 2008)).
“In accordance with Brady, if a prosecutor has suppressed evidence that would be favorable to
the accused and the evidence is material to guilt or punishment, the defendant’s due-process
rights have been violated and a new trial must be granted.”   Id. (quoting McManus, 941 A.2d at
229-30).
13 Prior to appointment of counsel, Anderson had also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel in
his postconviction-relief application; however, that claim was not pursued in the Superior Court.
14 General Laws 1956 § 10-9.1-8 reads as follows:
“All grounds for relief available to an applicant at the time he or
she commences a proceeding under this chapter must be raised in
his or her original, or a supplemental or amended, application. Any
ground  finally  adjudicated  or  not  so  raised,  or  knowingly,
voluntarily and intelligently waived in the proceeding that resulted
in  the  conviction  or  sentence  or  in  any  other  proceeding  the
applicant has taken to secure relief, may not be the basis for a
subsequent application, unless the court finds that in the interest of
justice the applicant should be permitted to assert such a ground
for relief.”
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Anderson was able to view them and discern that the records revealed evidence that Anderson
contended was “relevant and exculpatory.”   At the hearing, Anderson’s counsel explained that
the medical records indicated
“that not only was [sic] there no injuries, there was no tearing or
cuts in her vagina, no evidence of any kind of trauma; that her
hymen was still intact; that she could not even tolerate the internal
exam given to her by Women & Infants’ Hospital; that she had
indicated to Women & Infants’ Hospital way back in 1995 that she
was sexually active. She indicated that her means of birth control
was  using  condoms.  Both  those  situations  would  be  factual
situations one could infer she was in fact at that point in time
maybe even a virgin, even though claiming to be sexually active
and using condoms.”
Anderson argued that, had his trial counsel known of the specific details contained in the medical
reports, “it would have affected his preparation and it would have affected his strategy during the
course of  [the] trial.”   Pointing to his acquittal on the digital penetration charge, Anderson
contended that the jury had relied largely on the credibility of witnesses and that the medical
records were significantly relevant to the complaining witness’s overall credibility.    Thus,
Anderson argued, under Brady and Rule 16, the state erred in withholding the medical records
from him during the trial.
At the hearing, the state countered that at no time did it deliberately fail to turn over
medical records in its possession, despite the fact that the state had been aware of the physical
examination.   The state emphasized that every attorney who had represented Anderson since
1995 had also been aware of the existence of the records.   Additionally, the state recounted the
Superior Court’s previous encounter with the medical-records issue with respect to Anderson’s
first application for postconviction relief.   At that time, the hearing justice had noted the “highly
speculative” nature of the physical examination of the complaining witness given its occurrence
three months after the alleged molestation.   Lastly, the state maintained that, because Anderson
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had the opportunity to raise his claim of prosecutorial misconduct in connection with his earlier
application for postconviction relief, but failed to do so, his claim was barred in accordance with
§ 10-9.1-8.
In a bench decision rendered immediately after the hearing, the hearing justice denied
Anderson’s application for postconviction relief.   Noting that, in his view, “[n]obody has had
more bites at the jurisdictional apple than Randy Anderson[,]” the hearing justice “renew[ed] the
sentiment” previously expressed by both the Superior Court and this Court that the “records were
medically stale.”   He further articulated that, “under no stretch of the most elastic and fertile
imagination, would [the] records have had any substantial or significant bearing” on the outcome
of Anderson’s trial.   The hearing justice determined that any failure to produce the medical
records was not deliberate in nature and thus “not a Wyche type of failure.”15   Citing the United
States Supreme Court’s holding in Strickler v. Green, 527 U.S. 263 (1999), the hearing justice
also concluded that the state’s nondisclosure did not rise to the level of such seriousness that
there  was                                                                                            “a  reasonable  probability that  the  suppressed  evidence  would  have  produced  a
different verdict.”   Id. at 281. The hearing justice recounted Anderson’s acquittal of the digital
penetration charge and found that the medical records would have been “of little or no value to a
factfinder in the context of [Anderson’s] trial.” Given the absence of prejudice to Anderson, the
15 The hearing justice was citing to this Court’s opinion in State v. Wyche, 518 A.2d 907 (R.I.
1986), in which we held that
“[w]hen the failure to disclose is deliberate, this [C]ourt will not
concern itself with the degree of harm caused to the defendant by
the prosecution's misconduct; we shall simply grant the defendant
a new trial. * * * The prosecution acts deliberately when it makes
‘a considered decision to suppress * * * for the very purpose of
obstructing’ or where it fails  ‘to disclose evidence whose high
value to the defense could not have escaped * * * [its] attention.’”
Id. at 910 (quoting United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 146-47
(2nd Cir. 1968)).
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hearing justice found that the nondisclosure of the medical records did not constitute a violation
of Brady.
In coming to  his decision denying Anderson’s  postconviction-relief application, the
hearing  justice  also  considered  whether  the  medical  records  constituted  newly-discovered
evidence.     Deeming  the  records  as  discoverable  since                                         1995,   “merely  cumulative  and
impeaching[,]” and unlikely to have changed the verdict at trial, the hearing justice rejected the
notion that the medical records could have been considered newly-discovered.16   Lastly, the
hearing justice determined that Anderson’s prosecutorial-misconduct claim “should have been
raised a long time ago in a prior post-conviction relief application.”
Final  judgment  was  entered  on  May                                                               17,     2010,  denying  the  postconviction-relief
application.  Anderson filed a timely notice of appeal on May 19, 2010.
II
Issues on Appeal
Anderson advances three issues on appeal.   He first contends that the trial justice erred in
finding his prosecutorial-misconduct claim to be barred.   Anderson argues that he did not obtain
the medical records until 2006 (after his first application) and that the information was thus not
previously  “available” to him.17    Second, Anderson maintains that the trial justice erred in
determining that the state’s failure to produce the medical records did not constitute a discovery
violation.   Lastly, Anderson contends that the trial justice erred in concluding that the medical
16 On appeal, Anderson does not contend that the medical records meet the standard for newly-
discovered evidence.   See Reise v. State, 913 A.2d 1052, 1056 (R.I. 2007) (outlining the test
employed by Rhode Island courts in granting a new trial based on newly discovered evidence).
17 We note that in his appellate materials, Anderson shies away from his “interest of justice”
contention proffered at the postconviction-relief hearing and instead argues that the grounds
upon which he bases his present claim were not “available” to him at the time he filed his first
application.
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records would have been  “of little or no value to a factfinder in the context of [his] trial,”
because  the  medical  records  would  have  gone  to  undermining  the  complaining  witness’s
credibility.18
III
Standard of Review
“The postconviction remedy, set forth in G.L. 1956 § 10-9.1-1, provides that ‘one who
has been convicted of a crime may seek collateral review of that conviction based on alleged
violations of his or her constitutional rights.’”   Rice v. State, 38 A.3d 9, 16 (R.I. 2012) (quoting
Lynch v. State, 13 A.3d 603, 605 (R.I. 2011)).  This Court will not impinge upon the fact-finding
function of a hearing justice in reviewing an application for postconviction relief “absent clear
error or a showing that the [hearing] justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence in
arriving at those findings.”   Chapdelaine v. State, 32 A.3d 937, 941 (R.I. 2011) (quoting Gordon
v. State, 18 A.3d 467, 473 (R.I. 2011)).                                                                “However, when a decision regarding postconviction
relief ‘involv[es] questions of fact or mixed questions of law and fact pertaining to an alleged
violation of an applicant’s constitutional rights,’ this Court’s standard of review is de novo.”
State v. Laurence, 18 A.3d 512, 521 (R.I. 2011) (quoting Washington v. State, 989 A.2d 94, 98
(R.I.                                                                                                   2010)).  Nonetheless,                                “[e]ven  when  the  de  novo  standard  is  applied  to  issues  of
constitutional dimension, we still accord a hearing justice’s findings of historical fact, and
inferences drawn from those facts, great deference in conducting our review.”   Rice, 38 A.3d at
18 Specifically, Anderson maintains that because the medical records indicated “no evidence of
trauma by visual inspection” and that the complaining witness was  “unable to tolerate  [an]
internal exam,” the records could have been used to significantly undermine the complaining
witness’s credibility at trial by revealing inconsistencies in prior statements about her sexual
history.   We note that the medical records also say that the complaining witness “states [the]
alleged incident occurred 3/95. It is now 6/95 and any injuries that would have occurred at that
time would have healed by this time.”
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16                                                                                                        (quoting  Laurence,                                                       18  A.3d  at   521).   “An  applicant  who  files  an  application  for
postconviction relief bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that such
relief is warranted.”  Mattatall v. State, 947 A.2d 896, 901 n.7 (R.I. 2008).
IV
Discussion
Before this Court can consider the merits of Anderson’s postconviction-relief claims, we
must first determine whether his claims are procedurally precluded pursuant to § 10-9.1-8, as
proffered by the state.                                                                                   “Section 10-9.1-8, which codifies * * * the doctrine of res judicata
within the postconviction-relief context, bars ‘relitigation of the same issues between the same
parties’ after a final judgment has entered in a prior proceeding.”   Brown v. State, 32 A.3d 901,
910 (R.I. 2011) (quoting Figueroa v. State, 897 A.2d 55, 56 (R.I. 2006) (mem.)).                          “An applicant
is likewise precluded from raising new issues in a subsequent application, where such issues
were not set forth in the first postconviction-relief application, and the applicant fails to establish
a reason why his or her claims could not have been presented initially.”   Id. (citing Ramirez v.
State, 933 A.2d 1110, 1112 (R.I. 2007)).                                                                  “Under § 10-9.1-8, an applicant is permitted to assert
an otherwise estopped ground for relief only if it is in the ‘interest of justice.’”   Ferrell v. Wall,
971 A.2d 615, 621 (R.I. 2009).
On appeal, Anderson avers that his claim of prosecutorial misconduct is not precluded
because the medical records at issue were not  “available” to him until  2006, when he first
“discovered  the  extent  of  relevant,  exculpatory  information  those  records  contained.”    In
asserting this argument, Anderson relies on the language of § 10-9.1-8 that bars “[a]ll grounds
for relief available to an applicant at the time he or she commences a [postconviction-relief]
proceeding”  that  are  not                                                                               “raised  in  his  or  her  original,  or  a  supplemental  or  amended,
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application.”                                                                                          (Emphasis added.)   Because his first postconviction-relief application was denied
in 2000, Anderson contends this particular ground for relief was not “available” to him at the
time he filed that application, as contemplated by the postconviction-relief statute.
However, upon review of Anderson’s application, the hearing justice found otherwise,
noting that Anderson had “notice” of the medical records in 1995 and “that the defense, through
different counsel” had known about the documents since that time.   Our review of the record
brings  us  to  the  same  conclusion—that  the  grounds  upon  which  Anderson  constructs  his
prosecutorial-misconduct claim were certainly “available” to him at the time he commenced his
first postconviction-relief proceeding.   Although Anderson did not actually view the medical
records until 2006, the records’ existence—as well as the fact that the records concerned the
complaining witness’s physical examination—was made known to Anderson’s defense counsel
at the probation violation hearing in June 1995.   At no time between the violation hearing in
1995  and Anderson’s trial in  1998 did either party procure the medical records from the
hospital.19   Moreover, in Anderson’s first application for postconviction relief, filed in 2000, he
proffered an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim premised specifically on his trial counsel’s
alleged failure “to locate the [complaining witness’s] medical records, which [Anderson] claimed
would show no evidence of any physical injury to the [complaining witness].”   Anderson, 878
A.2d at 1049.   Notably, the same claim was also presented in his collateral postconviction-relief
application filed in                                                                                   2001 in connection with his representation in the June  1995 probation
violation hearing.    Undoubtedly, because Anderson was capable of asserting an ineffective-
assistance-of-counsel claim stemming from the non-procurement of the medical records in his
19 As asserted during the postconviction-relief hearing on the application presently before the
Court, the state apparently did not procure or possess the medical records  after notifying
Anderson’s counsel at the violation hearing of the complaining witness’s physical examination at
the hospital.
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first postconviction-relief application filed over a decade ago, he was likewise able to set forth a
claim based on the alternative theory that the prosecution failed to produce the records for trial.
Thus, this Court concludes that Anderson’s prosecutorial-misconduct claim could have,
and should have, been raised in his first postconviction-relief proceeding.                               “Under § 10-9.1-8,
parties cannot bring forth new claims in subsequent applications that could have been, but were
not, raised in the first postconviction-relief application—absent an ‘interest of justice’ showing.”
Ramirez,  933 A.2d at  1112.    Our review reveals that Anderson has failed to make such a
showing here.   He offers this Court not one passable reason as to why this challenge could not
have been raised in connection with his previous postconviction-relief application, particularly in
light of his prior counsels’ notice of the records’ existence and his previous allegations of
deficient assistance by trial counsel for not procuring the same records.  See Miguel v. State, 924
A.2d 3, 4-5 (R.I. 2007) (mem.); State v. DeCiantis, 813 A.2d 986, 993 (R.I. 2003).   His neglect
to raise this allegation at that point “results in a bar to the litigation of that issue and that claim
for relief.”  Ferrell, 971 A.2d at 621.
Additionally,  we  view  Anderson’s  attempt  to  distinguish  his  present  theory  of  the
medical records’ significance (impeachment of the complaining witness’s credibility) from the
theory posited in his first postconviction-relief application (physiological evidence of no trauma)
as guilefully futile.   Both of his theories are rooted in what was known to Anderson as early as
1995—that the physical examination produced no evidence of trauma.   This Court has held that
an applicant for postconviction relief cannot evade the preclusive effects of res judicata upon a
successive claim simply by presenting the same issue under an alternate theory.   See Carillo v.
Moran,  463  A.2d  178,  182  (R.I.  1983).    Accordingly, we deem  Anderson’s  allegation of
prosecutorial misconduct to be barred under § 10-9.1-8 as a matter of law.
- 13 -




Based on our conclusion that Anderson’s allegation of prosecutorial misconduct is barred
under § 10-9.1-8, we need not address whether that claim had any possible merit.   However, we
would be inclined to agree with the hearing justice’s findings that the medical records would
have been “of little or no value to a factfinder in the context of [Anderson’s] trial” given the
“medically[-]stale”  nature  of  the  records,  as  well  as  Anderson’s  acquittal  on  the  digital-
penetration charge asserted against him.20   Furthermore, the record indicates that the state never
possessed the medical records nor deliberately failed to produce the reports.   Cf. State v. Adams,
481 A.2d 718, 724 (R.I. 1984) (expert’s report referring to a bite mark, and a cast taken thereof,
was a relevant and material element of the state’s case, and nondisclosure of report and cast to
defense was deliberate despite state’s original intent to use neither at trial).   Thus, this Court
concurs with the hearing justice’s determination that no violation of either Rule 16 or Brady
occurred as alleged by the applicant.
V
Conclusion
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.  The
record shall be remanded to the Superior Court.
20 This Court has previously recognized that Anderson
“was represented at trial by a highly skilled and respected court-
appointed lawyer, who undertook a lengthy and pointed cross-
examination of the complaining witness spanning more than 100
pages of trial transcript. Notwithstanding this advocacy, the jury
chose to believe the complainant and returned a verdict of guilty
on one of two counts.”  Anderson, 878 A.2d at 1050.
- 14 -




RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT CLERK’S OFFICE
Clerk’s Office Order/Opinion Cover Sheet
TITLE OF CASE:                                          Randy Anderson v. State of Rhode Island.
CASE NO:                                                No. 2010-218-Appeal.
                                                        (PM 09-108)
COURT:                                                  Supreme Court
DATE OPINION FILED:   June 27, 2012
JUSTICES:                                               Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia JJ.
WRITTEN BY:                                             Associate Justice Gilbert V. Indeglia
SOURCE OF APPEAL:    Providence County Superior Court
JUDGE FROM LOWER COURT:
Associate Justice Robert D. Krause
ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL:
For Applicant:    Catherine Gibran
Office of the Public Defender
For State:  Virginia M. McGinn
Department of Attorney General

Download 10-218.pdf

Rhode Island Law