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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
Filed - October 21, 2010
WASHINGTON, SC.                                                                                               SUPERIOR COURT
STATE OF RHODE ISLAND                                                                                         :
:
VS.                                                                                                           :                NO.  W1-1996-0595
:
CHRISTOPHER THORNTON                                                                                          :
DECISION
GALE, J.       Christopher Thornton  (Thornton), currently serving a lengthy prison term for
heinous crimes committed over fourteen years ago, is again back before this Court seeking
redress.   His pro se pleadings are in the nature of a Motion for a New Trial based on newly
discovered evidence.
This Court appointed Kenneth C. Vale, Esq. to represent Thornton in the pending matter.
In his pleadings and hearing arguments made on behalf of Thornton, Attorney Vale terms his
client’s  current  request  as  a  successive  application  or  petition  for  post  conviction  relief.
Accordingly, this Court will analyze this matter as both a Motion for New Trial under Super. R.
Crim. P. 33 and an application for post conviction relief governed by G.L. 1956 § 10-9.1-1, et.
seq.   The essence of Thornton’s claim for relief is his assertion that the prosecution failed to
honor its Super R. Crim. P. 161 discovery obligations by failing to provide him2 the victim
impact statements of Debra Means (Debra) and Diane Sullivan (Diane), both whom testified at
trial.
1 Super. R. Crim. P. 16 is to be interpreted liberally. See State. v. Stravato, 935 A.2d 948 (R.I. 2007).
2 Thornton represented himself at trial but had stand-by counsel, Anthony F. Amalfetano, Esq., with whom he
consulted on many occasions.
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Travel
Some six years prior to the June 1996 events which gave rise to his prosecution in the
instant case,   Thornton had been engaged in a relationship with Debra from which, a daughter,
Amy,3 was born.   Debra also has a son, Adam,4 from an earlier relationship.   The relationship
between Thornton and Debra was described as having been a tumultuous one during which he
had beaten her.   Shortly before the events giving rise to this prosecution, Debra broke off the
relationship and obtained a no-contact order against Thornton. However, he was permitted to
visit his daughter, Amy.   On the afternoon of June 18, 1996, Thornton unexpectedly walked into
Debra’s apartment with a knife having a blade at least ten inches long.   This incursion into
Debra’s apartment led to a fourteen hour standoff with the Narragansett Police.   During this
standoff, Thornton punched Debra in the face, knocking out her front teeth. He stabbed her four
times, twice in the side, once in the back, and once in the arm.   Also during the standoff, when
Diane, Amy’s babysitter, called Debra, Thornton threatened to kill her if she testified and he had
to go to jail.
On September 23, 1996, a Washington County grand jury indicted Thornton, charging
him with ten offenses stemming from the June 18-19, 1996 incident at Debra’s apartment.   He
was charged with first degree sexual assault of Debra  (Count  1); assault with a dangerous
weapon in a dwelling (Count 2); assault with a dangerous weapon (Count 3); assault with the
intent to murder Debra (Count 4); assault resulting in serious bodily injury (Count 5); breaking
and entering a dwelling without consent of Debra (Count 6); violation of no-contact order (Count
3 This is not the child’s real name.
4 This is not the child’s real name.
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7); kidnapping Debra (Count 8); intimidating a witness (Count 9); and kidnapping Amy (Count
10).
Thornton’s  trial  before  a  Washington  County  Superior  Court  jury  took  place  on
December  2-5,  1997.    On December  8, the jury returned its verdicts on the nine charges
submitted to it.5   The jury found Thornton guilty on Count 3 (felony assault with a dangerous
weapon); Count 5 (felony assault resulting in serious bodily injury); Count 7 (violation of no-
contact order; Count 8 (kidnapping Debra); and Count 9 (intimidating a witness).   He was found
not guilty on Count 1 (first degree sexual assault of Debra); Count 2 (assault with a dangerous
weapon in a dwelling); Count  4  (assault with the intent to murder Debra); and Count  10
(kidnapping Amy).
After sentences were imposed, Thornton timely appealed.    In his direct appeal, he
asserted that: (1) the trial justice erred in permitting him to waive his right to counsel without
first determining whether such waiver was knowingly and intelligent; (2) the trial justice unduly
impaired his right of self-representation; (3) the trial justice erred in precluding admission of
defense evidence that allegedly would have supported his diminished capacity defense; and (4)
the trial justice erred in permitting introduction of past incidents of misconduct by Thornton
during the prosecution’s cross-examination of defense expert Dr. Ronald Stewart.   Also before
the Court was the Defendant’s consolidated appeal from denial of his post-trial motion to reduce
sentence.   On June 27, 2002, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island denied the Defendant’s appeal.
See Thornton v. State, 800 A.2d 1016, 1045 (R.I. 2002).
5 At the close of the State’s case in chief, the trial justice granted the Defendant’s motion of acquittal on Count 6.
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On December 6, 2004, following his unsuccessful direct appeal, Thornton filed a pro se
application  for  post-conviction  relief  pursuant  to  G.L.                                          1956  §  10-9.1-1,  et.  seq.   In  his
application, he alleged: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) judicial error with respect to
waiver of his constitutional rights; and (3) errors in sentencing.   After he was appointed counsel,
the pertinent issues were briefed and hearings were held before another justice of this Court. That
justice  denied  Thornton’s  application.    Thornton  appealed  but  was  again  rebuffed  by  the
Supreme Court.  See Thornton v. State, 948 A.2d. at 317.
Thornton is again before the Superior Court arguing that the teachings of Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and newly discovered evidence require that he receive a new trial.
The Evidence in Question
The evidence Thornton bases both of his new claims on are two victim impact statements
filed with the Court on July 29, 1997.   One statement was written by Debra, and the other
statement was written by Diane.    Debra’s victim impact statement described her emotional
response to the events that transpired on June  18-19,  1996.   She described her fear that if
Thornton were to be released from prison he would return and kill her.   She also described her
desire to see Thornton serve a life sentence.   Debra stated that she suffered from post traumatic
stress disorder as well as depression. She further reported that her children attended counseling
sessions for “Rejuvenation” at the Women’s Resource Center.   In describing her injuries, she
stated that Thornton punched out her front teeth, inflicted three deep stab wounds to her back and
one to her elbow.   She further detailed her recovery process. By example, she reported that her
stab wounds were too old by the time she arrived at the hospital to allow closure by suture. This
resulted in a four week in-home treatment.   Moreover, she had to wear temporary teeth implants
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for six months because the oral surgeon could not implant permanent replacement teeth until the
traumatic injury to her jaw had healed.   Debra ended her statement with a description of the
pecuniary damages she suffered.
Diane’s victim impact statement only reflected her emotional response to the events that
transpired on June 18-19, 1996.  She described how she is anxious, startles easily, cries and has a
reduced appetite.    She reported two counseling sessions for crisis intervention.   Likewise, Diane
stated that she is afraid that her life would truly be at risk if Thornton were ever released from
prison and feels he is deserving of a life sentence.
The Brady Issue
Thornton’s current counsel filed an extensive memorandum with the Court, concluding
that Thornton’s claims have no merit.   Believing that the posture of the case was in the nature of
a successive application for post-conviction relief, counsel argued in a memorandum prepared
consistently with directive of Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.I. 2000), that even if the state
had failed to provide victim impact statements to Thornton, the sanctions pursuant to State v.
Stravato, 935 A.2d 948 (R.I. 2007) do not apply. See Memorandum Of Law In Support Of
Motion To Withdrawal  10-27.      In sum, counsel argues that Stravato6  established a new
procedural rule (automatic reversal of conviction and new trial required) which does not apply
retroactively to a case tried in 1997.
6 In State v. Stravato, the prosecution deliberately withheld witness impact statements from the defendant in
violation of Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure.   The court noted that where the state’s
nondisclosure is deliberate, prejudice is presumed and the defendant is entitled to a new trial.   Whether the state
acted in bad faith, or the defense may have received the same information through other means, is not determinative.
Even if the prosecution does not withhold the victim impact statement to gain a tactical advantage at trial, the effect
is to deprive the defendant of a witness statement that he is entitled to receive in discovery. See 935 A.2d 948,
951,953, 955 (R.I. 2007).
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Thornton has abandoned any claims under Stravato,  7 and bases his current claims for a
new trial on the rule of Brady v. Maryland and his “discovery” of allegedly new evidence. In
Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that  “the suppression by the prosecution of
evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is
material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecution.”
373 U.S. at 87.   The state is required to disclose information if it meets a two-part test: (1) the
information must constitute either exculpatory or impeachment evidence; and (2) it must be
material to the outcome of the case or sentencing. State v. Wyche, 518 A.2d 907, 909 (R.I.
1986).   To be material, evidence must present “a reasonable probability that, had … [it] been
disclosed to the defense, the result would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.
667, 682 (1985).
Assuming arguendo, that the victim impact statements should have been turned over to
Thornton during discovery, he would not be entitled to a new trial based on Brady because the
information  in  the  victim impact  statements was  either  immaterial  or  already  provided  in
discovery.  In  large  part  the  same  information  was  presented  to  the  jury.  Obviously,  any
information presented to the jury was heard simultaneously by Thornton. Debra’s and Diane’s
renditions of their emotional responses to the attack and ensuing standoff and their desire to see
Thornton sentenced to life in prison is neither exculpatory nor impeachment evidence.  Debra did
provide a very cursory description of her injuries in her victim impact statement. However, the
same information was provided to Thornton in the State’s Answer to Defendant’s Motion for
Discovery and Inspection.   The State provided Thornton with the transcript of Debra’s oral
statement taken in the hospital and medical reports from Dr. David Coppe and Dr. John
7 “I am not asking you to decide if Stravato applies.  I am asking you to decide the long-standing case law of the rule
of Brady v. Maryland to determine if a Rule 16 violation occurred.”   (Hr’g Morning session April 8, 2010 at 12.)
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Goldberg, all of which provided a detailed description of Debra’s wounds.  Furthermore, Debra’s
testimony at trial did not differ from the cursory description she provided in her victim impact
statement.8   Therefore, it is not reasonably probable that had the victim impact statements been
directly disclosed (in hand or by mail) to the defense, the result would have been different.
Moreover, the victim impact statements were readily available to both Thornton - who
chose to represent himself - and his standby counsel. The statements were filed with the Court
on July 29, 1997, and remain to this day in the official case file. Clearly, the state did not intend
to hide or fail to disclose them. Thornton may not choose to stick his head in the sand and then
claim to have been harmed as a result. Thornton is not entitled to a new trial based on the
teachings of Brady.
Newly Discovered Evidence
Thornton argues that the victim impact statements constitute newly discovered evidence
which should result in a new trial.     The test for whether newly discovered evidence warrants a
new trial has two prongs.   First, the evidence must be analyzed under four elements: (1) the new
evidence must have been discovered since trial; (2) even with the exercise of due diligence, the
evidence was not discoverable prior to trial; (3) the evidence must be material, and not merely
impeaching or cumulative; and (4) the evidence must be so crucial that the jury probably would
have acquitted the defendant.   State v. Luanglath, 863 A.2d 631, 639 (R.I. 2005). Second, the
trial justice then must exercise his or her independent judgment to determent whether the newly
discovered evidence is sufficiently credible to warrant vacating a jury conviction. See id.
8 “He punched me in my face and knocked my teeth out”; “I was stabbed four times . . . three in the back, and one in
the arm.” (Trial Tr. Vol. 1 at 122, 136 (Dec. 2-3, 1997)).                                                             “[P]unch[ed] out my front teeth”; “There were three deep
stab wounds to my back and one to my elbow.” (Debra Means’ Victim Impact Statement.)
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Thornton has arguably fulfilled the first element. However, he has failed as to the second,
third, and fourth elements of the first prong.   Through the exercise of due diligence, Thornton
and his standby counsel would have easily found the victim impact statements in the court file.
Not only are they present but they are clearly referenced in the Criminal Docket Sheet Report for
the case. The third element requires that the evidence be material, and not merely impeaching or
cumulative.   The information in the victim impact statements is either immaterial or merely
cumulative.  Debra’s victim impact statement describes her emotional response to the events that
transpired on June 18-19, 1996 and the pecuniary damages she sustained, neither of which is
exculpatory or impeaching.   Additionally, Debra’s victim impact statement contained a brief
description of the injuries she sustained, which did not differ from previous statements or her
trial testimony. Thus, the description of the events in question contained within the victim impact
statement is merely cumulative.   Diane’s victim impact statement merely states her emotional
response to the events that transpired on June 18-19, 1996 and is likewise not material9 .
The fourth element requires that the evidence must be so crucial that the jury probably
would have acquitted the defendant.   The victim impact statements do not provide any new
material information and what little material information they do provide was already presented
before the jury.   Thus, it is highly unlikely that the jury would have acquitted the Defendant had
these statements, or any part of them, been presented to the jury.   Because the victim impact
statements failed the first prong of the test for granting a new trial based on newly discovered
evidence, it is unnecessary for the Court to discuss the second prong of the test. Nor has
Thornton demonstrated that “there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and
9 Two other written statements were provided to the Court during the sentencing hearing. Those were “filed in open
court” and referenced repeatedly during the hearing. Accordingly, this Court finds that disclosure of these was made
to the defendant at that time.
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heard, that requires vacation of [his] conviction or sentence in the interest of justice.” G. L. 1956
§ 10-9.1-1(a) (4). To the extent that Defendant Thornton has attempted to raise other issues in
support of his motion, this court finds that they are devoid of merit or barred by the doctrine of
res judicata. See Mattatall v. State, 947 A.2d 896 (R.I. 2008).
Conclusion
For the above stated reasons, Thornton’s motion for a new trial, or in the alternative,
petition for post conviction relief is denied.
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