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Supreme Court
No. 2011-12-C.A.
(P2/09-1A)
State                                                                                                  :
v.                                                                                                     :
Yoneiry Delarosa.                                                                                      :
Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
O P I N I O N
Justice  Indeglia,  for  the  Court.    The  defendant,  Yoneiry  Delarosa                             (defendant  or
Delarosa), appeals from a Providence County Superior Court judgment adjudicating him a
violator of probation.   Delarosa submits on appeal that the hearing justice erred (1) by crediting
the testimony of Christina Bartley (Bartley) after she was offered a favorable plea disposition by
the state to testify against him; (2) in overruling defense counsel’s objection to certain testimony
by Bartley about which he had not been apprised prior to the hearing; and (3) by failing to allow
defense counsel or Delarosa the opportunity to address the court prior to sentencing.   This case
came  before  the  Supreme  Court  at  North  Providence  High  School  for  oral  argument  on
November 29, 2011, pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the
issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided.   After examining the written and
oral submissions of the parties, we are satisfied that this appeal may be resolved without further
briefing or argument.   For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the
Superior Court.
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I
Facts and Travel
On January 2, 2009, Delarosa pleaded nolo contendere in Providence County Superior
Court case number P2/09-1A to charges of unlawful possession of a controlled substance with
intent to deliver (count 1), for which he was sentenced to five years, with six months to serve and
the remainder suspended, with probation; and conspiracy to violate the Uniform Controlled
Substances Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 28 of title 21 (count 2), for which he received a five-year
suspended sentence, with probation, to run concurrently with the sentence imposed for count 1.
Delarosa completed his term of incarceration at the Adult Correctional Institutions and was
subsequently released.
On July 27, 2010, a home-invasion robbery occurred at 169 Almy Street in Providence,
Rhode Island, in which Delarosa was alleged to have participated.   On July 30, 2010, the state
filed a notice pursuant to Rule 32(f) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure,1 alleging
that Delarosa had violated the terms and conditions of his probation in Superior Court case
number P2/09-1A.  A violation hearing took place over five days in August and September 2010,
during which the court heard from five witnesses: Jose Silva (Silva), the alleged victim of the
robbery; Wandalyz Maldonado (Maldonado), Silva’s girlfriend; Angelina Breault (Breault), a
witness who was also present at the time of the robbery; Det. Ronald Riley (Det. Riley) of the
Providence Police Department; and Bartley, the driver of the car involved in the robbery.
The court first heard testimony from Silva, who recounted the events of July 27, 2010.
On that day, at approximately 5:30 p.m., Silva arrived at Maldonado’s second-floor apartment at
1 Rule 32(f) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure governs revocation of probation
proceedings.
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169 Almy Street in Providence, Rhode Island. Silva stated that Jason Weeks (Weeks), one of his
workers on a paint job, came to the apartment to get paid, accompanied by Weeks’s girlfriend,
Breault, and their nine-month-old son.  Silva and Maldonado’s ten-month-old daughter were also
in the parlor along with Weeks’s son.   Silva testified that the two couples talked in the parlor for
about forty-five minutes to an hour, at which point a man wearing a hockey goalie’s mask
entered the apartment brandishing a silver and black gun.2   Silva then saw a second man, who
had a shirt over his face and was just inside the apartment.   A third man was just outside the
apartment doorway and wore a black hat and had a red bandana covering the bottom half of his
face.
Silva testified that the gunman repeatedly asked him “where is the money?”, to which
Silva replied that he did not have any.   According to Silva, the second intruder instructed the
gunman to hit Silva with the gun.   The gunman complied, struck the back of Silva’s head with
the gun, and again demanded money.   Silva further testified that the gunman was “probably
Spanish,” taller than he but thinner, and had green eyes.   Silva described the second intruder as
heavyset and shorter than the gunman, and the third man as dark-skinned, skinny, and taller than
the gunman.   Silva added that the gunman fired a bullet into the floor two feet away from his
daughter, tried to pull Silva “out of the way,” and then lunged toward Maldonado.  It appeared to
Silva that the gunman was then trying to grab his daughter; however, he instead took a plasma
screen television and ran from the apartment with the other intruders.   Silva explained that he
and Weeks followed them and discovered the television abandoned in an alley, along with some
clothing he recognized as worn by them.  Silva immediately called the police.
2 Silva described the hockey goalie’s mask as “white” and similar to that worn by the “Jason
Voorhees” character in the “Friday the 13th” horror movies.   He described the gun as having a
scope, a silver long barrel and chamber, and a black part that was “probably the handle.”
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The state’s next two witnesses were Maldonado and Breault.   They both corroborated
Silva’s testimony that one man was armed with a silver gun and wore a hockey goalie’s mask.
Maldonado testified that there were three men but Breault stated that she saw only two.   Breault
testified that the gunman had tattoos on at least one arm.   Further, she confirmed that one of the
men had a red cloth covering his face and that the gunman struck Silva with the gun.   The
witnesses testified consistently that the gunman fired a shot toward the area of the two children,
that he grabbed the plasma screen television, and that he ran from the apartment with the other
intruders.
Detective Riley testified next.   He recalled that on July 27, 2010, a radio call came in
about a home invasion at 169 Almy Street.3   According to Det. Riley, the dispatcher relayed that
the suspects had fled the scene of the robbery in what was believed to be a black Ford with a
temporary plate in the rear window and a “J.D. Byrider” placard in place of the rear license plate,
and in which a “black female” was the driver.   Detective Riley proceeded in the direction of the
robbery scene and soon saw a black vehicle matching the dispatcher’s description.   Detective
Riley subsequently stopped the vehicle and identified the driver as Bartley, who was alone at that
point.   After notifying police officers at the robbery scene that he had apprehended Bartley, Det.
Riley was informed that a witness was to be transported to his location in order to further
identify Bartley as a suspect in the robbery.   He testified that a short time later, the witness,
3 While the record does not clearly indicate that Det. Riley was in his patrol car at the time he
received the radio dispatch, his testimony does support such an inference, in that after receiving
the description of the suspects and the vehicle, he “proceeded to drive up into [the area of the
robbery].”
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Marcus Borgess, confirmed through a showup identification4 that Bartley was in that vehicle at
the scene of the robbery.  Bartley was subsequently arrested.
The state then presented Bartley as its final witness.  At the time of her arrest, she worked
at a Wal-Mart store on Silver Spring Street in Providence and was a student at Providence
College.   She testified that on July 27, 2010, at approximately 4:30 p.m., her boyfriend Devon
Letourneau  (Letourneau) and two other individuals she did not know came to her place of
employment.   Letourneau had been using her car for the day.   After finishing her shift, she left
with Letourneau and the other two men in her black Ford Focus.   She drove, while Letourneau
sat in the passenger seat and the other two men occupied the back seat.   Bartley testified that she
saw the faces of the unknown men for five to ten minutes inside the Wal-Mart, and also while
she was driving, “looking back from time to time” and through the rearview mirror of her car.
Bartley recalled driving around for twenty to twenty-five minutes.   She stated that they first
headed to the “Plainfield” area of Providence5 and then to the Federal Hill area, where she
dropped the three men off on Almy Street.   She again observed the men’s faces when they left
the car.   Bartley indicated that the man sitting behind Letourneau was called “Cachulo,” whom
she later identified as Delarosa.   Bartley also testified that somewhere between the Plainfield
area and the Federal Hill area, Letourneau told her to pull over.   Letourneau and Delarosa went
to the trunk of the car; and, after both reentered the car, Letourneau handed a silver gun to
Delarosa, who was seated behind him. She further stated that Delarosa had the gun and a mask,
which she described as a “Jason” mask or “ski mask,” when he left the car.
4 A “showup” is “[a] pretrial identification procedure in which a suspect is confronted with a
witness to or the victim of a crime. Unlike a lineup, a showup is a one-on-one confrontation.”
Black’s Law Dictionary 1506 (9th ed. 2009).
5 The Plainfield area of Providence includes the immediate surrounding area of Plainfield Street
and is located in the southwest sector of the city.
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Bartley testified that after she dropped the three men off on Almy Street, she left the area,
but returned about fifteen minutes later.   She then saw Delarosa waving at her from the sidewalk
near a corner store farther down the street from the drop-off site. According to Bartley, she
picked up Delarosa and drove him to the  “Hartford Projects.”6    A short time later, while
returning once again to the Federal Hill neighborhood to pick up Letourneau, she was arrested.
Later, at the police station, she identified Delarosa’s photo as well as photos of the other two
participants.7   Also at the police station, Bartley provided a recorded statement describing the
events of July 27, 2010.8
On cross-examination, Bartley indicated that the three men discussed  their planned
robbery while she drove them around.   She also acknowledged that she had participated in
robberies with Letourneau in the past and had done so as recently as a few days prior to the
robbery on July 27, 2010.9   Bartley was also questioned about her cooperation agreement, under
which the state promised that she would be sentenced to no more than three years for a
conspiracy charge and that it might recommend she receive credit for “time served.”10
6 While not indicated in the record, we note that the  “Hartford Projects” to which Bartley
referred is the public housing development known as Hartford Park, presently operated by the
Providence  Housing  Authority.                                                                          See  Providence  Housing  Authority,  http://www.pha-
providence.com/hartford_park.php (last visited Mar. 14, 2012).
7 After Bartley finished her testimony in regard to the identifications, defense counsel moved to
suppress Bartley’s out-of-court identification of Delarosa on the grounds that the photo array was
unduly  suggestive.     The  hearing  justice  ruled,  however,  that  the  photo  array  was  not
impermissibly suggestive and that Bartley’s identification had independent reliability.
8  Defense counsel was provided with Bartley’s recorded statement and had that statement
transcribed.
9 Bartley testified that in a previous robbery, Letourneau had a silver gun and had threatened a
store clerk with it.  She also admitted that she lied in her statement to the police on July 27, 2010,
in  telling  them  that  she  had  not  participated  with  Letourneau  in  past  robberies.    She
acknowledged that she did so in order to protect herself and Letourneau that day.
10                                                                                                       “Time served” is an  oft-used expression describing a sentencing disposition whereby a
defendant is sentenced to the same jail time that he or she is credited with serving while in
custody generally while awaiting trial.  See Black’s Law Dictionary 1486 (9th ed. 2009).
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On September 20, 2010, the hearing justice issued a bench decision in the matter.11   She
found the testimony of the three witnesses who were present during the robbery to be “credible
and relevant.” The hearing justice also found that Bartley had several opportunities to observe
the men who rode with her in her Ford Focus, and that Bartley “credibly identified” Delarosa as
the person known to her as “Cachulo” who rode with her to the robbery.   She was not persuaded
that Bartley’s cooperation agreement wholly discredited her testimony.    The hearing justice
noted that Bartley’s testimony placed Delarosa at the scene of the robbery and indicated that
Delarosa conspired with the other participants to commit first-degree robbery.   She further found
that Bartley’s testimony was corroborated by the testimony of the eyewitnesses present in the
apartment during the robbery.
After making her findings, the hearing justice declared that she was reasonably satisfied
that Delarosa had failed to keep the peace and be of good behavior.   She noted that although
there was no proof that Delarosa was the gunman, there was evidence showing that he conspired
to commit the robbery.  The hearing justice then sentenced Delarosa, removing the suspension on
three and one half years from his previously imposed sentence on count 1 in P2/09-1A and on
five years from his suspended sentence on count 2.  Both sentences were to run concurrently.  On
September 22, 2010, Delarosa filed a notice of appeal in Superior Court.   Final judgment was
entered on September 28, 2010.12
11 The violation proceeding was consolidated with Delarosa’s bail hearing.
12 Although premature, Delarosa’s appeal is considered timely by this Court.   See State v. Pona,
13 A.3d 642, 646 n.3 (R.I. 2011).
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II
Issues on Appeal
Delarosa advances three issues on appeal.  He first argues that the hearing justice erred in
crediting the testimony of Bartley, the only witness who tied him to the robbery, after she was
offered an “incredible deal” by the state to testify against him.   Second, he maintains that the
hearing justice erred in overruling defense counsel’s objection to Bartley’s testimony concerning
her alleged second encounter with Delarosa after the robbery occurred because defense counsel
had not been apprised of this information prior to the hearing.   Lastly, Delarosa contends that the
hearing justice erred when she failed to allow defense counsel or Delarosa the opportunity to
address the court before sentencing.
III
Standard of Review
“The sole issue for a hearing justice to consider at a probation violation hearing is
whether or not the defendant has breached a condition of his or her probation by failing to keep
the peace or remain on good behavior.”   State v. English, 21 A.3d 403, 406 (R.I. 2011) (quoting
State  v.  Christodal,                                                                                 946  A.2d  811,  816  (R.I.                                                 2008)).   “[T]he  state  need  only  show  that
‘reasonably satisfactory’ evidence supports a finding that the defendant has violated his or her
probation.”   State v. Bouffard, 945 A.2d 305, 310 (R.I. 2008) (quoting State v. Forbes, 925 A.2d
929, 934 (R.I. 2007)).                                                                                 “Consequently, the ‘reasonably satisfied standard * * * should be applied
to whether [the] defendant maintained the conditions of his [or her] probation’ and not to the
issue of the defendant’s guilt with respect to the new charges.”   State v. Pona, 13 A.3d 642, 647
(R.I. 2011) (quoting State v. Sylvia, 871 A.2d 954, 957 (R.I. 2005)).
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“In determining whether or not a defendant has committed a probation violation, the
hearing justice is charged with weighing the evidence and assessing the credibility of the
witnesses.”  Pona, 13 A.3d at 647 (quoting State v. Tetreault, 973 A.2d 489, 492 (R.I. 2009)).   “It
is well established that  ‘[t]his Court’s review of a hearing justice’s decision in a probation-
violation proceeding is limited to considering whether the hearing justice acted arbitrarily or
capriciously in finding a violation.’”  English, 21 A.3d at 407 (quoting Sylvia, 871 A.2d at 957).
IV
Discussion
A
Credibility of Christina Bartley
Delarosa contends that the hearing justice erred in finding Bartley’s testimony to be
credible.   He points out that Bartley is an admitted criminal who lied to the police and received
an extremely favorable plea offer in exchange for her testimony.   He contends that these factors
should have discredited her testimony.   Delarosa also argues that Bartley’s testimony regarding
her return trip to the Almy Street area where she picked up Delarosa negates her credibility
because it “defies belief” that she would not have given this information to the police in the first
instance, if truthful.13  As to each of these contentions, we disagree.
The record reveals that the hearing justice noted that many details provided by Bartley
were corroborated by the testimony of the victims of the robbery.    For example, Bartley
described the “Jason”-style mask and the silver gun carried by the individuals in her car, as did
the victims.   Furthermore, the instances in which Bartley lied to the police pertained not to the
robbery at issue but concerned her involvement with Letourneau in other robberies.   The hearing
13 Bartley did not mention this return trip in her statement to the police on July 27, 2010.
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justice found that Bartley credibly identified Delarosa, and further found that she provided
credible testimony indicating that Delarosa was  “involved in and conspired with  [others] to
commit a first-degree robbery.”   This Court  “will not  ‘second-guess’ supportable credibility
assessments of a hearing justice in a probation-revocation hearing.”   Pona,  13 A.3d at  647
(quoting State v. Jones, 969 A.2d 676, 679 (R.I. 2009)); see also State v. Gauthier, 15 A.3d 1004,
1008 (R.I. 2011).  Such is the case here.
B
Discovery Issue
Delarosa maintains that the hearing justice erred in overruling his objection to Bartley’s
testimony regarding her return trip to the Almy Street area where she had a second encounter
with him because Delarosa’s counsel had not been apprised of this information prior to the
violation hearing.   Delarosa acknowledges on appeal that pre-trial discovery pursuant to Rule 16
of  the  Superior  Court  Rules  of  Criminal  Procedure  does  not  apply to  probation-violation
proceedings.14   See State v. Gautier, 950 A.2d 400, 408 (R.I. 2008) (“A probation-violation
hearing is a civil proceeding to determine whether a probationer has kept the peace and been of
14 Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure states in pertinent part:
“(a) Discovery by Defendant.   Upon written request by a defendant, the attorney
for the State shall permit the defendant to inspect or listen to and copy or
photograph any of the following items within the possession, custody, or control
of the State, the existence of which is known, or by the exercise of due diligence
may become known to the attorney for the State:
“* * *
“(8) as to those persons whom the State expects to call as witnesses at the trial,
all relevant recorded testimony before a grand jury of such persons and all written
or recorded verbatim statements, signed or unsigned, of such persons and, if no
such testimony or statement of a witness is in the possession of the State, a
summary of the testimony such person is expected to give at the trial;
“* * *
“(j) Applicability of Rule.    This rule applies only to criminal trials in the
Superior Court.”
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good  behavior                                                                                          *  *  *.”).    Nevertheless,  Delarosa  argues  that  minimum  due  process  and
fundamental fairness required the state to inform him of Bartley’s testimony prior to the violation
hearing.
The state responds that it could not have provided this information to Delarosa in advance
of the proceeding because no written or recorded statement regarding that specific testimony
existed for the state to produce.   Furthermore, the state notes that pursuant to Rule 26.1 of the
Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, it was required only to turn over written or recorded
statements by Bartley after she had testified to such information at the violation proceeding.15
See State v. Cianci, 430 A.2d 756, 760 (R.I. 1981) (acknowledging “[t]hat [Rule 26.1] provides
that after a witness called by the prosecution has testified on direct examination, a defendant may
obtain any witness’s statement in the possession of the attorney for the state, or under his control,
which relates to the subject matter to which the witness testified”).   Following defense counsel’s
request for additional statements made by Bartley, the state’s attorney indicated that there were
no additional recordings or written statements on the subject to which she was going to testify.
Ultimately, the hearing justice ruled that the state had complied with Rule 26.1 because the state
had in fact turned over to the defense all existing statements made by Bartley.
15 Rule 26.1 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure reads in pertinent part:
“(a) Production of Statements.   If pre-trial discovery pursuant to Rule 16 has not
occurred,  after  a  witness  other  than  the  defendant  has  testified  on  direct
examination, the court, on motion of a party who did not call the witness, shall
order the attorney for the State or the defendant and the defendant's attorney, as
the case may be, to produce, for the examination and use of the moving party, any
statement (as defined in subdivision (e)) of the witness that is in their possession
or under their control, and that relates to the subject matter concerning which the
witness has testified.
“* * *
“(f) Scope of Rule.   This rule applies at trial and at pre-trial hearings, such as
preliminary examinations, suppression hearings, and post-trial proceedings, such
as sentencing proceedings, hearings to revoke or modify probation, and other
post-conviction proceedings.”
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In regard to discovery in the context of probation-violation hearings, this Court has held
that such a hearing “is not part of the criminal-prosecution process; therefore, it does not call for
the ‘full panoply of rights’ normally guaranteed to defendants in criminal proceedings.”   State v.
Vashey, 823 A.2d 1151, 1154-55 (R.I. 2003) (quoting Hampton v. State, 786 A.2d 375, 379 (R.I.
2001)).                                                                                                  “The minimum due process requirements of a violation hearing call for the notice of the
hearing, notice of the claimed violation, the opportunity to be heard and present evidence in [the]
defendant’s behalf, and the right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against  [the]
defendant.”  Id. at 1155 (quoting State v. Casiano, 667 A.2d 1233, 1239 (R.I. 1995)).  This Court
has also recognized that “probation-violation hearings are ‘frequently held without the benefit of
preparation that precedes a criminal trial’ * * *.”  State v. Gautier, 871 A.2d 347, 359 (R.I. 2005)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Cosgrove, 629 A.2d 1007, 1011 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)).
Since Bartley revealed the information concerning her second encounter with Delarosa
for the first time at the violation hearing, and no written or recorded statement existed on this
particular issue, the hearing justice did not err in finding no discovery violation on the part of the
state and overruling Delarosa’s objection.16
C
Right to Allocution
Lastly, Delarosa argues that the hearing justice erred in failing to allow him or his
defense counsel the opportunity to address the court prior to sentencing.   Delarosa acknowledges
16 The record reflects that Delarosa did not request a continuance at the time he objected to
Bartley’s testimony regarding the second encounter.   We note that under Rule 16(i), a trial
justice has the ability to grant a requested continuance, among other remedies, “[i]f at any time
during the course of the proceedings it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has
failed to comply with [Rule 16] or with an order issued pursuant to this rule * * *.”   See also
State v. Gonzalez, 923 A.2d 1282, 1286 (R.I. 2007) (“Rule 16(i) provides the trial justice with a
range of sanctions for discovery violations.”).
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on appeal that, except where consecutive sentences are involved, allocution is generally not
required in a violation proceeding.   He points out, however, that this Court has indicated that the
“better practice” is to allow it.   See State v. Ratchford, 732 A.2d 120, 123 (R.I. 1999).   While
consecutive sentences were not imposed in this case, Delarosa nevertheless argues that this Court
should establish a new rule by applying the right of allocution to all probation violation cases.
In countering, the state contends that Delarosa was not entitled to allocution in this
context under existing authority.    The state further argues that Delarosa waived this issue
because he never requested the opportunity to speak nor asked the court to create a new rule.
We have previously held that in violation hearings,  “the better practice is to permit
counsel to address the court concerning any factors which may assist the court in fashioning a
sentence that ‘as to the court may seem just and proper.’”   Ratchford, 732 A.2d at 123 (quoting
G.L. 1956 § 12-19-9).   However, in State v. Jones, 969 A.2d 676 (R.I. 2009), this Court also
stated that allocution was not required prior to sentencing in a probation-violation case in which
consecutive sentences were not imposed or a sentence on more than one case was not levied.   Id.
at 682; see also State v. Nania, 786 A.2d 1066, 1069 (R.I. 2001).   The hearing justice correctly
followed the holdings set forth in Ratchford and Jones, and we decline to accept Delarosa’s
invitation to reconsider these well-reasoned opinions.17
After careful review, we conclude that reasonably satisfactory evidence existed to support
the hearing justice’s finding that the defendant violated the terms and conditions of his probation.
Therefore, it is our opinion that the hearing justice acted neither arbitrarily nor capriciously when
she adjudicated the defendant a probation-violator based on the record before her.
17 Furthermore, Delarosa may have waived the issue of his right to allocution because he did not
indicate to the hearing justice that he wished to address the court.   Under this Court’s “raise or
waive” rule, a defendant has not preserved an issue for appellate review if he has failed to raise a
specific objection at trial.  State v. McManus, 990 A.2d 1229, 1237 (R.I. 2010).
- 13 -




V
Conclusion
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court, to
which we remand the record in this case.
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Supreme Court
No. 2011-12-C.A.
(P2/09-1A)
State                                                                 :
v.                                                                    :
Yoneiry Delarosa.                                                     :
NOTICE:    This  opinion  is  subject  to  formal  revision  before
publication in the Rhode Island Reporter.  Readers are requested to
notify  the  Opinion  Analyst,  Supreme  Court  of  Rhode  Island,
250 Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone
222-3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published.




RHODE ISLAND SUPREME COURT CLERK’S OFFICE
Clerk’s Office Order/Opinion Cover Sheet
TITLE OF CASE:                                          State of RI v. Yoneiry Delarosa.
CASE NO:                                                No. 2011-12-Appeal.
                                                        (P2/2009-0001A)
COURT:                                                  Supreme Court
DATE OPINION FILED:    March 29, 2012
JUSTICES:                                               Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Flaherty, Robinson, and Indeglia, JJ.
WRITTEN BY:                                             Associate Justice Gilbert V. Indeglia
SOURCE OF APPEAL:    Providence County Superior Court
JUDGE FROM LOWER COURT:
Associate Justice Kristin Rodgers
ATTORNEYS ON APPEAL:
For State:                                              Lauren Zurier, Esq.
For Defendant:  Janice Weisfeld, Esq.

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