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Supreme Court
No.   99-468-C.A.
(P2/98-2949-AG)
State                                                                                                 :
:
v.                                                                                                    :
:
William Holdsworth.                                                                                   :
Present:  Williams, C.J., Lederberg, Bourcier, Flanders, and Goldberg, JJ.
O P I N I O N
PER CURIAM.   This appeal challenges:                                                                 (1) the Superior Court’s denial   of a criminal
defendant’s motion to suppress evidence that he was carrying a gun on his person; and, (2) the
court’s handling of the defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel after the trial justice became
aware that the defendant apparently suffered  from  mental-health problems.    The defendant,
William Holdsworth   (defendant or Holdsworth), appeals from a judgment of conviction in the
Superior Court for possession of a firearm without a license.   He contends that the trial justice
erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence of a gun that a police officer, conducting a
patdown search, found in the knapsack the defendant was carrying.   He also alleges that, after the
suppression  hearing,  the  trial  justice  failed  to  determine:                                    (a)  whether  the  defendant  was
competent to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel; and, (b) whether,
before waiving his right to counsel and proceeding to trial pro se, he was advised of the potential
sentence that he could receive if he were convicted on the gun-possession charge.
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After a prebriefing conference, a single justice of this Court ordered the parties to show
cause why the issues raised by this appeal should not be summarily decided.   Because they have
not done so, we proceed to decide the appeal at this time.
Denial of the Motion to Suppress
Before trial, defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence that he was carrying a gun
in his knapsack, alleging that he was the victim of an illegal search.   At the suppression hearing,
only the arresting officer and defendant testified.   The officer testified that, at the July 10, 1998,
roll call for the Providence Police Department, he received a letter from a community police
sergeant indicating that defendant was “having words” with his landlord and that the landlord
was concerned for his safety  because of threats defendant had uttered.   The letter provided a
physical description of  defendant and stated that  the police  had arrested  him in the past for
carrying a .380-caliber automatic handgun.   The arresting officer testified that, after receiving the
letter, he recalled seeing a flyer posted at the station about a year earlier that contained a picture
of defendant, together with statements from individuals “that he [defendant] always carried a gun
in his knapsack and that police had never found the gun.”   After roll call, the officer obtained a
copy of the flyer, which contained a photo of defendant, to take on his patrol.   The officer also
testified  that  he  learned  that  the  police  previously  had arrested  defendant  for  carrying  an
automatic weapon, but he did not know the outcome of that case.
Approximately forty-five minutes after the roll call, the officer, while on patrol, spotted
defendant walking through a parking lot at Elmwood and Lexington Avenues in Providence,
with a green knapsack slung over his shoulder.   The officer testified that he drove to the parking
lot where defendant was walking, pulled alongside him, and called his name.   The defendant
stopped and the officer got out of his cruiser and asked him about being evicted.   The defendant
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acknowledged that his landlord was trying to evict him, but said “I’m not going without a fight.”
The officer then asked him whether he owned any weapons, and defendant said that he did.   He
then asked defendant whether he was carrying a weapon on his person, and defendant said that
“he didn’t want to answer that question.”   The officer then asked defendant whether he had any
objections to a patdown, to which “he [defendant] didn’t really say anything.   He just threw his
hands up in the air as if to say go ahead.”   The officer immediately patted down the outside of
the knapsack until he felt a hard object at the bottom, which he thought was a pistol.  The officer
held onto the object and, as he started to reach inside the bag, defendant said, “Oh you found it.”
The officer then reached into the bag, removed the gun, and placed defendant under arrest.
According  to the  officer,  the  gun,  which  was  loaded, was a  .380-caliber automatic.    The
defendant testified that he did not give the officer permission to search him.   He said that he
“would never be that stupid.”    According to defendant,  the officer searched him  despite his
protestations and objections, and then found the gun inside the knapsack.   The defendant also
denied that he ever threatened his landlord with any harm.
After  the  hearing,  the  hearing  justice  denied  defendant’s  motion     to  suppress  this
evidence.   In denying the motion, the hearing justice distinguished the facts in this case from an
earlier case involving similar charges  in which  the court  had granted this same defendant’s
motion to suppress.  The hearing justice noted that, in the earlier case, the officer who had seized
a weapon from defendant’s person had done so after receiving an anonymous tip.   But in that
case the officer had “walked up to the defendant and just started to feel his bag without any
preliminaries whatever.”   Here, however, the  hearing justice  found that the officer possessed
information (from a police sergeant) that  the authorities believed defendant possessed several
firearms, the officer had a right to rely on that information in the course of his patrol, and that he
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was justified in stopping and questioning defendant when he saw him.   Furthermore, the court
found that the officer’s  version of the events surrounding the search of defendant’s bag was
“more probably true than that which is offered by Mr. Holdsworth.”  As a result, the court found
that defendant “voluntarily acquiesced to the search.”  The court concluded by stating:
“[T]here was an articuable  [sic] reason for this officer to have
probable  cause  that  a  crime  may  have  been  committed  in  his
presence based on his legal authority to rely on the information
presented in the communication of the Providence Police to the roll
call on the 10th of July particularly based on information generated
on the 9th. ”
The court found that defendant  “did, in fact, consent to the search, that his acquiescence in
assuming a position of submission to the officer was sufficient to convey to the world and to this
officer that he was consenting to this search  * * *.”   Accordingly, the hearing justice concluded
“that this search was appropriate and within the constraints placed upon law enforcement
authorities  with  regard  to  warrantless  searches  pursuant  to  the  Fourth  Amendment.”    The
defendant has not challenged this finding on appeal, thus  mooting his reasonable-suspicion
argument concerning the validity of the patdown search.   Nevertheless, even if the search had not
been consensual, the officer, we hold, still acted reasonably.
The defendant’s first assignment of error is that the trial justice erred in denying his
motion to suppress the gun that the police officers found in his knapsack.   Citing precedents from
the United States Supreme Court, defendant argues that the police officer lacked any reasonable
suspicion that he had committed a crime.   He contends that his behavior when the officer stopped
him “was completely innocuous” and that “no reasonable person possibly could have concluded
that any crime had been committed or was imminent.”   The state maintains that the search was
justified under the facts of the case.
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“When reviewing an alleged violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights, this Court
‘must make an independent examination of the record to determine if [the defendant’s] rights
have been violated.’”   State v. Abdullah, 730 A.2d 1074, 1076 (R.I. 1999) (per curiam) (quoting
In re John N., 463 A.2d 174, 176 (R.I. 1983)).                                                         “We review a trial justice’s determination of the
existence or nonexistence of probable cause  or  reasonable suspicion on a  de  novo basis.”
Abdullah, 730 A.2d at 1076.
The general rule is that “a police officer may conduct an investigatory stop, provided [the
officer] has a reasonable suspicion based on specific and articulable facts that the person
detained is engaged in criminal activity.”   Id. (quoting State v. Halstead, 414 A.2d 1138, 1147
(R.I. 1980)).   A police officer may initiate “an investigatory stop of an individual whom a police
officer reasonably suspects  (1) has engaged in wrongdoing, and  (2) may be armed and thus
dangerous to the officer or others                                                                     *  *  *     [in order to conduct] a limited and self-protective
patdown search of the suspect’s outer clothing.”   State v. Black, 721 A.2d 826, 829-30 (R.I.
1998) (citing Terry v. Ohio,  392 U.S.  1,  30,  88 S.Ct.  1868,  1884-85,  20 L.Ed.2d  889,  911
(1968)).
In Abdullah, we stated:
“Numerous factors exist which may contribute to a finding
of reasonable suspicion   of criminal activity.                                                        *  *  *   Some of the
factors * * * include the location in which the conduct occurred,
the time at which the incident occurred, the suspicious conduct or
unusual appearance of the suspect, and the personal knowledge and
experience of the police officer.”  Abdullah, 730 A.2d at 1077.
Here, the officer who conducted the patdown search had received information at roll call
that defendant possibly possessed several firearms, that his landlord was attempting to evict him
from  his  apartment,  and  that  he  had  threatened  his  landlord.    The  officer  also obtained
information that defendant “always carried a gun in his knapsack.”   The officer, on the alert for
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this individual, caught sight of  defendant in the area shortly thereafter.   He observed defendant,
who fit the description he had received earlier, walking  with the knapsack  slung over his
shoulder in the  general area of his apartment.   He then drove over to defendant and began
questioning him.  Ultimately, he patted down his knapsack and felt the weapon  inside.   Given the
information that the officer had received about this defendant, “especially when viewed from the
perspective of a trained and experienced law enforcement officer,” we conclude that the officer
possessed a reasonable suspicion that defendant was carrying a concealed weapon.   Abdullah,
730 A.2d at 1077.   Thus, the trial justice did not err in refusing to suppress the gun.
Adequacy of Proceedings Before Defendant’s Waiver of Counsel
“[I]n circumstances raising legitimate doubts about a defendant’s mental condition [at a
probation-revocation  hearing],”  State  v.  Chabot,                                                   682  A.2d  1377,  1380  (R.I.  1996),   “[w]e
previously have determined that a defendant is subjected to a heightened standard of competency
when he attempts to waive counsel and appear pro se.”  State v. Thomas, 794 A.2d 990, 994, 995
(R.I. 2002) (holding that, notwithstanding applicant’s disclosure during plea colloquy that he was
“off” his medication, applicant for post-conviction relief was mentally competent when he pled
nolo contendere to various charges, noting that the applicant “was at all times represented by
counsel” and that “not a scintilla of evidence” indicated that he was laboring under a mental
disability during the plea hearing).
In this case, defendant’s second claim of error is that the trial justice erred in failing to
inquire sufficiently about his psychiatric condition before deciding that defendant’s waiver of
counsel was knowing and intelligent.   The defendant contends that the trial justice failed  to
inquire about defendant’s  competency    to waive counsel as required by Chabot.   Instead of
engaging in such an inquiry, defendant argues, “the trial court’s examination was confined to a
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single question asking defendant whether he believed himself capable to represent himself
despite his mental illness.”   The defendant also maintains that the trial justice erred in failing to
determine whether his waiver of counsel was voluntary because he was not made aware of the
potential sentence that  the court  could  impose  upon  him  for  the  charge  he  was  facing  in
accordance with Chabot.
Before  trial     began,  defendant  expressed  his  desire  to  discharge  his  court-appointed
counsel and to proceed to trial pro se.  As a result of defendant’s request, the following colloquy
took place between the court and defendant :
“The Court:    I have been informed at a pretrial conference in
anticipation [of] beginning this case today that Mr. Holdsworth
wishes to discharge the services of Mr. Levy and proceed pro se, is
that correct, Mr. Holdsworth?
“The Defendant:   He is going to act as a standby.   He is going to
act as a standby lawyer because I’m going to need some kind of
legal presence, but I’m pretty much going to act as my attorney.
“The Court:   In order to do that officially, you have to listen to the
question.   The question is if you wish to discharge Mr. Levy as
your attorney; is that correct?
“The Defendant:   Yes.
“The Court:   Do you feel you’re capable of conducting your own
defense in this matter?
“The Defendant:   Yes.
“The Court:    And we heard some brief testimony  yesterday  in
pretrial motions that you are a recipient and have been from time to
time a patient at the Providence Mental Health Center; is that
correct?
“The Defendant:   That is correct, yes, sir.
“The Court:    All right.    Now, to me, that would indicate the
diagnosis by some competent official of some degree of mental
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disability.   Having said that and making that assumption, do you
feel that you are competent to represent yourself in this case?
“The Defendant:   Yes.
“The Court:   Do you understand that in order to do this, you will
be  given  no  consideration  by  this  Court  with  regard  to  your
perceived lack of Rules of Evidence or practice and procedure?
“The Defendant:   I have no problem with that.
“The Court: You will be held to the same standard as Mr. Dawson
in this case even though he has had the benefit of legal training.
Do you understand that?
“The Defendant:   Good sense is good law.
“The  Court:    The  Sixth  Amendment  gives  you  the  right  to
represent  yourself  in  this  case  if  the  Court  believes  you  are
qualified and capable to do so.   Are you requesting that Mr. Levy
be allowed to be your standby counsel in this case?
“The Defendant:   Yes, I am going to need some kind of standby,
somebody to, you know, hold my hand.
“The Court:   Well, you understand he will not be speaking on your
behalf in this capacity but will be available to you for discussion
on legal strategy and practice and procedure.   Do you understand
that?
“The Defendant:   That’s fine.
“The Court:   He will not be allowed to question people and he will
not offer objections on your behalf.  Do you understand that?
“The Defendant:   That’s fine.
“The Court:   He will also not be able to cross-examine or examine
witnesses or make argument on your behalf.
“The Defendant:   I have no problem with that * * *.”
Thereafter, the trial justice determined that defendant could represent himself.  He said:
“[T]he Court will find as a fact that based on the testimony that
you gave yesterday and your articulation of answers from the
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questions  put  to  you  and  the  general  manner  in  which  you
conducted yourself in addition to your request in exercising your
Sixth Amendment right to represent yourself, the Court will accept
your pro se representation in this case * * *.”
Thereafter, the trial proceeded, and the defendant subsequently  was  found guilty of
carrying a pistol without a license.
“The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that ‘in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to * * * have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence.’   The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant’s ‘right to represent himself or herself
in a criminal trial.’”   State v. Briggs, 787 A.2d 479, 485 (R.I. 2001) (quoting State v. Gatone,
698 A.2d 230, 240 (R.I. 1997) and (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 807, 95 S.Ct.
2525, 2527, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 566 (1975)).   This Court has held that, although a defendant may
waive the right to counsel and proceed pro se,                                                      “such a waiver must be given voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently.”   Chabot, 682 A.2d at 1379.   In determining the validity of the
waiver, we “look[] to the totality of the circumstances.”  Id. at 1379-80.
But  when  the  circumstances  existing  at  the  time  of  the  purported  waiver  create
“legitimate doubts about a defendant’s mental condition,” id. at 1380, it then becomes
“incumbent upon the trial justice to conduct a more searching
inquiry of defendant’s then existing mental health and physical
condition and, if that inquiry raise[s] further questions concerning
defendant’s competency to waive counsel, to order that defendant
undergo  a  psychiatric  evaluation  in  regard  to  his                                            [or  her]
competency to waive counsel and to defend himself [or herself]
* * *.”  Id.
In considering whether a defendant who has a history of mental-health problems — or
who exhibits the same before the court — is capable of voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently
waiving his or her right to counsel, the trial justice should consider the following factors:
“(1)  the  background,  the  experience,  and  the  conduct  of  the
defendant at the hearing, including his age, his education, and his
physical and mental health; (2) the extent to which the defendant
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has had prior contact with lawyers before the hearing;  (3) the
defendant’s knowledge of the nature of the proceeding and the
sentence that may potentially be reimposed; (4) the question of
whether standby counsel has been appointed and the extent to
which he or she has aided the defendant before or at the hearing;
(5) the question of whether the waiver of counsel was the result of
mistreatment or coercion; and  (6) the question of whether the
defendant  is  trying  to  manipulate  the  events  of  the  hearing.”
Chabot, 682 A.2d at 1380.
Indeed, even in a case that does not involve a defendant who may be suffering from
mental-health problems, the above-mentioned factors  nevertheless can  be used as a guide in
determining the validity of a defendant’s waiver of counsel.  Briggs, 787 A.2d at 486.
In this case, however, defendant testified at the suppression hearing that he was receiving
Social-Security disability benefits as a result of his mental-health problems.   He also testified
that he had received mental-health counseling.   During the court’s discussions with defendant
about his desire to represent himself, the trial justice noted that defendant had received mental-
health counseling.   The trial justice even remarked that defendant probably had been diagnosed
“by some competent official of [sic ] some degree of mental disability.”   Nevertheless, that was
the extent of the court’s inquiry regarding the present state of the defendant’s mental health.   The
court did not inquire whether defendant still was receiving mental-health counseling, whether he
was taking any medications for  mental disability, or whether his mental disability  was severe
enough that it might affect his ability to represent himself.   As noted above, Chabot holds that
once a defendant’s potential or existing mental-health problems raise legitimate doubts about a
defendant’s mental condition, it is “incumbent upon the trial justice to conduct a more searching
inquiry of defendant’s then-existing mental health and physical condition.”  Chabot, 682 A.2d at
1380.   Despite  our holding in Chabot, the court failed to  ascertain the nature and extent of
defendant’s mental disability, much less did it order a competency evaluation   that would have
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enabled it to independently assess whether defendant possessed the mental ability to understand
what he was doing in purporting to waive counsel and  in proceeding to trial   pro se.   Nor was
there any inquiry by the court about whether defendant was aware of the potential sentencing he
might face if he was convicted of the charge.   As we noted in Chabot, “[i]n determining whether
a defendant is making a knowing, an intelligent, and a voluntary waiver of his right to counsel *
* * the following factors should be considered:                                                         * * *  (3) the defendant’s knowledge of the
nature of the proceeding and the sentence that may potentially be []imposed.”  Chabot,                  682 A.2d
at 1380.
“Because a defendant’s knowledge and understanding of what he or she is doing is
essential to effectuate a voluntary waiver of the right to counsel, an inquiry into the matter must
sufficiently establish that knowledge and understanding on the record.”   Id. at 1381.  In this case,
given the defendant’s mental-health  disclosures, the court’s inquiry fell far short of what Chabot
required.   Here, the trial justice was not faced with a defendant who merely disclosed that he was
“off” his medication.   See Thomas, 794 A.2d at 993.1   Rather, this defendant admitted to the
1                                                                                                       In State v. Thomas, 794 A.2d 990 (R.I. 2002), we affirmed the Superior Court’s denial of
an application for post-conviction relief, rejecting the applicant’s suggestion that his pleas of
nolo contendere to rape, kidnapping, and assault and battery were invalid.   The applicant had
argued that he was mentally incompetent to plead nolo contendere at the time of the plea hearing
and that the hearing justice had failed to address his alleged mental illness before accepting his
plea — despite the applicant’s disclosure to the court that “I have been off my medicine” in
response to the hearing justice’s inquiry about whether he was under the influence of any
medication at the hearing.   Id. at 992.   We rejected that contention, however, because the hearing
justice “methodically” conducted a plea hearing under Rule 11 of the Superior Court Rules of
Criminal Procedure, finding in the end that the applicant possessed the requisite mental capacity
to understand the nature of his plea.  Id. at 993-95.
Unlike the case at bar, however, in Thomas the applicant did not suggest or present any
evidence at the hearing that he may have been suffering from any mental impairment.   Indeed,
the  applicant  in  Thomas  did  not  do  so  until  approximately  three  years  after  the  hearing
concluded, at which time he first alleged he was mentally incompetent.   Id. at 994.   Moreover,
the expert evidence presented by the applicant in Thomas was insufficient to prove that he was in
fact mentally incompetent at the previous plea hearing.   Id. at 995.   Thus, in contrast to Thomas,
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court that he was a patient at a mental-health clinic and the court itself concluded that                  “some
competent”   official had diagnosed him with                                                               “some degree of mental disability.”   These facts
triggered the need for the court to address and consider the six factors set forth in Chabot, and, if
that inquiry and analysis raised further questions concerning the defendant’s competency to
waive counsel, the court should have ordered the defendant to undergo a psychiatric evaluation
before passing on the waiver issue.   Because the court failed to proceed in this manner, we must
reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Conclusion
For the above reasons, we deny the defendant’s appeal in part and sustain it in part.   We
affirm the trial justice’s denial of  the motion to suppress.   With respect to the adequacy of the
court’s  mental-competency inquiry    before accepting the defendant’s waiver of his right to
counsel, however, we sustain the appeal, vacate the conviction, and remand this case for a new
trial and a hearing to determine the defendant’s competency to waive counsel in accordance with
this  Court’s  Chabot  decision,  including  obtaining  a  mental-competency  evaluation  of  the
defendant.    If,  after  conducting  such  proceedings, the Superior Court determines that the
defendant is competent to waive his right to counsel and to proceed to trial pro se, it shall appoint
stand-by counsel and proceed to conduct a new trial.   On the other hand, if the court determines
that the defendant is not mentally competent to waive counsel   (but that he is competent to stand
trial), the court shall  deny  the defendant’s motion to proceed pro se, appoint counsel, and
proceed to trial.
in which  the hearing justice found that “[t]here was not a scintilla of evidence that the [applicant]
was laboring under a disability of any kind during the trial or the plea itself,” id., here, the
evidence at the hearing showed that defendant was receiving Social Security benefits for his
mental-health problems and that he had been diagnosed with some type of undefined mental
disability.    These  disclosures,  we  hold,  were  red  flags  that  required  the  court  to  proceed
according to State v. Chabot, 682 A.2d 1377 (R.I. 1996).
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COVER SHEET
TITLE OF CASE:   State v. William Holdsworth
DOCKET NO:                                                                      99-468-C.A.
COURT:     Supreme
DATE OPINION FILED:    June 6, 2002
Appeal from
SOURCE OF APPEAL:                                                               Providence         County:  Superior
JUDGE FROM OTHER COURT:                                                         Darigan, J.
JUSTICES:    Williams, C.J., Lederberg, Bourcier, Flanders, and Goldberg, JJ.
Not Participating
Concurring
Dissenting
WRITTEN BY:      Per Curiam
ATTORNEYS:                                                                      Annie Goldberg
                                                                                Aaron L. Weisman
                                                                                For Plaintiff
ATTORNEYS:                                                                      Paula Rosin
                                                                                                   For Defendant
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