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STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS
PROVIDENCE, SC.                                                                                         SUPERIOR COURT
                                                                                                        (Filed:  June 27, 2011)
TAMMI M. BRANCH                                                                                         :
LORI CARDILLO-KELSALL                                                                                   :
:
vs.                                                                                                     :                         C.A. No. PC 07-620
:
THOMAS C. CARDILLO, JR.                                                                                 :
DECISION
RUBINE, J.,    After a non-jury trial, Plaintiffs were awarded recovery, under a theory of unjust
enrichment, of the contributions that they had made toward the settlement of a mortgage on
property that now is owned by Defendant, Thomas C. Cardillo, Jr. (Defendant).  See Decision of
the Court, dated February 24, 2011.  The issue now before the Court is whether, pursuant to G.L.
1956 § 9-21-10, Plaintiffs are entitled to prejudgment interest on that award.
Following this Court’s written Decision in the above-captioned matter, Plaintiffs filed a
Motion for Entry of Judgment with Interest, pursuant to § 9-21-10.     Defendant objects.   He
contends that the award does not constitute “pecuniary damages” for purposes of § 9-21-10.
It is axiomatic that “when the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, [this Court]
must interpret the statute literally and must give the words of the statute their plain and ordinary
meanings.”   In re Harrison, 992 A.2d 990, 994 (R.I. 2010).   If the statute is unambiguous, “there
is no room for statutory construction and must be applied as written.”   Id.    Accordingly, “[i]t is
only when confronted with an unclear or ambiguous statutory provision that this Court will
examine the statute in its entirety to discern the legislative intent and purpose behind the
provision.”  Id.
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Section                                                                                                  9-21-10  governs  the  awarding  of  interest  in                                   “civil  actions”  on  verdicts  or
judgments for “pecuniary damages.”  It provides in pertinent part:
“In any civil action in which a verdict is rendered or a decision
made for pecuniary damages, there shall be added by the clerk of
the court to the amount of damages interest at the rate of twelve
percent (12%) per annum thereon from the date the cause of action
accrued, which shall be included in the judgment entered therein
. This section shall not apply until entry of judgment or to any
contractual obligation where interest is already provided.”   Section
9-21-10(a) (emphases added).
Section  9-21-10 clearly requires  “the imposition of interest in any  ‘civil action’ in which a
verdict or a decision awards ‘pecuniary damages.’”   Murphy v. United Steelworkers of America
Local No. 5705, AFL-CIO, 507 A.2d 1342, 1346 (R.I. 1986).   It is well-settled that the purpose
of the prejudgment interest statute is to promote the expeditious settlement of claims.   See
DiMeo v. Philbin, 502 A.2d 825, 826 (R.I. 1986); Roy v. Star Chopper Co., Inc.,   584 F.2d 1124,
1135-1136 (1st Cir.  1978)  (“The Rhode Island pre-judgment interest statute was enacted to
promote the expeditious settlement of claims”) (citing Isserlis v. Director of Public Works, 111
R.I. 164, 300 A.2d 273, 274 (1973)).   Thus, “the Legislature’s primary intention was not to add
interest but to establish a device to encourage settlement of cases sounding in tort without undue
delay.”    DiMeo,                                                                                        502  A.2d  at  826.    Furthermore,  by  using  the  words  “civil  action,”  the
Legislature also “intended to equalize the right of tort and contract litigants to collect interest on
judgments.”  In re Estate of Cantore, 814 A.2d 331, 335 (R.I. 2003).
Although there are three categories of damages—compensatory, nominal, and punitive—
the  Legislature  employed  the  term  pecuniary                                                         “as  a  synonym  for  compensatory,”  where
“[c]ompensatory damages are awarded to a person in satisfaction of or in response to a loss or
injury sustained.”   Murphy, 507 A.2d at 1346; see also Liberty Mut. v. Kinser, 82 S.W.3d 71,
78 (Tex. App. 2002) (defining an award of damages “as the sum of money the law awards as
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pecuniary compensation, recompense, or satisfaction for an injury done or a wrong sustained as a
consequence of a breach of contractual obligation or a tortious act”); Dobrowolska ex rel.
Dobrowolska v. Wall, 530 S.E.2d 590, 598 (N.C. App. 2000) (“In legal contemplation, the term
‘damages’ is the sum of money which the law awards or imposes as pecuniary compensation,
recompense, or satisfaction for an injury done or a wrong sustained as a consequence of either a
breach of a contractual obligation or a tortious act[]”) (citing 22 Am. Jur. 2d Damages § 1
(1988)).   Furthermore, “[t]he word ‘damages’ has a commonly understood meaning: it generally
connotes payment in money for a plaintiff’s losses caused by a defendant’s breach of duty, and is
something different from equitable restitution.”   U.S. v. Balistrieri, 981 F.2d 916, 928 (7th Cir.
1992).
Our Supreme Court has stated that “an action for reimbursement . . . is not the equivalent
of a civil action for pecuniary damages.”  In re Estate of Cantore, 814 A.2d at 335.  Indeed, “[i]n
equity, restitution is usually thought of as a remedy by which defendant is made to disgorge ill-
gotten gains or to restore the status quo, or to accomplish both objectives.”   Rogers v. Loether,
467 F.2d 1110, 1121 (7th Cir. 1972).
Accordingly, “in the absence of an enforceable contract, the equitable doctrine of unjust
enrichment may apply under certain circumstances to prevent a person from retaining a benefit
received from another without appropriate payment for same.”   Doe v. Burkland,                        808 A.2d
1090, 1095 (R.I. 2002) (emphasis added).   See also Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Rhode
Island Covering Co.,   96 R.I. 178, 179-180, 190 A.2d 219, 220-221 (R.I. 1963) (“The doctrine of
unjust enrichment is equitable in its nature, and generally it is applied to permit a recovery where
one person has received a benefit from another and the retention thereof would be unjust under
some legal principle recognized in equity[]”); Merchants Mut. Ins. Co. v. Newport Hospital, 108
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R.I. 86, 93, 272 A.2d 329, 332 (R.I. 1971) (“Unjust enrichment permits the recovery in certain
instances where a person has received from another a benefit, the retention of which, would be
unjust under some legal principle, a situation which equity has established or recognized.”)
In the instant matter, the Court previously concluded that Plaintiffs failed to prove the
existence of a valid contract between the parties.   However, the record revealed that Plaintiffs
advanced  funds  to  Defendant  under  the  mistaken  belief that  a  contract  had  been  formed.
Accordingly,  pursuant  to  the  equitable  doctrine  of  unjust  enrichment,  this  Court  ordered
Defendant to reimburse said funds to Plaintiffs in order to prevent him from retaining the benefit
of their mistaken belief.   Considering that the nature of this relief is equitable, not legal, the
award does not constitute “pecuniary damages” for purposes of § 9-21-10.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs’ relief in this case constitutes
equitable restitution that is not entitled to the addition of prejudgment interest pursuant to § 9-21-
10.   Consequently, judgment shall enter for each of the Plaintiffs in the amount of $16,254.66,
without prejudgment interest. The Plaintiffs’ Motion for Entry of Judgment with Interest is
denied.  The Court will enter judgment for the Plaintiffs, but without the addition of prejudgment
interest.
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