Preview:

Supreme Court No. 98-555-Appeal. (PP 98-106) Virginia L. Sindelar v. Luis G. Leguia. : : :

Present: Weisberger, C.J., Lederberg, Bourcier, Flanders, and Goldberg, JJ. OPINION PER CURIAM. The plaintiff-mother, Virginia L. Sindelar, appeals from a Superior Court hearing justice's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant-father, Luis G. Leguia. She asserts that the trial justice committed error by granting summary judgment, arguing in effect, that our Wrongful Death Act recognizes an "absentee parent" exception to recovery of certain wrongful-death proceeds, and that therefore there existed genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendant-father enjoyed a sufficient familial relationship with their decedent-son to allow him to share one-half those proceeds. This case came before us pursuant to an order directing the parties to appear on April 4, 2000, and to show cause why the issues raised in this appeal should not be summarily decided. No cause has been shown, and we now proceed to decide the issues before us. I Case Facts and Travel

1

The marriage between Virginia L. Sindelar (Sindelar) and Luis G. Leguia (Leguia) ended in divorce in 1982, and the parties were granted joint custody of their two children, Gregor and Carl, with physical custody of both children granted to Sindelar. Leguia was ordered to pay child support, which he did until both children reached the age of majority. Leguia also provided health insurance for the children and contributed toward their college tuition expenses. On November 30, 1996, Gregor, the older son, then aged twenty-nine, was killed in an automobile accident in Rhode Island. At the time of his death, Gregor was unmarried, had no children, and left no will. Neither parent was involved in the accident. Sindelar, on subsequent petition, was appointed administrator of Gregor's estate by the Burrillville Probate Court in March 1997. Sindelar proceeded to settle various wrongful death claims on behalf of Gregor's estate for net proceeds of approximately $116,000. In November 1997, Sindelar filed a motion in the probate court, seeking to deny Leguia any portion of the wrongful-death settlement proceeds, asserting that Leguia's long-standing lack of contact with Gregor barred him from recovery under G.L. 1956 chapter 7 of title 10, Rhode Island's Wrongful Death Act (the Act). Her probate court motion was denied and she appealed to the Superior Court. In Superior Court, Leguia moved for summary judgment. He first noted in his motion that he had paid any and all necessary child support required during Gregor's minority and also that he was not involved in Gregor's accident and resulting death. He thus asserted that, as a matter of law, under the Act and under Rhode Island intestacy law, he was entitled to a half share of the wrongful-death settlement proceeds, regardless of the nature or quality of his relationship with Gregor prior to Gregor's death. Sindelar however, asserted that the Act was intended by the General Assembly to provide some level of compensation only to the decedent's heirs at law who possessed a reasonable expectation of 2

pecuniary benefit from the ongoing life of the decedent, advocating a so-called "absentee parent" exception to recovery. Consequently, she asserted that because Leguia had no relationship with Gregor other than by visitation rights from the date of the divorce, he had no reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit from his life and should be barred from receiving a pecuniary windfall therefrom. The hearing justice, after considering the parties' arguments, concluded that in this case, distribution of damages was fixed by the plain language of the Act, and thus Leguia was entitled to receive his statutory share of the wrongful-death settlement proceeds, without judicial inquiry into the quality or nature of his relationship with Gregor. Accordingly, he ordered the pending judgment of distribution to enter in the probate court. Sindelar has timely appealed to this Court, asserting first that the hearing justice erred by granting summary judgment because no discovery was conducted and no supporting affidavits were filed by Leguia, thus making the summary judgment motion procedurally defective, and secondly that the hearing justice erred as a matter of law in interpreting the Act not to require some level of familial relationship between parent and child as a prequisite to recovery under the Act. For the reasons hereinafter stated, we deny the plaintiff's appeal and sustain the grant of summary judgment. II Standard of Review "In reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, this Court employs the same standard on review as the trial justice. We must examine all of the pleadings, memoranda and affidavits in the `light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.' " Truk-Away of Rhode Island, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 723 A.2d 309, 313 (R.I. 1999) (quoting Splendorio v. Bilray Demolition Co., 682 A.2d 461, 465 (R.I. 1996)). We conduct such a de novo analysis "to decide whether an issue of material fact exist[s] and whether the moving party [is] entitled to summary judgment as a matter of 3

law." Buonanno v. Colmar Belting Co., 733 A.2d 712, 715 (R.I. 1999) (quoting Textron, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 638 A.2d 537, 539 (R.I. 1994)). Finally, as is particularly pertinent to the case at bar, "[s]ummary judgment is proper when there is no ambiguity as a matter of law." Id. (quoting Textron, Inc., 638 A.2d at 539). III The Summary Judgment Motion Sindelar first asserts on appeal that the summary judgment motion, lacking supporting affidavits and relevant discovery, was not procedurally ripe for consideration by the hearing justice. She argues that the dearth of such supporting materials meant that the hearing justice could not have had a complete and proper understanding of the legal and factual issues presented within the case to have properly awarded summary judgment. We disagree. We begin by noting that Rule 56(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a defending party "may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part thereof." Thus, a lack of supporting affidavits simply cannot be error, as Sindelar contends in this case. The plain language of the rule requires only that for summary judgment to enter, there be no genuine issues of material fact and that judgment for the moving party be appropriate as a matter of law. As will be discussed in detail infra, we believe that here there were no material facts to be litigated and, consequently, that the trial justice properly disposed of the case as a matter of law. His decision to do so is amply supported by the record we have before us, and in no way can we say that he approached the case before it was procedurally ripe for summary judgment or was somehow anything less than fully informed on the issues presented by the instant matter. 4

III The Wrongful Death Act Sindelar next asserts that the hearing justice erred by granting summary judgment in favor of Leguia because the justice incorrectly interpreted and applied the Act. She asserts that the Legislature, by using the term "pecuniary damages" in

Download 98-555.pdf

Rhode Island Law