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Supreme Court
No. 2002-693-Appeal.
(PC 99-2047)
(PC 99-4094)
(PC 00-3481)
(PC 01-2065)
Weybosset Hill Investments, LLC                                       :
v.                                                                    :
Thomas Rossi, in his capacity as tax assessor                         :
for the City of Providence.
NOTICE:  This  opinion  is  subject  to  formal  revision  before
publication in the Rhode Island Reporter.  Readers are requested to
notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 250
Benefit Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone 222-
3258 of any typographical or other formal errors in order that
corrections may be made before the opinion is published.




Supreme Court
No. 2002-693-Appeal.
(PC 99-2047)
(PC 99-4094)
(PC 00-3481)
(PC 01-2065)
Weybosset Hill Investments, LLC                                                                     :
v.                                                                                                  :
Thomas Rossi, in his capacity as tax assessor                                                       :
for the City of Providence.
Present: Williams, C.J., Flanders, Goldberg, Flaherty, and Suttell, JJ.
O P I N I O N
Suttell, Justice.   This is another in a series of tax appeals involving various parcels of
commercial real estate in downtown Providence.   In this case, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Rhode Island (Blue Cross) challenged three years of tax assessments on a seven-story office
building known as One Weybosset Hill.1  While these tax appeals were pending, Blue Cross sold
the property and assigned its rights to the appeals to the plaintiff, Weybosset Hill Investments,
LLC (Weybosset Hill).   The new owner continued to prosecute the appeals that Blue Cross
initiated, and challenged an additional assessment in its own right after it took title to the
property.
Failing to secure relief from either the tax assessor or the board of tax assessment review,
Weybosset Hill filed petitions in Superior Court challenging as excessive the property tax
assessments made by defendant Thomas Rossi in his capacity as tax assessor for the City of
Providence (the city) for tax years 1997, 1998, 1999, and 2000.   The actions were consolidated
1 The subject property is also identified as assessor’s plat 24, lot 626.
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for the purposes of trial.   The trial justice ruled that the real estate had been over-assessed for all
four  tax  years  and  awarded  to  Weybosset  Hill  damages  of                                           $871,170.90,  plus  interest  of
$352,134.16, for a total of $1,223,358.01. The city appealed, raising several issues, the most
significant of which questions the validity of the assignments.   After examining the record and
briefs filed by the parties and hearing the arguments of counsel, we affirm the judgment of the
Superior Court.
Facts and Travel
On March 12, 1999, Weybosset Hill became the owner of the property at One Weybosset
Hill in Providence (the property) and a parking lot across the street.   Weybosset Hill purchased
both parcels from Blue Cross for $3,592,000.
In 1987 the city conducted a decennial citywide revaluation of real estate, and assessed
the subject property for $10,425,400.   It then carried over this assessment each year thereafter,
including the tax years at issue in this case.   Blue Cross,   then the owner of the property,
challenged the assessments for tax years 1997, 1998, and 1999.   On July 23, 1998, Blue Cross
entered into a purchase and sale agreement with Paolino Realty, LLC, the predecessor-in-interest
to Weybosset Hill.2
The consideration for the sale of the property included an assignment of the property tax
challenges, which were then in various stages of the appellate process.   Two days before the
closing, an assignment agreement was executed in which Blue Cross assigned to Weybosset Hill
“all claims, rights, remedies, entitlements and obligations” relating to the pending appeals of tax
years 1998 and 1999.   On May 8, 2002, Blue Cross and Weybosset Hill executed a document
entitled “Confirmatory Assignment and Acceptance” that memorialized the intent of the parties
2 Joseph R. Paolino, Jr., the principal of Paolino Realty, LLC, signed the agreement and shortly
thereafter formed Weybosset Hill to purchase the property.
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to assign the appeal for tax year 1997, which had been “inadvertently omitted” from the original
assignment.
After the closing, Weybosset Hill continued to pursue diligently all appeals initiated by
Blue Cross.   Moreover, it challenged the assessment for the tax year 2000 in its own right.   All
such appeals were denied by the tax assessor and the board of tax assessment review, after which
Weybosset  Hill  timely  appealed  to  the  Superior  Court.    The  four  cases  eventually  were
consolidated, and were heard by a trial justice sitting without a jury in May 2002.
At trial, Weybosset Hill presented testimony from Webster Collins (Collins), a certified
real estate appraiser and executive vice president with CB Richard Ellis/Whittier Partners.   He
testified that he had been involved in appraisal work dealing with properties in Providence since
the  1970s.   Collins explained that there are three valuation methods one can employ when
appraising real estate:   the cost approach, the market sales comparison approach, and the income
approach.   The best evidence of value in a particular year, however, is an arm’s-length sale that
occurred in that year.   Consequently, he testified that the value of the property in 1999 was
$2,500,000, which he calculated by deducting from the total purchase price the estimated,
discounted value of the tax appeals and the cost of the parking lot.
With respect to the other years, Collins posited that the income approach generally is
preferred for valuing income-producing property, such as is at issue here.   According to Collins,
the income methodology weighs a number of factors, including the potential rental value of
similar property, the property’s vacancy rate, and the overall vacancy rate in the city.      In
calculating the value of the subject property, he also made adjustments for various expenses and
costs, including amortized capital improvements, leasing commissions, and parking operation
expenses.    Using this approach, Collins opined that the value of the property was $3,495,000 for
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tax year 1997, $3,895,000 for 1998, and $5,400,000 for 2000.   All of Collins’s conclusions and
calculations were included in an appraisal report that he prepared.   The city objected to the
introduction of this report, arguing that although it had requested the report months before trial, it
received the report only ten or twelve days before the trial commenced and had insufficient time
to review it.  The report was entered into evidence over the city’s objection.
Weybosset Hill also presented testimony from Thomas Bovis (Bovis), an assistant vice
president of engineering and administrative services for Blue Cross.   His duties included real
estate development, acquisition, and space planning.   Bovis explained the procedure Blue Cross
used to authorize the sale of real estate.   He further testified that part of the negotiations with
Paolino Realty, LLC over the purchase of the property concerned an assignment of Blue Cross’s
rights to its applications for tax abatements for tax years 1997, 1998, and 1999.   In addition,
Weybosset Hill produced as a witness Joseph R. Paolino, Jr. (Paolino), who also testified to the
extensive  “back-and-forth” negotiations and concessions each party made.    Based upon the
uncontradicted testimony of both Bovis and Paolino, the trial justice found that the sale of the
property was indeed an arm’s-length transaction.
Rossi did not appear at the trial because of medical reasons, but was permitted to submit
testimony by affidavit.  Specifically, Rossi characterized the sale as a “sale-leaseback,” which he
said often is motivated by a desire to convert an illiquid real estate asset into cash, while
retaining control and use of the facility.   He further averred that such arrangements generally
include a long-term lease commitment by the seller, a condition absent from this transaction.
Thus, according to the city, the sale was not an arm’s-length transaction and therefore not a valid
indicator of valuation.
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Rossi also questioned some of the underlying assumptions Collins made in his appraisal.
For instance, he asserted that Collins’s appraisal methodology did not conform to the Uniform
Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice.  Rossi noted that the rental figure of $15 per square
foot presented in Collins’s report was not accurate because the  “Greater Providence Office
Market Report” estimated comparable space between $15 and $20 per square foot.   He also
noted that the property’s good location indicated that the rental value should be higher than $15
per square foot.   He further averred, “The operating expenses, taxes, parking and utilities are the
responsibility of the tenants,” not the owner.   Therefore, those adjustments should not have been
made against the value of the property. Rossi concluded, “The Gross Rent was understated, and
the operating expenses are overstated.”
In lieu of closing arguments, both sides submitted multiple post-trial memoranda.   The
city also moved for judgment on partial findings pursuant to Rule 52(c) of the Superior Court
Rules of Civil Procedure, in which it renewed its previous argument that Weybosset Hill lacked
standing to challenge the assessments for the 1997, 1998, and 1999 tax years.   The city asserted
that the right to appeal an assessment under the statute is personal to the taxpayer and may not be
assigned.   Further, it argued that, with respect to the 1999 tax, the account, which is a statutory
prerequisite to seeking relief from a claimed overassessment, was filed by Blue Cross under oath
and was not transferable.
In a written decision, the trial justice denied the city’s Rule 52(c) motion, and found
Collins’s testimony to be “credible, convincing, and virtually uncontradicted.”   Accordingly, she
accepted his expert testimony and concluded that Weybosset Hill had presented sufficient
testimony to rebut  “the presumption of validity attendant to the assessor’s carry-over of a
decennial review * * *.”   The trial justice formally adopted Collins’s appraisals of fair market
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value, and ordered the city to “alter the assessments accordingly and return to [Weybosset Hill]
all of the excess amounts paid for those years relating to the Property, whether paid by [Blue
Cross] or [Weybosset Hill].”
Judgment entered on September 11, 2002, on behalf of Weybosset Hill, from which the
city timely appealed.3
Discussion
The city advances three arguments in support of its appeal.   First, it asserts that the trial
justice erroneously denied its motion to amend its answer to add the affirmative defense that
Weybosset Hill had failed to perfect its appeal because it did not file “a true and exact account
under oath” as required by G.L. 1956 §§ 44-5-15 and 44-5-16.  Second, the city contends that the
trial justice erred by not granting a reasonable continuance because Rossi, for medical reasons,
was unable to attend the trial.   Finally, the city argues that Weybosset Hill lacked standing to
appeal the tax assessments effectuated before it assumed ownership of the property.   As we
proceed to discuss each of these issues, additional facts will be supplemented as warranted.
Defendant’s Motion to Amend Answer
The city sought to amend its answer on two occasions.   It originally filed motions to
amend on September 17, 2001, in this case, as well as in other pending tax appeals, filed by
Granoff Realty II Limited Partnership (Granoff Realty II).   In its motions, the city attempted to
add the following affirmative defense:
“Defendant asserts the defense of R.I.G.L. § 44-5-15 and § 44-5-16
in that Plaintiff has failed to submit a true and exact account under
oath within the statutory time period and/or the defense of R.I.G.L.
3
The city filed its appeal from the trial justice’s August 6, 2002 decision on August 23, 2002.
We  treat  the  appeal,  therefore,  as  if  it  had  been  filed  after  the  entry  of  judgment.    See
Dovenmuehle Mortgage, Inc. v. Antonelli, 790 A.2d 1113, 1114 n.1 (R.I. 2002) (per curiam).
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§ 44-5-26  and  44-5-27  in  that  Plaintiff  has  failed  to  properly
perfect its appeal.”
The motions to amend were heard on October 10, 2001, by a motion justice4 and denied in all
cases.   The city then filed a petition in this Court seeking a writ of certiorari, which was denied.
Granoff Realty II’s case was tried first, and on April 2, 2002, judgment was entered in favor of
Granoff Realty II, from which the city appealed.   In an opinion issued on May 30, 2003, we
rejected the city’s argument that the motion justice abused his discretion by denying the motion
to amend. Granoff Realty II, Limited Partnership v. Rossi, 823 A.2d 296 (R.I. 2003) (per curiam)
(Granoff Realty). The same reasoning is persuasive in the case before us now.
In Granoff Realty, we recognized that, although leave to amend a pleading lies within the
sound discretion of a trial justice, Rule 15(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure5
“liberally permits amendment absent a showing of extreme prejudice.” Granoff Realty, 823 A.2d
at 298 (quoting Wachsberger v. Pepper, 583 A.2d 77, 78 (R.I. 1990)). “Accordingly, leave to
amend should be denied only when the nonmoving party can establish that it would be unduly
prejudiced by the amendment.” Id. (citing Wachsberger, 583 A.2d at 78-79).
The city acknowledges that Granoff Realty is dispositive of any claim of error that its
original motions to amend were wrongly denied at the hearing on October 10, 2001. It asserts,
however, that it renewed its motion to amend its answer at the commencement of trial, and that
4
The motion justice was a different Superior Court justice from the trial justice.
5
Rule 15(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part:
“Amendments.   A party may amend the party’s pleading
once as a matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading
is served or, if the pleading is one to which no responsive pleading
is permitted and the action has not been placed upon the trial
calendar, the party may so amend it at any time within 20 days
after  it  is  served.    Otherwise  a  party  may  amend  the  party’s
pleading  only  by  leave  of  court  or  by  written  consent  of  the
adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so
requires.”
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the trial justice erred by summarily denying it without explanation.   The trial justice did not
independently consider the motion to amend, the city argues, nor did she articulate her reasons
for denying it.   The city further contends that Weybosset Hill failed to show that it would suffer
extreme prejudice if the answers were amended.
As we said in Granoff Realty, 823 A.2d at 298, leave to amend a pleading generally is
liberally permitted. However, a court need not grant leave to amend a pleading when doing so
would unduly prejudice the nonmoving party. Id. Moreover, “[t]he question of prejudice to the
party opposing the amendment is central to the investigation into whether an amendment should
be granted.” Faerber v. Cavanagh, 568 A.2d 326, 329 (R.I. 1990).
At the hearing on October 10, 2001, Weybosset Hill argued that it would be prejudiced if
the motion to amend was granted because it would have to examine the accounts entered for the
relevant tax years to find whether any of the city’s claimed inadequacies, inaccuracies, or
omissions were substantial.   Since Weybosset Hill’s case was, at that date, set for trial in two or
three weeks, it asserted that it would be prejudiced if, in addition to preparing for trial, it had to
prepare new issues questioning the adequacy of its accounts.
In her decision, the trial justice reviewed the city’s original answer, and noted that the
record was “devoid of any evidence indicating that Defendant asserted this defense prior to trial
with the specificity and particularity required by [Super.R.Civ.P.] 9(c).”6   Without specifically
commenting on the city’s motion to amend filed on the eve of trial, she denied its Rule 52(c)
motion “based on [Weybosset Hill’s] alleged failure to comply with the statutory requirement.”
6 Rule 9(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
“Conditions  Precedent.  In  pleading  the  performance  or
occurrence of conditions precedent, it is sufficient to aver generally
that  all  conditions  precedent  have  been  performed  or  have
occurred. A denial of performance or occurrence shall be made
specifically and with particularity.”
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The city now argues that these findings did not constitute an independent exercise of
discretion or an explanation of why the trial justice departed from the policy that amendments
should be allowed liberally.   We conclude, however, that her failure to mention specifically the
city’s renewed motion to amend was not an abuse of discretion. We previously have held that
“[e]ven brief findings and conclusions are sufficient if they address and resolve the controlling
and essential factual issues in the case.” Donnelly v. Cowsill, 716 A.2d 742, 747 (R.I. 1998)
(quoting Anderson v. Town of East Greenwich, 460 A.2d 420, 423 (R.I. 1983)).
We agree with the trial justice. Employing our highly deferential standard to the findings
of fact of a trial justice sitting without a jury, DeBourgknecht v. Rossi, 798 A.2d 934, 937 (R.I.
2002) (per curiam), we hold that Weybosset Hill demonstrated prejudice sufficient to oppose the
city’s motion to amend, and that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial justice to deny the
motion.  Our reasoning in Granoff Realty, 823 A.2d at 298, bears repeating:
“The plaintiff may well have been extremely prejudiced had the
city  been  granted  leave  to  amend,  considering  the  lateness  of
defendant’s motion, its proximity to trial, and the significant work
plaintiff would have needed to undertake to prepare for the new
legal issue.   The fact that trial actually did not commence until six
months after the hearing on the motion is irrelevant because, at the
time of the hearing, the trial was scheduled to commence within a
week.”
In this case, the renewed motion to amend was filed but a week before the trial began.
Moreover, we conclude that the trial justice’s ruling was correct under the law of the case
doctrine, which provides that “ordinarily, after a judge has decided an interlocutory matter in a
pending suit, a second judge, confronted at a later stage of the suit with the same question in the
identical  manner,  should  refrain  from  disturbing  the  first  ruling.”  Ferguson  v.  Marshall
Contractors, Inc., 745 A.2d 147, 151 (R.I. 2000) (quoting Taveira v. Solomon, 528 A.2d 1105,
1107 (R.I. 1987)).   Nevertheless, “[this] doctrine does not apply when the second motion is
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based on an expanded record.” Goodman v. Turner,  512 A.2d  861,  864  (R.I.  1986).    It is
incumbent upon the moving party, however, to bring to the court’s attention material that
significantly extends the record. See Salvadore v. Major Electric & Supply, Inc., 469 A.2d 353,
356 (R.I. 1983).
In the case now before us, the record indicates that the city filed its second motion to
amend on May 2, 2002.   When the matter was reached for trial on May 9, 2002, it did not press
the motion, or even bring it to the trial justice’s attention, until midway through the first day of
testimony.   Although the trial justice did not say that she was applying the law of the case
doctrine, we conclude that she quite properly denied the motion to amend.
Motion to Continue
The city’s second allegation of error concerns the trial justice’s denial of its motion to
continue the trial because Rossi’s medical condition made him unable to attend.   According to
the city, Rossi’s absence was particularly problematic because not only was he the named
defendant, but he also was the city’s only expert witness.   Further, the city contends that it
received Collins’s appraisal report only ten days before trial and “Rossi was sick so he couldn’t
assist with understanding and digesting the report prior to the trial.”     Consequently, it asserts,
the trial justice’s failure to grant a reasonable continuance was reversible error.  We disagree.
Both parties acknowledge that these consolidated appeals came before an assignment
justice during the week of April 29, 2002, when the city requested a thirty-day continuance.  The
matter was continued, but only to May 8, when it was assigned for trial to a justice who chose to
recuse.   It then was reassigned to the trial justice for trial beginning the next day.   The first time
that the city requested a continuance from the assignment justice because of Rossi’s medical
condition was on May  8.   The assignment justice reviewed a doctor’s note and denied the
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request.   On May 9, the city renewed its request before the trial justice and produced the same
note, together with a cover letter from the doctor.
“It is well settled that ‘[a] motion for a continuance is addressed to the sound discretion
of the trial justice, and his or her decision will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of
discretion.’” Perry v. Garey, 799 A.2d 1018, 1024 (R.I. 2002) (quoting State v. Bruyere, 751
A.2d 1285, 1287 (R.I. 2000) (per curiam)).
We are satisfied that the trial justice in this case considered the city’s concerns, as well as
Weybosset Hill’s representations that its witnesses would be inconvenienced by further delay.
Moreover, we are not persuaded that the city did not have adequate time to review Collins’s
appraisal report before trial.  There was no evidence that Rossi was medically incapacitated at all
before May 8, 2002, much less that he was ever too sick to “assist with understanding and
digesting the report.”   On the contrary, the trial justice said at the close of the evidence that,
although she was not insensitive to his medical condition, she believed that he could, in fact, be
of assistance to defendant, and she allowed the city to submit Rossi’s testimony by affidavit.
We also note that pursuant to Rule 40 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure,
“[a]  motion  for  a  continuance  on  the  ground  of  sickness  of  a  party  or  witness  shall  be
accompanied by a certificate of a practicing physician stating the fact of said sickness, and the
kind, degree, and the time of the beginning thereof.”   The doctor’s letter and note that the city
submitted fell far short of this standard because the doctor’s note specified only the illness from
which Rossi suffered, not its degree and duration.   The city has failed to show that the trial
justice abused her discretion by denying its request for a continuance based upon Rossi’s medical
condition.
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Nor are we convinced that the city has shown that it was unfairly disadvantaged by the
receipt of Collins’s appraisal report only ten or twelve days before trial.   These appeals had been
pending in Superior Court for quite some time.   Certainly, the city had ample opportunity to
retain its own appraiser or to depose Collins before trial.   As it was, the trial justice found
Collins’s testimony to be most compelling, “notwithstanding a lengthy cross-examination.”
Weybosset Hill’s Standing
The city also alleged in its motion for judgment on partial findings, pursuant to Rule
52(c), that Weybosset Hill lacked standing to prosecute the appeals for tax years 1997 and 1998
because it did not own the property when such taxes were imposed.   It further asserted that
Weybosset Hill lacked standing to appeal the 1999 taxes, notwithstanding its purchase of the
property on March  12,  1999, because the  “true and exact account” that must be filed as a
prerequisite to challenging a tax assessment was, in fact, filed by Blue Cross, its predecessor in
title.  The trial justice denied the city’s Rule 52(c) motions in her written decision.
The issue of whether a plaintiff has standing to bring a tax appeal is a mixed question of
law and fact.   Cummings v. Shorey, 761 A.2d 680, 684 (R.I. 2000). A plaintiff has standing
when “the plaintiff alleges that the challenged action has caused him [or her] injury in fact,
economic or otherwise.” Id. (quoting Rhode Island Opthalmological Society v. Cannon, 113 R.I.
16,                                                                                                    22,   317  A.2d  124,  128  (1974)). Standing is not determined by whether the injury is
substantial or insubstantial, but only whether there is some injury as opposed to no injury. Id. We
also have held that a taxpayer has standing if he or she has a “personal stake beyond that shared
by all other members of the public at large or the taxpayers of the town.” Id. (quoting West
Warwick School Committee v. Souliere, 626 A.2d 1280, 1284 (R.I. 1993)).
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On appeal, the city argues that § 44-5-16 provides the exclusive remedy for relief from an
illegal tax assessment.   It further contends that, as municipalities possess only such power to tax
as is authorized by the constitution or the Legislature, the laws concerning taxation are in
derogation of common law and, therefore, must be construed strictly.
Section 44-5-26(a) provides in pertinent part:
“Any  person  aggrieved  on  any  ground  whatsoever  by  any
assessment of taxes against him or her in any city or town * * *
may within ninety (90) days from the date of the first tax payment
is due, file an appeal in the local office of tax assessment * * *.”
Thus, according to the city, Weybosset Hill was not an aggrieved party to challenge the
assessments for tax years 1997 and 1998 because it was not responsible for paying any taxes
imposed before it assumed ownership of the property.   Further, the city asserts that there is no
provision in the tax statutes that allows a tax appeal to be assigned, and in the absence of such a
specific statutory provision, a taxpayer who already has filed an appeal has no right to assign his
or her rights to another party. We reject the city’s reasoning.
Section 44-5-26  is  a  remedial  statute  and  should  be  construed  liberally  to  achieve
effectuation of the relief it is meant to provide. deZahara v. Weiss, 516 A.2d 879, 880 (R.I. 1986)
(citing Ayers-Schaffner v. Solomon, 461 A.2d 396, 399 (R.I. 1983)). Furthermore, “[a]s with all
revenue statutes, any doubt about the meaning or scope of § 44-5-26 must be resolved in favor of
the taxpayer and against the taxing authority.” deZahara, 516 A.2d at 880 (citing Norberg v.
Feist, 495 A.2d 687, 689 (R.I. 1985)).
In its reply brief, the city acknowledges that it is not challenging Weybosset Hill’s status
as an aggrieved party with respect to the assessment of December 31, 1998, for tax year 1999.
Even though Weybosset Hill did not take title to the property until March 12, 1999, it was the
owner when the tax bills were issued in the summer of 1999, and it paid such taxes.
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We were confronted with a similar situation in deZahara.   In deZahara, 516 A.2d at 879,
the plaintiff purchased property in Newport on June 15, 1983. Newport began the process of
revaluing the property before the plaintiff’s purchase. Id. Shortly after purchasing the property,
the plaintiff received a tax bill for the assessment on December 31, 1982, that was forwarded to
her by the previous owner. Id. She then filed an appeal to reduce the 1982 assessment. Id.
The tax assessor in deZahara, 516 A.2d at 879, similarly argued that the purchaser did not
have standing under § 44-5-26 to pursue the appeal because she was not aggrieved within the
meaning of the statute. Instead, the tax assessor argued that the previous owner was the proper
party to bring the appeal, and the purchaser’s remedy was to join the previous owner as an
indispensable party plaintiff. deZahara, 516 A.2d at 879-80. We held that the plaintiff was an
“aggrieved” party within the scope of § 44-5-26, and that she was the proper party to pursue the
appeal. deZahara, 516 A.2d at 880.
In reaching our holding, we refused to construe  § 44-5-26 narrowly. We said,  “[t]o
construe this section so narrowly as to mean that only the person owning a piece of property on a
specific  assessment  date  may  seek  relief  would  be  absurd.”  deZahara,                         516  A.2d  at  880.
Furthermore,  we  held  that  the  plaintiff  was  the  party  against  whom  the  taxes  had  been
“assessed”:                                                                                           “[s]ince the plaintiff is, in reality, the one against whom the taxes were imposed and
from whom the taxes must be collected, she is the one against whom the taxes were ‘assessed’ as
is meant by § 44-5-26.” deZahara, 516 A.2d at 880.
Pursuant to our opinion in deZahara, the trial justice found that “[Weybosset Hill] had
standing to challenge the 1998 assessment [i.e., for tax year 1999] in its own right.” We agree.
The present facts are similar to those we confronted in deZahara, and we affirm the trial justice’s
finding accordingly.
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Weybosset Hill’s standing to challenge the assessments for tax years 1997 and 1998
flows from its status as successor-in-interest to Blue Cross.   The city argues that the trial justice
erred in finding that Weybosset Hill had standing to pursue Blue Cross’s tax appeals for those
years that Blue Cross owned the property because title 44 does not specifically provide for the
assignment of tax appeals.  Conversely, Weybosset Hill asserts that legal claims may be assigned
if supported by adequate consideration, and that “as assignee of Blue Cross’ tax appeals it steps
into the shoes of the assignor and can avail itself of the assignor’s rights, no more and no less.”
The trial justice found, as a question of fact, that the assignment of the tax appeals for tax
years 1997 and 1998 from Blue Cross to Weybosset Hill were valid. She further ruled that
Weybosset Hill had claimed an injury in fact sufficient to establish itself as an “aggrieved party”
under § 44-5-26. She also stated, “[Weybosset Hill] arguably suffered a specific, concrete injury
from  the  assessment  process  when  it  purchased,  for  good  and  valuable  consideration,  its
predecessor’s pending appeal, which had been denied by the [city], along with the property.”
The city bases its argument on the proposition that chapter 5 of title 44, which authorizes
municipalities to levy a tax on its ratable property, is in derogation of the common law and
therefore must be strictly construed.  Thus, “in the absence of a specific statutory provision in the
tax title, a tax appellant has no right to assign his or her rights to another party.”   We reject,
however, the city’s contentions that the assignment is unenforceable, and that Weybosset Hill
“had no right to pursue any appeal based on tax assessments for which it had no responsibility to
pay.”
Contrary to the city’s assertions, we conclude that G.L.  1956  § 9-2-8 applies to the
assignments at issue here.  Section 9-2-8 provides:
“Assignee  of  nonnegotiable  chose  in  action.                                                         —  The
assignee  of  a  nonnegotiable  chose  in  action  which  has  been
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assigned in writing may maintain an action thereon in his or her
own name, but subject to all defenses and rights of counterclaim,
recoupment, or setoff to which the defendant would have been
entitled had the action been brought in the name of the assignor.”
The trial justice considered § 9-2-8 and ruled that it “impliedly authorizes assignments
like the subject one.”  We agree.  Moreover, we are unpersuaded by the city’s contention that the
lack of a specific statute authorizing the assignment of tax appeals trumps the more general
language of § 9-2-8.
In Cerberus Partners, L.P. v. Gadsby & Hannah,  728 A.2d  1057,  1061  (R.I.  1999)
(Cerberus), we held that a legal malpractice claim, a claim sounding in tort, was assignable
because it arose out of an earlier commercial loan transaction. Cerberus involved a suit by
purchasers of commercial loans against two law firms that, while representing the original
lenders, failed to perfect the lenders’ security interests. Id. at  1057-59. We held  “that legal
malpractice claims, transferred along with other assets and obligations to an assignee in a
commercial  transaction,  are  assignable                                                                *  *  *.”  Id.  at   1061.  There  we  acknowledged  “the
distinction between market assignments involving purely economic transactions,  *  *  * and
freestanding malpractice personal injury claim assignments that necessarily involve and invoke
the unique lawyer-client relationship * * *.” Id. at 1060.
The trial justice compared the assignment in this case to that in Cerberus and found them
to be strikingly similar.   She reasoned, “[l]ike in Cerberus Partners, the transfer of the appeals in
the  present  case  appears  to  be  a  market  assignment  involving  a  finite,  purely  economic
transaction.”   Moreover, the trial justice opined that any danger of establishing a commercial
market in assessment appeals was remote “because the assignee purchased property along with
the pending appeals, not merely the hypothetical right to bring an appeal.”
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We endorse the trial justice’s reasoning and affirm her judgment. We add that the
assignment not only was an essential component of the transaction, but also allowed Blue Cross
to transfer all its interests related to the property to Weybosset Hill.   This would seem to be the
most appropriate outcome from a commercial point of view.   After transferring its title to the
property, a previous owner’s incentive to prosecute the appeals vigorously might well be
diminished. Also, the subsequent purchaser would be placed in an untenable position if it were
required to oversee or otherwise monitor the previous owner to ensure that its interests were
being adequately protected in the litigation.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court, to which we
return the record in this case.
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COVER SHEET
TITLE OF CASE:   Weybosset Hill Investments, LLC v. Thomas Rossi, in his
capacity as tax assessor for the City of Providence.
DOCKET SHEET NO :                                                          2002-693
(PC 99-2047, PC 99-4094, PC 00-3481, PC 01-2065)
COURT:                                                                     Supreme
DATE OPINION FILED:   July 6, 2004
Appeal from
SOURCE OF APPEAL:     Superior Court                                                                                                      County:   Providence
JUDGE FROM OTHER COURT: Gibney, J.
JUSTICES:                                                                  Williams, CJ., Flanders, Goldberg, Flaherty and Suttell, JJ.
WRITTEN BY:                                                                Suttell, J.
ATTORNEYS:                                                                 Richard A. Licht, Esq.
For Plaintiff
ATTORNEYS:                                                                 Caroline Cornwell, Esq.
For Defendant

Download 02-693.pdf

Rhode Island Law