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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA07-1377
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  3 June  2008
AUSTIN HATCHER REALTY, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v.                                                                                              Brunswick County
No.  07-CVS-255
HAZEL GAITHER ARNOLD, MICHAEL
JAMES ARNOLD, ROGER WADE
ARNOLD, CHARLES TONY ARNOLD,
JAMES ARNOLD and JAMES KEITH
ARNOLD,
Defendants.
Appeal  by  p                                                                                   f  from  order  entered  9  July  2007  by  Judge
Ola  M.  Lewis  in  Superior  Court,  Brunswick  County.    Heard  in  the
Court of Appeals  29 April  2008.
Ward and Smith, P.A., by Thomas S. Babel and Ryal W. Tayloe,
for plaintiff-appellant.
Marshall,  Williams  &  Gorham,  L.L.P.,  by  John  L.  Coble,  for
defendant-appellee Hazel Gaither Arnold.
The  Chandler  Law  Firm,  P.A.,  by  John  Calvin  Chandler,  for
defendants-appellees   Michael   James   Arnold,   Charles   Tony
Arnold, James Arnold, and James Keith Arnold.
WYNN, Judge.
As  we  have  previously  noted,                                                                “appellate  review  of  the
dismissal of an action under North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6) is subject to more stringent rules than other procedural




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postures that come before us.”   1  When conducting such a review, we
“test  the  law  of  the  claim,  not  the  facts  which  support  it.”2
Here,  because  we  find  that  Plaintiff  Austin  Hatcher  Realty,  Inc.
has  alleged  facts  sufficient  to  support  its  claims  for  breach  of
contract and unjust enrichment against Defendants, we reverse the
trial court’s order dismissing the complaint.
According to the allegations in the complaint filed by Hatcher
Realty,  Rufus  and  Hazel  Arnold  signed  an  Exclusive  Right  to  Sell
Listing Agreement with Hatcher Realty on 19 May 2004, for property
located at 271 Smith Avenue in Shallotte, North Carolina, held only
in the name of Rufus Arnold.    The Listing Agreement provided that
the purchase price for the property would be  $1.1 million, with a
ten percent commission of one hundred thousand dollars to be paid
to Hatcher Realty.   It further stated that the commission “shall be
deemed earned”:
(a)   If  a  ready,  willing  and  able  buyer  is
procured by Agent, the Seller, or anyone
else during the Term of this Agreement at
the price and on the terms set herein, or
at any price and terms acceptable to the
Seller;
(b)   If   the   property   is   sold,   exchanged,
conveyed  or  transferred,  or  the  Seller
agrees   to   sell,   exchange,   convey   or
transfer the Property at any price and on
any terms whatsoever, during the Term of
this Agreement or any renewal hereof;
(c)   If,  within  160  days  after  expiration  of
1
Okuma Am. Corp. v. Bowers,  181 N.C. App.  85,  88,  638
S.E.2d  617,  619  (2007); see also N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  1A-1, Rule
12(b)(6)  (2005).
2
White v. White,  296 N.C.  661,  667,  252 S.E.2d  698,  702
(1979)  (quotation and citation omitted); see also Locklear v.
Lanuti,  176 N.C. App.  380,  383,  626 S.E.2d  711,  714  (2006).




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the    Term    of    this    Agreement                                        (the
“Protection   Period”),   Seller   either
directly or indirectly sells, exchanges,
conveys or transfers, or agrees to sell,
exchange, convey or transfer the Property
upon  any  term  whatsoever,  to  any  person
with  whom  Seller,  Agent,  or  any  real
estate  licensee  communicated  regarding
the  Property  during  the  Term  of  this
Agreement or any renewal hereof, provided
the  names  of  such  persons  are  delivered
or  postmarked  to  the  Seller  within                                       15
days  from  date  of  expiration.    HOWEVER,
Seller shall NOT be obligated to pay such
fee  if  a  valid  listing  agreement  is
entered  into  between  Seller  and  another
real  estate  broker  and  the  Property  is
sold, exchanged, conveyed or transferred
during such Protection Period.
Six days after signing the Agreement, Mr. Arnold executed a power
of  attorney  to  Ms.  Arnold.    However,  Mr.  Arnold  died  intestate
three  weeks  later,  extinguishing  the  power  of  attorney.    Under
operation of law, the Smith Avenue property passed outside of the
estate  to  Ms.  Arnold  and  Mr.  Arnold’s  five  sons  as  tenants  in
common.    Ms.  Arnold  was  appointed  administrator  of  Mr.  Arnold’s
estate on  6 July  2004.
According to the complaint, Ms. Arnold subsequently signed “on
behalf  of  herself,  the  Estate  and  as  agent  of  the  Beneficiaries”
extensions  of  the  Listing  Agreement  with  Hatcher  Realty  on            16
November  2004 and  12 May  2005.    Mr. Arnold’s estate was closed on
8  July                                                                       2005.    The  complaint  alleged  that  Ms.  Arnold,  again   “on
behalf of herself, the Estate and as agent of the Beneficiaries,”
signed another six-month extension of the agreement on 26 September
2005, to last until  30 March  2006.   On  21 October 2005, Ms. Arnold
petitioned  the  trial  court  for  an  order  to  sell  the  Smith  Avenue




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property as one parcel; she then filed a motion to sell by private
sale and appoint a commissioner on  15 November  2005.
The complaint further states that Austin Hatcher, of Hatcher
Realty, met with Tonia Twigg, the attorney for Mr. Arnold’s estate,
to assist her with preparing for the hearing on the motion to sell
by  private  sale.     On                                                    30  December                                                    2005,  Hampton  Coastal,  Inc.
executed an Offer to Purchase and Contract for the purchase of the
Smith Avenue property at the listed price of $1.1 million.   Hatcher
Realty  alleges  in  the  complaint  that  Ms.  Twigg                        “represented  to
Hatcher  Realty  that  the  sale  of  the  Property,”  presumably  to
Hampton  Coastal,                                                            “would  go  through  once  the  Court  granted  the
Motion  filed  by”  Ms.  Arnold  for  a  private  sale  and  that  Hatcher
Realty would receive its commission once the Smith Avenue property
was  sold.    The  complaint  likewise  asserts  that  Ms.  Arnold  also
“represented  to  Austin  Hatcher  that  Hatcher  Realty  would  be  paid
its Commission once the Property was sold.”
On                                                                           12  January                                                     2006,  the  court  granted  the  motion  for  the
property to be sold as a single parcel and appointed Ms. Twigg, the
estate attorney, as the commissioner.    Neither Ms. Arnold nor Ms.
Twigg  acted  on  the  offer  from  Hampton  Coastal,  despite  numerous
attempts by Hampton Coastal and Hatcher Realty to contact them.   On
23  May                                                                      2006,  the  court  ordered  the  sale  of  the  Smith  Avenue
property to Mac Construction Company for a purchase price of  $1.2
million.     According  to  the  complaint,  Mac  Construction  was  a
potential buyer that Hatcher Realty had contacted during the course
of the Listing Agreement.




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The  sale  was  confirmed  on                                                  27  June                                     2006,  with  the  proceeds
distributed to the estate beneficiaries.   The final accounting from
the sale was approved by the court on 15 August 2006.   However, Ms.
Arnold and the other beneficiaries refused to pay the commission to
Hatcher Realty, who filed a complaint on  7 February  2007, amended
on  12  April  2007,  for  breach  of  contract  and  unjust  enrichment.
Following answers filed by Ms. Arnold and the other beneficiaries,
Ms.  Arnold  filed  a  Rule                                                    12(b)(6)  motion  to  dismiss,  which  was
granted on  9 July  2007 after a hearing before the trial court.
Hatcher Realty now appeals the trial court’s order (I) denying
its  motion  to  strike  Ms.  Arnold’s  motion  to  dismiss;                   (II)
dismissing  its  complaint  for  breach  of  contract;  and                    (III)
dismissing its complaint for unjust enrichment.
I.
Hatcher  Realty  first  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  by
denying  its  motion  to  strike  Ms.  Arnold’s  motion  to  dismiss.
According  to  Hatcher  Realty,  the  motion  to  dismiss  “fail[ed]  to
state with particularity the grounds” on which it was based, such
that it should be stricken pursuant to Rules  12(f) and  7(b)(1) of
the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.   We find this argument
to be without merit.
Rule 7(b)(1) requires that a motion “shall be made in writing,
shall state with particularity the grounds therefor, and shall set
forth  the  relief  or  order  sought.”    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  1A-1,  Rule
7(b)(1)  (2005).    Significantly,  we  have  noted  that  a  “motion,  to
satisfy the requirements of Rule  7(b)(1), must supply information




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revealing  the  basis  of  the  motion.”    Smith  v.  Johnson,  125  N.C.
App. 603, 606, 481 S.E.2d 415, 417 (citation omitted), disc. review
denied,                                                                       346  N.C.   283,   487  S.E.2d   554   (1997).   We  have  also
repeatedly   indicated   that   the   purpose   of   the   particularity
requirement  is  to  ensure  that  “the  trial  court  and  the  opposing
party  [are  not  left]  to  guess  what  the  particular  grounds  might
be,”  N.C.  Alliance  for  Transp.  Reform  Inc.  v.  N.C.  Dep’t  of
Transp., 183 N.C. App. 466, 470, 645 S.E.2d 105, 108, disc. review
denied, 361 N.C. 569, 650 S.E.2d 812 (2007), “[f]or where court and
adverse  party  cannot  comprehend  the  basis  of  a  motion,  they  are
rendered powerless to respond to it.”   Dusenberry v. Dusenberry, 87
N.C. App.  490,  492,  361 S.E.2d  605,  606  (1987).
In  the  instant  case,  Ms.  Arnold’s  motion  indeed  stated  that
she sought a dismissal of Hatcher Realty’s complaint  “for failing
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]”   She made no
argument as to an affirmative defense to Hatcher Realty’s claims.
See  Johnson  v.  N.C.  Dep’t  of  Transp.,  107  N.C.  App.  63,  66,  418
S.E.2d  700,  702  (1992)  (noting that, if a defendant is arguing an
affirmative defense in support of a motion to dismiss, “the motion
must ordinarily refer expressly to the affirmative defense relied
upon,” unless  “the non-movant has not been surprised and has full
opportunity  to  argue  and  present  evidence  on  the  affirmative
defense.”  (citations and quotations omitted)).
We find Ms. Arnold’s statement that she was seeking dismissal
of  the  complaint  “for  failing  to  state  a  claim  upon  which  relief
can be granted” sufficient to  “reveal[] the basis of the motion,”




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as the essence of a Rule  12(b)(6) motion is that the plaintiff is
entitled  to  no  relief  under  any  state  of  facts  that  could  be
presented   in   support   of   the   claims.                                  Ladd   v.   Estate   of
Kellenberger, 314 N.C. 477, 481, 334 S.E.2d 751, 755 (1985).   Each
of the cases cited by Hatcher Realty, in which motions were held to
be improper for a lack of particularity, involved either Rule 59 or
Rule  60  motions;  none  concerned  a  Rule  12(b)(6)  motion.    Indeed,
Hatcher Realty’s argument that Ms. Arnold’s motion did not provide
it with sufficient notice of the basis for dismissal, such that its
defense at the hearing on the motion was impaired, is feckless.   To
defeat the motion to dismiss, Hatcher Realty needed to argue at the
hearing  only  that  its  complaint  alleged  facts  to  support  a  legal
claim  against  Ms.  Arnold  and  the  other  beneficiaries.    See  N.C.
Gen. Stat.  §  1A-1, Rule  12(b)(6); Piles v. Allstate Ins. Co.,  ___
N.C.  App.                                                                     ___,                      ___,   653  S.E.2d   181,   184   (2007)   (noting  that  a
motion  to  dismiss  should  be  denied  when  “as  a  matter  of  law,  the
allegations of the complaint are sufficient to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted under some legal theory.”).
Accordingly,  we  affirm  the  trial  court’s  denial  of  Hatcher
Realty’s motion to strike the motion to dismiss.
II.
Next,  Hatcher  Realty  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  by
granting  Ms.  Arnold’s  motion  to  dismiss  on  the  merits.    Hatcher
Realty  contends  that  it  has  alleged  sufficient  facts  that,  when
taken  in  the  light  most  favorable  to  Hatcher  Realty,  would
constitute  a  breach  of  contract  by  Ms.  Arnold  as  well  as  a  claim




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for unjust enrichment.
We note at the outset that “appellate review of the dismissal
of an action under North Carolina Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)
is subject to more stringent rules than other procedural postures
that come before us.”   Okuma Am. Corp. v. Bowers, 181 N.C. App. 85,
88,  638  S.E.2d  617,  619  (2007);  see  also  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  1A-1,
Rule  12(b)(6)  (2005).    When conducting such a review, we consider
only the question of whether, as a matter of law, the allegations
of the complaint are sufficient to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted under some legal theory. Id.    Thus, we must accept
as true the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint and
review  the  case  de  novo  “to  test  the  law  of  the  claim,  not  the
facts  which  support  it.”    White  v.  White,  296  N.C.  661,  667,  252
S.E.2d  698,  702  (1979)  (quotation and citation omitted); see also
Locklear  v.  Lanuti,  176  N.C.  App.  380,  383,  626  S.E.2d  711,  714
(2006).
To  state  a  claim  for  breach  of  contract,  a  “plaintiff  must
demonstrate that a valid contract existed which terms were breached
by the defendant.”   Jackson v. Carolina Hardwood Co., 120 N.C. App.
870,  871,  463 S.E.2d  571,  572  (1995).    Here, the facts alleged in
Hatcher Realty’s complaint, when taken as true, demonstrate that a
valid contract existed between Hatcher Realty and Ms. Arnold from
19 May 2004, when the original Listing Agreement was signed, until
the extension signed on 16 November 2004.   At that point, under the
facts  outlined  in  the  complaint,  particularly  the  assertion  that
Ms. Arnold signed the extension  “on behalf of herself, the Estate




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and as agent of the Beneficiaries”  (emphasis added), the contract
continued to exist between Hatcher Realty and all of the tenants in
common in the Smith Avenue property.   The Agreement was then valid
through  the  two  subsequent  extensions  signed  by  Ms.  Arnold           “on
behalf of herself, the Estate and as agent of the Beneficiaries,”
ultimately  expiring  on  30  March  2006.    When  taken  as  true,  this
allegation is sufficient to show ratification by the beneficiaries
of Ms. Arnold’s actions and effort to sell the property as a single
parcel, and therefore to bind them to the contract.   See LDDC, Inc.
v.  Pressley,                                                                71  N.C.  App.                                431,   433,   322  S.E.2d   416,   417   (1984)
(holding  that  a  tenant                                                    “may  not  bind  a  co-tenant  by  any  act
relating to the common property in the absence of ratification or
estoppel.”) (citing Hinson v. Shugart, 224 N.C. 207, 29 S.E.2d 694
(1944)).
Given that the complaint shows that a valid contract existed
between  Hatcher  Realty  and  the  tenants  in  common  of  the  Smith
Avenue  property,  Hatcher  Realty’s  claim  rests  on  whether  its
complaint in turn alleges facts sufficient to show a breach of that
contract.   Hatcher Realty’s complaint asserts two specific breaches
of  the  Listing  Agreement  by  Ms.  Arnold:  first,  that  she  was
presented  with  a  ready,  willing,  and  able  buyer  for  the  listed
price for the Smith Avenue property, namely, Hampton Coastal; and
second,  that  Hatcher  Realty  contacted  Mac  Construction  Company
about the Smith Avenue property during the term of the Agreement,
and Mac Construction was the ultimate buyer.
When taken as true, these actions could constitute breaches of




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the  specific  terms  of  the  Listing  Agreement.    Moreover,  if  Ms.
Arnold did have authority to sign the extensions of the Agreement
on  behalf  of  herself  and  as  agent  of  the  other  beneficiaries,  as
asserted  by  Hatcher  Realty  in  its  complaint,  then  these  actions
also took place on dates within the term of the Agreement and the
160-day “Protection Period” defined in the Agreement, respectively.
Accordingly,  we  reverse  the  trial  court’s  dismissal  of  Hatcher
Realty’s  complaint  for  failure  to  state  a  claim  for  breach  of
contract.3
III.
Finally, Hatcher Realty argues that the trial court erred by
dismissing its complaint for unjust enrichment.    We disagree.
To  state  a  claim  for  unjust  enrichment,  the  plaintiff’s
allegations  must  set  forth  that  a  benefit  was  conferred  on  the
defendant,  that  the  defendant  accepted  the  benefit,  and  that  the
benefit was not gratuitous.    Booe v. Shadrick,  322 N.C.  567,  570,
3
Ms. Arnold and the other beneficiaries argue to this Court
that the proceedings initiated by Ms. Arnold to partition the
property by sale should remove the court-approved sale of the
Smith Avenue property from the provisions of the Listing
Agreement.    However, the partition proceeding was voluntarily
initiated by Ms. Arnold; it was neither court-ordered nor
dictated, and we conclude that Ms. Arnold cannot hide behind
those proceedings to avoid the responsibilities she owes under
the terms of the Listing Agreement.
Moreover, even with a pending partition proceeding, the
tenants in common were still legally free to sell, transfer, or
convey their respective interests in the Smith Avenue property;
although the court had jurisdiction over the issue of partition,
it did not  “own” the property, nor did the action suspend any of
the ownership rights of the tenants in common.    If, as alleged in
the complaint, the Listing Agreement was agreed to by all of the
tenants in common, then it was still in force and unaffected by
the partition proceedings.




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369  S.E.2d  554,  556,  reh’g  denied,  323  N.C.  370,  373  S.E.2d  540
(1988).                                                                       Hatcher   Realty’s   complaint   includes   no   specific
allegations as to what benefits were conferred on Ms. Arnold, only
the  statement  that                                                          “Hatcher  Realty  provided  services”  that  were
accepted by Ms. Arnold, from which she benefitted and for which she
has  refused  to  pay.    At  the  hearing  on  the  motion  to  dismiss,
Hatcher  Realty  argued  that  these  services  included  assistance  to
Ms.  Twigg  in  preparing  for  the  hearing  on  the  motion  to  sell  by
private  sale,  partly  due  to  representations  that  Hatcher  Realty
would still be paid its commission when the sale was completed.
We find these facts as alleged to be insufficient to state a
claim for unjust enrichment.    Hatcher Realty has not claimed that
Ms. Arnold and the other beneficiaries would not have been able to
sell  the  Smith  Avenue  property  without  their  “services”  and  have
thus  failed  to  assert  facts  that  would  show  that  a  benefit  was
conferred on Ms. Arnold and the other beneficiaries, or that they
accepted the benefit.   Id.   Further, Austin Realty has not made any
showing that the preparation for the hearing on the motion to sell
was  a  benefit  that  was  not  gratuitous,  id.,  such  that  the
assistance would not have been provided absent the alleged promise
of payment of the commission.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of Hatcher
Realty’s claim for unjust enrichment.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Judges CALABRIA and GEER concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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