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NO. COA12-201
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                     18 December  2012
AUSTIN MAINTENANCE & CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Plaintiff
Mecklenburg County
v.
No.  10 CVS  22651
CROWDER CONSTRUCTION COMPANY and
STEVE LANIER,
Defendants
Appeal  by  plaintiff  from  judgments  entered                            2  November  2011
by  Judge  Calvin  E.  Murphy  in  Mecklenburg  County  Superior  Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals  14 August  2012.
Moye,  O’Brien,  O’Rourke,  Pickert  &  Dillon,  LLP,  by  J.
Andrew  Williams,  Stephen  W.  Pickert,  and  Peter  C.  Anderson,
for plaintiff-appellant.
Erwin,  Bishop,  Capitano  &  Moss,  P.A.,  by  Joseph  W.  Moss,
Jr., for defendant-appellee Steve Lanier.
Johnston,  Allison  &  Hord,  P.A.,  by  Michael  L.  Wilson  and
Kerry    L.    Traynum,    for    defendant-appellee    Crowder
Construction Company.
ERVIN, Judge.
Plaintiff  Austin  Maintenance  &  Construction,  Inc.,  appeals
from  orders  granting  summary  judgment  in  favor  of  Defendants
Steve  Lanier  and  Crowder  Construction  Company  with  respect  to
Plaintiff’s  breach  of  fiduciary  duty  claim,  which  had  been




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asserted   solely   against   Mr.   Lanier;   Plaintiff’s   claims   for
tortious  interference  with  contract,  unfair  or  deceptive  trade
practices,  and  civil  conspiracy,  which  had  been  asserted  against
both  Defendants;  and  Plaintiff’s  request  for  injunctive  relief.
On  appeal,  Plaintiff  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  by
granting  summary  judgment  in  favor  of  Defendants  on  the  grounds
that  the  record  reveals  the  existence  of  genuine  issues  of
material  fact  concerning  whether  Mr.  Lanier  breached  a  fiduciary
duty  that  he  owed  Plaintiff  and  whether  Defendants  tortiously
interfered  with  a  contract  between  Plaintiff  and  The  Timken
Company,  engaged  in  unfair  or  deceptive  trade  practices,  and
participated  in  a  civil  conspiracy,  and  on  the  grounds  that
Plaintiff  was  entitled  to  injunctive  relief.     After  careful
consideration  of  Plaintiff’s  challenges  to  the  trial  court’s
orders  in  light  of  the  record  and  the  applicable  law,  we
conclude that the trial court’s orders should be affirmed.
I. Background
A. Substantive Facts
Timken  operates  a                                                          “tapered  roller  bearing”  manufacturing
plant  in  Randleman,  a  town  near  Asheboro.     Timken  personnel
refer  to  this  facility  as  the  Asheboro  plant.    Between  2006  and
2010,   Sanders   Brothers   Inc.   provided   construction-related
maintenance  services  at  Timken’s  Asheboro  plant  and  several




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other  Timken  plants  pursuant  to  a  Master  Service  Agreement
(MSA).    The  MSA  set  out  the  general  terms  and  conditions  which
would  apply  to  specific  contracts  into  which  Timken  and  Sanders
might  enter  in  the  future.     The  MSA  did  not  provide  for  the
provision  of  specific  services  or  obligate  either  party  to  enter
into  specific  contracts;  instead,  the  MSA  provided  that  Timken
would  execute  Purchase  Orders  memorializing  any  future  contracts
between the parties.
In                                                                          2010,                                Sanders                                          experienced   serious   financial
difficulties.     At  that  point,  Rick  Flickinger,  the  manager  of
Timken’s   Asheboro   plant,   investigated   the   possibility   of
procuring   construction-related   maintenance   services   from   a
different  company.     In  the  course  of  that  process,  Crowder,
which  competes  with  Plaintiff  in  the  construction  maintenance
business,  made  Mr.  Flickinger’s                                          “short  list.”     However,  after
Sanders  Brothers  assigned  its  rights  under  the  MSA  to  Plaintiff
effective  on                                                               9  June                              2010,  Plaintiff  assumed  responsibility  for
providing  construction-related  maintenance  services  at  Timken’s
Asheboro plant instead.
At  the  time  that  Plaintiff  began  providing  construction
maintenance  services  at  the  Asheboro  plant,  Mr.  Lanier  had  been
employed  at  that  facility  for  twelve  years,  with  the  last  six
years  of  that  period  having  been  spent  as  a  Sanders  Brothers




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employee.     Mr.  Lanier  supervised  a  crew  consisting  of  three
other  men  who  had  also  worked  at  the  plant  for  at  least  five
years                                                                        -  James  Moore,  Willard  McDaniel,  and  Earl  Turner.1     The
crew  performed  various  tasks  at  the  direction  of  Mr.  Flickinger,
including   welding,   metal   fabrication,   wiring,   repairing   the
water  pipes  and  coolant  system,  pipe  fitting,  and  performing
other  machine  repairs.    In  addition,  Timken  had  a                    “tendency  to
rearrange  machines”  in  the  Asheboro  plant,  so  Mr.  Lanier’s  crew
was  involved  in  implementing  these  “machine  moves”  as  well.    The
machines  were  very  large;  moving  them  required  a  complex  series
of  procedures  including  the  performance  of  some  construction-
related work.
After  Plaintiff  purchased  Sanders  Brothers’  rights  under
the  MSA,  it  hired  Mr.  Lanier  and  the  other  members  of  the  crew
as  hourly,  at-will  employees.    Mr.  Lanier  continued  to  serve  as
crew   foreman   after   coming   into   Plaintiff’s   employment;   his
immediate  supervisor  was  Jack  Richardson,  one  of  Plaintiff’s
General   Managers.                                                          As   crew   superintendent   and   Plaintiff’s
highest  ranking  employee  at  the  Asheboro  plant,  Plaintiff  had
additional  responsibilities  over  and  above  those  assigned  to  the
1Mr.  Lanier’s  crew  originally  included  a  janitor  named  Juan
Estrada.    However,  Crowder  did  not  hire  Mr.  Estrada  because  of
questions  about  his  immigration  status.                                  As  a  result,  all
references  to  Mr.  Lanier’s  crew  throughout  the  remainder  of  this
opinion  should  be  understood  as  encompassing  only  the  four
individuals named in the text.




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other  crew  members.    Among  other  things,  Mr.  Lanier  supervised
the  crew,  coordinated  their  work  on  specific  projects,  and  had
the  right  to  select  crew  members  and  request  pay  raises.     Mr.
Lanier    also    had    certain    record-keeping    responsibilities,
including   documenting   compliance   with   safety   regulations,
overseeing  weekly  employee  time  sheets,  and  preparing  documents
that  Plaintiff  used  to  generate  invoices  and  prepare  other
reports.    Finally,  Mr.  Lanier  functioned  as  the  primary  source
of  communication  between  his  crew  and  the  individuals  directly
responsible  for  operating  Timken’s  Asheboro  plant  and  Plaintiff.
Mr.  Lanier  did  not  work  from  an  office;  instead,  he  performed
his  supervisory  tasks  while  working  with  the  rest  of  the  crew  on
construction-related  maintenance  projects.     Neither  Mr.  Lanier
nor  any  other  member  of  the  crew  was  asked  to  sign  a  non-
competition   agreement,   a   non-solicitation   agreement,   or   a
confidentiality agreement.
Within  a  month  after  becoming  employed  by  Plaintiff,  the
members  of  the  crew  became  dissatisfied  with  the  manner  in  which
Plaintiff  handled  certain  administrative  issues,  the  amount  of
paperwork  that  Plaintiff  required,  and  the  manner  in  which
Plaintiff  responded  to  their  concerns.     As  a  result,  all  four
crew  members  began  looking  for  other  employment  during  the
summer of  2010.




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On                                                                           14   July                             2010,   James  Moore  called  Brian  Gossett,  a
Crowder  employee  with  whom  James  Moore  had  worked  when  both  were
employed  by  Sanders  Brothers  at  the  Asheboro  plant.     At  that
time,  James  Moore,  who  wanted  to                                        “get  away  from                      [Plaintiff],”
asked  Mr.  Gossett  if  he  might  obtain  employment  at  Crowder.
After  Mr.  Gossett  indicated  that  Crowder  was  always  looking  for
good  workers,  James  Moore  gave  him  Mr.  Lanier’s  phone  number.
Mr.  Gossett,  in  turn,  agreed  to  provide  Mr.  Lanier’s  phone
number  to  Tracy  Moore,  who  held  a  management  position  with
Crowder.
On  the  following  day,  Tracy  Moore  called  Mr.  Lanier.     At
that  time,  Mr.  Lanier  and  Tracy  Moore  discussed  the  possibility
that  Mr.  Lanier’s  entire  crew  would  begin  working  for  Crowder.
During  that  conversation,  Mr.  Lanier  asked  Tracy  Moore  to  send
him  information  concerning  the  salary  and  benefit  package  that
Crowder would be in a position to offer to members of the crew.
Mr.  Lanier  also  talked  to  Mr.  Flickinger  about  the  possible
change.    Among  other  things,  Mr.  Lanier  told  Mr.  Flickinger  that
he  did  not  want  to  continue  working  for  Plaintiff  and  that  the
crew  complained  about  Plaintiff                                           “several  times  a  week.”    After
speaking   with   his   supervisors,   Mr.   Flickinger   informed   Mr.
Lanier  that,  instead  of  being  contractually  obligated  to  work
with    Plaintiff,    Timken    was    free    to    procure    specific




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construction-related  maintenance  services  from  Crowder  rather
than  Plaintiff.     In  addition,  Mr.  Flickinger  told  Mr.  Lanier
that  he  would  like  the  crew  to  stay  at  the  Asheboro  plant
regardless  of  whether  they  were  employed  by  Plaintiff,  Crowder,
or   some   other   company.                                                After   receiving   this   information,
Crowder  provided  salary  and  benefits  information  to  Mr.  Lanier,
submitted  a  proposal  under  which  Crowder  would  perform  work  at
Timken’s  Asheboro  plant  to  Mr.  Flickinger,  and  completed  the
documentation   required   for   Crowder   to   become   qualified   to
provide    construction-related    maintenance    services    at    the
Asheboro plant.
Between  July  and  October  of                                             2010,  the  crew  had  frequent
discussions  concerning  their  dissatisfaction  with  Plaintiff  and
the   possibility   that   they   might   begin   working   for   Crowder
instead.     On                                                             23  August                                2010,  Mr.  Richardson  received  an  email
from  Caleb  Rice,  one  of  Plaintiff’s  safety  managers,  in  which
Mr. Rice stated that:
I   just   wanted   to   send   you   guys   a   note
reflecting  on  my  visit  with  Steve  Lanier  at
Timken  Asheboro  last  week.                                               .  .  .     I  would
regret  not  letting  you  know  the  concerns
that  Steve  has  voiced  to  me,  and  knowing
Steve  as  a  very  honest  and  straightforward
person,  these  are  not  idle  threats.
Steve  is  looking  at  other  contactors  to  work
for  in  the  Timken  Asheboro  plant,  and  right
now  the  only  thing  stalling  the  change  is
which  company  will  offer  the  best  pay  and
benefits.    First  of  all,  Steve  says  that  he




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does  not  want  to  change  companies,  he  feels
that  they  have  been  through  enough  without
having  to  go  through  another  change,  but  the
crew  up  there  will  not  continue  working  with
all  of  these  issues.    The  following  are  some
of  the  issues  that  he  has  had  over  the  last
two months.  .  .
On  the  following  day,  Mr.  Richardson  traveled  to  the  Asheboro
plant  and  met  with  Mr.  Lanier,  Mr.  Flickinger,  and  the  other
members  of  the  crew  for  the  purpose  of  discussing  issues  that
were  of  concern  to  the  crew.    However,  the  crew  continued  to  be
dissatisfied with their status as employees of Plaintiff.
On                                                                            27  September                                       2010,  the  members  of  the  crew  met  with
                                                                              Tracy  Moore  to  discuss  working  for  Crowder.   Although  the
benefits  offered  by  Crowder  were  not  as  favorable  as  those
already  provided  by  Plaintiff,  the  entire  crew  decided  to  quit
working  for  Plaintiff  and  to  go  to  work  for  Crowder.     As  a
result,  on                                                                   7   October                                         2010,   the   crew  traveled  to  Crowder’s
Spartanburg,  South  Carolina,  office,  where  they  completed  job
applications  and  were  hired  to  work  for  Crowder  beginning  on  18
October  2010.
The  crew  was  involved  in  moving  a  very  large  and  complex
machine  during  the  following  week.     On                                 14  October                                         2010,  which
was  a  Thursday,  they  worked  three  hours  overtime  in  order  to
make  sure  that  the  machine  move  had  been  sufficiently  completed
that  a  regular  Timken  employee  or  contractor  could  finish  the




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job   without   a   loss   of   production   capability   if   something
prevented   the   crew   from   returning   on   Monday   as   Crowder
employees.    After  finishing  work  on  14  October  2010,  Mr.  Lanier
called  Mr.  Richardson  and  informed  him  that  he,  Mr.  McDaniel,
Mr.  Turner,  and  Mr.  Moore  were  resigning.     On  the  following
Monday,                                                                        18  October   2010,  Mr.  Lanier  and  the  other  crew  members
returned to work at the Asheboro plant as Crowder employees.
B. Procedural History
On  3  November  2010,  Plaintiff  filed  a  complaint  in  which  it
sought  damages  from  both  Defendants  based  on  claims  sounding  in
tortious   interference   with   contractual   relations,   unfair   or
deceptive   trade   practices,   and   civil   conspiracy   and   an
additional  claim  against  Mr.  Lanier  for  breach  of  fiduciary
duty.    In  addition,  Plaintiff  sought  the  issuance  of  a  permanent
injunction  barring  Crowder  from  providing  construction-related
maintenance  services  at  the  Asheboro  plant.    On  3  January  2011,
Defendants  filed  separate  answers  in  which  they  denied  the
material  allegations  of  Plaintiff’s  complaint;  asserted  various
affirmative  defenses;  sought  dismissal  of  Plaintiff’s  complaint
pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  1A-1,  Rule  12(b)(6);  and  requested
an  award  of  attorneys’  fees.    On  20  April  2011,  Judge  Richard  D.
Boner  entered  an  order  denying  Defendants’  dismissal  motions  and
allowing Plaintiff’s request to amend its complaint.




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On                                                                            26  April                                                                                   2011,  Plaintiff  filed  an  amended  complaint  in
                                                                                             which  it  asserted  the  same  claims  that  had  been  asserted  in  its
original   complaint.                                                                                                                                                     In   essence,   Plaintiff   alleged   that
Defendants  had                                                                              “knowingly  conspired”  to                                                                                                         “implement  a  predatory
scheme”  by  which  the  crew  would  resign  “en  masse”  in  “the  middle
of  a  critical  machine  move”  on                                           14  October    2010  and  that,  given
that  set  of  circumstances,  Mr.  Flickinger  “had  no  choice”  but  to
use  Mr.  Lanier’s  crew,  in  their  capacity  as  Crowder  employees,
for  needed  construction-related  maintenance  services.    On  1  June
2011,  Defendants  filed  answers  in  which  they  denied  the  material
allegations    of    the    amended    complaint,    asserted    various
affirmative  defenses,  sought  dismissal  of  Plaintiff’s  claims  for
failure  to  state  a  claim  for  which  relief  could  be  granted,  and
requested an award of attorneys’ fees.
On                                                                            2  September   2011,  Defendants  filed  motions  seeking  the
entry  of  summary  judgment  in  their  favor  with  respect  to  all  of
Plaintiff’s  claims.    The  trial  court  conducted  a  hearing  for  the
purpose  of  addressing  the  issues  raised  by  Defendants’  summary
judgment  motions  on  14  September  2011.    On  2  November  2011,  the
trial   court   entered   summary   judgment   orders   in   favor   of
Defendants  with  respect  to  all  of  the  claims  that  had  been
asserted  in  the  amended  complaint.     Plaintiff  noted  a  timely
appeal to this Court from the trial court’s orders.




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II. Legal Analysis
A. Standard of Review
An   award   of   summary   judgment   is   appropriate                      “if   the
pleadings,    depositions,    answers    to    interrogatories,    and
admissions  on  file,  together  with  the  affidavits,  if  any,  show
that  there  is  no  genuine  issue  of  material  fact  and  that  any
party  is  entitled  to  judgment  as  a  matter  of  law.”    N.C.  Gen.
Stat.  §  1A-1,  Rule  56(c).                                                “A  party  moving  for  summary  judgment
may  prevail  if  it  meets  the  burden                                     (1)  of  proving  an  essential
element  of  the  opposing  party’s  claim  is  nonexistent,  or  (2)  of
showing  through  discovery  that  the  opposing  party  cannot  produce
evidence  to  support  an  essential  element  of  his  or  her  claim.”
Lowe  v.  Bradford,  305  N.C.  366,  369,  289  S.E.2d  363,  366  (1982)
(citations  omitted).                                                                                                                                                                                             “The  party  seeking  summary  judgment  bears
                                                                                                                                     the  initial  burden  of  demonstrating  the  absence  of  a  genuine
                                                                                                                                     issue  of  material  fact.”    Liberty  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Pennington,
                                                                                                                                     356  N.C.  571,  579,  573  S.E.2d  118,  124  (2002)  (citing  DeWitt  v.
Eveready  Battery  Co.,                                                                                                  355  N.C.   672,                                                                         681,                                              565  S.E.2d   140,   146
(2002)).                                                                     However,                                                                                                                             “[o]nce  the  party  seeking  summary  judgment
makes  the  required  showing,  the  burden  shifts  to  the  nonmoving
party  to  produce  a  forecast  of  evidence  demonstrating  specific
facts,  as  opposed  to  allegations,  showing  that  he  can  at  least
establish  a  prima  facie  case  at  trial.”    Gaunt  v.  Pittaway,  139




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N.C.  App.  778,  784-85,  534  S.E.2d  660,  664,  disc.  review  denied,
353  N.C.  262,  546  S.E.2d  401  (2000),  cert.  denied,  353  N.C.  371,
547  S.E.2d  810,  cert.  denied,  534  U.S.  950,  122  S.  Ct.  345,  151
L. Ed.  2d  261  (2001).
“A  genuine  issue  of  material  fact  arises  when                            ‘the  facts
alleged  .  .  .  are  of  such  nature  as  to  affect  the  result  of  the
action.’”    N.C.  Farm  Bureau  Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Sadler,                   365  N.C.
179,                                                                            182,               711   S.E.2d                                   114,     116                           (2011)               (quoting   Kessing   v.
                                                                                Mortgage  Corp.,   278  N.C.                                      523,     534,                          180  S.E.2d   823,   830                       (1971)
                                                                                                   (citation  and  quotation  marks  omitted)).                                                               “On  a  motion  for
summary  judgment  the  court  may  consider  evidence  consisting  of
affidavits,  depositions,  answers  to  interrogatories,  admissions,
documentary   materials,   facts   which   are   subject   to   judicial
notice,  and  any  other  materials  which  would  be  admissible  in
                                                                                                   evidence  at  trial.”    Huss  v.  Huss,                31  N.C.  App.                463,          466,   230
S.E.2d                                                                          159,               161-62                                         (1976)   (citations   omitted).                             “‘When
considering  a  motion  for  summary  judgment,  the  trial  judge  must
view  the  presented  evidence  in  a  light  most  favorable  to  the
nonmoving  party.’”    In  re  Will  of  Jones,  362  N.C.  569,  573,  669
S.E.2d                                                                          572,               576                                            (2008)   (quoting  Dalton  v.  Camp,   353  N.C.     647,
651,  548 S.E.2d  704,  707  (2001)).
The  “standard  of  review  on  appeal  from  summary  judgment  is
whether  there  is  any  genuine  issue  of  material  fact  and  whether




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the  moving  party  is  entitled  to  a  judgment  as  a  matter  of  law.”
Bruce-Terminix  Co.  v.  Zurich  Ins.  Co.,                                    130  N.C.  App.   729,   733,
504  S.E.2d  574,  577  (1998),  mod.  on  other  grounds,  Harleysville
Mut.  Ins.  Co.  v.  Buzz  Off  Insect  Shield,  L.L.C.,  364  N.C.  1,  7,
692  S.E.2d  605,  611  (2010).    A  trial  court’s  decision  to  grant  a
summary  judgment  motion  is  reviewed  on  a  de  novo  basis.     Va.
Elec.  &  Power  Co.  v.  Tillett,  80  N.C.  App.  383,  385,  343  S.E.2d
188,  191,  cert.  denied,  317  N.C.  715,  347  S.E.2d  457  (1986).    We
will  now  utilize  this  standard  of  review  for  the  purpose  of
analyzing  the  appropriateness  of  the  trial  court’s  decision  to
grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
B. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
In   its   first   challenge   to   the   trial   court’s   order,
Plaintiff   contends   that   the   trial   court   erred   by   granting
summary   judgment   in   favor   of   Mr.   Lanier   with   respect   to
Plaintiff’s  breach  of  fiduciary  duty  claim.    In  support  of  this
argument,   Plaintiff   asserts   that   the   record   discloses   the
existence  of  genuine  issues  of  material  fact  regarding  the
extent  to  which  Mr.  Lanier  owed  a  fiduciary  duty  to  Plaintiff
and  whether  he  breached  that  duty.    Plaintiff’s  argument  lacks
merit.2
2Although  Plaintiff  makes  much  of  allegedly  unsupported
“findings”  of  undisputed  fact  in  the  trial  court’s  order,  we
need  not  address  its  specific  complaints  about  these  “findings”




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“For  a  breach  of  fiduciary  duty  to  exist,  there  must  first
be   a   fiduciary   relationship   between   the   parties.                   Such   a
relationship  has  been  broadly  defined  by  this  Court  as  one  in
which  ‘there  has  been  a  special  confidence  reposed  in  one  who  in
equity  and  good  conscience  is  bound  to  act  in  good  faith  and
with  due  regard  to  the  interests  of  the  one  reposing  confidence
.  .  .  and  in  which  there  is  confidence  reposed  on  one  side,  and
resulting  domination  and  influence  on  the  other.’”    Dalton,  353
N.C.  at  651,  548  S.E.2d  at  707-08  (citing  Curl  v.  Key,  311  N.C.
259,                                                                           264,               316  S.E.2d                                          272,                                              275                                                                                                                                                                                   (1984),  and  quoting  Abbitt  v.
Gregory,                                                                                          201  N.C.     577,                                   598,                                              160  S.E.                                                                    896,                                                    906                                              (1931)).                            “‘[I]n
                                                                               North   Carolina                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               .   there   are   two   types   of   fiduciary
                                                                               relationships:                                                                                                                                                                                         (1)  those  that  arise  from  legal  relations  such
                                                                                                                                                       as  attorney  and  client,  broker  and  client                                                                                                                                                                                                                             .  partners,
                                                                                                                                                                                                         principal  and  agent,  trustee  and  cestui  que  trust,  and  (2)  those
                                                                                                                                                                                                         that  exist  as  a  fact,  in  which  there  is  confidence  reposed  on
                                                                                                                                                                                                         one  side,  and  the  resulting  superiority  and  influence  on  the
                                                                                                                other.’”     Ellison  v.  Alexander,                                                                                                                                                                                          207  N.C.  App                                   401,                                408,           700
S.E.2d                                                                         102,               108           (2010)                                                                                                                                                                                                                        (quoting  S.N.R.  Mgmt.  Corp.  v.  Danube
Partners                                                                                          141,  LLC,                                           189  N.C.  App.                                                                                                                601,                                                    613,                                             659  S.E.2d                         442,           451
(2008)  (internal citation omitted).
given  that  we  have  been  able,  based  on  our  own  review  of  the
record,  to  determine  what  the  undisputed  record  evidence  tends
to show.




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Business   partners,   for   example,   are   each
other’s  fiduciaries  as  a  matter  of  law.    In
less  clearly  defined  situations  the  question
whether  a  fiduciary  relationship  exists  is
more   open   and   depends   ultimately   on   the
circumstances.                                                               Courts   have   historically
declined  to  offer  a  rigid  definition  of  a
fiduciary   relationship   in   order   to   allow
imposition    of    fiduciary    duties    where
justified.    Thus,  the  relationship  can  arise
in  a  variety  of  circumstances  .  .  .  and  may
stem from varied and unpredictable factors.
Hajmm  Co.  v.  House  of  Raeford  Farms,                                   328  N.C.                      578,   588,   403
S.E.2d  483,  489  (1991)  (citing  Casey  v.  Grantham,  239  N.C.  121,
124-25,  79 S.E.2d  735,  738  (1954)  (other citation omitted).
The  undisputed  evidence  tends  to  show  that  Mr.  Lanier  was
the  foreman  of  a  crew  that  consisted  of  four  men,  including
himself;  that  his  job  duties  were  confined  to  performing  various
tasks    related    to    the    provision    of    construction-related
maintenance  services;  and  that  his  employment  was  terminable  at
will  by  Plaintiff.    Under  that  set  of  circumstances,  we  have  no
difficulty  in  concluding  that  Mr.  Lanier  did  not  occupy  the  type
of   fiduciary   relationship   with   Plaintiff   that   arises   by
operation  of  law,  such  as  that  inherent  in  an  attorney-client
relationship.     As  a  result,  the  only  way  in  which  a  fiduciary
relationship  between  Plaintiff  and  Mr.  Lanier  could  have  existed
would  be  if  Plaintiff  reposed  trust  and  confidence  in  Mr.
Lanier,  resulting  in  a  situation  in  which  Mr.  Lanier  exercised
“superiority and influence” over Plaintiff.




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Although  our  appellate  jurisprudence  does  not  precisely
define  when  a  fiduciary  relationship  of  this  second  type  does  or
does  not  exist,                                                             “the  broad  parameters  accorded  the  term  have
been   specifically   limited   in   the   context   of   employment
situations.    Under  the  general  rule,                                     ‘the  relation  of  employer
and  employee  is  not  one  of  those  regarded  as  confidential.’”
Dalton,                                                                       353  N.C.  at                                                   651,            548  S.E.2d  at          708   (quoting  King  v.
R.R.,                                                                         157   N.C.                                                      44,    62-63,   72   S.E.         801,   808   (1911)               (other
citation  omitted).    As  a  result,  in  the  absence  of  some  unusual
set   of   facts   that   would   suffice   to   differentiate   the
relationship   between   Plaintiff   and   Mr.   Lanier   from   other
employer-employee   relationships,   Mr.   Lanier   did   not   have   a
fiduciary relationship with Plaintiff.
According  to  the  record,  Plaintiff’s  corporate  parent  has
over                                                                          7,000   employees  and  an  annual  income  of  approximately
$300,000,000.00  to  $500,000,000.00,  of  which  Plaintiff’s  work  at
Timken’s  Asheboro  plant  generated  approximately                           $2,000,000.00,
or  .04  percent  to  .06  percent.    Of  these  7,000  or  so  employees,
only  five  were  working  at  the  Asheboro  plant,  which  Plaintiff
characterizes  as  a                                                          “remote”  company  site.     As  we  have  already
noted,  Mr.  Lanier  was  an  hourly,  at-will  employee  charged  with
supervising  a  four-person  crew.    The  record  contains  no  evidence
tending   to   show   that   Mr.   Lanier   played   any   role   within




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Plaintiff’s  organization  except  for  that  of  a  foreman  overseeing
a  crew  performing  construction-related  maintenance  services.    In
light  of  that  set  of  facts,  we  conclude  that  any  confidence  that
Plaintiff  reposed  in  Mr.  Lanier  consisted  of  nothing  more  than
relying  on  him  to  competently  perform  his  assigned  duties.
Simply  put,  given  that  the  record  demonstrates  that  Mr.  Lanier
was  a  relatively  small  cog  in  a  very  large  operation,  we  have  no
hesitation  about  concluding  that  Mr.  Lanier  exercised  little  or
no  control  over  Plaintiff’s  overall  operations  and  that  Mr.
Lanier did not owe any fiduciary duties to Plaintiff.
In   attempting   to   persuade   us   to   reach   a   contrary
conclusion,  Plaintiff  stresses  the  degree  of  responsibility  and
authority  assigned  to  a  foreman  such  as  Mr.  Lanier  and  argues
that  he  had  considerable  responsibility  for,  and  authority  over,
the  other  crew  members.    However,  the  fact  that  Mr.  Lanier  had
responsibility    for    ensuring    the    proper    performance    of
construction-related  maintenance  tasks  assigned  to  his  crew  by
Mr.  Flickinger  simply  does  not  make  him  Plaintiff’s  fiduciary.
As the Supreme Court observed in Dalton:
[T]he  managerial  duties  of  Camp  were
such  that  a  certain  level  of  confidence  was
reposed  in  him  by  Dalton;  and                                             (2)   as  a
confidant    of    his    employer,    Camp    was
therefore  bound  to  act  in  good  faith  and
with  due  regard  to  the  interests  of  Dalton.
In  our  view,  such  circumstances,  as  shown
here,  merely  serve  to  define  the  nature  of




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virtually                                                                     all                                        employer-employee
relationships;    without    more,    they    are
inadequate  to  establish  Camp’s  obligations
as   fiduciary   in   nature.                                                 No   evidence
suggests  that  his  position  in  the  workplace
resulted  in  “domination  and  influence  on  the
other                                                                         [Dalton],”  an  essential  component  of
any  fiduciary  relationship.    Camp  was  hired
as   an   at-will   employee   to   manage   the
production  of  a  publication.                                               [H]is
responsibilities  were  not  unlike  those  of
employees  in  other  businesses  and  can  hardly
be  construed  as  uniquely  positioning  him  to
exercise dominion over Dalton.
Dalton  at  651-52,  548  S.E.2d  at  708  (quoting  Abbitt,  201  N.C.  at
598,                                                                          160  S.E.  at                              906).    Thus,  for  essentially  the  same  reasons
that   underlie   the   Supreme   Court’s   decision   in   Dalton,   we
conclude  that  Mr.  Lanier’s  status  as  the  foreman  of  a  four-
person  crew  did  not  “uniquely  position”  him  to  exercise  dominion
over Plaintiff.
We    have    carefully    considered    Plaintiff’s    remaining
arguments  in  support  of  its  claim  that  Mr.  Lanier  breached  his
fiduciary  duty  owed  to  Plaintiff,  and  conclude  that  they  lack
merit  as  well.    For  example,  Plaintiff  contends  that  there  are
disputed  issues  of  fact  regarding  the  scope  of  Mr.  Lanier’s
responsibilities  and  authority  given  Plaintiff’s  contention  that
Mr.  Lanier                                                                   “participated  in  any  discussions        [with]  plaintiff’s
officers  concerning  management  level  decisions  or  operations  of
the  company  concerning  cash  flow,  lines  of  credit,  issuance  of
stock  or  debt  and  the  like.”     However,  the  only  evidentiary




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support  that  Plaintiff  has  offered  for  this  argument  is  the  fact
that  Mr.  Lanier  had  supervisory  responsibility  for  a  four-person
crew  and  that  he  reported  to  Mr.  Richardson,  one  of  Plaintiff’s
managers.    The  undisputed  record  evidence  shows  that  Mr.  Lanier
only  interacted  with  Mr.  Richardson  concerning  matters  affecting
his  four-person  crew;  nothing  in  the  record  suggests  that  Mr.
Lanier   was   ever   involved   in   making   any                           “management   level
decisions”  as  that  term  is  ordinarily  understood.     Similarly,
Plaintiff  asserts  that  issues  of  fact  regarding  the  extent  to
which  Mr.  Lanier  owed  a  fiduciary  duty  to  Plaintiff  arise  from
language  in  the  MSA  spelling  out  Plaintiff’s  obligation  to
employ  on-site  supervisory  personnel.     However,  the  relevant
language  from  the  MSA,  which  has  no  binding  effect  unless  Timken
actually  contracted  with  Plaintiff  to  perform  specific  work  at
the  Asheboro  plant,  provides  no  additional  basis  for  concluding
that  Mr.  Lanier  had  a  fiduciary  relationship  with  Plaintiff.
Moreover,  Plaintiff  argues  that  the  fact  that  Mr.  Lanier  was  an
hourly  at-will  employee  and  had  not  been  asked  to  sign  a  non-
competition  agreement  or  similar  documents  is                           “immaterial  to
whether  [Plaintiff]  reposed  trust  and  confidence  in  [Mr.]  Lanier
resulting  in                                                                [his]  domination  and  influence  on   [Plaintiff]  at
the  Timken  Asheboro  plant  site.”    In  view  of  the  fact  that  the
presence  or  absence  of  such  agreements  did  shed  light  on  the




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nature  of  the  relationship  between  Plaintiff  and  Mr.  Lanier,  we
believe  that  the  trial  court  properly  considered  these  factors
in  determining  whether  to  grant  summary  judgment  in  favor  of  Mr.
Lanier.    As  a  result,  none  of  Plaintiff’s  attempts  to  persuade
us  that  there  were  genuine  issues  of  material  fact  concerning
the  extent,  if  any,  to  which  Mr.  Lanier  owed  a  fiduciary  duty  to
Plaintiff have any merit.
Similarly,   we   are   unable   to   agree   with   Plaintiff’s
contention  that  the  Supreme  Court’s  decision  in  Sara  Lee  Corp.
v.  Carter,                                                                                                                 351  N.C.         27,                                          519  S.E.2d                                                                   308,  rehearing  denied,                    351
N.C.                                                                           191,                                         541  S.E.2d       716                                                                                                                        (1999),  supports  its  contention  that
                                                                                                                                                                                           Mr.  Lanier  breached  a  fiduciary  duty  that  he  owed  Plaintiff.    In
                                                                                                                                                                                           Sara   Lee,   the   defendant’s   job   description   required   him   to
                                                                               provide   the   plaintiff                                                                                                                                                                 “‘with   the   best   possible   pricing,
                                                                                                                                                                                           availability,   and   support   of   hardware   and   services.’”                                                         In
violation  of  this  obligation,  the  defendant  started  his  own
company  and  “engaged  in  self-dealing  by  supplying  Sara  Lee  with
computer  parts  and  services  at  allegedly  excessive  cost  while
concealing  his  interest  in  these  businesses.”     Sara  Lee,              351
N.C.  at                                                                       29,                                          519  S.E.2d  at   309.    On  these  facts,  we  upheld  the
trial  court’s  conclusion                                                     “that  defendant  owed  a  fiduciary  duty
to  Sara  Lee  with  respect  to  his  role  in  recommending  the
purchase  and  ordering  of  computer  parts  and  related  services  for




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Sara  Lee  and  that  defendant  breached  that  fiduciary  duty[.]”
Sara  Lee  at  30,  519  S.E.2d  at  310.    However,  the  alleged  breach
of  fiduciary  duty  at  issue  in  Sara  Lee  is  very  different  from
the  alleged  breach  of  fiduciary  duty  at  issue  here.    According
to Plaintiff:
The  record  evidence  establishing  that
the    self-dealing                                                           [Mr.]    Lanier    was    a
fiduciary  of                                                                 [Plaintiff]  is  even  stronger
than   that   of   the   employee   in   Sara   Lee.
[Plaintiff]   entrusted   and   authorized   its
Site  Manager                                                                 [Mr.]  Lanier  to  interact  with
its  valued  customer  Timken  and  to  manage  and
supervise  the  other  [Plaintiff]  employees  at
the   site.                                                                   [Mr.]   Lanier   maintained   and
repaired  unique  machinery  for                                              [Plaintiff’s]
customer  Timken.     For                                                     [Plaintiff’s]  benefit
he   was   supposed   to   maintain   a   strong
relationship    with                                                          [Mr.]    Flickinger    and
provide   other   support   as   needed.
Instead,                                                                      [Mr.]   Lanier   acted   to   benefit
himself   to   the   strong   detriment   of   his
employer,  [Plaintiff].
However,  the  record  contains  no  evidence  that  Mr.  Lanier  failed
to  “manage  and  supervise  the  other  [Plaintiff]  employees  at  the
site,”    to                                                                  “maintain    a    strong    relationship    with   [Mr.]
Flickinger,”  to  perform  any  other  duty  arising  from  his  job
description,  or  to  refrain  from  engaging  in  self-dealing.     On
the  contrary,  the  sole  basis  for  Plaintiff’s  claim  that  Mr.
Lanier  engaged  in                                                           “self-dealing”  and  acted                         “to  benefit  himself
to  the  strong  detriment  of  his  employer”  is  the  fact  that  Mr.
Lanier  resigned  from  his  employment  with  Plaintiff  in  order  to




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work  for  Crowder  because  he                                                “was  clearly  not  happy  working  for
[Plaintiff]”  and  saw  a  “switch  to  Crowder  as  being  in  his  long-
term   best   interests   from   a   job   satisfaction   perspective.”
(PB29)    However,  the  fact  that  an  at-will  employee  stops  working
for  one  employer,  as  the  result  of  personal  dissatisfaction  with
his  existing  position,  and  goes  to  work  for  another,  who  then
takes  over  work  that  had  previously  been  performed  by  the
employee’s   original   employer,   is   not   consistent   with   any
                                                                               recognized   definition   of                                                                “self-dealing,”   see   Black’s    Law
Dictionary                                                                     1390                                                                (8th   ed.      2004)   (defining   self-dealing   as
“[p]articipation  in  a  transaction  that  benefits  oneself  instead
of  another  who  is  owed  a  fiduciary  duty”),  and  does  not  bear  any
significant resemblance to the facts at issue in Sara Lee.
In  addition,  Plaintiff  points  out  that  the  Supreme  Court
stated  in  Dalton  that  the  defendant,  although  not  a  fiduciary,
was                                                                            “bound  to  act  in  good  faith  and  with  due  regard  to  the
interests  of”  his  employer.    Similarly,  Plaintiff  argues  that  it
“placed  its  trust  and  confidence  in                                       [Mr.]  Lanier  and  that                                            [he]
used  that  trust,  confidence  and  resulting  power  to  dominate
[Plaintiff]                                                                    and                                                                 [Plaintiff’s]   other   employees                                and,
surreptitiously,  from  the  inside,  stole  away  the  very  business
he  was  supposed  to  service  and  safeguard  for                            [Plaintiff].”
However,  the  record  contains  no  evidence  tending  to  show  that




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Mr.   Lanier   had   any   responsibility,   beyond   the   adequate
performance   of   his   job   duties,   for   safeguarding   Timken’s
decision  to  contract  with  Plaintiff,  instead  of  some  other
entity,  for  the  provision  of  construction-related  maintenance
services  at  the  Asheboro  plant.    As  a  result,  we  do  not  believe
that Plaintiff’s argument in reliance upon Dalton has any merit.
We  have  carefully  examined  Plaintiff’s  factual  contentions
regarding  the  circumstances  surrounding  the  resignation  of  Mr.
Lanier  and  his  co-workers  from  their  employment  with  Plaintiff
and   Timken’s   decision   to   transfer   construction   maintenance
service  work  from  Plaintiff  to  Crowder  and  have  concluded  that
these  contentions  lack  adequate  record  support.     For  example,
Plaintiff  contends  that  Mr.  Lanier                                        “leveraged  the  trust  and
confidence   reposed   in   him   by                                          [Plaintiff]   to   pressure   both
[Plaintiff’s]   other   employees   and                                       [Mr.]   Flickinger   into
submitting  to  a  conspiracy  with  Crowder  to  replace                     [Plaintiff]
with  Crowder  at  the  Timken  Asheboro  plant  site.”    In  addition,
Plaintiff  repeatedly  asserts  that  Mr.  Lanier  “pressured”  his  co-
workers  and  Mr.  Flickinger  to  work  with  Crowder  instead  of
Plaintiff  and  contends  that,  in  order  to                                “achieve  his  self-
dealing  goal,  [Mr.]  Lanier  directed  the  crew  to  .  .  .  resign  en
masse  from                                                                   [Plaintiff]  in  the  middle  of  a  critical  machine
move.”     Finally,  Plaintiff  contends  that  Mr.  Lanier                   “filtered




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and  provided  the  information  that  he  thought  would  best  advance
his  self-dealing  conspiracy  with  Crowder  to  steal  the  Timken
business.”
After  thoroughly  reviewing  the  evidentiary  materials  that
were  submitted  for  the  trial  court’s  consideration,  we  find  no
evidence  that  Mr.  Lanier                                                 “pressured”  his  crew  to  resign  their
employment  with  Plaintiff  or  to  begin  working  for  Crowder  or
that  Plaintiff                                                             “filtered”  the  information  that  they  received
prior  to  deciding  to  change  employers.     As  we  have  already
noted,  each  crew  member  testified  that,  even  before  learning  of
a  possible  position  at  Crowder,  they  were  planning  to  leave
Plaintiff’s  employment.    None  of  the  crew  members  testified  that
Mr.  Lanier  “pressured”  them  into  resigning  their  employment  with
Plaintiff;  in  fact,  the  record  is  completely  devoid  of  any
evidence  that  Mr.  Lanier  suggested  that  the  members  of  the  crew
should  work  for  Crowder  rather  than  Plaintiff.    Similarly,  there
is   no   evidence   that   Mr.   Lanier   concealed   or                   “filtered”
information   in   order   to                                               “pressure”   his   crew   into   leaving
Plaintiff’s  employment.    Although  the  record  does  reflect  that
Tracy  Moore  sent  copies  of  Crowder’s  benefits  package  to  Mr.
Lanier  for  delivery  to  the  members  of  the  crew  and  subsequently
met  with  the  crew  to  answer  any  questions  they  might  have,
nothing  in  the  record  reflects  that  Mr.  Lanier  did  anything  to




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put   pressure   on   his   fellow   crew   members   to   leave   their
employment with Plaintiff and to begin working with Crowder.
Similarly,   we   find   no   indication   that   Mr.   Lanier
“pressured”   Mr.   Flickinger   into   using   Crowder   rather   than
Plaintiff   for   the   purpose   of   providing   construction-related
maintenance  services  at  the  Asheboro  plant.                               Mr.  Flickinger
testified  that  he  had  worked  with  Mr.  Lanier  for  over  ten  years,
that                                                                           “[Mr.   Lanier’s]   work   is   always   top-notch,”   and   that,
“[p]ersonally[,]  I  think  he’s                                               []  very  honest[.]”     During  the
four  months  that  Mr.  Lanier  worked  for  Plaintiff  at  Timken’s
Asheboro  plant,  he  and  his  crew  did  a  good  job  and  were             “very
conscientious”  about  safety  regulations.     After  the  crew  began
to  have  problems  with  Plaintiff,  Mr.  Flickinger  consulted  with
Timken’s    management    about    changing    construction-related
maintenance  providers  and  learned  that  he  had  no  contractual
obligation  to  continue  using  Plaintiff’s  services.     When  Mr.
Lanier  spoke  with  Mr.  Flickinger  about  the  possibility  that
Crowder  would  assume  responsibility  for  performing  construction-
related  maintenance  work  at  the  Asheboro  plant,  Mr.  Flickinger
indicated  that  he  was  open  to  a  proposal  from  Crowder.    In  fact,
Mr.  Flickinger  testified  that  he  intended  to  continue  working
with  Mr.  Lanier’s  crew  regardless  of  whether  they  were  employed
by  Plaintiff,  Crowder,  or  some  other  company.                            Simply  put,




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nothing  in  the  present  record  in  any  way  tends  to  show  that  Mr.
Flickinger’s  preference  for  working  with  Mr.  Lanier’s  crew  had
any  source  other  than  his  satisfaction  with  the  quality  of  their
work.
In  addition,  although  Plaintiff  argues  that  the  crew  timed
its  resignation  from  Plaintiff’s  employment  in  such  a  way  as  to
force  Mr.  Flickinger’s  hand                                                “by  scheduling  the   .  crew’s  en
masse  resignation  in  the  middle  of  a  planned  critical  machine
move,”   the   record   simply   does   not   support   this   assertion.
Instead,  the  undisputed  evidence  in  the  record  indicates  that
Mr.  Lanier’s  crew  worked  several  hours  overtime  on                     14  October
2010  for  the  sole  purpose  of  preventing  any  production  delays  in
the  event  that  the  crew  was  unable  to  return  to  the  Asheboro
plant  on  the  following  Monday  as  employees  of  Crowder.     In
essence,  Mr.  Flickinger  testified  that,  when  Mr.  Lanier  left  on
14  October  2010,  the  work  being  done  on  the  machine  had  reached
“a  point  it  would  be  operational  so  if  no  one  was  there  Monday
.  .  .  we  could  continue  operations;”  that  the  crew  “finished  the
work  that  the  mechanical  contractor  would  have  needed  to  that
day,  so  if  no  one  showed  up  Monday,  we  could  have  continued  to
work  with  our  associates  and  made  product;”  and  that,  when  the
members  of  the  crew  resigned  from  Plaintiff’s  employment,  their
part  in  the  machine  move  was  essentially  “complete.”    Similarly,




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Mr.  Lanier  testified  that  the  crew  worked  on  14  October  2010  in
order  to                                                                    “get  that  machine  back  where  somebody  could  finish  it
if  something  happened.”    As  a  result,  we  conclude  that  there  is
no  record  support  for  Plaintiff’s  contention  that  Mr.  Flickinger
was   forced   to   stop   using   Plaintiff   for   the   provision   of
construction  maintenance  services  based  upon  pressure  from  Mr.
Lanier,  the  timing  of  the  crew’s  resignation,  or  any  other
similar factor.3
Plaintiff  also  asserts  that  Mr.  Lanier  acted  “secretly”  and
that  he                                                                     “secretly  recruited  the  entire  work  force  and  betrayed
[Plaintiff]  in  persuading                                                  [Mr.]  Flickinger  to  switch  to  the
company  that  best  suited  him,  to  the  detriment  of  [Plaintiff].”
A  careful  examination  of  the  record  reveals  no  indication  that
Mr.   Lanier   or   his   crew   made   any   effort   to   hide   their
dissatisfaction  with  Plaintiff.    Mr.  Lanier  discussed  the  crew’s
complaints  with  Mr.  Flickinger,  who  testified  that,  every  time
Mr.  Richardson  visited  the  plant,  “[he]  would  tell  him,  the  guys
aren’t  happy,  you  need  to  try  to  help[.]”     In  addition,  the
record  reflects  that  Mr.  Rice  met  with  Mr.  Lanier  in  mid-August
2010  and,  at  Mr.  Lanier’s  request,  informed  Plaintiff  of  the
crew’s  dissatisfaction.     On                                              23  August                                                      2010,  Mr.  Rice  sent  Mr.
Richardson  an  email  that  specifically  informed  him  that  Mr.
3Mr.  Richardson  testified  that  he  had  no  personal  knowledge
of the status of the machine move as of  14 October  2010.




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Lanier  was                                                                   “looking  at  other  contactors  to  work  for  in  the
Timken  Asheboro  plant,  and  right  now  the  only  thing  stalling  the
change  is  which  company  will  offer  the  best  pay  and  benefits.”
The  fact  that  Mr.  Richardson  claims  not  to  have  noticed  this
portion  of  the  email  does  not  in  any  way  detract  from  the  fact
that   it   was   sent.                                                       As   a   result,   the   record   contains   no
indication that Mr. Lanier acted secretly.
In  addition,  such  an  allegation,  even  if  proven,  would  not
necessarily  constitute  evidence  of  wrongdoing.     Plaintiff  has
not  cited  any  authority  tending  to  suggest  that  Mr.  Lanier  had
an  obligation  to  keep  Plaintiff  apprised  of  his  desire  to  quit,
his  discussions  with  co-workers  about  changing  jobs,  or  his
negotiations  with  Crowder.                                                  “In  North  Carolina,  ‘in  the  absence
of  an  employment  contract  for  a  definite  period,  both  employer
and  employee  are  generally  free  to  terminate  their  association
at  any  time  and  without  any  reason.’”    Elliott  v.  Enka-Candler
Fire  and  Rescue,  __  N.C.  App  __,  __,  713  S.E.2d  132,  135  (2011)
                                                                                                                                                  (quoting  Salt  v.  Applied  Analytical,  Inc.,                                                       104  N.C.  App.          652,
655,                                                                          412  S.E.2d                                               97,       99                                                (1991),  cert.  denied,                             331  N.C.         119,   415
S.E.2d                                                                        200                                                       (1992))                                                     (other  citations  omitted).     As  the  Supreme
Court  has  recognized,                                                       “[t]o  restrict  an  employer’s  right  to
entice  employees,  bound  only  by  terminable  at  will  contracts,
from  their  positions  with  a  competitor  or  to  restrict  where




-29-
those   employees   may   be   put   to   work   once   they   accept   new
employment  savors  strongly  of  oppression.”     Peoples  Security
Life  Ins.  Co.  v.  Hooks,                                                   322  N.C.                                            216,       222-23,       367  S.E.2d   647,
651,  rehearing  denied,                                                      322  N.C.                                            486,       370  S.E.2d   227           (1988)
(citation  omitted).    As  a  result,  for  all  of  these  reasons,  we
conclude  that  the  trial  court  did  not  err  by  granting  summary
judgment  in  favor  of  Mr.  Lanier  with  respect  to  Plaintiff’s
breach of fiduciary duty claim.
C. Tortious Interference with Contract
Secondly,  Plaintiff  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  by
granting  summary  judgment  in  favor  of  Defendants  with  respect  to
Plaintiff’s   tortious   interference   with   contract   claim.              In
support  of  this  contention,  Plaintiff  contends  that  the  record
reflects  the  existence  of  a  genuine  issue  of  fact  concerning  the
extent   to   which                                                           “Defendants   conspired   to   pressure              [Mr.]
Flickinger  not  to  perform  the  MSA  with  Austin  and  to  hire
Crowder   instead”   and   to   which                                         “Defendants   acted   without
justification.”                                                               Once   again,   we   conclude   that   Plaintiff’s
arguments lack merit.
“The  tort  of  interference  with  contract  has  five  elements:
(1)  a  valid  contract  between  the  plaintiff  and  a  third  person
which  confers  upon  the  plaintiff  a  contractual  right  against  a
third  person;                                                                (2)  the  defendant  knows  of  the  contract;       (3)  the




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defendant  intentionally  induces  the  third  person  not  to  perform
the  contract;                                                                 (4)  and  in  doing  so  acts  without  justification;
(5)   resulting  in  actual  damage  to  the  plaintiff.”                      United
Laboratories,  Inc.  v.  Kuykendall,  322  N.C.  643,  661,  370  S.E.2d
375,                                                                           387                                                           (1988)                                                                         (citing  Childress  v.  Abeles,   240  N.C.              667,   674
84  S.E.  2d  176,  182-83                                                     (1954)).    A  careful  study  of  the  record
compels  the  conclusion  that  Plaintiff  has  failed  to  forecast
evidence  tending  to  show  the  existence  of  the  first  element
required  to  establish  a  tortious  interference  with  contract
claim.
As  we  have  already  noted,  the  MSA  sets  out  the  terms  and
conditions   under   which   Plaintiff   and   Timken   agreed   to   do
business.                                                                      “It  is  common  practice  for  companies  and  contractors
to  enter  into  master  service  agreements,  the  specific  terms  of
which  govern  future  work  performed  by  the  contractor  pursuant  to
individual  work  orders  or  authorizations.”     John  E.  Graham  &
Sons  v.  Brewer  (In  re  John  E. Graham  &  Sons),  210  F.3d  333,  341,
                                                                               rehearing  denied,                                            2000  U.S.  App.  LEXIS                                                        15071                             (5th  Cir.  La.  May
22,                                                                            2000).                                                        “Typically,  they  first  sign  a                                                                                ‘blanket  contract’
                                                                                                                                             that  may  remain  in  place  for  an  extended  period  of  time.    Later,
                                                                                                                                             they  issue  work  orders  for  the  performance  of  specific  work,
                                                                                                                                             which  usually  incorporate[]  the  terms  of  the  blanket  contract.”
                                                                                                                                             Grand  Isle  Shipyard  Inc.  v.  Seacor  Marine,  LLC,                                                           589  F.3d              778,




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787  n.6                                                                     (5th  Cir.  La.                                    2009),  cert.  denied,   __  U.S.                         __,          130  S.
                                                                             Ct.  3386,  177  L.  Ed.  2d  302  (2010).                                  “A  master  service  agreement
contemplates    as    yet    unspecified    and    wholly    contingent
performance   in   the   future.                                             The   agreement   standing   alone
obligates  neither  party  to  perform  any  services.    The  issuance
of  a  specific  work  order  triggers  the  obligation  to  perform.”
Burnham  v.  Sun  Oil  Co.,                                                  618  F.  Supp.                                     782,                     785-86                           (W.D.  La.
1985).
Consistently   with   the   pattern   outlined   above,   the   MSA
defines  Timken  as  the  “Buyer”  and  Plaintiff  (standing  in  Sanders
Brothers’  shoes)  as  the  “Contractor,”  provides  for  a  seven  year
term,   and   defines   a                                                    “Purchase   Order”   as   the                      “document   or
electronic    notification    through    which    Service(s)    and/or
Merchandise  shall  be  requested  by  Buyer.”     The  MSA                  “shall  be
incorporated  into  and  made  a  part  of  each  Buyer’s  Purchase  Order
issued  to  Contractor,  whe

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