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NO. COA01-1108
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  17 September  2002
KEVIN BELVERD and wife, MERYL BELVERD,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
ALLAN D. MILES and wife, WANDA M. MILES, SYCAMORE PROPERTIES, a
North Carolina General Partnership, SYCAMORE DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
and HUNTER & BROWN, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal  by  plaintiffs  from  an  order  entered  16  April  2001  by
Judge Michael E. Beale in Superior Court, Cabarrus County.    Heard
in the Court of Appeals  5 June  2002.
Womble  Carlyle  Sandridge  &  Rice,  PLLC,  by  John  C.  Cooke  and
Christine Carlisle Odom, for plaintiff-appellants.
Rosenman  &  Colin  LLP,  by  Richard  L.  Farley,  for  defendant-
appellees.
McGEE, Judge.
This   case   involves   the   question   of   whether   Sycamore
Properties,  Sycamore  Development,  LLC,  and  Hunter  &  Brown,  Inc.
(the  Developers)  are  prohibited  from  using  a  particular  strip  of
land,  located  on  a  lot  in  a  subdivision,  to  construct  a  through-
street  as  a  result  of  certain  restrictive  covenants.    The  trial
court held that the restrictive covenants do not prohibit the use
of the land in question to construct a through-street.   We affirm.
The  following  facts  are  undisputed.  The  Partridge  Bluff
subdivision                                                                   (Partridge  Bluff)  is  a  single-family,  residential
subdivision  in  Concord,  Cabarrus  County,  North  Carolina  that  is
divided into two sections, Section I and Section II.   The original




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owners of Partridge Bluff, Allan D. Miles and Wanda M. Miles  (the
Mileses),   executed   and   recorded   "Protective   Covenants   and
Restrictions   for   the   Subdivision   of   Partridge   Bluff"               (the
Covenants) for Section I of Partridge Bluff at Book 527, Page 93 in
the Cabarrus County Registry.    The Mileses conveyed Lot  30 to the
predecessor-in-title  of  plaintiffs  in                                       1983.                                                                Lot   30  fronts  on
Bridlewood Place (a public street) and is directly across from Lot
1.                                                                             The  Mileses  also  owned  a  large  tract  of  land  adjacent  to
Partridge Bluff (the Sycamore Property).   The Mileses conveyed the
Sycamore Property and a certain portion of Lot 1 of Partridge Bluff
(together the Sycamore Tract) to defendant Sycamore Properties by
deed (the Sycamore Deed) dated 26 January 1988.   The Sycamore Deed
identifies the portion of Lot 1 conveyed to Sycamore Properties as
being sixty feet in width and 385 feet in length (the Lot 1 Strip).
One  of  the  purposes  of  including  the  Lot  1  Strip  in  the  Sycamore
Deed  was  "to  provide  access  to  the  Sycamore  Tract  directly  from
Bridlewood Place, a public street."
Lot                                                                            30  was  acquired  by  Carolina  Family  Restaurants  Limited
Partnership  I                                                                 (CFRP  I)  and  Carolina  Family  Restaurants  Limited
Partnership II (CFRP II) in 1996.   Plaintiff Kevin Belverd was and
is the general partner of CFRP I and CFRP II.    CFRP I and CFRP II
conveyed Lot 30 to Carolina Family Restaurants Limited Partnership
III  (CFRP III) in  1998.    CFRP III conveyed Lot  30 to plaintiffs.
Defendant  Sycamore  Properties  employed  defendant  Hunter  &
Brown,  Inc.  in                                                               1998  to  provide  planning  and  project  management
services  for  the  development  of  the  Sycamore  Tract.    In  November




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1998,  Hunter  &  Brown,  Inc.  presented  to  the  City  of  Concord
Planning and Zoning Commission (the Commission) a preliminary plan
to  subdivide  the  Sycamore  Tract  into  a  residential  section  and  a
commercial section, and to call the subdivision "Coldwater."    The
Commission published a Notice of Public Hearing on  4 January  1999
for the preliminary plat review of the Coldwater Subdivision.    No
notice of the hearing was mailed directly to the owners of lots in
Partridge  Bluff,  and  plaintiffs  did  not  have  actual  knowledge  of
the Commission's consideration of the plat.
At the hearing on  19 January  1999, the preliminary plat plan
was unopposed, and the Commission thereafter approved the plat.   In
March                                                                        1999,  the  Developers  began  to  construct  a  through-street
across   the   Lot                                                           1   Strip   in   order   to   connect   the   Coldwater
Subdivision on the Sycamore Tract to Bridlewood Place in Partridge
Bluff, Section I.
Plaintiffs  filed  a  complaint  against  the  Developers  and  the
Mileses  on                                                                  5  May                                                            2000,  setting  forth  various  causes  of  action,
requesting declaratory judgment, and seeking to prevent continued
construction of the through-street.   The Developers and the Mileses
filed  answers  denying  the  allegations  and  asserting  affirmative
defenses  of  laches  and  estoppel.     The  trial  court  entered  a
temporary restraining order in June  2000 and subsequently entered
a  preliminary  injunction,  specifically  enjoining  the  use  of  the
through-street for access to the commercial portion of Coldwater.
The  trial  court  indicated  that  the  Developers  could  continue  to
construct  the  through-street  at  their  own  risk.    The  Developers




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proceeded with construction of the through-street and offered the
street  for  public  dedication  in  December                                2000.        The  street,
originally named "Henry Place" and subsequently renamed "Ravenswood
Drive," now connects the residential portion of the Sycamore Tract,
renamed Sycamore Ridge, to Bridlewood Place.    Ravenswood Drive is
currently  the  only  completed,  paved  street  connecting  Sycamore
Ridge to the public street system.
The parties participated in a Mediated Settlement Conference
and  reached  a  Settlement  Agreement  in  January  2001,  pursuant  to
which plaintiffs dismissed all of their claims for damages against
Sycamore Properties, Sycamore Development, LLC, and Hunter & Brown,
Inc., and took a voluntary dismissal as to all claims against the
Mileses.    Plaintiffs  filed  one  motion  for  summary  judgment  as  to
all of their claims, and a second motion for summary judgment as to
the  Developers'  affirmative  defenses  of  laches  and  estoppel.
Plaintiffs  also  filed  a  motion  to  join  necessary  parties.    The
Developers  filed  a  motion  for  summary  judgment  as  to  all  of
plaintiffs' claims.    Following a hearing, the trial court entered
an   order   on                                                              16   April   2001   that   dissolved   the   preliminary
injunction, granted the Developers' motion for summary judgment on
all claims, and denied all of plaintiffs' motions, holding that the
Developers' "use and intended use of the disputed portion of Lot 1
does   not   violate,   complies   with   and   is   permitted   by          [the
covenants]."   The trial court's order did not address the $5,000.00
bond  that  plaintiffs  had  posted  in  support  of  the  preliminary
injunction.




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On appeal, plaintiffs first argue that the trial court erred
in  granting  summary  judgment  in  favor  of  the  Developers  on  claim
one (seeking injunctive relief based on an alleged violation of the
covenants),  and  on  claim  nine                                               (seeking  declaratory  judgment).
Plaintiffs  contend  that  the  applicable  covenants  prohibit  the
Developers'  use  of  the  Lot                                                  1  Strip  as  a  through-street.     We
disagree.
The  covenants  contain  a  list  of  provisions,  including  the
following:
1.                                                                              No  lot  shall  be  used  for  other  than
residential purposes.   No residential dwelling
shall  be  erected,  placed  or  permitted  to
remain on any lot other than one single family
dwelling[.]
13.   No  lot  shall  be  used  for  the  purpose  of
constructing  a  public  street  or  to  provide
access  to  and  from  the  properties  located  in
the  subdivision  of  Partridge  Bluff,  Section
One, to property surrounding Partridge Bluff,
Section  One,  except  with  the  written  consent
and  permission  of  Allan  D.  Mileses  and  wife,
Wanda M. Mileses, their heirs and assigns.
Neither paragraph one nor paragraph thirteen is, on its own,
ambiguous.    However,  in  terms  of  whether  a  lot  may  be  used  for  a
through-street,  paragraphs  one  and  thirteen  conflict  with  each
other.   Paragraph one would prohibit the use of a lot for a public
through-street  since  such  use  is  clearly  not  "residential."    See
Easterwood  v.  Burge,  103  N.C.  App.  507,  509,  405  S.E.2d  787,  789
(1991)                                                                          (holding   that   a   covenant   restricting   property   to
"residential purposes only" prohibited construction of access road
to separate parcel);   see also Franzle v. Waters, 18 N.C. App. 371,




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376,  197  S.E.2d  15,  18  (1973).    Paragraph  thirteen,  on  the  other
hand,  would  allow  such  use  if  the  Mileses  gave  written  consent.
Plaintiffs  contend  that  paragraph  thirteen  was  not  intended  to
modify  the  general  prohibition  against  using  lots  for  non-
residential purposes in paragraph one; rather, plaintiffs contend,
paragraph thirteen was only intended to "add[] an additional layer
of protection."    We find this argument to be without merit.
If paragraph thirteen is not construed as modifying paragraph
one, then, pursuant to paragraph one, no lot could ever be used to
construct a public street because such use is not residential, and
paragraph  thirteen,  purporting  to  allow  such  use  if  the  Mileses
give  written  consent,  would  be  superfluous.    We  believe  such  an
interpretation of the covenants would be contrary to the applicable
rules of interpretation.
The  applicable  rules  of  interpretation
require  that  the  meaning  of  the  contract  be
gathered  from  a  study  and  a  consideration  of
all the covenants contained in the instrument
and   not   from   detached   portions.   It   is
necessary  that  every  essential  part  of  the
contract  be  considered  --  each  in  its  proper
relation   to   the   others                                                  --   in   order   to
determine the meaning of each part as well as
of  the  whole,  and  each  part  must  be  given
effect according to the natural meaning of the
words used.
Another fundamental rule of construction
applicable here requires that each part of the
contract must be given effect, if that can be
done by fair and reasonable intendment, before
one clause may be construed as repugnant to or
irreconcilable with another clause.
Callaham  v.  Arenson,                                                        239  N.C.              619,   625,   80  S.E.2d   619,   623-24
(1954)  (internal citations omitted).




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Pursuant to these rules, we hold that paragraph thirteen was
intended  to  modify  the  general  prohibition  of  paragraph  one  by
providing that lots could be used for the specific non-residential
purpose of constructing a public street upon obtaining consent from
the   Mileses   in   writing.                                                 Furthermore,   we   note   that   this
construction comports with the well-established principle that when
the  meaning  of  covenants  purporting  to  restrict  the  free  use  of
property is in doubt, such covenants are to be construed in favor
of the unrestricted use of property.   See Long v. Branham, 271 N.C.
264,  268,  156 S.E.2d  235,  239  (1967).
Because  we  hold  that  the  covenants  do  not  prohibit  the
Developers' use of the Lot 1 Strip as a through-street, we need not
address plaintiffs' argument that the trial court erred in denying
plaintiffs'  motion  for  summary  judgment  as  to  the  Developers'
defenses of laches and estoppel.   Plaintiffs also contend that the
trial  court  erred  in  granting  summary  judgment  in  favor  of  the
Developers on plaintiffs' claim that the Mileses breached a promise
implied  from  the  development  plan.    We  disagree  and  affirm  the
trial court's ruling on this claim because the claim, as set forth
in the complaint, is expressly alleged against the Mileses and, as
noted  above,  plaintiffs  have  voluntarily  dismissed  all  claims
against the Mileses.
Furthermore,  we  disagree  with  plaintiffs'  argument  that  the
trial  court  erred  in  denying  plaintiffs'  motion  to  join  certain
parties.    Plaintiffs  rely  solely  upon  the  case  of  Karner  v.  Roy
White  Flowers,  Inc.,  351  N.C.  433,  527  S.E.2d  40  (2000),  for  the




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proposition  that  the  trial  court  should  have  joined  as  necessary
parties  all  of  the  lot  owners  and  the  City  of  Concord.    However,
plaintiffs' reliance upon Karner is misplaced.   That case involved
a  "determination  of  whether  a  change  of  circumstances  has  taken
place  so  as  to  void  a  restrictive  covenant  in  equity[.]"    Id.  at
437,                                                                           527  S.E.2d  at   43.   The  case  before  us  involves  no  such
determination, but rather involves the determination of whether a
certain  use  of  the  land  in  question  violates  the  applicable
restrictive  covenants.  Having  found  no  authority  to  support
plaintiffs' proposition, we affirm the trial court's ruling on this
issue.
We  have  also  examined  plaintiffs'  arguments  that  the  trial
court erred in granting summary judgment on plaintiffs' claims of
negligence and unfair and deceptive practices and find them to be
without merit.
Finally, plaintiffs contend the trial court erred by failing
to return to plaintiffs the $5,000.00 bond posted by plaintiffs as
security for the issuance of the preliminary injunction.   However,
the record does not contain any indication that the trial court has
yet considered or determined whether the Developers have sustained
any  damages  as  a  result  of  the  injunction  entered  against  them.
See  Tedder  v.  Alford,  128  N.C.  App.  27,  36,  493  S.E.2d  487,  492
(1997), disc. review denied,  348 N.C.  290,  501 S.E.2d  917  (1998).
Thus, plaintiffs' assignment of error on this issue is premature.
We affirm the order of the trial court.
Affirmed.




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Judges WYNN and LEWIS concur.

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