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BOBBY LEE BOND, Employee, Plaintiff v. FOSTER MASONRY, INC.,
Employer; SELF-INSURED,  (Key Risk Management Services),
Defendants
No. COA99-696
(Filed 18 July 2000)
1.                                                                                                Workers’ Compensation--average weekly wage--calculation
In a workers’ compensation action involving a bricklayer who was a full-time employee
even though he was not always required to work due to weather and demand, the Industrial
Commission correctly chose the second rather than the fifth method of calculating his average
weekly wage under N.C.G.S. § 97-2(5), but did not correctly use the second method in the
calculation.  The case was remanded for the Commission to determine the number of weeks
plaintiff did not work and then to divide plaintiff’s yearly earnings by the number of weeks
remaining.
2.                                                                                                Workers’ Compensation--earning capacity after injury--wages from current
employment
The Industrial Commission’s findings as to earning capacity in a workers’ compensation
action were affirmed where competent evidence showed that plaintiff met his burden of showing
that he was unable to earn the same wages as before the injury by showing his earnings from his
current employment.  Defendant presented no evidence that plaintiff could obtain employment
earning more than this amount.
Appeal  by  defendants  from  an  opinion  and  award  entered                                    5
February  1999 by the North Carolina Industrial Commission.    Heard
in the Court of Appeals  27 March  2000.
Walden & Walden, by Daniel S. Walden, for plaintiff-appellee.
Womble  Carlyle  Sandridge  &  Rice,  P.L.L.C.,  by  Clayton  M.
Custer and Lawrence B. Somers, for defendant-appellants.
HUNTER, Judge.
Foster   Masonry,   Inc.   and   Key   Risk   Management   Services
(“defendants”),  appeals  from  an  opinion  and  award  of  the  North
Carolina Industrial Commission (“Industrial Commission”) wherein it
awarded   Bobby   Lee   Bond                                                                      (“plaintiff”),   workers’   compensation
benefits and calculated plaintiff’s average weekly wage under the
second method identified in N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  97-2(5).    We affirm




in  part  and  remand  in  order  for  the  Full  Industrial  Commission
(“Full  Commission”)  to  re-calculate  plaintiff’s                              “average  weekly
wage” under the second method in N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  97-2(5).
The  evidence  indicates  that  plaintiff  had  been  working  for
defendant  as  a  brick  mason  for  approximately  three  years  when  he
was injured at work on  9 August  1996 due to the sudden giving away
of his right arm.   Plaintiff went to Kernersville Immediate Care on
the  day  of  his  injury.    He  did  not  return  to  masonry  work  due  to
continued problems related to the injury; however, plaintiff began
working  at  Direct  Transport,  Inc.,  on  3  February  1997,  where  his
duties consisted of driving automobiles from various locations to
Greensboro,  North  Carolina.    Plaintiff  was  ultimately  diagnosed
with a right rotator cuff strain with brachial plexus strain on 10
March  1997.    It was determined that plaintiff had reached maximum
medical  improvement  on                                                         28  April          1997,  and  he  was  assigned  a
permanent partial disability rating of twenty percent (20%) to the
right upper extremity, with restrictions of no lifting over twenty-
five pounds, no overhead work, and no repetitive use of the right
arm.
Plaintiff filed a claim with the Industrial Commission, which
defendant contested on the basis that plaintiff’s injury was not an
injury  by  accident,  and  therefore  was  not  compensable  under  the
North Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act (“Act”).   After a hearing
on  the  matter,  Deputy  Commissioner  William  C.  Bost  entered  an
opinion  and  award  on  16  February  1998,  concluding  as  a  matter  of
law that plaintiff’s injury was compensable under the Act, and that
4.                                                                                                                                     Plaintiff’s average weekly wages on
August                                                                           9,                 1996   were                        $458.99,   yielding   a




compensation  rate  of  $306.01.    G.S.  97-2(5);
G.S.  97-29.
5.                                                                            As  a  result  of  his  August           9,                                    1996
injury  by  accident,  plaintiff  was  totally
disabled  during  the  period  August                                         9,                                       1996
through February  2,  1997.    G.S.  97-29.
6.                                                                            As  a  result  of  his  August           9,                                    1996
injury   by   accident,   plaintiff’s   earning
capacity   was   permanently   diminished   from
$458.99 per week to $234.15 per week effective
February                                                                      3,                                       1997,   thus   entitling   him   to
$149.01 per week until the end of the 300-week
period.    G.S.  97-30.
Commissioner Bost made the following award, in pertinent part:
1.                                                                            For  his  temporary  total  disability
compensation,  defendant  shall  pay  plaintiff
temporary total disability compensation at the
rate of $306.01 per week for the period August
9,  1996 through February  2,  1997.  .  .
2.                                                                            For   his   temporary   partial   and
permanent   partial   disability   compensation,
defendant   shall   pay   plaintiff   temporary
partial   and   permanent   partial   disability
compensation  at  the  rate  of  $149.91  per  week
starting February 3, 1997 and continuing until
the end of the 300-week period starting August
9,  1996.  .  .
Defendants appealed this opinion and award to the Full Commission.
In  its  opinion  and  award  of  5  February  1999,  the  Full  Commission
affirmed that plaintiff had suffered a compensable injury under the
Act.    As to plaintiff’s compensation rate, it found:
11.   Regarding    his    employment    with
defendant, plaintiff was a full time employee.
Although  he  did  not  work  when  defendant  did
not  have  contract  jobs  available,  plaintiff
was   not   a   part   time   employee   and   his
employment was not seasonal in nature.
12.   In  the  prior  Opinion  and  Award,
plaintiff’s pre-injury average weekly wage was
calculated    pursuant    to    an    Industrial
Commission  Form                                                              22  submitted  by  defendant.
According  to  this  Form                                                     22,  plaintiff  worked
only four (4) days in November 1995.   However,




as shown by Defendant’s Answers to Plaintiff’s
Interrogatories, plaintiff worked thirty  (30)
days in November 1995.   Therefore, plaintiff’s
pre-injury   average   weekly   wage   was   not
$458.99,  as  found  in  the  prior  Opinion  and
Award.
13.   During   the   fifty-two                                              (52)   week
period  prior  to  plaintiff’s                                              9  August                       1996
injury  by  accident,  he  missed  seven                                                                    (7)  or
more   consecutive   days   on   more   than   one
occasion.    Therefore, the second method under
G.S.                                                                        §                               97-2(5)  of  calculating  his  average
weekly wage should be used.
14.   Plaintiff  earned                                                     $12,262.50  during
the fifty-two (52) weeks preceding his injury.
Over this period, plaintiff worked two-hundred
and thirteen (213) days, yielding a daily wage
rate of $57.57.   When multiplied by seven (7),
this daily rate yields an average weekly wage
for plaintiff of  $402.99 as of  9 August  1996,
which yields a compensation rate of  $268.67.
As  a  result  of  these  findings,  the  Full  Commission  awarded
plaintiff temporary total disability from  9 August  1996 through  2
February                                                                    1997  at  the  rate  of         $268.67  per  week,  and                 “partial
disability  compensation  at  the  rate  of  two-thirds  the  difference
between his average weekly wage of $402.99 and his post injury wage
level  of                                                                   $190.00  for  the  period  of   3  February                              1997  through  the
present, subject to the statutory maximum period of three hundred
(300) weeks.”    Defendants appeal.
[1] First, we note that our review of claims under the Act is
limited.    The  North  Carolina  Supreme  Court  has  stated  that  “the
findings of fact made by the Commission are conclusive on appeal,
. . . if supported by competent evidence . . . even though there is
evidence which would support a finding to the contrary.”                    Hansel
v. Sherman Textiles,  304 N.C.  44,  49,  283 S.E.2d  101,  104  (1981).
When  this  Court  reviews  a  decision  of  the  Full  Commission,  its




inquiry is limited to:                                                         (1) whether there is competent evidence to
support  the  Industrial  Commission’s  findings  of  fact;  and,              (2)
whether  the  findings  of  fact  support  the  conclusions  of  law  and
decision of the Industrial Commission.   Id.   Conclusions of law by
the  Industrial  Commission  are  reviewable  de  novo  by  this  Court.
Grantham  v.  R.  G.  Barry  Corp.,  127  N.C.  App.  529,  491  S.E.2d  678
(1997), disc. review denied,  347 N.C.  671,  500 S.E.2d  86  (1998).
Under  our  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  97-2(5),  average  weekly  wage  is
defined in pertinent part as
[1]  earnings  of  the  injured  employee  in  the
employment in which he was working at the time
of  the  injury  during  the  period  of                                       52  weeks
immediately preceding the date of the injury,
.  .  .  divided  by  52;                                                      [2]  but  if  the  injured
employee  lost  more  than  seven  consecutive
calendar days at one or more times during such
period,  although  not  in  the  same  week,  then
the  earnings  for  the  remainder  of  such                                   52
weeks shall be divided by the number of weeks
remaining  after  the  time  so  lost  has  been
deducted.                                                                      [3]  Where  the  employment  prior  to
the injury extended over a period of less than
52 weeks, the method of dividing the earnings
during that period by the number of weeks and
parts thereof during which the employee earned
wages  shall  be  followed;    provided,  results
fair and just to both parties will be thereby
obtained.                                                                      [4] Where, by reason of a shortness
of time during which the employee has been in
the  employment  of  his  employer  or  the  casual
nature  or  terms  of  his  employment,  it  is
impractical  to  compute  the  average  weekly
wages as above defined, regard shall be had to
the average weekly amount which during the  52
weeks previous to the injury was being earned
by  a  person  of  the  same  grade  and  character
employed  in  the  same  class  of  employment  in
the same locality or community.
[5] But where for exceptional reasons the
foregoing  would  be  unfair,  either  to  the
employer  or  employee,  such  other  method  of
computing average weekly wages may be resorted
to as will most nearly approximate the amount
which  the  injured  employee  would  be  earning




were it not for the injury.
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                              §           97-2(5)                                                     (1999).     In  its  first  assignment  of
error,  defendants  contend  that  the  Full  Commission  erred  in
calculating plaintiff’s average weekly wage under the second method
in N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  97-2(5), for a total of  $402.99.    Defendants
argue  that  the  appropriate  method  in  this  case  is  the  fifth,  or
“exceptional  reasons”  method  identified  in  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  97-
2(5),   whereby   defendants   urge   that   as   a   seasonal   worker,
plaintiff’s yearly earnings   should be divided by 52 for an average
weekly wage of $235.82.   We note that this calculation is identical
to  the  first  method  identified  in  the  subject  statute,  which  is
used when the employee has worked  52 weeks in the year.
From our review of this statute and the prior holdings of this
Court,  it  is  clear  that  this  statute  establishes  an  order  of
preference  for  the  calculation  method  to  be  used,  and  that  the
primary  method,  set  forth  in  the  first  sentence,  is  to  calculate
the total wages of the employee for the fifty-two weeks of the year
prior  to  the  date  of  injury  and  to  divide  that  sum  by  fifty-two.
Hensley v. Caswell Action Committee, 296 N.C. 527, 533, 251 S.E.2d
399,  402  (1979).   The final, or fifth method, as set forth in N.C.
Gen.  Stat.                                                                    §           97-2(5),  may  not  be  used  unless  there  has  been  a
finding  that  unjust  results  would  occur  by  using  the  previously
enumerated methods.    See Wallace v. Music Shop, II, Inc.,  11 N.C.
App.  328,  331,  181  S.E.2d  237,  239  (1971).    In  Derebery  v.  Pitt
County  Fire  Marshall,                                                        318  N.C.   192,                                                        347  S.E.2d                                  814   (1986),  the
North  Carolina  Supreme  Court  held  that  a  worker’s  average  weekly
wage  should  be  based  upon  the  measure  of  the  injured  employee’s




earning   capacity,   noting   that   this   must   be   determined   by
calculating                                                                     “‘the  amount  which  the  injured  employee  would  be
earning  were  it  not  for  the  injury.’”    Id.  at  197,  347  S.E.2d  at
817  (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  97-2(5)).
Defendant  contends  that  because  plaintiff’s  work  with  his
employer  was  sporadic,  fairness  to  the  employer  requires  the
consideration  of  “both  peak  and  slack  periods”  in  calculating  an
employee’s  average  weekly  wage  where  the  employment  in  question
does  not  provide  work  in  each  of  the  fifty-two  weeks  in  a  year.
Joyner v. Oil Co.,  266 N.C.  519,  522,  146 S.E.2d  447,  450  (1966).
Therefore, defendant argues that plaintiff’s earnings of $12,262.50
should  be  divided  by  fifty-two  weeks,  instead  of  the  number  of
weeks  he  actually  worked,  to  arrive  at  an  average  weekly  wage  of
$235.82.    We disagree.
In Joyner v. Oil Co., 266 N.C. 519, 146 S.E.2d 447 (1966), the
North  Carolina  Supreme  Court  considered  a  workers’  compensation
case where the employee was a relief truck driver who worked only
on an as-needed basis during the fifty-two weeks prior to injury.
The   Court   described   the   driver’s   employment   as                      “inherently
part-time  and  intermittent”  and  held  it  was                               “[un]fair[]  to  the
employer . . . [not to] take into consideration both peak and slack
periods,”  id.  at  522,  146  S.E.2d  at  450,  in  calculating  average
weekly  wage  because                                                           “it  gives  plaintiff  the  advantage  of  wages
earned in . . . ‘peak’ . . . season without taking into account the
slack  periods”  during  which  he  did  not  work.    Id.  at                  521,                                                      146
S.E.2d  at  449.    As  a  result,  the  Court  held  that  the  employee’s
average  weekly  wage  was  to  be  calculated  under  the  “exceptional




reasons,” (fifth) method set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(5) by
taking the total wages earned during the twelve month period prior
to injury and dividing that amount by fifty-two, representing the
number of weeks in a year.   Id. at  522,  146 S.E.2d at  450.   As for
the  total  wage  calculation,  the  court  reasoned  that  without  the
injury, the employee  “would not be earning more than this sum in a
normal  year.”    Id.    In  a  more  recent  case,  Barber  v.  Going  West
Transp., Inc., 134 N.C. App. 428, 517 S.E.2d 914 (1999), plaintiff
was injured in  1996 while working as a driver for his employer, a
provider  of  long  haul  transportation  services  specializing  in
produce shipment.   The Full Commission had found that plaintiff had
been continuously employed with employer since  1994, and that his
employment was not seasonal.    This Court reversed, stating:
The parties stipulated in a Form  22 Wage
Chart  to  the  days  and  weeks  plaintiff  worked
in                                                                             1995  and   1996  and  to  the  earnings  she
received.    Upon  review  of  the  Wage  Chart,  we
note  plaintiff  did  not  work  during                                        1995  in
February,    March,    August,    September    or
November,  and  reported  working  only  eleven
days in April, six days in July and seven days
in December.    In consequence of a fluctuating
work  schedule  dependent  in  the  main  upon  the
produce season, plaintiff’s job more properly
qualified as “seasonal” rather than continuous
employment.
Id. at  436,  517 S.E.2d at  921.    As in Joyner, the court held that
the employees weekly wage should be computed under the fifth method
stated  in  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  97-2(5),  i.e.,  by  dividing  his  total
earnings by fifty-two.   Unlike Barber and Joyner, plaintiff in the
present  case  was  not  a  “seasonal”  worker  or  a  relief  worker  who
filled  in  when  a  regular  employee  could  not.    Because  work  with
defendant was dependent on demand and weather conditions, sometimes




plaintiff  was  not  required  to  work  for  days  or  weeks  at  a  time;
however,  he  was  considered  a  full-time  employee,  not  a  seasonal
one.   A seasonal employee or relief worker does not work full-time
every week in the year.    To the contrary, it is entirely possible
that  as  a  brick  mason,  plaintiff  could  be  required  to  work  every
week,  full-time  by  his  employer.    Accordingly,  we  believe  that
plaintiff’s  earnings  should  not  be  divided  by  52  under  the  fifth
method in N.C. Gen. Stat.  § 97-2(5), but rather, the second method
in  this  statute  is  appropriate  in  the  case  at  bar.    However,  our
review indicates that the Full Commission did not correctly use the
second method in calculating plaintiff’s average weekly wage.
The  Full  Commission  computed  plaintiff’s  daily  wage  rate  by
dividing plaintiff’s total earnings by the number of days worked,
then  multiplied  this                                                         “daily  wage  rate”  by  seven  for  an  average
weekly  wage.    First,  we  note  that  the  second  method  of  N.C.  Gen.
Stat.  §  97-2(5)  does  not  authorize  using  a  “daily  wage  rate”  and
multiplying  it  by  seven  in  calculating  an  average  weekly  wage.
Additionally,  no  evidence  indicates  that  plaintiff  worked  seven
days  a  week,  which  would  substantiate  multiplying  plaintiff’s
alleged “daily wage rate” by seven.                                            “Under G.S. 97-2(e), ‘average
weekly  wages’  of  the  employee  ‘in  the  employment  in  which  he  was
working at the time of the injury’ must be related to his earnings
rather than to his earning capacity.”    Liles v. Electric Co.,  244
N.C.  653,  657,  94  S.E.2d  790,  794  (1956)  (emphasis  in  original).
The  computation  used  by  the  Full  Commission  indicates  what
plaintiff’s  earning  capacity  would  be  if  he  worked  seven  days  a
week  for  thirty-six  weeks  as  a  brick  mason.    This  calculation  is




not provided for in the second method under N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  97-
2(5), and therefore was error.   Accordingly, those portions of the
Full  Commission’s  opinion  and  award  based  on  a  calculation  of
plaintiff’s average weekly wage at $402.99 are reversed.   This case
is  remanded  in  order  for  the  Full  Commission  to  calculate
plaintiff’s average weekly wage as specified in the second method
in N.C. Gen. Stat.  §                                                        97-2(5), which states in pertinent part:
if  the  injured  employee  lost  more  than  seven
consecutive calendar days at one or more times
during  such  period,  although  not  in  the  same
week,  then  the  earnings  for  the  remainder  of
such  52  weeks  shall  be  divided  by  the  number
of weeks remaining after the time so lost has
been deducted.
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  97-2(5).    In  accordance  with  this  method,  the
Full Commission shall determine the number of weeks which plaintiff
did not work  (“time so lost”), and then divide plaintiff’s yearly
earnings by  “the number of weeks remaining after the time so lost
has  been  deducted.”     Id.     The  Full  Commission  may  make  any
corresponding  changes  in  the  opinion  and  award  based  on  this  re-
calculation, in accordance with this opinion.
[2] Last, defendant argues that plaintiff failed to meet his
burden as to his present earning capacity which was determined to
be $190.00 per week.   Defendants urge that plaintiff could possibly
earn more than this amount.    This Court has held:
An employee injured in the course of his
employment  is  disabled  under  the  Act  if  the
injury results in an “incapacity . . . to earn
the wages which the employee was receiving at
the  time  of  injury  in  the  same  or  any  other
employment.”                                                                 N.C.G.S.                                   §   97-2(9)   (1991).
Accordingly, disability as defined in the Act
is  the  impairment  of  the  injured  employee’s
earning    capacity    rather    than    physical
disablement.




The  burden  is  on  the  employee  to  show
that  he  is  unable  to  earn  the  same  wages  he
had  earned  before  the  injury,  either  in  the
same  employment  or  in  other  employment.    The
employee  may  meet  this  burden  in  one  of  four
ways:                                                                       (1) the production of medical evidence
that  he  is  physically  or  mentally,  as  a
consequence   of   the   work   related   injury,
incapable  of  work  in  any  employment;  (2)  the
production  of  evidence  that  he  is  capable  of
some work, but that he has, after a reasonable
effort  on  his  part,  been  unsuccessful  in  his
effort    to    obtain    employment;                                       (3)    the
production  of  evidence  that  he  is  capable  of
some work but that it would be futile because
of    preexisting    conditions,    i.e.,    age,
inexperience, lack of education, to seek other
employment; or  (4) the production of evidence
that  he  has  obtained  other  employment  at  a
wage  less  than  that  earned  prior  to  the
injury.
Russell v. Lowes Product Distribution, 108 N.C. App. 762, 765, 425
S.E.2d                                                                      454,                                     457   (1993)   (citations  omitted).    Competent  evidence
indicates that plaintiff at bar met his burden under (4) identified
above  by  showing  his  earnings  through  his  employment  with  Direct
Transport, Inc.   These earnings, likewise, were competent evidence
of plaintiff’s earning capacity.    Defendant presented no evidence
that  plaintiff  could  obtain  employment  earning  more  than  this
amount.    Therefore, we hold that this argument is meritless.
In  summary,  we  reverse  and  remand  for  re-calculation  of
plaintiff’s average weekly wage, and any award based thereon.    We
affirm  the  Full  Commission’s  findings  as  to  plaintiff’s  earning
capacity.
Reversed and remanded in part, affirmed in part.
Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge TIMMONS-GOODSON concur.

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