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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA09-1723
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                                          3 August  2010
DANIEL ERNEST BRADLEY,
Plaintiff,
v.                                                                                              Halifax County
                                                                                                No.  08 CVS  68
WYATT LEON GAY,
Defendant.
Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 1 October 2009 by Judge
Alma  L.  Hinton  in  Halifax  County  Superior  Court.    Heard  in  the
Court of Appeals  27 May  2010.
Thomas & Farris, P.A., by Albert S. Thomas, Jr.; and Lawyers
East, by R. Alfred Patrick, for plaintiff-appellant.
Valentine, Adams, Lamar, Murray, Lewis & Daughtry, L.L.P., by
Bruce L. Daughtry and Kevin N. Lewis, for defendant-appellee.
Poyner  Spruill   LLP,  by  Timothy  W.  Wilson,  for  unnamed
defendant-appellee.
JACKSON, Judge.
Daniel  Bradley                                                                                 (“plaintiff”)  appeals  the                                                  30  September   2009
                                                                                                order  granting  summary  judgment  in  favor  of  Leon  Gay  (“Gay”)  and
                                                                                                unnamed  defendant  North  Carolina  Farm  Bureau  Mutual  Insurance
                                                                                                Company, Inc. (“Farm Bureau”).   For the reasons set forth below, we
affirm.




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On                                                                             8  January                            2007,  at  approximately   6:00  p.m.,  defendant
struck  plaintiff  with  his  vehicle  while  plaintiff  stood  in  the
middle of North Carolina Highway  30 trying to pull a wounded deer
from  the  roadway.    Plaintiff  had  stopped  his  car  a  few  minutes
earlier to assist the motorist, Edward Price (“Price”), who had hit
the  deer.    Plaintiff  parked  his  vehicle  on  the  side  of  the  road,
facing  east,  with  his  headlights  on.    Price  stood  on  the  side  of
the road, watching plaintiff pick up the deer’s head and attempt to
drag  it  off  the  road.    As  plaintiff  attempted  to  remove  the  deer
from  the  middle  of  the  road,  defendant  approached  from  the  east
with  his  headlights  on,  from  approximately  “a  quarter  of  a  mile
away.”     Traveling  down  the  highway,  defendant  saw  plaintiff’s
headlights, but the lights obstructed his vision, and he was unable
to  see  plaintiff  in  the  middle  of  the  road.     Observing  the
headlights,  defendant  slowed  down  from  the  posted  speed  limit  of
fifty-five  miles  per  hour  to  approximately  twenty-five  miles  per
hour,  constantly  applying  his  brakes  as  he  came  closer.     The
undisputed  facts  are  that  this  was  a  straight  stretch  of  highway
and that the collision occurred on a clear evening.
While  watching  plaintiff  in  the  middle  of  the  road  and  upon
seeing  defendant’s  vehicle  at  a  distance  of  approximately  one
quarter  of  a  mile  away,  Price  verbally  warned  plaintiff  that
defendant’s  car  was  coming  towards  them.    Price  testified  in  a
sworn  deposition  that  plaintiff  looked  up  in  the  direction  of
defendant’s  oncoming  car.                                                    Specifically,  Price  testified  as
follows:




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Q:  Could  you  see  his  reaction  when  you  told
him a car was coming?
A: He looked up.
Q: Do you know which direction he looked?
A: Towards where the car was coming.
Plaintiff   testified   during   his   deposition   that   he   saw
headlights  up  ahead,  but  he  assumed  they  belonged  to  other
motorists  keeping  a  lookout  and  that  they  were  going  to  stop.
Plaintiff continued to try to pull the deer from the roadway after
he  saw  the  lights.    Approximately  twenty  to  forty  seconds  after
Price  gave  warning  to  plaintiff,  defendant  struck  plaintiff  with
his vehicle.   Price testified that, if plaintiff had let go of the
deer and moved out of the road when he had been warned and looked
up at defendant’s car, plaintiff would have had time to avoid the
collision.   Defendant testified that he saw plaintiff only when he
was  four  feet  in  front  of  his  vehicle,  and  that                    “all  at  once”
plaintiff  went  from  a  crouching  position  to  a  standing  position.
Seconds later, defendant’s vehicle struck plaintiff.
On                                                                          14  January                                                  2008,  plaintiff  filed  a  complaint  against
defendant for motor vehicle negligence seeking compensatory damages
for the injuries he sustained in the accident.    On  11 March  2008,
defendant Gay filed an answer denying the allegations against him
and raising the affirmative defense of contributory negligence.   On
12  March                                                                   2008,  defendant  Farm  Bureau  filed  an  answer  denying
plaintiff’s   claims   and   raised   the   affirmative   defense   of
contributory negligence.   On 14 March 2008, plaintiff filed a reply
denying the allegation of contributory negligence and claiming that




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defendant  had  the  last  clear  chance  to  avoid  the  collision.    On
19  June  2009,  defendant  Gay  filed  a  motion  for  summary  judgment.
On                                                                            25  June                                                   2009,  defendant  Farm  Bureau  also  filed  a  motion  for
summary  judgment.    On  1  October  2009,  the  trial  court  entered  an
order  granting  summary  judgment  in  favor  of  both  Gay  and  Farm
Bureau.    Plaintiff appeals.
On appeal, plaintiff argues that trial court erred by granting
summary  judgment  in  favor  of  both  defendants  on  the  grounds  that
plaintiff did not demonstrate an adequate forecast of evidence for
a prima facie case of negligence.    We disagree.
The Supreme Court of North Carolina has held that  “[s]ummary
judgment is appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories   and   admissions   on   file,   together   with   the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material  fact  and  that  any  party  is  entitled  to  a  judgment  as  a
matter of law.’”    Craig v. Hanover,  363 N.C.  334,  337,  678 S.E.2d
351,                                                                          353                                                        (2009)                                                        (quoting  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                §   1A-1,  Rule      56(c)
(2007)).                                                                                                                                                                                               The  trial  court’s  granting  of  summary  judgment  is
                                                                                                                                         reviewed  de  novo.    Id.  at  337,  678 S.E.2d  at  354.                                                                   “‘The  showing
required  for  summary  judgment  may  be  accomplished  by  proving  an
essential  element  of  the  opposing  party’s  claim                         .  would  be
barred by an affirmative defense.’”   Id. (quoting Dobson v. Harris,
352  N.C.  77,                                                                83,                                                        530  S.E.2d  829,                                             835  (2000)).  A  defendant  in  a
negligence claim may be entitled to summary judgment if he or she
can  show                                                                     “that  the  plaintiff  cannot  surmount  an  affirmative
defense.”    Bartlett Milling Co. v. Walnut Grove Auction,  192 N.C.




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App.  74,  85,  665  S.E.2d  478,  488  (2008),  disc.  rev.  denied,  362
N.C.  679,  669  S.E.2d  741  (2008).    We  review  all  evidence  in  the
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion for summary
judgment.    Dobson v. Harris,  352 N.C.  77,  83,  530 S.E.2d  829,  835
(2000).   Furthermore, “‘if the granting of summary judgment can be
sustained on any grounds, it should be affirmed on appeal.’”   Azar
v. Presbyterian Hosp.,  191 N.C. App.  367,  370-71,  663 S.E.2d  450,
453  (2008)  (quoting Shore v. Brown,  324 N.C.  427,  428,  378 S.E.2d
778,                                                                          779         (1989)),  cert.  denied,   363  N.C.     372,   678  S.E.2d   232
(2009).
“Even  though  summary  judgment  is  seldom  appropriate  in  a
negligence  case,  summary  judgment  may  be  granted  in  a  negligence
action where there are no genuine issues of material fact and the
plaintiff  fails  to  show  one  of  the  elements  of  negligence.”
Lavelle  v.  Schultz,  120  N.C.  App.  857,  859,  463  S.E.2d  567,  569
(1995),  disc.  rev.  denied,                                                 342  N.C.   656,                       467  S.E.2d          715           (1996)
(citing  Lamb  v.  Wedgewood  South  Corp.,                                                                          308  N.C.     419,   425,          302
S.E.2d 868, 871 (1983)).   See also McCullough v. Amoco Oil Co., 310
N.C. 452, 457, 312 S.E.2d 417, 420 (1984) (explaining that summary
judgment  is  appropriate  in  a  negligence  action  when  the  moving
party has proven that an essential element of the opposing party’s
claim  is  nonexistent,  or  that  the  opposing  party  cannot  produce
evidence  to  support  an  essential  element  of  his  or  her  claim)
(citing Lowe v. Bradford,  305 N.C.  366,  289 S.E.2d  363  (1982)).
In  order  to  survive  a  motion  for  summary  judgment  in  a
negligence claim, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of




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negligence  by  showing:                                                      “‘(1)  that  defendant  failed  to  exercise
proper  care  in  the  performance  of  a  duty  owed  plaintiff;  (2)  the
negligent breach of that duty was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s
injury; and  (3) a person of ordinary prudence would have foreseen
that the plaintiff’s injury was probable under the circumstances.’”
Biggers v. Bald Head Island, ____ N.C. App. ____, ____, 682 S.E.2d
423,                                                                          425                                            (2009)   (quoting  Lavelle,                        120  N.C.  App.  at   859-60,        463
                                                                              S.E.2d  at                                              569),  cert.  denied,         363  N.C.   853,                  ____  S.E.2d   ____
(2010).
Here, defendant raised the affirmative defense of contributory
negligence  in  response  to  plaintiff’s  negligence  claim.    It  is
well-established  in  this  state  that  a  finding  of  contributory
negligence  bars  plaintiff’s  negligence  claim  against  defendant.
Sawyer v. Food Lion, Inc., 144 N.C. App. 398, 401,  549 S.E.2d  867,
869 (2001).   We previously have explained that “‘[t]he law imposes
upon a person the duty to exercise ordinary care to protect himself
from injury and avoid a known danger; and that where . . . there is
an opportunity to avoid such a known danger, failure to take such
an opportunity is contributory negligence.’”   Diorio v. Penny, 103
N.C.  App.  407,  409,  405  S.E.2d  789,  791  (1991)  (quoting  Lenz  v.
Ridgewood Associates, 55 N.C. App. 115, 122, 284 S.E.2d 702, 706-07
(1981),  disc.  rev.  denied,  305  N.C.  300,  290  S.E.2d  702  (1982)).
Courts long have held that a duty to exercise such care is placed
upon pedestrians.   See Meadows v. Lawrence, 75 N.C. App. 86, 89-90,
330  S.E.2d                                                                   47,                                            50       (1985),  aff’d,               315  N.C.   383,                  337  S.E.2d    851
(1986)                                                                        (per  curiam)                                           (citing  Price  v.  Miller,               271  N.C.             690,           157




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S.E.2d  347  (1967);  Blake  v.  Mallard,  262  N.C.  62,  136  S.E.2d  214
(1964)).    When  coupled  with  conditions  such  as  a  straight  road,
unobstructed visibility, clear weather, and working headlights, a
pedestrian’s  failure  to  see  and  avoid  the  vehicle  will  be  deemed
contributory negligence as a matter of law.    See Meadows,  75 N.C.
App. at  89-90,                                                               330 S.E.2d at  50.
However,  the  last  clear  chance  doctrine  may  provide  an
exception  to  a  plaintiff’s  contributory  negligence.    In  order  to
grant the exception, evidence of four elements must be found:
(1)  [t]hat  the  pedestrian  negligently  placed
himself  in  a  position  of  peril  from  which  he
could not escape by the exercise of reasonable
care;                                                                         (2)  that  the  motorist  knew,  or  by  the
exercise   of   reasonable   care   could   have
discovered, the pedestrian’s perilous position
and  his  incapacity  to  escape  from  it  before
the  endangered  pedestrian  suffered  injury  at
his hands;  (3) that the motorist had the time
and  means  to  avoid  injury  to  the  endangered
pedestrian by the exercise of reasonable care
after    he    discovered,    or    should    have
discovered, the pedestrian’s perilous position
and his incapacity to escape from it; and  (4)
that  the  motorist  negligently  failed  to  use
the  available  time  and  means  to  avoid  the
injury  to  the  endangered  pedestrian,  and  for
that reason struck and injured him.
Nealy  v.  Green,                                                             139  N.C.  App.                                500,   504-05,   534  S.E.2d   240,   243
(2000)  (citing  Wade  v.  Sausage  Co.,  239  N.C.  524,  525,  80  S.E.2d
150,  151  (1954)).
In  the  case  sub  judice,  plaintiff  contends  that  defendant’s
negligence caused his injury.   However, on these facts, we need not
address defendant’s negligence because we hold that plaintiff was
contributorily negligent.   Furthermore, plaintiff fails to meet the




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elements  required  to  avail  himself  of  the  last  clear  chance
doctrine exception.
The following facts show plaintiff’s contributory negligence:
(1)  by  asking  Price  and  at  least  one  other  motorist  to  keep  a
lookout for cars, plaintiff demonstrated that he was aware of the
presence  and  danger  of  other  vehicles  on  the  highway  when  he
stepped into the middle of the road to move the deer;  (2) the road
where  the  collision  occurred  was  “straight  as  an  arrow,”  and  the
weather  was                                                                    “dry  and  clear;”                   (3)  Price  warned  plaintiff  about
defendant’s  vehicle  while  it  was                                            “one  quarter  of  a  mile  away;”
(4) plaintiff looked up at the vehicle with at least twenty seconds
—  and  as  much  as  forty  seconds                                            —  to  move  out  of  the  way;
(5) plaintiff saw oncoming headlights but assumed the vehicle would
stop; (6) if plaintiff had “let go of the deer and moved off of the
road when  .  .  . warned,  .  .  .  [he] had time to get out of the road
.  .  .  [;]”  and  (7)  plaintiff  stayed  in  the  road  and  continued  to
try  to  remove  the  deer.    Twenty  seconds  was  ample  time  for  the
plaintiff  to  remove  himself  from  harm’s  way.    We  previously  have
recognized  a  pedestrian’s  duty  to  use  “ordinary  care  to  protect
himself from injury and avoid a known danger[.]”   Diorio, 103 N.C.
App.  at                                                                        409,                                 405  S.E.2d  at                                791   (citations  omitted).    Where,  as
here,  “there is an opportunity  [for the pedestrian] to avoid such
a known danger, failure to take such an opportunity is contributory
negligence.”                                                                    Id.                                  Accordingly,  we  hold  that  plaintiff  was
contributorily negligent.




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Furthermore,  plaintiff  cannot  meet  all  four  of  the  required
elements to demonstrate that defendant had the last clear chance to
avoid  the  accident.    First,  plaintiff  cannot  demonstrate  that  he
was  in  a  position  of  peril  from  which  he  could  not  escape.    See
Nealy,  139  N.C.  App.  at  504,  534  S.E.2d  at  243  (establishing  the
first element of the last clear chance doctrine requiring that the
pedestrian’s  position  be  one  of                                             “peril  from  which  he  could  not
escape  by  the  exercise  of  reasonable  care[.]”).    The  following
facts  support  the  contention  that  plaintiff,  in  fact,  was  in  a
position  from  which  he  could  safely  remove  himself:                      (1)  Price
warned   plaintiff   that   defendant’s   vehicle   was   approaching;
(2)  plaintiff  looked  up  at  defendant’s  vehicle  while  it  was  one
quarter of a mile away;  (3) plaintiff saw oncoming headlights but
assumed  the  vehicle  would  stop;  (4)  plaintiff  had  approximately
twenty  seconds  —  and  as  much  as  forty  seconds  —  from  the  time  he
looked  up  at  defendant’s  vehicle  to  the  time  he  was  struck;  and
(5)  plaintiff  went  back  to  moving  the  deer  out  of  the  road  after
Price gave him the verbal warning, instead of removing himself from
the position of danger.
Having both knowledge of the perilous situation and sufficient
time  to  remove  himself  from  harm’s  way  precludes  plaintiff  from
meeting the first of the required elements of the last clear chance
doctrine  and  bars  him  from  benefitting  from  this  exception  to
contributory negligence.   Accordingly, in the case sub judice, the
exception is not available to plaintiff.




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For  the  foregoing  reasons,  we  hold  that  the  trial  court
properly granted summary judgment in favor of Gay.    Consequently,
Farm Bureau also is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.    See
Grimsley  v.  Nelson,  342  N.C.  542,  548,  467  S.E.2d  92,  96  (1996)
(explaining  that  if  a  cause  of  action  is  dismissed,  liability
cannot be imposed upon the unnamed defendant, there, a traveler’s
insurance  company)                                                          (citing  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.   §   20-279.21(b)(3)a.
(2005)).
Affirmed.
Judges GEER and BEASLEY concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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