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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA08-157
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                                          3 February  2009
KEITH BRINEGAR,
Plaintiff,
v.                                                                                              Forsyth County
No.  06 CVS  7373
THE CITY OF WINSTON-SALEM,
Defendant.
Appeal by plaintiff from judgment entered 12 December 2007 by
Judge  Steve  A.  Balog  in  Forsyth  County  Superior  Court.    Heard  in
the Court of Appeals  24 September  2008.
Randolph M. James, P.C., by Randolph M. James, for plaintiff-
appellant.
Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, by James R. Morgan, for
defendant-appellee.
JACKSON, Judge.
Keith  Brinegar  (“plaintiff”)  appeals  from  an  order  granting
summary   judgment   in   favor   of   the   City   of   Winston-Salem
(“defendant”).    For the following reasons, we affirm.
In August 1993, plaintiff sought employment with the Winston-
Salem  Police  Department                                                                       (“Police  Department”).     At  that  time,
plaintiff experienced a non-specific, generalized anxiety disorder.




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Plaintiff’s  mental  condition  was  marked  by  excessive  worry  about
several  circumstances  with  no  specific  triggers.                         Plaintiff
experienced feelings of anxiety and panic, accompanied by obsessive
compulsive thoughts, depression, and fear of social situations.
The Police Department was aware of plaintiff’s condition and
required   plaintiff’s   psychiatrist,   Dr.   Edward   Weaver                (“Dr.
Weaver”), to provide a written assessment of plaintiff’s fitness to
become a sworn police officer.    Dr. Weaver’s letter to the Police
Department  stated  that  plaintiff  was  able  to  serve  as  a  sworn
officer within the Police Department.   On 2 August 1993, plaintiff
was hired by defendant as a police officer.
In August  1999, plaintiff’s condition worsened.    On  4 August
1999,  plaintiff  went  on  sick  leave  from  the  Police  Department.
Plaintiff  was  unable  to  return  to  his  duties  as  a  police  officer
after  4 August  1999.
On                                                                            9   December                    1999,   plaintiff   applied   for   disability
retirement   with   the   City   of   Winston-Salem   Police   Officers’
Retirement System (“Officers’ Retirement System”).   On 10 December
1999, plaintiff requested an advancement of paid sick leave.   On 13
December 1999, the Police Department denied plaintiff’s request and
notified plaintiff that he would be on leave without pay between 19
December                                                                      1999  and                       31  December                                     1999.     On   20  December   1999,  the
Police Department went to plaintiff’s home and collected all items
issued by the Police Department.
On 23 December 1999, Police Chief Linda Davis (“Chief Davis”)
sent  a  memorandum  to  Denise  Bell                                         (“Bell”),  defendant’s  Chief




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Financial Officer.   In her memorandum, Chief Davis stated that she
was aware that plaintiff had applied for disability retirement and
that no positions were available within the Police Department that
would  utilize  fully  plaintiff’s  skills  and  training.     However,
Chief  Davis  recommended  that  plaintiff  be  assigned  as  a  Police
Records Specialist.
Around   that   time,   the   Winston-Salem   Police   Officers’
Retirement  Commission  (“Officers’  Retirement  Commission”)  sent  a
copy  of  plaintiff’s  disability  retirement  application,  relevant
medical  records,  and  a  copy  of  the  job  description  for  Police
Records Specialist to the Medical Review Board.   The Medical Review
Board was asked to render an opinion as to whether plaintiff would
be  capable  of  performing  the  duties  required  of  either  a  police
officer or a Police Records Specialist.    The Medical Review Board
usually took between two weeks and two months to make this kind of
determination.
In   January                                                                2000,   prior   to   the   Medical   Review   Board’s
determination, plaintiff began selling marijuana on a daily basis.
On                                                                          21  January                                             2000,  the  Forsyth  County  Sheriff’s  Department
(“Sheriff’s  Department”)  arrested  plaintiff  when  he  attempted  to
sell  marijuana  to  a  teenager.     Also  on                              21  January                                             2000,  the
Sheriff’s Department informed the Police Department of plaintiff’s
arrest.   Effective 21 January 2000, plaintiff was suspended pending
termination   from   employment   with   the   Police   Department   for
violation  of  the  Police  Department’s  Rules  of  Conduct  which
prohibited   the   possession   or   use   of   controlled   substances,




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narcotics, or hallucinogens except as prescribed for treatment by
a physician or dentist.
On 28 January 2000, plaintiff filed a grievance contesting his
suspension  and  possible  termination  from  the  Police  Department.
Subsequently, in February 2000, the Medical Review Board determined
that plaintiff was capable of performing the job of Police Records
Specialist.
On                                                                           25   February   2000,   Loris   Colclough   (“Colclough”),
Administrator  of  the  Officers’  Retirement  Commission  informed
plaintiff  by  letter  that  plaintiff  was  offered  an  alternative
position as a Police Records Specialist and that he was ineligible
for  disability  retirement  at  that  time  based  upon  the  Medical
Review  Board’s  determination  and  pursuant  to  defendant’s  Code  of
Ordinances.    At  the  time  Colclough  sent  the  letter  to  plaintiff,
plaintiff was unable to accept the alternative position due to his
suspension from the Police Department.
On  16  March  2000,  plaintiff  pled  guilty  in  federal  court  to
the felonies of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute
and possession of a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking
charge.
Plaintiff’s grievance was heard on  31 July  2000.   On 7 August
2000,   Bryce   Stuart,   defendant’s   City   Manager,   upheld   the
termination of plaintiff’s employment from the Police Department.
Plaintiff   filed   a   complaint   against   defendant   alleging
constitutional violations and breach of contract on 9 October 2006.
On  2 November  2007, defendant moved for summary judgment pursuant




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to  North  Carolina  Rules  of  Civil  Procedure,  Rule  56,  judgment  on
the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c), and dismissal of plaintiff’s
complaint  pursuant  to  Rule                                                  12(b)(6).    On                                              12  December   2007,  the
trial  court  entered  an  order  granting  defendant’s  motion  for
summary judgment.    Plaintiff appeals.
On  appeal,  plaintiff  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in
granting   defendant’s  motion  for  summary  judgment                         (1)   as  to
plaintiff’s  substantive  due  process  claim,  (2)  as  to  plaintiff’s
breach of contract claim, and (3) in light of our prior holding in
Hogan v. City of Winston-Salem, 121 N.C. App. 414, 466 S.E.2d 303,
aff’d,  344 N.C.  728,  477 S.E.2d  150  (1996)  (per curiam).
Summary   judgment   is   appropriate                                          “if   the   pleadings,
depositions,  answers  to  interrogatories,  and  admissions  on  file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a
judgment  as  a  matter  of  law.”  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  1A-1,  Rule  56(c)
(2007).                                                                        “An issue is  ‘genuine’ if it can be proven by substantial
evidence[,]  and  a  fact  is                                                  ‘material’  if  it  would  constitute  or
irrevocably  establish  any  material  element  of  a  claim  or  a
defense.” Lowe v. Bradford,  305 N.C. 366, 369, 289 S.E.2d 363, 366
(1982)  (citing  Bone  International,  Inc.  v.  Brooks,  304  N.C.  371,
374-75,  283 S.E.2d  518,  520  (1981)).
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a trial court must
consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party. See Summey v. Barker, 357 N.C. 492, 496, 586 S.E.2d 247, 249
(2003).    If  there  is  any  evidence  of  a  genuine  issue  of  material




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fact, a motion for summary judgment should be denied. Howerton v.
Arai Helmet, Ltd.,  358 N.C.  440,  471,  597 S.E.2d  674,  694  (2004).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that no triable
issue of fact exists. Pembee Mfg. Corp. v. Cape Fear Constr. Co.,
313 N.C. 488, 491,  329 S.E.2d  350, 353  (1985) (citing Texaco, Inc.
v. Creel, 310 N.C. 695, 314 S.E.2d 506 (1984)).   This burden can be
met  “by proving that an essential element of the opposing party’s
claim  is  nonexistent,  or  by  showing  through  discovery  that  the
opposing  party  cannot  produce  evidence  to  support  an  essential
element  of  his  claim  or  cannot  surmount  an  affirmative  defense
which  would  bar  the  claim.”  Collingwood  v.  G.E.  Real  Estate
Equities,  324  N.C.  63,  66,  376  S.E.2d  425,  427  (1989)  (citations
omitted).   Once the moving party has met its burden, the non-moving
party must forecast evidence that demonstrates the existence of a
prima facie case. See id.
Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred by granting
defendant’s motion for summary judgment in violation of plaintiff’s
substantive due process rights.    We disagree.
Plaintiff contends that he had a protected property interest
in  disability  retirement  benefits  from  the  Officers’  Retirement
System.    Plaintiff  concedes  that  his  purported  interest  is  not  a
fundamental right.
We  have  instructed  that                                                   “‘[i]n  general,  substantive  due
process   protects   the   public   from   government   action   that
unreasonably  deprives  them  of  a  liberty  or  property  interest.’”
Tripp  v.  City  of  Winston-Salem,  __  N.C.  App.  __,  __,  655  S.E.2d




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890, 893 (2008) (quoting Toomer v. Garrett, 155 N.C. App. 462, 469,
574 S.E.2d 76, 84 (2002)). See also U.S. Const. amend XIV, § 1 (“No
State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without  due  process  of  law  .  .  .                                        .”).                   “‘[W]here  the  interest  is
not  fundamental,  the  government  action  need  only  have  a  rational
relation   to   a   legitimate   governmental   objective   to   pass
constitutional muster.’” Tripp,  __ N.C. App. at  __,  655 S.E.2d at
893  (brackets  in  original)  (quoting  Toomer  v.  Garrett,  155  N.C.
App.                                                                           462,                   469,                           574  S.E.2d   76,   84   (2002)).   “[I]n  order  for
plaintiff to make a substantive due process claim, [he] must allege
that  [he]  had  a  protected  property  interest  and  the  government’s
action  depriving  [him]  of  it  was  without  rational  relation  to  a
legitimate governmental interest.” Id.
“[Plaintiff]  must  have  a  legitimate  claim  of  entitlement  to
the  property  interest.”  Id.  (citing  Bd.  of  Regents  v.  Roth,  408
U.S. 564, 577, 33 L. Ed. 2d 548, 561 (1972)).                                  “‘Property interests
.  are  created  and  their  dimensions  are  defined  by  existing
rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such
as state law — rules or understandings that secure certain benefits
and  that  support  claims  of  entitlement  to  those  benefits.’”  Id.
(quoting  Bd.  of  Regents  v.  Roth,  408  U.S.  564,  577,  33 L.  Ed.  2d
548,  561  (1972)).
The  property  interest  in  the  case  sub  judice  is  defined  by
defendant’s  Code  of  Ordinances  which  governs  the  retirement  of
defendant’s employees.   With regard to disabled police officers, it
provides in pertinent part that




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[a]ny  member,  who  did  not  have  five  years  of
creditable service as of August  20,  1990, and
who is no longer able to perform the duties of
a  sworn  police  officer  as  certified  by  the
medical review board may be transferred by the
city   to   other   duties   within   the   police
department  upon  recommendation  of  the  police
chief and/or human resources director, subject
to   the   review   and   recommendation   of   the
retirement  commission  to  the  city  manager.
Should a member of the plan desire transfer to
a  civilian  position  outside  of  the  police
department,  the  city  will  assist  with  the
transfer.    The following provisions, in order
to maintain police officer retirement benefits
insofar as possible, will apply to a transfer
to another position within the city under this
section:
(6)   An officer who did not have five years of
creditable service as of August  20,  1990, and
elects  not  to  accept  a  transfer  to  a  new
position   in   the   police   or   other   city
department  will  not  be  eligible  to  continue
participation in the city [retirement] plan or
to receive  [retirement] benefits  .  .  ., or to
thereafter elect to accept the transfer.
Winston-Salem, N.C., Code of Ordinances  §  50-104(g)  (2000).
In Tripp, a case almost identical to the case sub judice, we
held  that  the  disabled  police  officer  did  not  have  a  protected
property interest in the officer’s retirement benefits pursuant to
section  50-104(g) of the Winston-Salem Code of Ordinances. Tripp,
__ N.C. App. at  __,  655 S.E.2d at  893.
In Tripp, the plaintiff was a disabled police officer who did
not  have  five  years  of  creditable  service  with  the  Police
Department prior to  20 August 1990. Tripp, __ N.C. App. at  __,  655
S.E.2d at  892.    The plaintiff was offered an alternative position




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as a Police Records Specialist within the Police Department instead
of retirement. Id.    We explained that
the City [of Winston-Salem] could require [the
plaintiff] to transfer to another position in
the                                                                            [Police  Department]  or  to  a  civilian
position with the City outside of the  [Police
Department],  and  if  plaintiff  refused  such  a
position, she would be entitled to a refund of
her  entire  contributions  to  the  retirement
plan, but she would not be eligible to receive
benefits under the plan.
Id.
In  the  case  sub  judice,  plaintiff  attempts  to  distinguish
Tripp  by  arguing  that  he  was  ineligible  to  be  transferred  due  to
his   incarceration   as   a   result   of   his   drug-related   federal
convictions.     We  are  not  persuaded  by  plaintiff’s  distinction.
When  determining  whether  defendant  violated  a  protected  property
interest  protected  by  substantive  due  process,  the  issue  is  not
whether  plaintiff  was  eligible  for  transfer.    Rather,  we  inquire
whether  plaintiff  had  a  legitimate  claim  of  entitlement  in  the
property  interest.  Tripp,  __  N.C.  App.  at  __,  655  S.E.2d  at  893
(citing  Bd.  of  Regents  v.  Roth,  408  U.S.  564,  577,  33  L.  Ed.  2d
548,  561  (1972)).
In Tripp, we explained that
[a]ccording to the Retirement Code, plaintiff
was   never   entitled   to   collect   retirement
benefits  upon  her  disability  because,  under
[section]                                                                      50-104(g),  the  City  reserved  the
option  to  transfer  a  disabled  police  officer
to another position in the [Police Department]
or   elsewhere   in   the   City.                                              Therefore,
plaintiff’s    interest    in    her    retirement
benefits   was   not   a   protected   property
interest.




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Id.                                                                         (emphasis  added).     Accordingly,  we  hold  that  plaintiff’s
ineligibility  to  transfer  due  to  incarceration  is  immaterial
because  plaintiff  never  had  a  protected  property  interest  in
disability   retirement   benefits   under   section                        50-104(g)   of
defendant’s  Code  of  Ordinances.  See  id.    As  such,  plaintiff  has
presented no genuine issue of material fact that defendant violated
a property interest protected by substantive due process.
Because  plaintiff  fails  to  establish  a  protected  property
interest,   we   need   not   address   whether   defendant’s   Code   of
Ordinances,  section                                                        50-104(g)  bears  a  rational  relation  to  a
legitimate government interest. 1See id.
Next,  plaintiff  contends  that  the  trial  court  erred  in
granting  summary  judgment  to  defendant  as  to  defendant’s  alleged
breach of contract with plaintiff.    We disagree.
Specifically, plaintiff alleges that  (1) defendant failed to
raise   properly   the   affirmative   defense   of   the   statute   of
limitations  and                                                            (2)  defendant  breached  its  implied  duty  of  good
faith  and  fair  dealing  with  plaintiff  by  offering  plaintiff  an
alternative position as a Police Records Specialist when plaintiff
was suspended pending termination for drug-related federal criminal
charges.
Contrary to plaintiff’s assertion, we note that defendant did
raise the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense in its
1
We note, however, that we previously have held that
defendant’s Code of Ordinances, section  50-104(g) does have a
rational relation to a legitimate government interest. See Tripp,
__ N.C. App. at  __,  655 S.E.2d at  893-94.




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answer  to  plaintiff’s  complaint.     Furthermore,  the  applicable
statute  of  limitations  in  the  case  sub  judice  is  two  years.  N.C.
Gen.  Stat.  §  1-53(1)  (2007);  see  also  Tripp,  __  N.C.  App.  at  __,
655 S.E.2d at  894.    On  25 February  2000, Colclough, Administrator
of  the  Officers’  Retirement  Commission,  offered  plaintiff  an
alternative  position  as  a  Police  Records  Specialist  and  informed
plaintiff that he was ineligible for disability retirement at that
time.                                                                          On                                                              9   October   2006,   plaintiff   filed   this   action.
Accordingly, plaintiff’s breach of contract claim is barred by the
applicable statute of limitations, 2and the trial court did not err
in granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment on plaintiff’s
claim for breach of contract.
Because defendant’s alleged breach of contract is statutorily
time-barred,  we  need  not  address  whether  defendant  acted  in  good
faith by offering plaintiff an alternative position endorsed by the
Medical  Review  Board  prior  to  the  hearing  regarding  plaintiff’s
possible termination.    We note, however, that plaintiff, like the
plaintiff in Tripp, “alleged no genuine issue of material fact that
the                                                                            [Police  Department]  failed  to  follow  the  terms  of  the
retirement  plan  as  it  existed  in  the  Winston-Salem  Code  of
Ordinances  when  plaintiff  became  vested.”  Tripp,  __  N.C.  App.  at
__,  655 S.E.2d at  895.
2
The parties note that on  24 February  2003, plaintiff
originally filed this action.    On  9 October  2006, after a series
of voluntary dismissals, plaintiff re-filed the action.    The
record does not contain plaintiff’s earlier complaint.    However,
even taking the earliest date agreed upon by the parties,
plaintiff’s breach of contract allegation still is barred by the
statute of limitations.




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Finally,  plaintiff  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  in
granting  summary  judgment  in  light  of  our  decision  in  Hogan.    We
disagree.
Plaintiff attempts to fashion a genuine issue of material fact
as  to  whether  defendant’s  actions  created  an  unconstitutional
impairment  of  contract.  See  U.S.  Const.  art.  I,  §  10,  cl.  1  (“No
State  shall  .  .  .  pass  any  .  .  .  Law  impairing  the  Obligation  of
Contracts  .  .  .                                                               .”).    Our Supreme Court has explained that
[i]n  determining  whether  a  contractual  right
has been unconstitutionally impaired, we . . .
[ask]:                                                                           (1)  whether  a  contractual  obligation
is  present,                                                                     (2)  whether  the  state’s  actions
impaired  that  contract,  and                                                                                                  (3)  whether  the
impairment  was  reasonable  and  necessary  to
serve an important public purpose.
Bailey v. State of North Carolina, 348 N.C. 130, 140-41, 500 S.E.2d
54,  60  (1998)  (internal  citations  omitted).    Plaintiff  relies  on
our statement in Hogan that
[w]hile there may be an issue of material fact
as  to  whether  the  [20  August  1990]  Amendment
[to   defendant’s   Code   of   Ordinances]   was
reasonable   and   necessary   in   relation   to
officers who had not become vested at the time
of its enactment, there is no genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the Amendment was
reasonable and necessary as to an officer who
had become vested prior to its enactment.
Hogan,  121 N.C. App. at  421,  466 S.E.2d at  308.
Plaintiff’s reliance is without merit.   We recently held that
when a police officer did not have five years of creditable service
at the time of the  20 August  1990 amendment to defendant’s Code of
Ordinances, “there was no contractual obligation and no impairment
of contract.” Tripp,  __ N.C. App. at  __, 655 S.E.2d at 895 (citing




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Schimmeck v. City of Winston-Salem,  130 N.C. App.  471,  502 S.E.2d
909, disc. rev. denied,  349 N.C.  531,  526 S.E.2d  182  (1998)).
In   Tripp,   the   plaintiff   was   employed   with   the   Police
Department on  6 February  1989  — more than a year and a half prior
to  the  amendment  at  issue.     In  the  case  sub  judice,  however,
plaintiff was not employed with the Police Department until almost
three  years  after  the                                                    20  August   1990  amendment.     Therefore,
plaintiff’s  position  is  even  more  attenuated  than  that  of  the
plaintiff in Tripp.    Accordingly, plaintiff’s argument is without
merit.     We  hold  that  the  trial  court  did  not  err  in  granting
summary judgment in light of Hogan.
Plaintiff’s   remaining   assignments   of   error   are   deemed
abandoned. N.C. R. App. P.  28(b)(6)  (2007).
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s grant
of summary judgment in defendant’s favor.
Affirmed.
Judges STEELMAN and STROUD concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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