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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal  authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule  30(e)(3) of the  North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA12-287
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                                          18 December  2012
CELESTE G. BROUGHTON,
Plaintiff
v.                                                                                              Wake County
                                                                                                No.  10 CVD  20602
COUNTY COMMISSION OF WAKE COUNTY,
Defendant
                                                                                                Appeal  by  plaintiff  from  orders  entered  12  July  2011  and  12
October                                                                                         2011   by  Judge  Christine  M.  Walczyk  in  Wake  County
District  Court.     Heard  in  the  Court  of  Appeals                                         13  September
2012.
Celeste G. Broughton, Plaintiff-Appellant, pro se.
Office  of  the  Wake  County  Attorney,  by  Scott  W.  Warren  &
Mary Elizabeth Smerko, for Defendant-Appellee.
ERVIN, Judge.
Plaintiff  Celeste  G.  Broughton  appeals  from  orders  entered
by   the   trial   court   granting   a   dismissal   motion   filed   by
Defendant   County   Commission   of   Wake   County   and   denying
Plaintiff’s  request  for  relief  pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  1A-
1,   Rule                                                                                       59.                                                                     In   her   brief,   Plaintiff   advances   numerous




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challenges  to  the  trial  court’s  orders,  including  contentions
that  the  12  July  2011  order  lacks  adequate  findings  of  fact  and
conclusions  of  law,  that  the  trial  court’s  findings  of  fact  lack
adequate  evidentiary  support,  that  the  trial  court  misapplied  or
misunderstood  the  legal  principles  upon  which  it  relied  in
dismissing   Plaintiff’s   complaint,   and   that   the   trial   court
unlawfully  failed  to  allow  Plaintiff’s  motion  for  change  of
venue.    After  careful  consideration  of  Plaintiff’s  challenges  to
the   trial   court’s   orders   in   light   of   the   record   and   the
applicable  law,  we  conclude  that  the  trial  court’s  orders  should
be affirmed.
I. Factual Background
Plaintiff  is  a  resident  of  Wake  County.    In  her  complaint,
Plaintiff  alleges  that  Defendant  valued  a  tract  of  real  property
that  she  owned  at  an  impermissibly  high  amount  in                     2000.    After
unsuccessfully    pursuing    available    administrative    remedies,
Plaintiff  filed  a  civil  action  against  Defendant  in  the  Wake
County  District  Court  in                                                   2006.     However,  Plaintiff  voluntarily
dismissed  her  complaint  against  Defendant  without  prejudice  on
14  December                                                                  2009.                                        On   13  December   2010,  Plaintiff  filed  the
complaint  which  led  to  the  present  proceeding,  in  which  she
alleged  that  her  property  had  been  impermissibly  assessed  in
violation  of  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  105-317;  that  Defendant  had  been




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unjustly  enriched  at  Plaintiff’s  expense  through  the  receipt  of
excessive   tax   payments   premised   on   the   impermissibly   high
valuation  assigned  to  her  property;  that  Plaintiff  had  been
denied  due  process  of  law  during  her  attempts  to  challenge  the
valuation  assigned  to  her  property;  that  Defendant’s  actions
                                                                                                                                                                                                    subjected  it  to  liability  pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                                                                                                                                           §§          75-1,
50,                                                                           51,  and                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       54;  that  Defendant’s  actions  violated  N.C.  Gen.
Stat.                                                                         §§                                                                 14-112.2  and                                                                                                                                                                               221.1;  and  that  Defendant  was  liable  to
Plaintiff  pursuant  to                                                                                                                                                                                                                                             42  U.S.C.                                                               §                                                       1983  based  upon  alleged  due
                                                                                                                                                 process   and   equal   protection   violations.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      Defendant   sought
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    compensatory  and  punitive  damages,  injunctive  relief,  and  a
                                                                              declaratory judgment in her favor.
                                                                              On                                                                 14  January                                                                                                                                                                                 2011,  Defendant  filed  a  responsive  pleading
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    in  which  it  sought  dismissal  of  Plaintiff’s  complaint  pursuant
to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                                                                                                                               §                                                               1A-1,  Rules                                                             12(b)(1),                                                                                 12(b)(2),            12(b)(6),
and                                                                           12(b)(7)  for  lack  of  standing,  lack  of  jurisdiction  over
Defendant’s  person,  failure  to  state  a  claim  for  which  relief
could   be   granted,   and   failure   to   join   the   real   party   in
interest.     In  addition,  Defendant  asserted  various  additional
affirmative  defenses  and  denied  the  material  allegations  of
Plaintiff’s  complaint.1                                                      On                                                                 8  June                                            2011,  Plaintiff  filed  a
1Although  Plaintiff  argues  that  Defendant  waived  the  right
to  seek  dismissal  of  her  complaint  on  the  grounds  that  a  similar
motion  had  not  been  filed  in  response  to  the  earlier  complaint




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response   to   Defendant’s   responsive   pleading   in   which   she
disputed  the  validity  of  Defendant’s  legal  positions,  including
its  assertion  that  she  had  lacked  the  authority  to  file  suit
against Defendant.
On  10  June  2011,  Defendant’s  dismissal  motions  came  on  for
hearing  before  the  trial  court.     On                                    12  July                                            2011,  the  trial
court  entered  an  order  granting  Defendant’s  dismissal  motions  in
which it stated, among other things, that:
The   Court   finds   that   the                                              “County
Commission  of  Wake  County”  is  not  a  proper
defendant  as  to  any  of  the  eight  causes  of
action  alleged  in  the  Plaintiff’s  Complaint
and   any   amendment   to   add   a   new   party
defendant  at  this  time  would  not  relate  back
to  the  original  complaint.     Except  for  the
Plaintiff’s  claims  under  [42  U.S.C.]  §  1983,
which  may  be  based  on  a  pattern  or  practice
of    behavior,    the    allegations    of    the
Complaint   establish   that   the   causes   of
action    would    be    barred    by    applicable
statutes   of   limitation.                                                                                                       The   last   tax
                                                                              assessment  referred  to  in  the  Complaint  was
in                                                                            2006,   and   there   is   some   mention   of
behavior   in                                                                 2008.                                               The   Plaintiff’s   oral
                                                                              request  for  leave  to  amend  the  Complaint
should   be   denied.                                                                                                             Plaintiff’s   Complaint
should   be   dismissed   in                                                                                                      [its]   entirety
pursuant   to   the   authority   of   Piland   v.
Hertford  County  Board  of  Commissioners,                                   141
N.C. App.  293,  539 S.E.2d  669  (2000).
that  she  voluntarily  dismissed  with  prejudice,  that  argument  is
without  merit  in  light  of  well-established  principles  of  North
Carolina  law.    Tompkins  v.  Log  Systems,  Inc.,  96  N.C.  App.  333,
336,  385  S.E.2d  545,  547  (1989)  (stating  that,  in  the  event  that
a  plaintiff  refiles  a  voluntarily  dismissed  action,                     “it  was  as
if  the  suit  had  never  been  filed”),  disc.  review  denied,             326
N.C.  366,  389 S.E.2d  819  (1990).




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In  the  alternative,  and  as  separate  and
additional grounds for dismissal:
                                                1.                                                           To   the   extent   that   Plaintiff   has
                                                                                                             attempted    to    set    out    an    unjust
                                                                                                             enrichment  claim  in     Count  Two  of  the
                                                                                                             Complaint,   this   claim   is   dismissed
                                                                            pursuant  to                     [N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                      §                            1A-1,
                                                Rule]                       12(b)(6)                         in                                                      that                         unjust
                                                                                                             enrichment  is  not  a  cognizable  claim
                                                                                                             against   the   party   defendant   or   a
                                                county;
                                                2.                                                           To   the   extent   that   Plaintiff   has
                                                                                                             attempted  to  set  out  a  claim  for  unfair
                                                                                                             and  deceptive  trade  practices  in  Count
                                                                                                             Four  of  the  Complaint,  this  claim  is
                                                                            dismissed  pursuant  to                                                                  [N.C.  Gen.  Stat.
                                                §                           1A-1,  Rule]                                                                             12(b)(6)  for  failure  to
                                                                            state a cognizable claim;
                                                3.                                                           To   the   extent   that   Plaintiff   has
                                                                                                             attempted  to  set  out  a  claim  for  unfair
                                                                                                             debt  collection  practices  in  Count  Four
                                                                                                             of    the    Complaint,    this    claim    is
                                                                            dismissed  pursuant  to                                                                  [N.C.  Gen.  Stat.
                                                §                           1A-1,   Rule]                                                                            12(b)(6)   in   that   the
                                                                            defendant   is   not   a                                                                 “debt   collector”
                                                                            within  the  meaning  of  N.C.                                                           [Gen.  Stat.
                                                                            §]  75-50;
                                                4.                                                           To  the  extent  that  Plaintiff  attempted
                                                                                                             to   bring   claims   for   violation   of
                                                                            criminal  statutes  N.C.                                                                 [Gen.  Stat.                 §§]
                                                                                                             14-112.2  and  []  221.1,  these  claims  are
                                                                            dismissed  pursuant  to                                                                  [N.C.  Gen.  Stat.
                                                §                           1A-1,    Rule]                                                                           12(b)(6)    in    that
                                                                                                             Plaintiff  has  no  civil  cause  of  action
                                                                            under Chapter  14.
Based  on                                       this                                                         reasoning,  the  trial  court  dismissed  Plaintiff’s
                                                complaint with prejudice.




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On  25  July  2011,  Plaintiff  filed  a  motion  pursuant  to  N.C.
Gen.  Stat.  §  1A-1,  Rule  59  seeking  relief  from  the  12  July  2011
order   on   the   grounds   that   Defendant   had   made   certain
misrepresentations   of   fact,   that   the   decision   to   dismiss
Plaintiff’s  complaint  was  contrary  to  the  evidence,  and  that  the
trial  court  erred  by  failing  to  allow  Plaintiff  to  amend  her
complaint.    On  12  October  2011,  the  trial  court  entered  an  order
denying  Plaintiff’s  request  for  relief  from  the                          12  July      2011
order,   rejecting   Plaintiff’s   request   that   this   case   be
transferred   to   Nash   County,   and   noting   that   Plaintiff   had
withdrawn  her  request  to  amend  her  complaint.2    Plaintiff  noted
an appeal to this Court from the trial court’s orders.3
2The  trial  court’s                                                           12  October   2011  order  suggests  that
Plaintiff  filed  a  separate  motion  to  amend  her  complaint.    The
record  on  appeal  does  not  contain  a  separate  amendment  motion  of
the  type  to  which  the  trial  court  appears  to  allude.    However,
the  motion  that  Plaintiff  filed  pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.           §
1A-1,  Rule  59  includes  language  suggesting  that  Plaintiff  should
be  allowed  to  amend  her  complaint  to  assert  her  claims  against
Wake  County  rather  than  the  County  Commission.     We  need  not
address  the  extent  to  which  Plaintiff  did,  in  fact,  properly
seek  to  amend  her  complaint  or  whether  Plaintiff  withdrew  her
request  for  leave  to  amend  given  that,  for  the  reasons  set  forth
below,  Plaintiff  has  failed  to  properly  preserve  any  challenge
which  she  might  have  otherwise  been  able  to  assert  with  respect
to her amendment motion for appellate review.
3As the trial court noted, the extent to which Plaintiff was
entitled  to  seek  relief  from  the  12  July  2011  order  pursuant  to
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  1A-1,  Rule  59  is,  at  best,  uncertain.    In  the
event  that  Plaintiff  lacked  the  right  to  seek  relief  from  the  12
July  2011  order  pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  1A-1,  Rule  59,  her
notice  of  appeal  from  the  12  July  2011  order  would  not  have  been




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II. Legal Analysis
As  the  trial  court  noted,  this  case  is  controlled  by  our
previous   decision   in   Piland   v.   Hertford   County   Board   of
Commissioners,                                                                 141  N.C.  App.                                               293,                                                                       539  S.E.2d                                                    669                                (2000),  in
                                                                                                                                             which  the  plaintiffs  challenged  the  rezoning  of  their  property
                                                                                                                                             by  initiating  a  civil  action  against  the  Hertford  County  Board
                                                                               of  Commissioners.    Piland,                                                                                                            141  N.C.  App.  at                                            294,                               539  S.E.2d  at
                                                                                                                                             670.     The  defendant  filed  a  motion  to  dismiss  the  plaintiffs’
                                                                               complaint  pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                                               §                                                              1A-1,  Rules                       12(b)(1),
12(b)(2),                                                                      12(b)(4),                                                     12(b)(6),  and                                                                                                                            12(b)(7)  on  the  grounds  that
“it  was  not  a  proper  defendant,  that  Hertford  County  was  the
proper  defendant,  and  that  the  complaint  could  not  be  amended  to
add  or  substitute  Hertford  County  as  a  defendant”  given  that  the
applicable  statute  of  limitations  had  expired.    Id.  at  295,  539
S.E.2d  at  670.    Although  the  trial  court  denied  the  defendant’s
dismissal  motion,  this  Court  on  appeal  noted  that,                      “‘[w]here  a
county  is  the  real  party  in  interest,  it  must  sue  and  be  sued in
its  name’”  and  held  that                                                   “the  real  party  in  interest  in  this
case  is  Hertford  County,  not  the  Board  of  Commissioners.”    Id.
                                                                               timely  filed.     N.C.R.  App.  P.                                                                                                                                                                                                        3(c)(3)           (stating  that,                      “if  a
                                                                                                                                                                                                                        timely  motion  is  made  by  any  party  for  relief  under                                                                                             [N.C.  Gen.
Stat.                                                                          §§                                                            1A-1,]                                                                     50(b),                                                         52,   or                                             59   of   the   Rules   of   Civil
Procedure,  the  thirty  day  period  for  taking  an  appeal  is  tolled
as  to  all  parties  until  entry  of  an  order  disposing  of  the
motion”).                                                                      However,   we   need   not   address   this   issue   since
Plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  appellate  relief  from  the  trial
court’s orders for other reasons.




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at                                                                           296,                                                                 539  S.E.2d  at                                    671                             (alteration  in  original)   (quoting
Johnson  v.  Marrow,  228  N.C.  58,  60,  44  S.E.2d  468,  470  (1947)).
In  addition,  we  held  that  any  attempt  to  amend  the  plaintiffs’
complaint  to  name  Hertford  County  as  the  party  defendant  would
“effectively  seek[]  to  add  a  new  party-defendant  rather  than
merely  correct  a  misnomer,”  so  that  such  an  amendment  would  not
relate  back  to  the  date  upon  which  the  original  complaint  was
filed.    Id.  at                                                            301-02,                                                              539  S.E.2d  at                                    674.    As  a  result,  since
“the  plaintiffs’  suit  against  the  county  was  time-barred,”  we
concluded   that                                                             “the   trial   court   should   have   granted   the
defendant’s motion to dismiss.”    Id. at  302,  539 S.E.2d at  674.
In  this  case,  as  in  Piland,  Plaintiff  filed  suit  against
the                                                                          “County  Commission  of  Wake  County.”     As  was  the  case  in
Piland,  the  real  party  in  interest  in  this  case  was  Wake  County
rather  than  the  Wake  County  Commission.     We  need  not  decide
whether  a  timely  motion  to  amend  her  complaint  might  have
sufficed  to  remedy  this  deficiency  given  that  Plaintiff  has
failed  to  advance  any  argument  in  her  brief  to  the  effect  that
she  was  erroneously  denied  the  right  to  amend  her  complaint  for
the  purpose  of  asserting  her  claim  against  the  proper  party
defendant,  thereby  abandoning  any  contention  to  that  effect  that
she  might  have  otherwise  been  able  to  advance.    N.C.R.  App.  P.
28(a)                                                                        (stating  that                                                       “[i]ssues  not  presented  and  discussed  in  a




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party’s  brief  are  deemed  abandoned”).     As  a  result,  since  the
trial  court  did  not  err  by  dismissing  Plaintiff’s  complaint4  and
since  Plaintiff  has  not  preserved  any  challenge  that  she  might
otherwise  have  had  to  the  denial  of  her  amendment  motion  for
appellate  review,  we  conclude  that  the  trial  court’s  order
should be, and hereby is, affirmed.5
AFFIRMED.
Judges ROBERT N. HUNTER, JR. and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).
4The   fact   that   the   trial   court   had   already   dismissed
Plaintiff’s  complaint  prior  to  the  time  at  which  Plaintiff
appears  to  have  requested  that  this  case  be  transferred  from
Wake  County  to  Nash  County  precludes  us  from  finding  that  the
denial  of  her  transfer  motion  was  unlawful,  given  that  there  was
no  case  to  transfer  by  the  time  that  Plaintiff  sought  such
relief.
5Although  Plaintiff  argues  at  length  in  her  brief  that  the
12  July  2011  order  lacked  proper  findings  and  conclusions,  such
findings  and  conclusions  are  generally  not  required  in  the
                                                                               absence  of  a  timely  request.     N.C.  Gen.  Stat.   §                                             1A-1,  Rule
52(a)(2)                                                                       (stating  that                                           “[f]indings  of  fact  and  conclusions  of
law  are  necessary  on  decisions  of  any  motion  or  order  ex  mero
motu  only  when  requested  by  a  party  and  as  provided  in               [N.C.
Gen.  Stat.  §  1A-1,]  Rule  41(b)).”    As  a  result  of  the  fact  that
the  record  contains  no  indication  that  Plaintiff  requested  the
making  of  findings  and  conclusions  prior  to  the  entry  of  the  12
July  2011  order,  Plaintiff  has  waived  her  right  to  object  to  the
absence   of   such   findings   and   conclusions   from   that   order.
Moreover,   given   the   basis   for   the   trial   court’s   dismissal
decision,  we  are  unable  to  ascertain  how  the  making  of  findings
and  conclusions  would  have  assisted  us  in  reviewing  the  trial
court’s order.

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