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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA02-54
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                                          31 December  2002
BURTON LUMBER CORPORATION,
Plaintiff
v.                                                                                              Beaufort County
No.  99 CVD  326
MATTHEW G. TANERCAN and
MARY JEAN TANERCAN,
Defendants
Appeal by defendants from judgment entered 3 November 2000 by
Judge James W. Hardison in Beaufort County District Court.    Heard
in the Court of Appeals  19 September  2002.
Ward  &  Smith,  P.A.,  by  J.  Michael  Fields,  for  plaintiff-
appellee.
Wilkinson  &  Rader,  P.A.,  by  Steven  P.  Rader,  for  defendant-
appellants.
CAMPBELL, Judge.
Defendants appeal from an order denying their motion for new
trial.   Defendants argue that the trial court erred in: (1) finding
that  defendants’  attorney  was  informed  of  the  continuance  of  the
case;  and                                                                                      (2)  denying  defendants’  motion  for  new  trial  on  the
grounds  that  defendants  were  not  properly  notified  of  the  trial
date.    We find no error in the trial court’s rulings.
Background




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Burton Lumber Corporation  (“plaintiff”) filed an action on  5
April                                                                       1999  to  recover  money  owed  for  windows  sold  on  credit  by
plaintiff to defendants.   The action was first set for trial during
the  court  session  beginning  20  March                                   2000.    As  a  result  of  not
being  reached  during  that  session  and  subsequent  court  sessions,
the  case  was  rescheduled  for  trial  numerous  times  between  March
2000 and September 2000.   One of the sessions at which the case was
scheduled  for  trial  was                                                  28  August                                                           2000.   On   30  August   2000,
defendants’  counsel  was  in  the  courtroom  attending  to  a  matter
other than the one involving defendants.   When the court concluded
the other matter, the presiding trial judge, Judge Michael A. Paul
(“Judge Paul”), and defendants’ counsel discussed the present case.
Judge Paul and defendants’ counsel agreed that the trial would be
reset to the court session beginning  18 September  2000.
At the agreed upon session, on 18 September 2000, defendants’
counsel  was  present  when  the  trial  calender  was  called.     The
following  day,  the  trial  court  informed  counsel  for  both  parties
that  the  case  would  be  reached  for  trial  on                         20  September                                                        2000.
When  the  case  was  called  on  the  morning  of                          20  September                                                        2000,
plaintiff’s counsel appeared in court with plaintiff’s witnesses,
but    defendants’ counsel informed the court that he was unable to
reach  defendants  regarding  the  trial  date,  even  though  he  had
attempted  to  reach  them  and  left  a  message  with  their  son.
Defendants’ counsel then asked to be allowed to withdraw from the
case due to defendants’ lack of cooperation throughout the lawsuit.
The  court  allowed  defendants’  counsel  to  withdraw,  but  then




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proceeded  with  the  trial  of  the  case.    After  hearing  plaintiff’s
evidence, the court entered a money judgment in favor of plaintiff.
On  2  October                                                                 2000,  defendants’  counsel  filed  an  unverified
motion   for   new   trial   on   defendants’   behalf,   alleging   that
defendants did not receive proper notice of the trial.    At the  30
October                                                                        2000  hearing,  Judge  Hardison  reviewed  the  record  and
entered an order denying defendants’ motion for new trial.
Standard of Review
As to defendants’ first assignment of error, a “trial court's
findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent
evidence, even when the record includes other evidence that might
support  contrary  findings.”    Static  Control  Components,  Inc.  v.
Vogler, ___ N.C.App. ___, ___, 568 S.E.2d 305, 308 (2002) (citation
omitted).
In  reviewing  the  lower  court’s  denial  of  the  defendants’
motion  for  new  trial,  this  Court  must  decide  whether  the  record
“affirmatively  demonstrates  an  abuse  of  discretion.”    Whaley  v.
White  Consolidated  Industries,  Inc.,                                        144  N.C.  App.                                               88,   92,   548
S.E.2d 177, 180 (2001), review denied, 354 N.C. 229, 555 S.E.2d 277
(2001).
Argument I.    Defendant’s knowledge of the continuance
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in finding
as  a  fact  that  defendants’  attorney  was  specifically  informed  by
Judge Paul of the continuance of the case to the session beginning
18  September                                                                  2001  on  the  grounds  that  there  is  no  evidence  to
support  such  a  finding.    Our  review  of  the  record  shows  that  the




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following  evidence  supports  the  trial  court’s  finding:                 (1)  the
transcript  of  the  30  August  2000  conversation  between  Judge  Paul
and  Mr.  Rader  along  with  a  notation  of                                “C                             9-18”  on  the  court
calender for the 28 August 2000 civil non-jury session; (2) notice
to   defendants’   counsel   was   imputed   to   defendants;   and          (3)
defendants’  counsel  did  not  move  for  a  continuance  when  the  case
was called on  18 September  2000 or at any time prior to the trial
on  20 September  2000.
First, the notation of  “C  9-18” on the August court calendar
clearly  represents  that  the  case  was  continued  until  the  court
session beginning 18 September 2000.   This notation was made during
the                                                                          28  August                     2000  session.    When  defendants’  counsel,  Stephen
Rader (“Mr. Rader”), was in court attending to another matter on 30
August  2000, the following colloquy took place between Judge Paul
and Mr. Rader:
Judge  Michael  A.  Paul:  Before  you  leave,  I
want  to  make  sure  I’m  understood  on  some                              -
Burton  Lumber  Corporation,  is  that                                       -  versus
Tanercan  - is that  -
Steve  Rader:  That’s  one  I  guess  we  just  need
to re-set.    What court do we set it?  [sic]
Judge  Michael  A.  Paul:  Next  -  we  can  set  it
for  next  session  as  far  as  I  know,  there’s
nothing  else  set                                                           -  nothing  special  set  is
there?
Steve Rader: Let’s see  .  .  . probably the  18th
or  25 t would be better.h
Judge Michael A. Paul: September 18th?   That is
a date isn’t it?
Courtroom Clerk: That’s a date.
Judge Michael A. Paul: Eighteenth or  25th?  .  .  .  18th?




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Steve Rader: Yeah, either one.
Judge  Michael  A.  Paul:  All  right,  September
18 t then for that case.  h
This  evidence  is  sufficient  to  support  the  trial  court’s  finding
that Mr. Rader had notice of the continuance of this case to the 18
September  2000 session.
Secondly, the notice given to Mr. Rader on 30 August 2000 that
the  case  would  be  continued  to                                            18  September   2000  is  imputed  to
defendants.    N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  1A-1 provides:
(b)  Service  -  How  made.  -  A  pleading  setting
forth  a  counterclaim  or  cross  claim  shall  be
filed with the court and a copy thereof shall
be  served  on  the  party  against  whom  it  is
asserted or on the party's attorney of record.
With  respect  to  all  pleadings  subsequent  to
the   original   complaint   and   other   papers
required  or  permitted  to  be  served,  service
with  due  return  may  be  made  in  the  manner
provided for service and return of process in
Rule  4  and  may  be  made  upon  either  the  party
or,  unless  service  upon  the  party  personally
is  ordered  by  the  court,  upon  the  party's
attorney of record.  .  .
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  1A-1,  Rule  5(b)  (2001)  (emphasis  added).    The
notice  provided  by  the  pleading  is  deemed  to  be  provided  to  the
person  named  in  the  action,  if  the  pleadings  or  other  papers  are
delivered to his/her attorney.    The notice is imputed through the
attorney  to  the  client.    We  draw  an  analogy  between  this  rule  of
service  and  information  given  to  an  attorney  on  behalf  of  his
client.     Personal  notice  given  to  an  attorney  in  open  court
regarding the date of a hearing concerning an attorney’s client is
imputed to that client for which the hearing is scheduled.    If an
attorney  neglects  to  inform  his  client  of  any  information  or




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neglects  his  client’s  case  in  any  manner,  our  Supreme  Court  has
held that the attorney’s negligence can be imputed to his client.
Briley  v.  Farabow,                                                           348  N.C.                                                 537,           546-47,       501  S.E.2d   649,                            655
(1998), rev’g,  127 N.C. App.  281,  488 S.E.2d  621  (1997); see also
Parris  v.  Light,  146  N.C.  App.  515,  553  S.E.2d  96  (2001),  review
denied,                                                                        355  N.C.                                                 349,           562  S.E.2d   283           (2002).    In  the  case  sub
judice, the notice of the continuance of defendants’ trial to the
18  September  2000  session  is  imputed  to  defendants  through  their
attorney, who agreed to the continuance on  30 August  2000.
Finally, Mr. Rader should have protected his clients by moving
to continue the case, rather than withdrawing at the  20 September
2000  hearing.    Judge  Hardison,  who  presided  over  the  trial  on  20
September 2000, allowed Mr. Rader to withdraw on the representation
that the clients were not cooperating, and then allowed plaintiff’s
counsel  to  proceed  on  the  merits  of  the  case.    On                    22  September
2000,  Judge  Hardison  entered  an  order  finding  as  a  fact  that  Mr.
Rader  appeared  on  behalf  of  defendants  and                               “[b]ased  on  his
inability  to  contact  [d]efendants,  and  his  representation  to  the
[c]ourt  that                                                                  [d]efendants  had  been  uncooperative  throughout  the
lawsuit,  the                                                                  [c]ourt  allowed  Wilk[in]son  &  Rader’s                 [m]otion  to
[w]ithdraw before calling the case for trial.”
Mr. Rader contends that his motion to withdraw had been filed
and  served  on  his  clients  and  was  to  be  heard  during  the            25
September  2000 session, the session after the case was called for
trial.    We  do  not  find  this  motion  to  withdraw  in  the  record  on
appeal.   Nor do we find evidence that defendants had notice of this




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motion.   Even if they did have notice, there is nothing to put them
on notice that they should appear at the 18 September 2000 session.
In order to protect his clients, Mr. Rader could have moved for a
continuance when the case was called during the  18 September  2000
session.    Instead, Mr. Rader withdrew. 1
Argument II.    Denying defendant’s motion for new trial
After withdrawing from the case, Mr. Rader filed an unverified
motion  for  new  trial.    Mr.  Rader  represented  defendants  on  this
motion,  heard                                                                 30  October        2000.    At  the  hearing,  Judge  Hardison
stated to Mr. Rader:
[E]verybody’s  entitled  to  notice,  but
when you come in and tell me that your clients
won’t  cooperate  with  you                                                    .  they  haven’t
answered  any  of  your  questions,  they  won’t
contact you, they won’t get in touch with you
and  you  want  to  withdraw,  and  I  believed  at
the time that they had been notified . . . and
without going into the fine details of the law
of  notice,  it  appears  to  me  that  everybody
knew  what  was  going  on  and  they  just  didn’t
show  - choose to show up.    And your motion to
withdraw, backs that up.
At  the  end  of  the  hearing  on  the  motion  for  new  trial,  Judge
Hardison  stated  that  he  needed  time  to  think  about  the  case.    In
his order denying defendants’ motion for new trial, Judge Hardison
stated in his findings of fact:
This case was set for trial at the August
28,  2000 Beaufort County Civil District Court
Session.    On Monday, August  28,  2000, counsel
for                                                                            [d]efendants       (Steven   P.   Rader.                         .)
1
We  call  attention  to  Rule  1.16(b)  of  the  Revised  Rules  of
Professional Conduct, which states, with exceptions, that “a lawyer
may  withdraw  from  representing  a  client  if  withdrawal  can  be
accomplished  without  material  adverse  effect  on  the  interests  of
the client[.]”  2002 State Bar Lawyer’s Handbook.




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appeared  at  the  calendar  call  for  the  August
28,  2000 Session before the Honorable Michael
A.  Paul.    On  said  date,  Judge  Paul  continued
the  trial  of  this  case  to  the  September  18,
2000 Beaufort County Civil District Session.
At the time, Steven P. Rader was specifically
informed  by  Judge  Paul  of  the  continuance  of
the case to September  18,  2000.
Steven  P.  Rader  continued  to  represent
[d]efendants  until  the  morning  of  September
20, 2000, at which time this Court allowed his
Motion to Withdraw.
We note that Judge Hardison’s finding is incorrect with respect to
the  actual  date  on  which  Mr.  Rader  agreed  to  the  setting  of  the
case for trial.   According to the transcript, it was actually on 30
August                                                                        2000  that  Judge  Paul  and  Mr.  Rader  agreed  to  the   18
September  2000  session.    We  do  not  find,  however,  that  the  lower
court’s ruling was an abuse of its discretion.    Because Mr. Rader
chose not to move to continue the case and argued only that he had
no notice of the trial date where there is evidence in the record
to support that he did, this Court has no grounds to overturn the
trial  court’s  ruling  under  Briley,  348  N.C.  537,  501  S.E.2d  649,
despite the possibility of no actual notice to defendants.
No error.
Judge HUDSON concurs.
Judge TIMMONS-GOODSON concurs in the result only.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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