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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal  authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule  30(e)(3) of the  North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA11-314
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  6 December  2011
CALDWELL COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF
SOCIAL SERVICES, ex. rel., CORRENA
C. HOWE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.                                                                                              Caldwell County
                                                                                                No.  09-CVD-1085
BRADLEY EARL HOWE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal  by  Defendant  from  order  entered                                                     12  January                                                           2011  by
Judge  Robert  M.  Brady  in  District  Court,  Caldwell  County.    Heard
in the Court of Appeals  13 September  2011.
Lucy R. McCarl for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Bradley Earl Howe, Defendant-Appellant, pro se.
McGEE, Judge.
Caldwell  County  Department  of  Social  Services                                              (Plaintiff)
filed  a  complaint  on                                                                         16  June                                                              2009  to  compel  child  support  from
Bradley  Earl  Howe                                                                             (Defendant)  for  the  benefit  of  a  minor  child
(the  minor  child)  whom  Defendant  fathered  with  Correna  Christine
Howe                                                                                            (Ms.  Howe).    The  trial  court  entered  an  "order  of  support
for  minor  child;  income  withholding  and  for  medical  insurance"




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(the  child  support  order)  on  26  October  2009.    Pursuant  to  N.C.
Gen.  Stat.                                                                  §                    1A-1,  Rule                                                                                                                                         60(b)(3),  Defendant  filed  a  motion  to
                                                                                                                                                                          set  aside  the  child  support  order,  which  the  trial  court  denied
                                                                             by  order  entered                                              19  February                 2010.                                                                       Defendant  filed  a  second
Rule                                                                                                                                                                      60(b)  motion  to  set  aside  the  child  support  order  on               31
August                                                                       2010                                                            (Defendant's  second  Rule                                                                               60(b)  motion).    The  trial
                                                                                                  court  denied  Defendant's  second  Rule                                                                                                            60(b)  motion  in  an  order
entered                                                                                           12  January                                2011.                                                                                                    Defendant  appeals  from  the  trial
court's  12 January  2011 order.
I. Factual Background
The  relevant  undisputed  facts  are  that  Defendant  and  Ms.
Howe  were  married  and  resided  together,  along  with  their  minor
child,   in   Cleveland   County.                                            In   May             2009,   Ms.   Howe   left
Cleveland   County   and   moved   to   Caldwell   County,   where   she
petitioned  for  child  support.    Plaintiff,  on  behalf  of  Ms.  Howe,
notified  Defendant  of  Plaintiff's  involvement  in  seeking  child
support  and  of  its  intent  to  pursue  the  matter.     Defendant
failed  to  respond  to  Plaintiff's  notice  and  Plaintiff  thereafter
filed  a  complaint  to  compel  child  support.    Further  facts  will
be discussed as needed.
II. Standard of Review and Scope of Appeal
This  Court  has  held  that  "[n]otice  of  appeal  from  denial  of
a   motion   to   set   aside   a   judgment   which   does   not   also




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specifically  appeal  the  underlying  judgment  does  not  properly
present  the  underlying  judgment  for  our  review."     Von  Ramm  v.
Von  Ramm,  99  N.C.  App.  153,  156,  392  S.E.2d  422,  424  (1990).    In
                                                                                the   present   case,   Defendant's   notice   of   appeal,   filed   30
November                                                                        2010,  is  addressed  solely  to  "the  ORDER                         .  .  . that
dismissed  or  denied  .  .  .  Defendant[']s  MOTION  FOR  RELIEF  FROM
JUDGEMENT  [sic]  OR  ORDER  (RULE  60)  entered  on  5  November  2010."
We  note  that  the  hearing  on  Defendant's  second  Rule  60(b)  motion
was  conducted  on                                                              5  November                                                           2010.    Though  the  order  from  which
Defendant  appeals  was  not  entered  until  12  January  2011,  it  was
announced   in   open   court   on                                              5   November                                                          2010.   Therefore,
Defendant's  notice  of  appeal  is  sufficient  to  present  the  trial
court's  12  January  2011  order  for  our  review.    See  e.g.,  Merrick
v.  Peterson,  143  N.C.  App.  656,  660,  548  S.E.2d  171,  174  (2001)
("'rendering  of  an  order  commences  the  time  when  notice  of
appeal  may  be  taken  by  filing  and  serving  written  notice,  while
entry  of  an  order  initiates  the  thirty-day  time  limitation
within  which  notice  of  appeal  must  be  filed  and  served.'")
(citation  omitted);  see  also  Harbin  Yinhai  Tech.  Dev.  Co.  v.
Greentree  Fin.  Grp.,  Inc.,  196  N.C.  App.  615,  620-21,  677  S.E.2d
854,  858  (2009)  (holding  notice  of  appeal  proper  where  decision
was  announced  in  open  court  on                                             30  April                                                             2008,  the  plaintiff
filed  notice  of  appeal  on  6  May  2008,  "explaining  that  the  order




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                                                                                                                                   being  appealed  was  'rendered  orally  by  [the  court]  on  April  30,
                                                                               2008   and   to   be   entered   shortly.'                                                                                       [And]                                         [t]he   order   was
                                                                                                                                   subsequently  entered  on  27  May  2008.").    However,  in  the  present
                                                                                                                                   case,  neither  the  child  support  order  nor  the  order  denying
                                                                                                                                   Defendant's  first  motion  to  set  aside  the  judgment  is  properly
before  us.     See  Von  Ramm,                                                                                                    99  N.C.  App.  at                                                                         156,                            392  S.E.2d  at
424.
                                                                                                                                   "[A]  motion  for  relief  under  Rule  60(b)  is  addressed  to  the
                                                                                                                                   sound  discretion  of  the  trial  court  and  appellate  review  is
                                                                                                                                   limited  to  determining  whether  the  court  abused  its  discretion."
Sink  v.  Easter,                                                              288  N.C.                                    183,   198,                                                                         217  S.E.2d   532,                            541                   (1975).
                                                                               We  therefore  review  the  trial  court's                                                                                                     12  January                     2011  order
denying  Defendant's  second  Rule                                             60(b)  motion  for  an  abuse  of
discretion.    "A  ruling  committed  to  a  trial  court's  discretion
is  to  be  accorded  great  deference  and  will  be  upset  only  upon  a
showing  that  it  was  so  arbitrary  that  it  could  not  have  been  the
                                                                                                                                   result  of  a  reasoned  decision."    White  v.  White,                                   312  N.C.                       770,
777,                                                                           324  S.E.2d                                  829,   833                                                                          (1985).       However,  "'whether  a  trial
court  has  subject  matter  jurisdiction  is  a  question  of  law,
which  is  reviewable  on  appeal  de  novo.'"     Childress  v.  Fluor
Daniel,  Inc.,  172  N.C.  App.  166,  167,  615  S.E.2d  868,  869  (2005)
(citation omitted).
III.    Abuse of Discretion and Sufficiency of the Record




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While  Defendant  makes  numerous  arguments  on  appeal,  he  does
not  argue  that  the  trial  court  abused  its  discretion  in  any  of
its  rulings.     Further,  we  note  that  the  record  on  appeal  is
insufficient  to  address  many  of  Defendant's  assertions.     The
trial  court's  order  denying  Defendant's  first  Rule  60(b)  motion
contains the following findings of fact:
6.                                                                          .    The                                    [c]ourt    conducted    an
                                                                            extensive    evidentiary    hearing                                      [on    the
original    judgment],    during    which  .  .  .
Plaintiff  was  allowed  to  present  testimonial
evidence  as  well  as  documentary  evidence,
and  .  .  . Defendant  was  allowed  to  present
testimonial  evidence  as  well  as  documentary
evidence.
7.  Each  of  the  issues  that  .  .  .  Defendant
has  raised  in  his  Rule                                                  60  Motion                                  .  was
                                                                            raised  in  the  evidentiary  hearing  on   [the
original   judgment].                                                       The                                         [c]ourt   made
extensive  findings  of  fact  in  the
hearing regarding those issues.
Defendant's  affidavits  in  support  of  his  second  Rule                 60(b)
motion  include  extensive  arguments  concerning  the  trial  court's
alleged  error  in  determining  whether  Ms.  Howe  was  a  custodial
parent,   as   well   as   allegations   that   Ms.   Howe   "maliciously
applied  for  and  received  Medicaid  to  gain  services  of  the  Child
Support  Enforcement  Agency[.]"                                            Further,  in  his  answer  and
counter-complaint,  Defendant  raised  the  issue  of  Ms.  Howe's
residence.    During  the  hearing  on  Defendant's  second  Rule  60(b)




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motion,  the  trial  court  and  Defendant  engaged  in  the  following
exchange:
[The   court]:                                                            I've   also   read
everything   that   he's   recently   filed   in
support  of—all  the  documents  he's  filed  in
support  of  the,  uh,  motion,  the  most  recent
motion  for  relief  from  judgment  that  was
filed  August  31st  of  2010.    And  quite  frankly
Mr.  Howe,  in  the  giving  you  and  looking  at
this  in  the  light  most  favorable  to  you  as
the  plaintiff  of  the  moving  party,  uh,  I  can
clearly  tell  from  the  order  that  was  the
findings    of    fact    in    Judge                                     [Owsley]'s
original  order  back  in  October  of  last  year
and  from  the  findings  of  fact  that  were,  uh,
entered  in  the,  uh,  motion  for  relief  in
judgment  pursuant  to  Rule                                              60  that  was  filed
in  February  in  the  order,  in  response  there
too,  that  was                                                           [Inaudible                                       00:15:16]  by  Judge
[Owsley],  and  by  what  you've  just  recently
filed,  that  the  issues  are  the  same.     That
many   of   the   issues,   if   not   all   of   the
issues,  that  you  raised  in  your  first  motion
for   relief   per   Rule                                                 60,   were   actually
resolved.    In  other  words,  those  issues  were
raised   and   heard   and   resolved   by   Judge
[Owsley]  in  her  original  order.    Um,  so  when
you  filed  your  motion  for  relief  from  that
order,  back  in  February  of  this  year,  um,
she  rightly  so  said,  you  know,  these  things
have  already  been  heard,  they  have  already
been  litigated  the  same  issues  about,  for
all   of   the   same   issues   about   date   of
separation,  the  same  issues  about,  uh,  when
Medicare  or  Medicaid  was  applied  for,  the
same  issues  about  residency,  the  same  issues
about  custody,  the  same  issues  about,  uh,
the  temporary  orders  that  were  entered.    All
those  issues  were  heard  during  the  first
hearing,  then  they  were  also  re-litigated  in
the  motion  for  Rule  60.    So  all  those  things
                                                                          that  you  have  filed  on  this  Rule           60  have
                                                                          been  heard  and,  and  responded  to  in  the
first  Rule                                                               60  Motion.                                      I  don't  see  that




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there's  anything  for  this  court  to  hear  that
hasn't already been litigated twice.
[Defendant]:  Well,  Your  Honor,  there  was,
uh,  specifically  the  Medicaid  fraud  was  not
addressed  in  the  initial  order  or  in  this
first,  uh,  Rule                                        60  order.     That  has  been
information  that  has  just  come  to  light.
Uh,  additionally  the  jurisdiction  was  not
challenged  in  the  first  order  or  the  second
Rule  60 order as—
[The court]: But all that information.
[Defendant]:   And   as   well   as                      [Inaudible
00:17:07]
[The   court]:   But   that   information   was
available,  or  if  it  wasn't  available,  it
should  have  been  available.     And,  uh,  I’m
finding  as  a  matter  of  fact  and  as  a  matter
of  law  that  this,  uh,  matter  has  already
been  litigated,  that  it  is  res  judicata  that
the  prior  Rule                                         60  Motion  that  was  heard
addressed  these  very  same  issues  that  you're
raising  here  before  the  court  today  that
dealt  with  those  and  that  it's,  it's,  uh,
this  issue  is  moot.    Also  that  an  appeal  was
taken  from  the  order  of  Judge                                                                                           [Owsley]  in
October  the,  uh,                                       16th.    I  think  it  was,  it
was   heard   October   the                                                                          16th,   filed   maybe
around  October  the                                     26th,                                       28,  whatever  that
date  specifically  was.    And  there  was  appeal
taken  from  that,  which  never  was  perfected,
which  would've  been  the  most  appropriate  way
to  deal  with  an  order  that  you  felt  like  was
not  an  appropriate  order.     But  that  appeal
was  then  subsequently  dismissed.    So  this  is
just  another  effort  to  try  and  handle  this
case  through  an  appeal  process,  uh,  by  Rule
60.                                                      And  so  you're  trying  to  get  another
bite  at  the  apple  to  appeal.    Uh,  but  I  have
looked  at  both  at  the  recent  things  and  what
happened   before,   and   every   one   of   those
issues  has  been  addressed.    Uh,  and  if  they
weren't  addressed,  it  would  be  through  the




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fact   that,   that   they   were   not   properly
raised  at  the  time,  and  could  have  been
raised  at  the  time.     Because  all  the  facts
that  you've  talked  about  were  in  existence
at the time the case was tried originally.
However,   the   record   on   appeal   does   not   contain   the
transcripts  of  either  the  hearing  on  Plaintiff's  complaint  for
child  support  or  the  hearing  on  Defendant's  first  Rule                60(b)
motion.     Further,  there  are  no  copies  of  any  affidavits  or
memoranda  in  support  of  Defendant's  first  Rule                          60(b)  motion.
Thus,  we  are  unable  to  determine  precisely  what  occurred  at  the
prior  hearings  or  what  arguments  Defendant  may  have  made  at
those  hearings.     "An  appellate  court  is  not  required  to,  and
should  not,  assume  error  by  the  trial  judge  when  none  appears  on
the  record  before  the  appellate  court."    State  v.  Williams,  274
N.C.  328,  333,  163  S.E.2d  353,  357  (1968);  see  also  McDaniel  v.
McBrayer,  164 N.C. App.  379,  383-84,  595 S.E.2d  784,  788  (2004).
Reviewing   the   record   on   appeal,   including   motions,
affidavits,  and  orders  that  Defendant  has  filed  with  the  trial
court,  and  in  light  of  the  fact  that  Defendant  has  failed  to
file  complete  transcripts  of  the  underlying  hearings,  we  can
find  no  abuse  of  discretion  in  the  trial  court's  determination
that  all  of  the  issues  had  previously  been  raised  and  ruled  on.
Because  Defendant  does  not  argue  that  the  trial  court  abused  its
discretion  in  denying  his  motion  to  set  aside  the  judgment




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entered  against  him,  and  because  the  record  is  insufficient  for
us  to  determine  such  even  if  Defendant  did  so  argue,  we  find
Defendant's arguments without merit.
IV.    Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Defendant   also   argues   subject   matter   jurisdiction   and
standing.     "Subject  matter  jurisdiction  cannot  be  conferred  by
consent  or  waiver,  and  the  issue  of  subject  matter  jurisdiction
may  be  raised  for  the  first  time  on  appeal."    In  re  H.L.A.D.,
                                                                             184  N.C.  App.        381,                                      385,                                           646  S.E.2d                                                                  425,                   429                                           (2007).     Further,
                                                                                                                                                                                             "'issues  pertaining  to  standing  may  be  raised  for  the  first  time
                                                                                                    on  appeal[.]'"     Myers  v.  Baldwin,                                                                                                                                                      ___  N.C.  App.                               ___,                      ___,   698
S.E.2d                                                                       108,                   109                                       (2010)                                                                                                                      (citation  omitted).                                                 Because  subject
                                                                                                                                                                                             matter  jurisdiction  may  be  raised  for  the  first  time  on  appeal,
                                                                                                    we address Defendant's arguments.
                                                                                                                                                                                             Defendant   contends   that   the   trial   court   "committed
                                                                                                                                              reversible   error   by   the   hearing   of                                                                                                                                                     [Plaintiff's]   initial
                                                                             complaint  filed                                                 16  June                                                                                                                                           2009  in  the  absence  of  subject  matter
jurisdiction."     In  Defendant's  argument  that  the  trial  court
lacked  subject  matter  jurisdiction,  he  asserts  that  "Plaintiff,
by  not  having  custody  of  [the  minor  child],  nor  having  initiated
an  action  or  proceeding  for  the  custody  of                            [the  minor  child],
the   Plaintiff[]   and   the   court[]   lacked   subject   matter
jurisdiction  to  initiate  and  therefore  rule  upon  an  action  for




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the  support"  of  the  minor  child.    Defendant  does  not  appear  to
argue  that  Ms.  Howe  did  not  have  custody  of  the  minor  child,  but
rather  that  she  did  not  have  sole  custody  of  the  minor  child
and, therefore, was not the custodial parent.
"'Subject  matter  jurisdiction  refers  to  the  power  of  the
court  to  deal  with  the  kind  of   action  in  question[,  and]
.  .  . is  conferred  upon  the  courts  by  either  the  North  Carolina
Constitution  or  by  statute.'"     In  re  McKinney,                         158  N.C.  App.
441,                                                                           443,                                                581   S.E.2d           793,                             795   (2003)   (citation   omitted).
Concerning  subject  matter  jurisdiction,  Defendant  makes  a  second
argument  related  to  standing.     Defendant  contends  that  "the
[trial]  court  committed  reversible  error  by  the  hearing  of
[Plaintiff's]    initial    complaint  .  .  . in    the    absence    of
standing."    Defendant  argues  that  Plaintiff  lacked  standing  to
bring  this  action  because  of  allegedly  false  statements  made  by
Ms.  Howe  regarding  her  income.    Defendant  also  alleges  that  he
had  in  fact  "willfully  provid[ed]  child  support  funds"  for  the
minor  child.                                                                  "'Standing  is  a  necessary  prerequisite  to  a
court's   proper   exercise   of   subject   matter   jurisdiction.'"
Marriott  v.  Chatham  Cty.,  187  N.C.  App.  491,  494,  654  S.E.2d  13,
16                                                                             (2007)                                              (citation  omitted).   Because  both  of  Defendant's
arguments  ostensibly  concern  subject  matter  jurisdiction,  we
address them together.




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The  specific  type  of  action  involved  in  the  present  case  is
a  child  support  action.                                                   N.C.  Gen.  Stat.   §                                  7A-244   (2009)
provides,  in  pertinent  part,  that  "[t]he  district  court  division
is   the   proper   division   without   regard   to   the   amount   in
controversy,  for  the  trial  of  civil  actions  and  proceedings  for
.  child  support[.]"     N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                  §                   50-13.4(a)                         (2009)
provides  in  pertinent  part  that:  "Any  parent,  or  any  person,
agency,  organization  or  institution  having  custody  of  a  minor
child,  or  bringing  an  action  or  proceeding  for  the  custody  of
such  child,  or  a  minor  child  by  his  guardian  may  institute  an
action for the support of such child as hereinafter provided."
In  his  second  Rule  60(b)  motion,  Defendant  argued  that  Ms.
Howe  fraudulently  indicated  that  she  had  custody  of  the  minor
child.     Defendant  further  argued  that  Plaintiff  did  not  have
custody   of   the   minor   child   because   "the   parties[]   had
voluntarily  entered  into  a  consent  order  from  Cleveland  County
District  Court  to  equally  share  custody  of  their  minor  child[.]"
However,  we  note  that  N.C.G.S.                                           §                   50-13.4(a)  requires  only  that
the  person  seeking  child  support  be  "[a]ny  parent                     .  .  .  having
custody[.]"     Id.     Defendant's  own  argument  indicates  that  Ms.
Howe  had  at  least  joint  custody  of  the  minor  child.    Therefore,
there  is  no  merit  to  Defendant's  contention  that  Plaintiff
lacked  standing  because  Ms.  Howe  did  not  "have  custody"  of  the




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minor  child.                                                                Thus,  because  the  district  court  has  subject
matter   jurisdiction   over   child   support   cases,   and   because
Plaintiff  brought  the  present  action  on  behalf  of  a  custodial
parent   and   therefore   had   standing,   there   is   no   merit   to
Defendant's arguments regarding subject matter jurisdiction.
V. Conclusion
As  discussed  above,  Defendant  fails  to  argue  abuse  of
discretion  and,  reviewing  the  record  provided  by  Defendant,  we
conclude  the  trial  court  did  not  abuse  its  discretion  in  denying
Defendant's  second  Rule                                                    60(b)  motion.                                       Further,  Defendant's
arguments  concerning  subject  matter  jurisdiction  and  standing
are  without  merit.    We  therefore  affirm  the  trial  court's  order
denying Defendant's second Rule  60(b) motion.
Affirmed.
Judges ELMORE and HUNTER, Jr. concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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