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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA01-787
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                                          16 July  2002
WILLIAM E. CANTRELL and wife
ELLEN C. CANTRELL, as TRUSTEES
OF THE WILLIAM E. CANTRELL AND
ELLEN C. CANTRELL LIVING TRUST
dated March  18,  1996 and
WILLIAM E. CANTRELL and wife,
ELLEN C. CANTRELL, individually,
Petitioners
v.                                                                                              Polk County
No.  00 CVS  0260
BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT OF
POLK COUNTY, JASON DECK
and wife, TINA DECK, and
JAMES L. DECK and wife,
BRENDA H. DECK,
Respondents.
Appeal  by  petitioners  from  judgment  entered  7  March  2001  by
Judge Dennis J. Winner in Polk County Superior Court.   Heard in the
Court of Appeals  18 April  2002.
Roberts & Stevens, P.A., by Sarah Patterson Brison Meldrum and
Christopher   Z.   Campbell,   and   Callahan   Law   Offices,   by
Christopher Callahan, for petitioners-appellants.
Prince,  Youngblood  &  Massagee,  by  Sharon  B.  Alexander,  and
Mullinax  and  Alexander,  by  William  M.  Alexander,  Jr.,  for
respondents-appellees.
TYSON, Judge.
William E. Cantrell and Ellen C. Cantrell individually and as
trustees  of  the  William  E.  Cantrell  and  Ellen  C.  Cantrell  living




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trust dated 18 March 1996 (collectively “petitioners”) appeal from
an  order  affirming  the  decision  of  the  Polk  County  Board  of
Adjustment  (“Board”) that granted Jason Deck, Tina Deck, James L.
Deck, and Brenda H. Deck (collectively “respondents”) a conditional
use permit for construction and operation of a concrete plant.   We
remand to the superior court to set forth and apply the appropriate
standard of review of the Board’s decision.
I.    Facts
Petitioners own the Green River Plantation, a forty-two room
house  located  on  366  acres,  that  operates  as  a  bed  and  breakfast
inn located in Rutherfordton, North Carolina.    Respondents own an
adjacent  tract  of  undeveloped  property  zoned  multiple  use.    On  3
August                                                                        2000,  respondents  appeared  before  the  Board,  verbally
requested  a  conditional  use  permit  to  build  a  concrete  plant  on
their property, and submitted preliminary plans for their project.
No  action  was  taken  at  that  meeting  other  than  to  receive  the
application and plans and to set a hearing date.
On  24 August  2000, the Board conducted a hearing to consider
respondents’  request  for  a  conditional  use  permit.    Petitioners
received notice of that meeting, appeared, and presented evidence.
After  the  hearing,  the  Board  decided  to  tour  the  site  of  the
proposed  concrete  plant  and  to  remain  in  open  session.    On          31
August                                                                        2000,  the  Board  conducted  another  hearing.     Petitioners
appeared  with  counsel  and  requested  a  continuance  because  their
regular  lawyer  was  unavailable.    The  Board  approved  petitioners’
request and continued the hearing until  7 September  2000.




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At   the   reconvened   hearing,   respondents   and   petitioners
presented  and  cross-examined  witnesses  under  oath,  and  presented
and  had  the  opportunity  to  examine  all  exhibits.     After  the
witnesses testified and exhibits were received, motion was made and
seconded  to  approve  respondents’  application  with  the  following
conditions: (1) double rows of leland cypress or white pines around
the property, (2) no other operations, and (3) proper signage.   The
motion was approved on a four to one vote.   The Board held another
hearing  on  5  October  2000  with  petitioners’  attorney  present  to
review   the   Board’s   findings   of   fact   which   were   approved
unanimously.    The  Board’s  conclusions  of  law  were  approved  by  a
vote of four to one.
Petitioners filed a “Petition For Review And Certiorari” with
the superior court in Polk County on 3 November 2000 claiming that
the  Board’s  decision                                                      “is  contrary  to  law,  was  not  rendered  in
accordance with the procedures specified by law, is not supported
by  competent,  material  and  substantial  evidence  and  is  arbitrary
and  capricious.”     Respondents  filed  motions  to  dismiss  on          9
November  2000.    The Board filed a motion to dismiss on  11 January
2001.   Respondents filed an answer on 26 February 2001.   The Board
did not file an answer.
After a hearing, the superior court filed an order affirming
the Board’s decision on  7 March  2001.    Petitioners appeal.
II.    Issues
The issues presented are whether: (1) the trial court applied
the proper standard of review to an agency decision, (2) the trial




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court   erred   by   ruling   that   a   concrete   batch   plant   is   a
manufacturing use, (3) the trial court erred by failing to conclude
that the Board did not follow proper procedure, and (4) petitioners
due process rights were violated,
III.    Standard of Review
Petitioners  contend  that  the  superior  court  erred  by  not
applying the proper standard of review when it reviewed the Board’s
granting of a conditional use permit, and argue that  “[i]t is the
responsibility of the trial court, as a reviewing court, to review
the  entire  record  to  make  the  determinations  required  by  Coastal
Ready-Mix.”    We are unable to determine from the superior court’s
order whether it applied the appropriate standard of review to the
issues raised by petitioners.
“Zoning decisions regarding conditional use permits are quasi-
judicial in nature.”   Howard v. City of Kinston, ___ N.C. App. ___,
___,  558  S.E.2d  221,  225  (2002)  (citing  Concrete  Co.  v.  Board  of
Comm’rs,                                                                      299  N.C.         620,   626,   265  S.E.2d   379,   383   (1980)).   “Our
task, in reviewing a superior court order entered after a review of
a  board  decision  is  two-fold:  (1)  to  determine  whether  the  trial
court  exercised  the  proper  scope  of  review,  and                        (2)  to  review
whether  the  trial  court  correctly  applied  this  scope  of  review.”
Whiteco  Outdoor  Adver.  v.  Johnston  County  Bd.  of  Adjustment,  132
N.C. App.  465,  468,  513 S.E.2d  70,  73  (1999)  (citations omitted).
“Such  determination  might  well  require  remand  of  the  case  to  the
trial court for its application of the proper standard of review.”
Sun  Suites  Holdings,  LLC  v.  Board  of  Aldermen  of  Town  of  Garner,




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139 N.C. App.  269,  274,  533 S.E.2d  525,  528  (2000)  (citing Sutton
v.  N.C.  Dep’t.  of  Labor,  132  N.C.  App.  387,  389,  511  S.E.2d  340,
342 (“order vacated and case remanded where order failed to specify
standards of review and trial court's application thereof”)).
A court reviewing a board’s decision on an application for a
conditional  use  permit  issued  must:                                        (1)  review  the  record  for
errors in law;  (2) insure that procedures specified by law in both
statute and ordinance are followed; (3) insure that appropriate due
process rights of petitioner are protected, including the right to
offer evidence, cross-examine witnesses and inspect documents; (4)
insure that the decisions of boards of adjustment are supported by
competent, material and substantial evidence in the whole record;
and  (5)  insure  that  decisions  are  not  arbitrary  and  capricious.
Coastal  Ready-Mix  Concrete  Co.  Inc.  v.  Board  of  Comm'rs.  of  the
Town of Nags Head,  299 N.C.  620,  626,  265 S.E.2d  379,  383  (1980).
The  superior  court  is  not  the  trier  of  fact  and  it  sits  in  the
posture  of  an  appellate  court  when  reviewing  decisions  of  quasi-
judicial bodies.   Id.                                                         “[T]he scope of review is limited to errors
alleged  to  have  occurred  before  the  local  board.”    Tate  Terrace
Realty Investors, Inc. v. Currituck County, 127 N.C. App. 212, 218,
488  S.E.2d                                                                    845,                                          848-49   (1997)(citing  Godfrey  v.  Zoning  Bd.  of
Adjustment,  317 N.C.  51,  63,  344 S.E.2d  272,  279  (1986)).
Here,  petitioners  alleged  that  the  Board’s  decision  was
“contrary  to  law,   was   not  rendered  in  accordance  with  the
procedures  specified  by  law,  is  not  supported  by  competent,
material and substantial evidence and is arbitrary and capricious.”




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“When it is alleged that the action of a quasi-judicial body
was  not  supported  by  substantial  evidence  or  was  arbitrary  and
capricious,  the  reviewing  court  must  apply  the                           ‘whole  record’
test.”    Tate,                                                                127  N.C.  App.  at                               218,   488  S.E.2d  at   849                                        (citing
Ballas v. Town of Weaverville,  121 N.C. App.  346,  349,  465 S.E.2d
324, 326 (1996)).                                                              “The ‘whole record’ test requires the reviewing
court  to  examine  all  the  competent  evidence  and  pleadings  which
comprises the  ‘whole record’ to determine if there is substantial
evidence  in  the  record  to  support  the                                    [Board’s]  findings  and
conclusions.”   Ellis v. N.C. Crime Victims Compensation Comm., 111
N.C. App. 157, 162, 432 S.E.2d 160, 164 (1993) (citation omitted).
“The reviewing court may not substitute its own judgment for
that of the body when the record contains competent and substantial
evidence  supporting  the  findings  indicated  by  the  quasi-judicial
body,  even  though  conflicting  evidence  in  the  record  would  have
allowed  the  court  to  reach  a  contrary  finding  if  proceeding  de
novo.”   Tate,  127 N.C. App. at  218,  488 S.E.2d at  849  (citing CG &
T Corp. v. Bd. of Adjustment of Wilmington,  105 N.C. App.  32,  40,
411 S.E.2d 655, 660 (1992)). “Substantial evidence is that which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Id.
“If a petitioner contends the Board's decision was based on an
error of law, de novo review is proper.”    Westminster Homes, Inc.
v.  Town  of  Cary  Zoning  Bd.  of  Adjustment,  140  N.C.  App.  99,  102,
535  S.E.2d                                                                    415,                                              417    (2000)            (citing  JWL  Invs.,  Inc.  v.  Guilford
County Bd. of Adjustment,  133 N.C. App.  426,  429,  515 S.E.2d  715,




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717,  disc.  review  denied,  351  N.C.  357,  540  S.E.2d  349  (1999)).
“The role of appellate courts is to review the trial court's order
for  errors  of  law.    Westminster  Homes,  Inc.,                             140  N.C.  App.  at
102-03,  535 S.E.2d at  417  (citing In re Appeal of Willis, 129 N.C.
App.  499,  502,  500 S.E.2d  723,  726  (1998)).
Some issues presented for review to the trial court relate to
the  proper  interpretation  of  an  ordinance,  which  presents  a
question  of  law.                                                              Ayers  v.  Bd.  of  Adjustment  for  Town  of
Robersonville,  113 N.C. App.  528,  531,  439 S.E.2d  199,  201, disc.
review denied, 336 N.C. 71, 445 S.E.2d 28 (1994) (citing Capricorn
Equity Corp. v. Town of Chapel Hill,  334 N.C.  132,  431 S.E.2d  183
(1993)).    Whether the Board erred in allowing the construction of
a concrete plant in a multiple use district raises an issue of law
and is subject to de novo review.
Some  issues  presented  for  review  to  the  trial  court  require
the whole record test to be applied.    The order reflects that the
trial  court  only                                                              “reviewed  the  record.”     While  this  language
suggests  that  the  court  applied  a  “whole  record  test,”  the  order
did  not  expressly  state  what  type  of  review  it  applied.      We  are
unable  to  conclude  from  the  order  whether  the  superior  court
exercised the proper scope of review on all issues before it.
The order of the superior court is vacated.   We remand to the
superior court to set forth and apply the appropriate standard of
review based on the alleged errors raised in petitioners’ petition.
In  light  of  our  holding,  we  do  not  reach  petitioners  other
assignments of error.




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Vacated and remanded.
Judges MARTIN and THOMAS concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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