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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA06-269
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                                          5 December  2006
CAPITAL REALTY, INC.,
Plaintiff
v.                                                                                              Wake County
                                                                                                No.  04 CVS  10226
GEORGIA ALSTON JONES;
MANSON OTIS JONES, JR.;
HERMAN LEVERN JONES, and
CAROLYN WILLIAMS JONES,
Defendants
Appeal by defendant Georgia Alston Jones from judgment entered
28 September 2005 by Judge Donald L. Smith in Wake County Superior
Court.    Heard in the Court of Appeals  18 October  2006.
Harris  &  Hilton,  P.A.,  by  Nelson  G.  Harris,  for  plaintiff-
appellee.
Boxley,  Bolton,  Garber  &  Haywood,  L.L.P.,  by  Kenneth  C.
Haywood, for defendant-appellant Georgia Alston Jones.
HUNTER, Judge.
Georgia Alston Jones  (“defendant”) appeals through her legal
guardians  from  judgment  of  the  trial  court  granting  summary
judgment  in  favor  of  Capital  Realty,  Inc.                                                 (“plaintiff”)  and
ordering  defendant  to  pay  $110,000.00  as  damages  for  breach  of  a
real  estate  contract.     Defendant  argues  summary  judgment  was
improperly granted because material issues of fact exist regarding
plaintiff’s  production  of  a  buyer,  defendant’s  competency  at  the




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time  she  signed  the  contract,  and  whether  the  contract  is  the
result of undue influence.   Defendant also contends the trial court
erred  in  awarding  attorneys’  fees.     For  the  reasons  set  forth
herein, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
On 21 July 2004, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant
in  Wake  County  Superior  Court  alleging  breach  of  a  real  estate
listing  agreement.    The  complaint  alleged  that  on                     22  May                                                              2004,
defendant entered into an exclusive listing agreement for plaintiff
to market through its agent, Melanie Osborne  (“Osborne”), certain
property  (“the  property”)  owned  by  defendant  and  her  son,  Manson
Jones                                                                        (“Manson”)  as  tenants  in  common.    Under  the  terms  of  the
listing agreement, defendant and Manson agreed to pay plaintiff as
commission  ten  percent  (10%)  of  the  gross  sale  of  the  property.
Plaintiff  had  the  exclusive  right  to  sell  the  property,  with  a
listed  sales  price  of  $950,000.00,  until  22  November  2005.    The
listing agreement further provided that:
In  the  event                                                               [defendant]  sells  or  otherwise
disposes  of                                                                 [her]  interest  in  the  Property,
[defendant] shall remain liable for payment of
the  commissions  provided  for  in  this  and  any
other   agreement   of   which   it   is   a   part,
including, without limitation, the commission
obligations  set  forth  in  Paragraph                                       7.a.  or
7.b.   unless   the   purchaser   or   transferee
assumes all of such obligations in writing and
[plaintiff]   agrees   in   writing   to   such
assumption.
On                                                                           15  June                                                             2004,  defendant  and  Manson  entered  into  an
agreement  for  the  sale  of  the  property  with  Filmore  C.  Johnson
(“Johnson”), a buyer produced by plaintiff.   The purchase price was
listed  as  $1,100,000.00,  with  a  closing  date  of  on  or  before  21




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September  2004.    On  2  July  2004,  however,  defendant  changed  her
mind regarding sale of the property and conveyed as a gift her one-
half  undivided  interest  in  the  property  to  her  son,  Herman  Jones
(“Herman”)  and  his  wife,  Carolyn.    Defendant  thereafter  sent  a
letter  to  Osborne  dated  3  July  2004  informing  her  and  plaintiff
that defendant  “no longer want[ed] to use  [their] services.”
On 15 July 2004, defendant suffered a heart attack and stroke.
Plaintiff  filed  its  complaint  against  her  on  21  July  2004.    The
complaint alleged that defendant committed an anticipatory breach
of the listing agreement by conveying her interest in the property
and sought damages.   On 30 July 2004, Herman was declared to be the
interim guardian of defendant’s person and her estate.    Defendant
was declared incompetent on  13 September  2004 and legal guardians
were appointed for her person and her estate.
Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, which was heard
by  the  trial  court  on                                                    28  September    2005.   Upon  reviewing  the
matter,  the  trial  court  found  there  were  no  genuine  issues  of
material fact and plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.   The trial court entered judgment in favor of plaintiff in the
amount  of  $110,000.00,  the  amount  equivalent  to  the  ten  percent
(10%) commission to which plaintiff was entitled under the listing
agreement, and awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $16,500.00.
Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed defendants Herman and Carolyn and
obtained  a  default  judgment  against  Manson.                             Thus,  present
defendant is the only defendant remaining in the case.    Defendant
appeals.




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Summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.    N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  1A-1, Rule  56(c)  (2005); Cashion v. Texas
Gulf, Inc., 79 N.C. App. 632, 633, 339 S.E.2d 797, 798 (1986).                “An
issue  is  material  if  the  facts  alleged  would  constitute  or  would
irrevocably establish any material element of a claim or defense.”
Anderson  v.  Canipe,                                                         69  N.C.  App.                              534,                                                       536,   317  S.E.2d   44,   46
(1984).                                                                                                                   “An  issue  is  genuine  if  it  may  be  maintained  by
substantial evidence.”    Id.
Defendant first argues genuine issues of material fact exist
concerning whether plaintiff adequately performed under the terms
of the listing agreement and produced a buyer who was ready, able
and  willing  to  purchase  the  property.    We  find  no  merit  to  this
argument.
Defendant   signed   an                                                       “exclusive   right   to   sell”   listing
agreement with plaintiff.   Such an agreement “prohibit[s] the owner
from  selling  both  personally  and  through  another  broker,  without
incurring liability for a commission to the original broker.”   Joel
T. Cheatham, Inc. v. Hall,  64 N.C. App.  678,  681,  308 S.E.2d  457,
459  (1983).
In    accordance    with    cases    of    other
jurisdictions, in the event the owner breaches
this  type  of  agreement,  he  is  liable  for  the
commission  which  would  have  accrued  if  the
broker  had  obtained  a  purchaser  during  the
period  of  the  listing.    The  broker  need  not
show that he could have performed by tendering
an  acceptable  buyer,  or  that  he  was  the
procuring  cause  of  the  sale.    The  owner  may
breach  the  agreement  by  arranging  a  sale  in
violation of the agreement or by action which
renders the broker’s performance impossible.




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Id.  at  681-82,  308  S.E.2d  at  459  (emphasis  added)  (holding  that
summary  judgment  was  properly  granted  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff
real  estate  broker  where  the  defendant  property  owner  sold  the
property  in  question  to  a  third  party  in  breach  of  the  exclusive
listing agreement).
In the instant case, defendant conveyed her one-half interest
in  the  property  on  2  July  2004,  barely  five  weeks  after  entering
into the exclusive listing agreement with plaintiff.    Defendant’s
action  rendered  performance  by  plaintiff  under  the  agreement
impossible.    The  listing  agreement  gave  plaintiff  the  exclusive
right  to  sell  the  property  until  22  November  2005.    Thus,  at  the
time defendant breached the agreement, plaintiff still had almost
seventeen months to perform under the agreement.   Because defendant
conveyed  her  half-interest  in  the  property  during  the  time  set
forth  in  the  exclusive  listing  agreement,  rendering  plaintiff’s
performance  impossible,  she  is  in  breach  of  the  agreement  and
plaintiff  is  entitled  to  the  commission  it  would  have  earned  but
for  such  breach.     See  id.;  Adaron  Group,  Inc.  v.  Industrial
Innovators, Inc.,  90 N.C. App.  758,  760,  370 S.E.2d  66,  67  (1988)
(holding  that  summary  judgment  was  properly  granted  to  the
plaintiff real estate broker for commission on the sale of property
arising  from  breach  by  the  defendant  of  an  exclusive  listing
agreement).
Defendant nevertheless cites the case of Egan v. Guthrie,  94
N.C.  App.  307,  380  S.E.2d  135  (1989),  in  support  of  her  argument
that   issues   of   material   fact   exist   regarding   plaintiff’s




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performance  under  the  listing  agreement.    In  Egan,  the  defendant
property  owners  privately  agreed  to  sell  the  property  at  issue,
which was under an exclusive listing agreement with the plaintiff
real estate broker, to a third party prior to the expiration of the
agreement.   Id. at  310,  380 S.E.2d at  137.   Completion of the sale
took place two days after expiration of the listing agreement.   The
plaintiff  did  not  procure  the  buyer  of  the  property.     After
learning of the sale, the plaintiff brought suit for the commission
to  which  it  claimed  it  was  entitled,  and  the  trial  court  granted
summary  judgment  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff.    Upon  review,  this
Court  stated  that,                                                          “[n]othing  else  appearing,   [the  defendants’]
actions would have constituted a breach of the exclusive right to
sell agreement by [the] defendants and entitled [the] plaintiff to
a commission on the sale and summary judgment in this case.”    Id.
However, the Court noted that  “[u]nder the contract in this case,
[the]  plaintiff  was  obligated  to  make,  at  a  minimum,  reasonable
efforts  to  sell  the  owner’s  property  in  order  to  entitle             [the]
plaintiff  to  a  commission.”     Id.  at                                    311,                           380  S.E.2d  at      138.
Because the plaintiff had produced no evidence that it had made any
effort to sell the property in question, the Court held that issues
of material fact existed regarding the plaintiff’s compliance with
the performance required by the listing contract and reversed the
trial court.
Unlike  the  case  of  Egan,  plaintiff  here  had  seventeen  more
months  to  perform  under  the  listing  agreement.     Most  notably,
however,  plaintiff  produced  ample  evidence  that  it  substantially




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performed   in   the   five   weeks   before   defendant   breached   the
agreement.    Plaintiff procured a buyer for the property, Johnson,
who  entered  into  an  agreement  on  15  June  2004  with  defendant  and
Manson  for  the  sale  of  the  property  with  a  purchase  price  of
$1,100,000.00.    Defendant, however, conveyed away her interest in
the  property  before  the  sale  of  the  property  could  be  completed.
Although defendant attempts to cast doubt on Johnson’s ability to
perform  under  the  purchase  agreement,  it  was  defendant’s  actions
which  rendered  performance  by  Johnson  and  plaintiff  impossible.
Defendant  cannot  now  claim  some  future  possibility  of  lack  of
performance by Johnson as grounds for creating issues of material
fact.    See  Anderson,  69  N.C.  App.  at  536,  317  S.E.2d  at  46  (in
order  to  be  genuine  issues  of  material  fact,  such  issues  must  be
maintained  by  substantial  evidence).                                       As  plaintiff  produced
substantial   evidence   of   its   performance   under   the   listing
agreement,  the  present  case  is  unlike  the  situation  in  Egan,  and
the  trial  court  properly  granted  summary  judgment  in  favor  of
plaintiff.
Defendant further argues genuine issues of material fact exist
as to whether she was competent at the time she signed the listing
agreement.    This  argument  has  no  merit.    There  is  no  substantial
evidence in the record to suggest that defendant was incompetent at
the time she signed the listing agreement.   Indeed, all evidence is
to  the  contrary.     The  evidence  tended  to  show  that  defendant
personally managed her business affairs, including the management
of  multiple  properties  she  owned.    Her  son  Herman  testified  that




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defendant was  “very lucid” until her heart attack and stroke, and
that any dementia she experienced developed after her stroke.    He
stated that she had no  “significant medical problems prior to the
stroke” besides diabetes, and that she was a “strong-willed woman”
who “would get up and go everyday, and do everything[.]”   According
to  Herman,  defendant                                                        “had  thought  it  through”  and  decided  she
wanted to keep the property in the family, but wanted to convey her
interest  in  the  property  for  tax  purposes.    Osborne  testified  by
affidavit that defendant appeared completely competent during the
multiple  times  that  Osborne  dealt  with  her.    Because  defendant
presented no substantial evidence to suggest she was not competent
at  the  time  she  entered  into  the  listing  agreement,  we  overrule
this assignment of error.
Defendant  next  contends  there  was  evidence  she  was  acting
under the undue influence of her son Manson at the time she entered
into the listing agreement.   However, defendant never asserted this
defense  in  her  answer  to  plaintiff’s  complaint.    The  defense  of
undue  influence  must  be  affirmatively  pled.    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.         §
1A-1,  Rule  8(c)  (2005);  Howell  v.  Landry,  96  N.C.  App.  516,  526,
386 S.E.2d 610, 616 (1989) (noting that where affirmative defenses
such as undue influence are neither pled nor litigated, such issues
are not properly raised and will not be addressed by this Court).
As  defendant  did  not  plead  undue  influence  as  an  affirmative
defense,  nor  is  there  evidence  of  record  that  such  was  litigated
before the trial court, we overrule this assignment of error.




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Defendant argues the trial court erred in awarding attorneys’
fees,  contending  there  is  no  statutory  authority  authorizing  the
award of attorneys’ fees in this case.    We do not agree.    Section
6-21.2 of the North Carolina General Statutes authorizes the award
of  attorneys’  fees  in  cases  of  breach  of  contract  where  there  is
“evidence of indebtedness.”   N.C. Gen. Stat. § 6-21.2 (2005).   The
statute also provides that:
If  such  note,  conditional  sale  contract  or
other  evidence  of  indebtedness  provides  for
the  payment  of  reasonable  attorneys’  fees  by
the  debtor,  without  specifying  any  specific
percentage, such provision shall be construed
to   mean   fifteen   percent                                                  (15%)   of   the
“outstanding  balance”  owing  on  said  note,
contract or other evidence of indebtedness.
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                              §                             6-21.2(2)                         (2005).   “Evidence  of  indebtedness
signifies a written agreement or acknowledgment of debt, such as a
promissory  note  or  conditional  sales  contract,  which  is  executed
and   signed   by   the   party   obligated   under   the   terms   of   the
instrument.”    Supply,  Inc.  v.  Allen,  30  N.C.  App.  272,  277,  227
S.E.2d  120,  124  (1976).
The  exclusive  listing  agreement  in  the  present  case  is
evidence of indebtedness on defendant’s part to pay the ten percent
(10%)   commission  owed  to  plaintiff.                                       The  listing  agreement
specifies that should plaintiff be forced to institute legal action
to   enforce   the   agreement,   plaintiff                                    “shall   be   entitled   to
reasonable  attorney’s  fees  and  costs.”    Pursuant  to  section            6-
21.2(2), plaintiff was entitled to a reasonable attorneys’ fee of
fifteen   percent                                                              (15%)   of   the              $110,000.000   commission,   or
$16,500.00, which the trial court awarded.   We hold the trial court




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properly awarded attorneys’ fees, and we overrule this assignment
of error.
Finally, defendant argues the trial court improperly failed to
consider  all  of  the  evidence  submitted  at  the  summary  judgment
hearing.   As evidence therefor, defendant cites the language of the
judgment of the trial court, wherein the trial court states it is
granting summary judgment to plaintiff after  “having reviewed the
pleadings of record[.]”    Assuming arguendo that the trial court’s
statement  indicates  it  failed  to  review  all  of  the  evidence
submitted in the case, this Court has conducted a thorough de novo
review of all of the evidence, and we hold the trial court did not
err  in  granting  summary  judgment  in  favor  of  plaintiff.     We
therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
Judges HUDSON and CALABRIA concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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