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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA04-68
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                                          7 December  2004
BEVERLY J. CHILDERS,
Plaintiff
v.                                                                                              New Hanover County
                                                                                                No.  02 CVD  2819
KEITH H. CHILDERS,
Defendant
Appeal  by  defendant  from  orders  entered                                                    1  July                                       2003  and   5
September  2003 by Judge J.H. Corpening, II, in New Hanover County
District Court.    Heard in the Court of Appeals  12 October  2004.
Johnson  Lambeth  &  Brown,  by  Anna  Averitt,  and  Carlton
Prickett, for the plaintiff-appellee.
Lea,  Rhine  &  Rosbrugh,  by  Lori  W.  Rosbrugh,  for  defendant-
appellant.
THORNBURG, Judge.
Keith  H.  Childers                                                                             (“defendant”)  appeals  from  an  equitable
distribution, alimony, and attorney fees order entered 1 July 2003
and  an  order  denying  defendant’s  request  for  a  decrease  in  his
child  support  and  post-separation  support  obligations  entered                             5
September  2003.
Beverly J. Childers  (“plaintiff”) and defendant were married
on  30  March  1985  and  have  two  children  from  the  marriage,  born  7
May  1988 and  1 September  1991.    Plaintiff and defendant separated




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on  14 July  2002.   On  15 July 2002, plaintiff filed a complaint for
child  custody,  child  support,  post-separation  support,  alimony,
equitable  distribution  and  attorney  fees.    On  23  September  2002,
the  district  court  entered  an  order  requiring  defendant  to  pay
child  support  and  post-separation  support.    On  11  February  2003,
defendant filed a motion requesting that the court reduce his child
support   payments   and   eliminate   his   post-separation   support
payments.    A  hearing  on  these  matters  was  conducted  on  11  and  12
March 2003 in New Hanover County District Court.   The court issued
orders  on                                                                     1  July                 2003  and                                5  September   2003  addressing  these
matters.   On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred
in  its  classification  and  distribution  of  a  First  Union  CAP
account,  in  making  an  unequal  distribution  to  plaintiff,  in
awarding alimony to plaintiff, and in denying defendant’s motion to
decrease child support and post-separation support.
Classification of the First Union CAP Account
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by finding
and  concluding  that  the  First  Union  CAP  account  was  marital
property.    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                 §                       50-20  requires  the  trial  court  to
classify  the  parties’  property  as  marital  or  separate.     This
section defines marital and separate property as follows:
“Marital property” means all real and personal
property  acquired  by  either  spouse  or  both
spouses during the course of the marriage and
before  the  date  of  the  separation  of  the
parties, and presently owned, except property
determined   to   be   separate   property   or
divisible property . . .                                                       . It is presumed that
all   property   acquired   after   the   date   of
marriage and before the date of separation is
marital  property  except  property  which  is




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separate  property                                                           .  .    This  presumption
may  be  rebutted  by  the  greater  weight  of  the
evidence.
“Separate   property”   means   all   real   and
personal property acquired by a spouse before
marriage  or  acquired  by  a  spouse  by  bequest,
devise, descent, or gift during the course of
the  marriage                                                                .  Property  acquired  in
exchange  for  separate  property  shall  remain
separate  property  regardless  of  whether  the
title is in the name of the husband or wife or
both   and   shall   not   be   considered   to   be
marital  property  unless  a  contrary  intention
is  expressly  stated  in  the  conveyance.  The
increase in value of separate property and the
income derived from separate property shall be
considered separate property.
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  50-20(b)(1),(2)(2003).
It  is  undisputed  that  the  property  at  issue  was  acquired
during  the  marriage,  before  the  date  of  separation,  and  is
presently owned.   Defendant, however, contends that the trial court
erred  by  not  classifying  a  portion  of  the  account  as  defendant’s
separate property.   Specifically, defendant points to evidence that
his father provided $10,000 and his mother provided $3,000 to fund
the account to further his contention that portions of the account
are defendant’s separate property.
The trial court made the following finding of fact in regard
to these events:
At separation, the parties had a joint account
at First Union which consisted of $9,922.32 in
the  “money market account” and  3100 shares of
Parametric Technology Corp. stock at $3.06 per
share,  for  a  total  value,  at  separation  of
$19,408.                                                                     Defendant   contended   that   this
account  contained  money  that  he  had  received
from  his  father  and  had  used  the  funds  and
invested   them   on   his   father’s   behalf   in
Parametric   Technology   stock.                                             Defendant
further  contended  that  the  account  contained




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money that he had received from his mother to
invest  in  Terex  stock  but  that  he  had  failed
to  invest  said  sum  for  her.    The  Court  finds
that  funds  were  deposited  into  and  withdrawn
from  this  account  by  Defendant  on  a  regular
basis;   that   Defendant   bought   and   sold
Parametric   Technology   stock   several   times
since  1997; that the funds received from said
sales were, from time to time, a part of this
CAP  account;  and  that  Defendant  reported  the
gains  and  losses  on  these  sales  of  stock  on
the   parties’   joint   tax   returns   for   the
applicable   years.                                                           The   Court   finds   that
Defendant cannot trace the funds received from
his father and his mother into the funds which
were on deposit at the time of separation and
the Court therefore finds that the balance in
the  CAP  account  at  separation  is  martial
property.
A  trial  court's  determination  that  property  is  to  be  labeled
marital  or  separate  will  not  be  disturbed  on  appeal  if  there  is
competent evidence to support the determination.   Minter v. Minter,
111 N.C. App.  321,  329,  432 S.E.2d  720,  725, disc. review denied,
335 N.C.  176,  438 S.E.2d  201  (1993).    After careful review of the
record on appeal, we conclude that the trial court did not err in
classifying this account as marital property.
In Minter, the defendant presented evidence that he received
inheritances  of  investment  securities,  and  that  he  purchased
various   other   assets   with   funds   from   the   sale   of   these
inheritances.  Id.  at                                                        323-24,                      432  S.E.2d  at   722.  There  was  no
dispute  that  the  contested  assets  were  acquired  during  the
marriage.    This  Court  found  that  “[o]nce  this  showing  [that  the
assets were acquired during the marriage] had been made, the burden
of  proof  necessary  to  show  that  the  assets  were  marital  had  been
met.    The  burden  then  shifted  to  the  defendant  to  show  that  the




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source of the contested property was separate property[.]”   Id. at
327,  432 S.E.2d at  724.   The defendant in Minter testified that he
could  not  trace  all  of  the  various  assets  he  inherited  to  the
assets  he  and  his  wife  owned  on  the  date  of  separation.    Id.  at
328,                                                                           432  S.E.2d  at   725.   The  defendant  had  placed  funds  from
various sources into the various accounts, and from these accounts
other investments were purchased, including the contested assets.
Id. at  323,  432 S.E.2d at  722.
As  in  Minter,  the  contested  assets  in  the  present  case  were
acquired  during  the  marriage  but  defendant  argued  that  separate
funds  were  used  to  acquire  these  assets.     However,  just  as  in
Minter,  there  is  competent  evidence  in  the  record  to  support  the
trial court's determination that defendant was unable to trace the
funds he argued were his separate property to assets present in the
CAP  account  at  the  time  of  the  parties’  separation.    Defendant
testified that the CAP account was his and plaintiff’s account and,
that during the marriage, funds from the account were used to pay
the  bills  of  the  parties.    No  detailed  records  were  offered  by
defendant accounting for any portion of the account attributable to
defendant’s  parents  except  for  cancelled  checks  for                      $10,000  and
$3,000.    Nor does the record reveal that  defendant presented more
than a few months of the records of the deposits and disbursements
made during the marriage.    Thus, we conclude that the trial  court
correctly  determined  that  defendant failed  to  carry  his  burden of
proof  to  show  that  any  part  of  this  account  was  his  separate
property.




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Unequal Distribution of the Marital Assets
Defendant  next  contends  that  the  trial  court  abused  its
discretion  in  making  an  unequal division of the  marital property.
However,  defendant fails to cite any authority in support of this
argument.     Accordingly,  these  assignments  of  error  are  deemed
abandoned.    N.C. R. App. P.  28(b)(6)(2003).
Alimony
Defendant  next  argues  that  the  trial  court  erred  by  awarding
alimony to plaintiff.   Specifically, defendant argues that the trial
court  erred  by  using  the  earning  capacity  standard  to  determine
alimony   without   also   entering   a   finding   that   defendant   is
deliberately    suppressing    his    income    to    avoid    family
responsibilities.
[A]n  award  of  alimony  may  be  based  upon  the
supporting   spouse’s   ability   to   earn   as
distinguished from his actual income . . . when
it appears from the record that there has been
a   deliberate   attempt   on   the   part   of   the
supporting spouse to avoid his financial family
responsibilities  by  refusing  to  seek  or  to
accept   gainful   employment;   by   willfully
refusing   to   secure   or   take   a   job;   by
deliberately   not   applying   himself   to   his
business;   by   intentionally   depressing   his
income    to    an    artificial    low;    or    by
intentionally leaving his employment to go into
another business.
Bowes  v.  Bowes,  287  N.C.  163,                                           171-72,  214  S.E.2d  40,  45  (1975).
Moreover,  this  Court  has  held  in  the  context  of  a  child  support
order that  “‘[i]t is not enough that there may be evidence in the
record  sufficient  to  support  findings  which  could  have been  made.
The  trial  court  must  itself  determine  what  pertinent  facts  are




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                                                                                             actually established by the evidence before it . . .                                   .’”   Atwell v.
Atwell,                                                                     74  N.C.  App.   231,                                                   234,   328  S.E.2d   47,   49   (1985)(quoting
Coble v. Coble,  300 N.C.  708,  712,  268 S.E.2d  185,  189  (1980).
In the case at bar,  the trial court’s order awarding alimony
does not contain a specific finding that defendant is deliberately
depressing his income to avoid family responsibilities.     Plaintiff
contends that any failure by the trial court to make this specific
finding  is  cured  by  the  order  refusing  to  modify  post-separation
support and child support, which was based on the same evidence and
does contain such a finding.   We are unconvinced, however, that the
trial court’s finding in a separate order satisfies Atwell, and thus
remand this issue to the trial court to make a specific finding as
to whether defendant was deliberately depressing his income, which
would support an award of alimony.
Order Refusing to Decrease Post-separation Support and Child
Support
This  assignment  of  error pertains to the  trial court’s  order
entered  5 September  2003 denying defendant’s motion for a decrease
in  support  payments.     Defendant  asserts  that  the  trial  court’s
finding that “[d]efendant appears to be intentionally depressing his
income  in  order  to  avoid  paying  his  child  support  and  post-
separation obligations to Plaintiff” is not supported by competent
evidence.    We disagree.
The  evidence  presented  at  the  hearing  tended  to  show  that
defendant was  terminated in November of  2002, and, that as of the
March  2003 hearing, defendant  had failed to apply for any type of




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employment.    Defendant also testified that since his severance pay
ended  in  the  first  week  of  February,  the  only  efforts  he  made  to
receive  unemployment  benefits  were  to  look  on  the  internet  to
determine how much he would be entitled to, if he applied.    Based
on this evidence, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion  by  declining  to  modify  defendant’s  post-separation
support and child support.    See Bowes,  287 N.C. at  172,  214 S.E.2d
at  45  (refusing to seek gainful employment is a factor sufficient
to warrant the imposition of the earning capacity rule).
Affirmed in part, remanded in part.
Judges WYNN and HUNTER concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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