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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ANDERSON/GREENWOOD DIVISION
Marion ”Turk” Culberson,                                                                            )
                                                                                                    )                                                                                 C/A No. 8:11-1708-TMC
Plaintiff,                                                                                          )
)
v.                                                                                                  )                                                                                 OPINION & ORDER
)
)
)
Kelly Nichols, in her official
capacity and individually, and                                                                      )
Anderson County,                                                                                    )
)
Defendants.                                                                                         )
In his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff Marion “Turk” Culberson (“Culberson”) raises a
federal claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims for malicious prosecution,
abuse of process, infliction of emotional distress, and negligence. This matter is before the
Court on Defendants Kelly Nichols (“Nichols”) and Anderson County’s (“County’s”) Motions
to Dismiss.                                                                                         (Dkt.  #  9 and  10).   For the reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motions to
Dismiss are granted on Culberson’s federal claim. However, the court declines to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Culberson's state law claims.
Background/Procedural History
Between  1986  and  November  2008, Joey Preston  (“Preston”) was  the  Anderson
County Administrator.   In March 2003, Nichols was hired by the County as a storm water
inspector.    Culberson  alleges  Preston  adopted  a  custom  or  practice  of  intimidation  to
silence persons who opposed his actions while the County Administrator and the County
acquiesced.  Culberson  became  a  vocal  opponent  of  Preston  and  often  voiced  his
opposition on a local radio talk show.   Culberson also alleges that Nichols and Preston had
a personal relationship and he often voiced his concern over Nichols’ qualifications for her




position with the County. Culberson alleges that, at the County’s direction, he and others
received letters from the law firm Young, Clements, & Rivers, LLP, threatening legal action
for expressing their opposition on the talk show.
On  or  about  April  25,  2011,  Nichols  contacted  the  Sheriff’s  Office  and  filed  an
incident report alleging Culberson was harassing her. Lt. Andrew Tribble of the Sheriff’s
Office spoke with Nichols and she complained that Culberson was trying to catch Nichols
using a County car in violation of County policy.    Nichols complained that in December
2006, Culberson had filed a Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) request with the County
requesting  information  about  Nichols;  in  January  and  July                                 2007,  and  in  July   2010,
Culberson  had  driven  by  Nichols  house;  and  in  March  2010,  Culberson  had  driven  by
Nichols twice while she was working on Crestview Road.   In early May, 2011, Tribble met
with Culberson and his wife.   Culberson admitted filing a FOIA request regarding Nichols,
but he denied following, stalking, or harassing her.   Tribble told Nichols he did not believe
any prosecutable crime had occurred and the case was closed.   On May 6, 2011, Nichols,
however, filed  an action in the Anderson County Magistrate Court seeking a restraining
order.   On May 11, 2011, the Magistrate court action was dismissed.
In stating his § 1983 claim, Culberson alleges that there was no probable cause for
the institution, prosecution and/or continuation of criminal and/or civil proceedings against
him by the Defendants and he alleges Nichols filed a complaint with the Sheriff’s Office
and/or instituted and prosecuted the action for a restraining order to unlawfully interfere
with his Constitutional rights, specifically his rights to freedom of speech, expression, and
travel.
Standard of Review
When presented with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must restrict its
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inquiry to  the sufficiency of the complaint rather than  “resolve contests  surrounding the
facts, the  merits of a claim , or the  applicability of defenses.” Republican  Party of North
Carolina v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.1992). To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion,
“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to
relief  that  is  plausible  on  its  face.”    Ashcroft  v.  Iqbal,                             556  U.S.  662  (2009)  (internal
quotation marks omitted). Under this plausibility standard, the court should  “assume th[e]
veracity” of well-pled factual allegations  “and then determine whether they plausibly give
rise to an entitlement to relief.”   Id. at 1950.
Discussion
Section 1983 provides a private cause of action for plaintiffs alleging constitutional
violations by persons acting under color of state law.   To establish a claim under § 1983, a
plaintiff must prove two elements: (1) that the defendant “deprived [him] of a right secured
by the Constitution and laws of the United States” and  (2) that the defendant  “deprived
[him]  of  this  constitutional  right  under  color  of                                         [State]  statute,  ordinance,  regulation,
custom , or usage.”   Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted).
The state action requirement reflects judicial recognition of the
fact that most rights secured by the Constitution are protected
only against infringement by governments. This  fundamental
limitation on the scope of constitutional guarantees preserves
an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal
law and avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials,
responsibility  for  conduct  for  which  they  cannot  fairly  be
blamed.
Id. at 310 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Employment by a municipality is not conclusive in determining whether a person
was  acting                                                                                      “under  color  of  state  law;”  but  it  is  relevant.  Murphy  v.  Chicago  Transit
Authority, 638 F.Supp. 464, 467 (N.D. Ill. 1986)(citations omitted). “Not all actions by state
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employees are acts under color of law.”   Edwards v. Wallace Community College, 49 F.3d
1517,  1523  (11th Cir.  1995)    Rather,  “[t]he  dispositive  issue  is  whether the  official  was
acting  pursuant  to  the  power  he/she  possessed  by  state  authority  or  acting  only  as  a
private individual.” Id.
In Hughes v. Halifax County School Bd., 855 F.2d 183, 186-87 (4 t Cir. 1988), theh
Fourth Circuit held that the relevant question in determining whether someone acted under
the  color  of  state  law  is  whether  “the  actions  complained  of  were  committed  while  the
defendants were purporting to act under the authority vested in them by the state, or were
otherwise  made  possible  because  of  the  privileges  of  employment.”    In  Hughes,  two
county employees assaulted the plaintiff in retaliation for the plaintiff's testimony before a
grand  jury  regarding  the  alleged  corruption  of  the  state  division  that  employed  the
employees and the plaintiff.   Id. at 184. Although the assault occurred at the work site, the
Fourth Circuit refused to find that the employees were state actors because there was no
indication that they had used the authority of their positions to assist them in assaulting the
plaintiff.   Id. at 187.
Here,  Culberson has not alleged what power or authority Nichols possesses based
upon  her employment as  a storm  water inspector and  how  she  was  acting  pursuant to
such power or authority when she filed the incident report against Culberson and sought a
restraining order.   Culberson cites Rossignol v. Voorhaar, 316 F.3d 516 (4 t Cir. 2003), inh
support of his argument that Nichols was acting under the color of state law.   However,
Rossignol is simply inapplicable.
In  Rossignol,  the  defendant  sheriff's  deputies  while  off  duty  and  out  of  uniform
conducted  a  countywide  mass  purchase  of  the  plaintiff's  newspaper  in  an  effort  to
suppress  criticism  of  their  official  conduct  before  an  election.  Rossignol,                    316  F.3d  at
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519-20. The Fourth  Circuit concluded  that the deputies' actions were  attributable  to  the
state because the deputies were motivated to censor criticism of their official conduct.   Id.
at  524-25.    Further, the Fourth Circuit found significant the fact that the off-duty officers
were  well-known  as  police  officers  and  it  appeared  that  they  had  used  their  status  as
officers  to  intimidate  store  employees.  See  id.  at                                                526  (explaining  that   “the  deputies'
identities as state officers played a role at several points during the seizure” and noting the
undoubted “effect of a police presence on a store owner or clerk”).
Here, in contrast, while Culberson alleges that all of Nichols’ actions are linked to
her  employment,  he  does  not  allege  that  Nichols  used  her  position  as  storm  water
inspector to gain an advantage when she filed the incident report or sought the restraining
order against Culberson.   While Culberson apparently has issues which he alleges arise
out of Nichols’ employment, it is clear that Nichols’ actions were simply the actions of a
private citizen.   Accordingly, Defendant Nichols’ Motion to Dismiss is granted.
As to Culberson’s § 1983 claims against the County, since there are no underlying
state law actions by Nichols, there can be no liability imposed upon the County. Temkin v.
Frederick  County  Comm'rs,                                                                              945  F.2d                716,              724   (4th  Cir.1991)(holding  a  claim  of
inadequate  training  under  §  1983  cannot  be  made  out  against  a  supervisory  authority
absent a finding of a constitutional violation on the part of the person being supervised.).
See also Miqui v. City of New York, No. 01-CV-4628, 2003 WL 22937690, at *5 (E.D.N.Y.
Dec. 5, 2003) (“Because [auxiliary city police officer] did not act under color of law, the City
. . . cannot be held responsible for his private acts”).
Moreover,  even  if  there  was  an  underlying  constitutional  violation  committed  by
Nichols, it is well-established that there is no respondeat superior liability under  §  1983.
Monell  v.  Dep’t  of  Soc.  Servs.,  436  U.S,  658,  691  (1978).    In  the  Fourth  Circuit,  “the
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principle  is  firmly  entrenched  that  supervisory  officials  may  be  held  liable  in  certain
circumstances  for  the  constitutional  injuries  inflicted  by  their  subordinates.”  Shaw  v.
Stroud,                                                                                                  13  F.3d                                     791,   798   (4th  Cir.   1994).  It  is   “only  when  the  execution  of  the
government's policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury that the municipality may be held liable
under §  1983.'“ City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 385  (1989) (quoting Springfield v.
Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257, 267 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).   In Carter v. Morris, 164 F.3d
215, 218 (4th Cir.1999), the Fourth Circuit identified four possible sources of official policy
or  custom  giving  rise  to  municipal  liability:                                                      1)  written  ordinances  and  regulations;   2)
affirmative  decisions  of  individual  policymaking  officials;                                         3)  omissions  by  policymaking
officials that manifest deliberate indifference to the rights of the citizens;   or (4) a practice
so persistent and widespread and so permanent and well settled as to constitute a custom
or usage with the force of law. (quotation marks and citations omitted). Municipalities may
also be held liable for failing to  “train, supervise, or discipline” their employees so as to
prevent  them  from  unlawfully  depriving  citizens  of  their  constitutional  rights.     City  of
Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
Culberson  has  not  alleged  a  single  fact  to  support  his  conclusory  allegations
regarding  the  existence  of  an  official  policy  or  custom  which  violated  his  constitutional
rights.  Culberson  advances  the  wholly  unsupported  leap  in  logic  that,  because  Nichols
filed  a  complaint  about  him  and  sought  a  restraining  order,  there  must  be  a  policy  or
custom,  or  lack  of  training,  that  led  to  such  actions.    Unsupported  allegations  such  as
these  fail.  See  Revene  v.  Charles  Cnty.  Comm'rs,  882  F.2d  870,  875  (4th  Cir.  1989)
(affirming dismissal of §  1983 claim alleging inadequate training by municipality because
there were no supporting facts); Allen v. City of Fredericksburg, No. 3:09CV63, 2011 WL
782039, at *8 (E.D.Va. Feb. 22, 2011) (unpublished) (finding complaint insufficient to state
cause  of  action  against  city or  its  police  department  as  it  was  lacking  facts  to  support
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plaintiff's conclusory failure to train claim).   Nichols’ conduct was simply that of a private
citizen.   Accordingly, Defendant County’s Motion to Dismiss is also granted.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants Nichols’ and Anderson County’s Motions to
Dismiss  (Dkt.  #  9  and  10) are  GRANTED  IN  PART  and  DENIED  IN  PART.    Plaintiff’s
federal claims are DISMISSED with prejudice.   The Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are
DENIED to the extent the motions seek dismissal with prejudice of the Plaintiff's state law
claims.  Instead,  pursuant  to                                                                      28  U.S.C.   §   1367   (c),  the  Court  declines  to  exercise
supplemental jurisdiction  over the  Plaintiff's  state law  claims. Accordingly, the  Plaintiff’s
state law claims are DISMISSED without prejudice and this case is DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Timothy M. Cain
United States District Judge
Greenville, South Carolina
January 11, 2012
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