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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA10-249
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                                          21 December  2010
JULIA L. DAWES,
Plaintiff
v.                                                                                              From the Industrial Commission
I.C. No.  473729
AUTUMN CARE OF MARSHVILLE,
Employer
and
KEY RISK MANAGEMENT SERVICES,
Insurer,
Defendants
Appeal by Defendants from Opinion and Award entered 3 December
2009  by  the  North  Carolina  Industrial  Commission.    Heard  in  the
Court of Appeals  13 September  2010.
Poisson, Poisson & Bower, PLLC, by E. Stewart Poisson and Fred
D. Poisson, Jr., for Plaintiff.
Hedrick, Gardner, Kincheloe & Garofalo, L.L.P., by Shelley W.
Coleman, and M. Duane Jones, for Defendants.
ERVIN, Judge.
Defendants Autumn Corporation and Key Risk Management Services
appeal from an Opinion and Award entered by Commissioner Danny Lee
McDonald,  with  the  concurrence  of  former  Commissioner  Dianne  C.
Sellers  and  Commissioner  Christopher  Scott,  directing  that  a
medical examination be performed in order to enable the Commission




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to  resolve  the                                                               “existence  and  compensability  of  Plaintiff’s
possible  injuries  to  her  left  knee  and  leg.”  After  careful
consideration of Defendants’ challenges to the Commission’s order
in  light  of  the  record  and  the  applicable  law,  we  conclude  that
Defendants’   appeal   has   been   taken   from   an   unappealable
interlocutory order and must be dismissed.
I. Factual Background
Plaintiff was employed by Defendant Autumn Care of Marshville
as  a  Certified  Nursing  Assistant  from  16  December  2002  until  21
December  2005.    According  to  a  stipulation  between  the  parties,
“Plaintiff sustained a compensable injury on October 16, 2004 when
a  large  patient  fell  on  her,  spraining  and  fracturing  her  left
ankle.”     Although  Defendants  treated  Plaintiff’s  ankle-related
injuries  as  compensable,  they  denied  the  compensability  of  the
injuries  that  Plaintiff  allegedly  sustained  to  her  left  knee  and
leg  on  the  grounds  that  these  injuries  were  not  caused  by  the  16
October 2004 accident.   On 11 January 2006, Defendants filed a Form
33 Request for Hearing, noting, in pertinent part, that the parties
disagreed about the  “existence and compensability” of Plaintiff’s
left knee and leg injuries.
After   a   hearing   conducted   on                                           26   October                                                        2006,   Deputy
Commissioner J. Brad Donovan issued an Opinion and Award dated  11
May                                                                            2007  addressing  Plaintiff’s  claim.     At  that  time,  Deputy
Commissioner  Donovan  denied  Plaintiff’s  claim  for  additional
temporary total disability benefits, but awarded Plaintiff medical
and  permanent  partial  disability  benefits.     Plaintiff  noted  an




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appeal to the Commission from Deputy Commissioner Donovan’s order.
On  3 December  2007, the Commission issued an Opinion and Award in
which it concluded, among other things: that Plaintiff had received
all of the temporary total disability compensation to which she was
entitled; that Plaintiff reached maximum medical improvement on 19
July  2005 and; that Plaintiff was entitled to medical benefits to
“pay for medical expenses incurred or to be incurred as a result of
the compensable injury.”    Plaintiff noted an appeal to this Court
from the Commission’s order.
On 6 January 2009, this Court filed an unpublished opinion in
Dawes v. Autumn Care of Marshville,  194 N.C. App.  820,  671 S.E.2d
598                                                                    (2009).                                               At   that   time,   we   affirmed   the   Commission’s
determination   that   Plaintiff   had   reached   maximum   medical
improvement with respect to her ankle injury.    On the other hand,
we reversed the Commission’s conclusion that there was no evidence
tending to show that Plaintiff’s current condition was disabling.
After noting that the Commission “‘has the duty and responsibility
to decide all matters in controversy between the parties, and, if
necessary,   the                                                       [F]ull   Commission   must   resolve   matters   in
controversy even if those matters were not addressed by the deputy
commissioner,’” we stated that:
[P]laintiff  argues  that  the  Commission  erred
by  failing  to  address  plaintiff's  argument
that   she   is   entitled   to   further   medical
treatment.     We  agree.                                              [T]he  Full
Commission  failed  to  resolve  the  disputed
issues[.]                                                              Accordingly,  we  are
constrained  to  remand  to  the  Full  Commission
for    resolution    of    the    existence    and
compensability    of    plaintiff’s    possible
injuries to her left knee and leg.




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Id.  (quoting Perkins v. U.S. Airways,  177 N.C. App.  205,  215,  628
S.E.2d 402, 408 (2006), disc. rev. denied, 361 N.C. 356, 644 S.E.2d
231  (2007)).
On  remand,  the  Commission  “reopened  the  record  to  allow  the
parties  to  submit  additional  briefs  .  .  .  which  were  received  on
May 18, 2009.”   On 3 December 2009, the Commission filed an Opinion
and  Award  finding,  in  pertinent  part,  that  Plaintiff  sustained  a
compensable injury on 16 October 2004 and that she reached maximum
medical improvement with respect to her ankle on 19 July 2005.   The
Commission also found that:
12.   At the hearing, Plaintiff testified
that  this  accident  affected  her  left  knee.
She  testified  that  when  she  fell,  she  struck
her  left  knee  on  the  cement,  and  that  since
the  accident,  it  gives  out  and  forces  her  to
catch herself.  .  .                                                          . Plaintiff’s testimony as
to  her  left  knee  that  was  injured  in  this
accident   is   corroborated   by   her   physical
therapy   records   immediately   following   the
accident.                                                                     These   records   reflect   that
Plaintiff  was  complaining  of  left  knee  pain
and  that  she  received  treatment  for  her  left
knee at physical therapy.   While these records
reflect  that  Plaintiff  had  some  pre-existing
left  knee  problems,  her  testimony  that  her
knee never went back to its pre-accident level
is  credible  and  shows  that  any  pre-existing
condition in her left knee was exacerbated by
this  fall.    Plaintiff’s  left  knee  injury  has
never  been  evaluated  for  its  relatedness  to
her compensable accident.
Based on its findings of fact, the Commission concluded that:
1.                                                                            Plaintiff  sustained  an  injury  by
accident  arising  out  of  and  in  the  course  of
her employment on October 16, 2004.   N.C. Gen.
Stat.  §  97-2(6).
2.                                                                            Plaintiff  reached  maximum  medical
improvement  from  her  ankle  injury  from  her
compensable accident on July  19,  2005.  .  .




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3.                                                     Plaintiff was terminated for reasons
any   non-injured   employee   would   have   been
terminated  [for].  .  .
4.                                                     Plaintiff   is   entitled   to   have
defendants  pay  for  medical  expenses  incurred
or   to   be   incurred   as   a   result   of   the
compensable injury.  .  .
5.                                                     The    Court    of    Appeals    mandate
requires “the Full Commission [to resolve] the
existence  and  compensability  of  plaintiff's
possible injuries to her left knee and leg . .
.  .”    The  competent  evidence  of  record  shows
that  she  struck  her  left  knee  on  the  ground
when  her  compensable  accident  occurred  and
that it has remained swollen and painful since
that  time,  not  returning  to  her  baseline
condition  prior  to  her  injury.     An  expert
evaluation would be probative on the issue of
causation   and   should   be   ordered   and,   if
[causation   is]   established   or   found            [the
evaluation   should   include]   the   type   of
treatment  which  may  be  required  to  provide
relief, effect a cure or lessen the period of
disability.  .  .
6.                                                     Determining  whether  plaintiff  has
reached maximum medical improvement  .  .  . can
not be determined until the evaluation of her
left  knee  is  completed  as  maximum  medical
improvement requires evaluation of all medical
conditions caused by the injury by accident. .
. . Therefore, any determination as to whether
Plaintiff  should  receive  benefits  under            [§]
97-30 or  [§]  97-31 of the General Statutes is
reserved for a later time.
As a result, the Commission ordered that:
1.                                                     Defendants  shall  authorize  and  pay
for a second opinion on Plaintiff’s rating to
her  left  foot  with  the  physician  of  her
choosing  to  evaluate,  test,  make  treatment
recommendations and treat.
2.                                                     Plaintiff   and   Defendants   shall
confer  and  recommend  a  physician  to  evaluate
plaintiff’s  left  knee.     If  the  parties  are
unable  to  agree,  each  party  shall  submit  the
name of  [a] qualified physician.    The parties




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shall  complete  this  mandate  within  fourteen
(14) days of the date of this Award.
3.                                                                             Defendants  shall  pay  for  medical
treatment for Plaintiff’s left foot and ankle
as may be required to provide relief, effect a
cure or lessen the period of disability.
Defendants  noted  an  appeal  to  this  Court  from  the  Commission’s
decision.
II. Legal Analysis
“A judgment is either interlocutory or the final determination
of the rights of the parties.”   N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  1A-1, Rule 54(a)
(2009).                                                                        “An interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of
an  action,  which  does  not  dispose  of  the  case,  but  leaves  it  for
further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine
the entire controversy.”    Veazey v. City of Durham,  231 N.C.  357,
362,                                                                           57  S.E.2d                                                   377,   381   (1950).   “An  interlocutory  order  is
generally  not  immediately  appealable.”    Duval  v.  OM  Hospitality,
LLC,  186  N.C.  App.  390,  392,  651  S.E.2d  261,  263  (2007)  (citing
Sharpe v. Worland,  351 N.C.  159,  161,  522 S.E.2d  577,  578  (1999).
However:
[A]  party  is  permitted  to  appeal  from  an
interlocutory  order  when  “the  order  deprives
the  appellant  of  a  substantial  right  which
would be jeopardized absent a review prior to
a  final  determination  on  the  merits.”  .
[I]t  is  the  appellant’s  burden  to  present
appropriate    grounds    for    this    Court’s
acceptance of an interlocutory appeal and our
Court’s    responsibility    to    review    those
grounds.
Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture, 115 N.C. App. 377, 379, 444
S.E.2d  252,  253  (1994)  (quoting  Southern  Uniform  Rentals  v.  Iowa




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Nat’l  Mutual  Ins.  Co.,  90  N.C.  App.  738,  740,  370  S.E.2d  76,  78
(1988), and citing N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  1-277).
This  Court  has  stated  with  respect  to  the  appealability  of
interlocutory Commission orders that:
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  97-86  .  .  .  provides  that
any party  .  .  . may  “appeal from the decision
of                                                                            [the]  Commission  to  the  Court  of  Appeals
for  errors  of  law  under  the  same  terms  and
conditions as govern appeals from the superior
court  to  the  Court  of  Appeals  in  ordinary
civil  actions.”                                                              “Thus,  an  appeal  of
right  arises  only  from  a  final  order  or
decision of the Industrial Commission.”  .  .  .
“A  decision  that  on  its  face  contemplates
further  proceedings  or                                                      .  .  does  not  fully
dispose of the pending stage of the litigation
is  interlocutory.”    Even  where  a  decision  is
interlocutory,  however,  immediate  review  of
the  issue  is  proper  where  the  interlocutory
decision  affects  a  substantial  right.     To
qualify,    the    right    affected    must    be
substantial,  and                                                             “the  deprivation  of  that
substantial right must potentially work injury
if  not  corrected  before  appeal  from  a  final
judgment.”
Cash v. Lincare Holdings, 181 N.C. App. 259,  263, 639 S.E.2d 9,  13
(2007) (quoting Ratchford v. C.C. Mangum, Inc., 150 N.C. App. 197,
199,  564 S.E.2d 245,  247  (2002), and Perry v. N.C. Dep’t of Corr.,
176 N.C. App.  123,  129,  625 S.E.2d  790,  794  (2006)).
In its order, the Commission noted our mandate directing it to
resolve the issues pertaining to Plaintiff’s claim for compensation
relating to the injuries that she allegedly sustained to her left
leg and knee and concluded that an expert medical examination would
be helpful in resolving the issue of whether Plaintiff’s injuries
to  her  left  leg  and  knee  resulted  from  the                            16  October                                      2004
compensable  accident.    The  Commission  also  specifically  reserved




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its decision with respect to the issue of whether Plaintiff’s left
leg  and  knee  had  reached  maximum  medical  improvement  until  after
the completion of the required medical examination.    As a result,
given  that  it  contemplates  the  necessity  for  further  proceedings
after  the  required  medical  examination  has  been  conducted,  the
Commission’s order is clearly interlocutory in nature.
In  their  brief,  Defendants  incorrectly  assert  that  their
appeal has been taken from a final Commission order.   As a result,
Defendants neither acknowledge that they have attempted to appeal
from  an  interlocutory  order  nor  assert  that  a  failure  to  permit
immediate appellate review of the Commission’s order will deprive
them of a substantial right.   Instead, Defendants simply attack the
Commission’s  order  on  the  merits,  arguing  that  it  is  legally
defective  because  the  Commission  failed  to  resolve  the  causation
issue  on  the  basis  of  the  existing  record  and  did  not  conclude,
considering only the existing evidentiary record, that Plaintiff’s
left leg and knee condition did not stem from the  16 October  2004
accident.                                                                    “It is not the duty of this Court to construct arguments
for  or  find  support  for  appellant’s  right  to  appeal  from  an
interlocutory  order;  instead,  the  appellant  has  the  burden  of
showing  this  Court  that  the  order  deprives  the  appellant  of  a
substantial right which would be jeopardized absent a review prior
to a final determination on the merits.”    Jeffreys,  115 N.C> App.
at  380,  444 S.E.2d at  254.    Defendants have failed to demonstrate
that  they  have  a  right  to  take  an  interlocutory  appeal  from  the
Commission’s order.    Furthermore, even though we are not required




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to  examine  this  issue  independently,  our  review  of  the  record
demonstrates that no substantial right of Defendants’ will be lost
by declining to hear Defendants’ appeal at this time.    Berardi v.
Craven  County  Schools,  __  N.C.  App.  __,  __,  688  S.E.2d  115,  117,
disc. review denied,  364 N.C.  128,  695 S.E.2d  755  (2010)  (holding
that  an  attempted  appeal  from  a  Commission  order  entered  in
compliance  with  the  Expedited  Medical  Motion  Procedure  adopted
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.  §§  97-78(f) and (g), predicated on the
theory  that  “the  medical  conditions  of  which  plaintiff  complains
were  not  caused  by  a  compensable  injury,”  did  not  affect  a
substantial  right  and  was  not  immediately  appealable).     Thus,
Defendants have no right to appeal from the Commission’s order at
this time.
III. Conclusion
Therefore,  for  the  reasons  stated  above,  we  conclude  that
Defendants   have   attempted   to   appeal   from   an   unappealable
interlocutory order in this case.   In light of that determination,
we have no jurisdiction over Defendants’ appeal.   Thus, Defendants’
appeal should be, and hereby is, dismissed.
DISMISSED.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge STROUD concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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