Preview:

ESTATE OF VERA HEWETT, et al, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF BRUNSWICK,
Defendant.
NO. COA08-1071
(Filed  1 September  2009)
Immunity  - governmental  - voluntary program to remove junk
Defendant Brunswick County was entitled to governmental
immunity and should have been granted summary judgment in an
action arising from a free program to remove junk items from
citizen’s property on request, with the purpose of protecting
and maintaining property values, eliminating public health or
environmental  nuisances,  and  protecting  public  safety  and
welfare.     Although  plaintiffs  argued  that  the  program  was
proprietary  because  it  was  not  an  undertaking  that  could  be
performed only by the government, prior cases have held that
cleaning up a municipality or collecting trash and junk were
governmental functions.
Appeal  by  defendant  from  order  entered  6  June  2008  by  Judge
William  F.  Fairley  in  Brunswick  County  Superior  Court.    Heard  in
the Court of Appeals  10 March  2009.
J. Eric Altman for plaintiff-appellee.
Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, by James R. Morgan, Jr. and
Robert T. Numbers, II, for defendant-appellant.
GEER, Judge.
Defendant,  the  County  of  Brunswick,  appeals  from  the  trial
court's order denying the County's motion for summary judgment on
the  ground  of  governmental  immunity.     On  appeal,  the  County
contends that plaintiffs' suit is barred because the operation of
the Appearance and Code Enforcement ("ACE") Program — through which
the  County  would  remove  without  charge  certain  items  from  its
citizens'  property                                                          —  was  a  governmental  function.     Because  we
agree, we reverse the trial court's denial of the County's motion




-2-
for  summary  judgment  and  remand  for  entry  of  summary  judgment  in
favor of the County.
Facts
The County operated the ACE Program from 20 August 2001 until
1  July  2007.    Under  that  program,  the  County  removed  junk  items
such  as  dilapidated  mobile  homes,  junked  vehicles,  and  abandoned
structures                                                                     —  from  its  citizens'  property  upon  request,  free  of
charge.     The  purpose  of  the  ACE  program  was  "to  improve  the
appearance  of  Brunswick  County,  protect  and  maintain  property
values, eliminate public health and/or environmental nuisances and
protect public safety and welfare."
The  County  was  asked  to  demolish  and  remove  a  barn  on  the
property  of  Irene  Holden,  located  at                                      1487  Holden  Beach  Road  in
Supply,  North  Carolina.     On                                               15  October                                                        2003,  County  employees
instead  mistakenly  demolished  barns  on  the  properties  of  Vera  H.
Hewett and Vera L. Hewett, located at 2150 Ouida Trail, SW and 1535
Holden Beach Road, SW in Supply, North Carolina.
On  14  June  2006,  plaintiffs  —  the  Estate  of  Vera  H.  Hewett,
Vera  L.  Hewett,  O.  Kenneth  Hewett,  and  Jeris  D.  Hewett  —  filed  a
complaint  against  the  County,  alleging  claims  for  negligence,
unjust  enrichment,  and  conversion.     Plaintiffs  contended  that
"[a]gents of the defendant negligently destroyed the barns located
on                                                                             [their]  property  and  owned  by  the  plaintiffs  without  the
plaintiffs'  consent"  and  that  "[a]gents  of  defendant  negligently
removed  the  contents  of  said  barns  which  included,  but  were  not




-3-
limited to: various antiques, tools, irreplaceable motor parts and
building supplies."   Plaintiffs further alleged that the County was
unjustly enriched by keeping the contents of the demolished barns
without paying for them and that the County "converted to [its] own
use those items of personal property" recovered from the barns.
On                                                                             19  May   2008,  the  County  filed  a  motion  for  summary
judgment, contending that it was "entitled to summary judgment as
a  matter  of  law  because  Plaintiffs  cannot  overcome  Brunswick
County's affirmative defense of governmental immunity."   On 6 June
2008, the trial court entered an order denying the County's motion
for summary judgment.    The County gave notice of appeal on  3 July
2008.
Discussion
On  appeal,  the  County  contends  it  is  entitled  to  summary
judgment because it is protected from plaintiffs' suit by sovereign
immunity.    We  first  note  that  a  trial  court's  denial  of  a  motion
for summary judgment is an interlocutory order that ordinarily is
not immediately appealable.   Anderson v. Town of Andrews, 127 N.C.
App.                                                                           599,      601,                                                 492  S.E.2d   385,   386   (1997).     "Although  a  party
generally  has  no  right  to  immediate  appellate  review  of  an
interlocutory order, we have held that orders denying dispositive
motions  grounded  on  the  defense  of  governmental  immunity  are
immediately reviewable as affecting a substantial right."   Hedrick
v.  Rains,  121  N.C.  App.  466,  468,  466  S.E.2d  281,  283,  aff'd  per
curiam, 344 N.C. 729,  477 S.E.2d 171  (1996).   The County's appeal,
therefore, is properly before this Court.




-4-
"When  the  denial  of  a  summary  judgment  motion  is  properly
before  this  Court,  as  here,  the  standard  of  review  is  de  novo."
Free  Spirit  Aviation,  Inc.  v.  Rutherford  Cty.  Airport  Auth.,  191
N.C. App.  581,  583,  664 S.E.2d  8,  10  (2008).    Summary judgment is
appropriate  only  when  "the  pleadings,  depositions,  answers  to
interrogatories,   and   admissions   on   file,   together   with   the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material  fact  and  that  any  party  is  entitled  to  a  judgment  as  a
matter of law."   N.C.R. Civ. P.  56(c).   Summary judgment should be
granted  "'if  the  non-moving  party  is  unable  to  overcome  an
affirmative  defense  offered  by  the  moving  party.'"    Free  Spirit
Aviation, 191 N.C. App. at 583, 664 S.E.2d at  10  (quoting Griffith
v.  Glen  Wood  Co.,                                                          184  N.C.  App.   206,   210,   646  S.E.2d   550,   554
(2007)).
"'Under  the  doctrine  of  governmental  immunity,  a  county  is
immune  from  suit  for  the  negligence  of  its  employees  in  the
exercise  of  governmental  functions  absent  waiver  of  immunity.'"
Evans  v.  Hous.  Auth.  of  City  of  Raleigh,                               359  N.C.         50,    53,    602
S.E.2d  668,  670  (2004)  (quoting Meyer v. Walls,  347 N.C.  97,  104,
489 S.E.2d  880,  884  (1997)).    The doctrine, however, "covers only
the  acts  of  a  municipality  or  a  municipal  corporation  committed
pursuant to its governmental functions."    Id.
The  parties  in  this  case  dispute  whether  the  ACE  program
constituted a governmental function.  1 In Evans, the Supreme Court
1
The County also argued in its brief that its participation in
a  county  risk  pool  did  not  waive  its  governmental  immunity  with
respect to claims for property damage because those claims are not




-5-
described  the  difference  between  governmental  and  proprietary
functions as follows:
"Any  activity  of  the  municipality  which
is  discretionary,  political,  legislative  or
public in nature and performed for the public
good  in  behalf  of  the  State,  rather  than  for
itself, comes within the class of governmental
functions.     When,  however,  the  activity  is
commercial   or   chiefly   for   the   private
advantage  of  the  compact  community,  it  is
private or proprietary."
Id. at 54, 602 S.E.2d at 671 (quoting Millar v. Town of Wilson, 222
N.C.  340,  341,  23 S.E.2d  42,  44  (1942)).
The Court acknowledged that it had "provided various tests for
determining into which category a particular activity falls," but
stressed  that  it  had  also  "consistently  recognized  one  guiding
principle":
"[G]enerally   speaking,   the   distinction   is
this:  If  the  undertaking  of  the  municipality
is  one  in  which  only  a  governmental  agency
could  engage,  it  is  governmental  in  nature.
It  is  proprietary  and  'private'  when  any
corporation,    individual,    or    group    of
individuals could do the same thing."
Id.  (quoting  Britt  v.  City  of  Wilmington,  236  N.C.  446,  451,  73
S.E.2d  289,  293  (1952)).
Thus, "[t]he liability of cities and towns for the negligence
of their officers or agents, depends upon the nature of the power
that the corporation is exercising, when the damage complained of
is sustained."   Moffitt v. City of Asheville, 103 N.C. 237, 254,  9
covered by the policy.   As plaintiffs have chosen not to challenge
this  argument,  we  do  not  address  it.    Nothing  in  this  opinion
should be construed as expressing any view as to whether the county
risk  pool  policy  did  or  did  not  waive  immunity  as  to  the  claims
asserted by plaintiffs in the complaint.




-6-
S.E.                                                                       695,   697           (1889).   As  the  Moffitt  Court  explained  over  a
century ago:
When   such   municipal   corporations   are
acting (within the purview of their authority)
in their ministerial or corporate character in
the  management  of  property  for  their  own
benefit, or in the exercise of powers, assumed
voluntarily for their own advantage, they are
impliedly  liable  for  damage  caused  by  the
negligence  of  officers  or  agents,  subject  to
their control, although they may be engaged in
some  work  that  will  enure  to  the  general
benefit of the municipality.  .  .
On  the  other  hand,  where  a  city  or  town
in  exercising  the  judicial,  discretionary  or
legislative   authority,   conferred   by   its
charter,  or  is  discharging  a  duty,  imposed
solely  for  the  benefit  of  the  public,  it
incurs no liability for the negligence of its
officers, though acting under color of office,
unless some statute (expressly or by necessary
implication)   subjects   the   corporation   to
pecuniary responsibility for such negligence.
Id. at  254-55,  9 S.E. at  697.
In line with the principle set out in Britt and reaffirmed in
Evans, plaintiffs argue that the ACE program is proprietary because
it  is  not  an  undertaking  that  could  only  be  performed  by  the
government.     Plaintiffs  point  out  that  the  ACE  program  is  a
demolition and junk removal service that could be performed by any
corporation, individual, or group of individuals.
In  response,  the  County  relies  on  McIver  v.  Smith,  134  N.C.
App.                                                                       583,   518  S.E.2d   522       (1999),  disc.  review  improvidently
allowed,  351 N.C.  344,  525 S.E.2d  173  (2000), in which this Court
interpreted  the  language  in  Britt.     In  McIver,  the  plaintiffs
argued  that  under  Britt,  a  county  "ambulance  service  is  a
proprietary  activity  because  it  is  providing  a  service  that  any




-7-
private individual or corporation could provide."   McIver, 134 N.C.
App. at 587, 518 S.E.2d at 526.   This Court rejected that argument,
explaining  that  "[a]ctivities  which  can  be  performed  only  by  a
government  agency  are  shielded  from  liability,  while  activities
that  can  be  performed  by  either  private  persons  or  government
agencies may be shielded, depending on the nature of the activity."
Id.
The Court reasoned that "[t]his interpretation of Britt is the
only  way  to  reconcile  its  holding  with  other  cases."    Id.    The
Court noted that "children may be educated by either public schools
or   private   schools,   but   public   schools   are   still   granted
governmental  immunity."    Id.    Similarly,  the  Court  pointed  out,
"[p]rivate  citizens  may  haul  off  and  dispose  of  leaves  just  like
government  employees,  but  government  leaf  haulers  are  afforded
governmental  immunity."    Id.    The  Court,  therefore,  held  that  a
"county-operated  ambulance  service  is  a  governmental  activity
shielded from liability by governmental immunity."   Id. at 588, 518
S.E.2d at  526.
The County argues, based on McIver, that the fact that the ACE
program  could  be  run  by  a  private  entity  or  individual  does  not
mean  it  is  automatically  a  proprietary  function.     The  County
contends  that  because  the  ACE  program  is  intended  to  serve  the
public  health  and  welfare,  a  traditionally  governmental  purpose,
the  ACE  program  is  a  governmental  function.    See  id.  at  586,  518
S.E.2d at 525 ("Since the responsibility for preserving the health
and welfare of citizens is a traditional function of government, it




-8-
follows  that  the  county  may  operate  government  functions  that
ensure  the  health  and  welfare  of  its  citizens.     An  ambulance
service does just this.   It is also noteworthy that the legislature
granted counties the power to operate ambulance services in all or
part of their respective jurisdictions.   The focus is therefore on
the nature of the service itself, not the provider of the service."
(internal citations omitted)).
In  Evans,  359  N.C.  at  54,  602  S.E.2d  at  671,  however,  while
noting  "[t]he  difficulties  of  applying  [the  Britt]  principle[,]"
the  Supreme  Court  did  not  adopt  the  approach  advocated  by  the
County in this case and used by this Court in McIver and did not in
any  way  modify  the  categorical  language  of  the  rule  expressed  in
Britt.     Nevertheless,  the  Supreme  Court's  application  of  Evans
suggests that the rule cannot be as absolute as Britt indicates.
In  Fisher  v.  Hous.  Auth.  of  City  of  Kinston,  155  N.C.  App.
189,                                                                         192,          573  S.E.2d   678,   681      (2002),  this  Court  held  that  a
"Housing   Authority's   activities   in   owning,   operating,   and
maintaining  the  low-income  housing  .  .  .  is  [sic]  a  proprietary
function."    The Court reasoned:
Managing   low-income   housing   is   not   an
enterprise in which only governmental entities
can engage.   Any individual or corporation can
—  and,  in  fact,  often  does  —  own  and  operate
low-income housing.    Providing rental housing
does   not   traditionally   fall   within   the
government's purview.
Id.    That decision was reversed by the Supreme Court based solely
on Evans.   Fisher v. Housing Auth. of City of Kinston, 359 N.C. 59,
59,                                                                          602  S.E.2d   359,          360    (2004)   (per  curiam).    Implicit  in  that




-9-
reversal  is  an  acknowledgment  by  the  Supreme  Court  that  the  mere
fact  that  a  function  could  be  performed  by  non-governmental
entities  does  not  necessarily  require  the  conclusion  that  the
function is proprietary.   Because of the difficulty this Court has
experienced  in  reconciling  the  Britt  rule  with  other  precedent,
guidance  from  the  Supreme  Court  is  needed  as  to  the  appropriate
test  for  determining  whether  a  function  is  governmental  or
proprietary.
Nonetheless, when grappling with these issues, both this Court
and the Supreme Court have looked to prior cases involving similar
functions  to  determine  whether  an  activity  is  governmental  or
proprietary.    Historically,  our  courts  have  concluded  that  when
municipalities engage in activities to clean up the municipality or
to  collect  trash,  junk,  or  other  waste,  they  are  engaging  in
governmental  functions.    For  example,  in  Hines  v.  City  of  Rocky
Mount,                                                                       162  N.C.   409,   411,      78  S.E.      510,   511      (1913),  the  Supreme
Court held that a city-organized general cleanup of the city was a
governmental function for which immunity was available.   The Court
reasoned that because the city's Board of Aldermen had the "power
to  make  proper  regulations  for  the  conservation  of  the  public
health," the acts of the city in cleaning up the trash around the
city  "were  chiefly  in  the  exercise  or  attempted  exercise  of  the
powers  there  conferred,  and  should  be  considered  governmental  in
character."   Id.,  78 S.E. at  510-11.   See also Blackwelder v. City
of  Winston-Salem,                                                           332  N.C.   319,   323-24,   420  S.E.2d   432,   435-36
(1992)  (holding  that  city  was  immune  with  respect  to  plaintiff's




-10-
collision  with  city  garbage  truck  because  garbage  collection  is
governmental function); Stephenson v. City of Raleigh, 232 N.C. 42,
46,  59  S.E.2d  195,  198-99  (1950)  (barring  claim  by  plaintiff  who
crashed  scooter  into  back  of  city's  truck  when  employees  were
collecting  and  removing  prunings  from  shrubbery  and  trees  from
citizens' homes because city's pruning collection was governmental
function); Broome v. City of Charlotte, 208 N.C. 729, 731, 182 S.E.
325,                                                                         326-27   (1935)   (finding  city  immune  from  suit  arising  from
plaintiff's  death  after  being  hit  by  trash  truck  because  trash
collection is governmental function); James v. City of Charlotte,
183  N.C.  630,  632-33,  112  S.E.  423,  424  (1922)  (determining  that
city  employee  removing  and  transporting  garbage  from  private
property was engaged in governmental function).
The  ACE  program  was  primarily  a  trash  and  junk  collection
service.   The stated goals of the ACE Program were to "improve the
appearance  of  Brunswick  County,  protect  and  maintain  property
values   and   eliminate   any   potential   public   health   and/or
environmental  nuisances."     In  his  affidavit,  J.  Leslie  Bell,
Director  of  Planning  and  Community  Development  for  the  County,
explained that the ACE Program provided the "free removal services
as  part  of  the  program's  efforts  to  eliminate  public  health
nuisances and protect public safety and welfare."
In light of the nature and stated purposes of the ACE program,
we  do  not  believe  that  it  can  be  meaningfully  distinguished  from
the  foregoing  cases,  and,  therefore,  hold  that  the  County  was
engaged  in  a  governmental  function  when  conducting  the  program.




-11-
The County, consequently, is entitled to governmental immunity in
this  action.    We,  therefore,  reverse  and  remand  for  the  entry  of
summary judgment in the County's favor.
Reversed and remanded.
Judges McGEE and BEASLEY concur.

Download 08-1071-3.pdf

South Carolina Law