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RAMON L. EVERTS and wife, REGINE M. EVERTS, Plaintiffs v. JOHN
PARKINSON and wife, VICKI T. PARKINSON; A.T. DOMBROSKI, JR.,
Individually; A.T.D. CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC.; RICKS
CONSTRUCTION, INC.; and PRIME SOUTH CONSTRUCTION, INC. Defendants
No. COA00-1148
(Filed  4 December  2001)
1.                                                                  Statutes of Limitations and Repose-synthetic stucco
                                                                    claims-time when damage might have been discovered- summary
judgment
Summary judgment should not have been granted for plaintiff
in a synthetic stucco action on the issue of whether plaintiffs’
claims against the original owners of the house were barred by
the statute of limitations where the evidence produced during
discovery indicated at least three times at which the defects or
damage might have reasonably become apparent to plaintiffs, the
last of which occurred within three years prior to the filing of
the complaint.    N.C.G.S.  §§  1-50(a)(5)(f),  1-52.
2.                                                                  Fraud-synthetic stucco-action against original owner-failure
to disclose material fact-reasonable reliance
The trial court erred in a synthetic stucco action by
granting summary judgment for defendant Mr. Parkinson on a fraud
claim, but correctly granted summary judgment for defendant Mrs.
Parkinson, where a jury could infer from the evidence that the
alleged material defects were known to Mr. Parkinson; Mr.
Parkinson knew that the defects were not discoverable in the
exercise of plaintiffs’ diligent attention or observation; Mr.
Parkinson therefore had a duty to disclose the existence of the
defects to plaintiffs, which he failed to do; Mr. Parkinson’s
breach of the duty to disclose was reasonably calculated to
deceive and undertaken with the intent to deceive; plaintiffs
were in fact deceived; and this deception resulted in damage to
plaintiffs.    Reasonable reliance is a redundant and unnecessary
element in the context of a claim of fraud based on a failure to
disclose a material fact.
3.                                                                  Fraud-negligent misrepresentation-synthetic
stucco-statements in contract to sell-condition precedent-no
liability
Summary judgment for defendants was affirmed as to a
negligent misrepresentation claim in a synthetic stucco action
against the original owners of the house where the statements
relied upon by plaintiffs  (who purchased the house from
defendants were in the contract to sell and were within the
context of a condition precedent.    As such, they may not be the
basis for liability.
4.                                                                  Contracts-sale of synthetic stucco house-condition of




purchase-condition precedent-no liability
The trial court in a synthetic stucco action correctly
granted summary judgment for defendants Parkinson  (the original
purchasers who in turn sold to plaintiffs) as to a breach of
contract claim where the language relied upon by plaintiffs was
in a addendum to the contract and was a condition of purchase.
The failure of a plaintiff to comply with conditions precedent in
a contract may allow the buyer to terminate the contract prior to
closing, but may not subject the seller to liability.
5.                                                                   Warranties-sale of synthetic stucco house-express warranty
claim
The trial court in a synthetic stucco action did not err by
granting summary judgment for defendants Parkinson on a breach of
express warranty claim.    There is no authority indicating that a
breach of express warranty claim may be brought upon alleged
warranties in a contract for the sale of a dwelling or real
property as opposed to goods.    The proper cause of action would
be a claim for breach of contract.
6.                                                                   Warranties-implied warranty of habitability-action by
subsequent purchaser against original owner
Summary judgment was properly granted for defendants
Parkinson in a synthetic stucco action on a claim for breach of
an implied warranty of habitability where the Parkinsons were the
original purchasers of the house who then sold to defendants.
This cause of action may only be maintained against a defendant
who is both the builder and the vendor of a building, consistent
with the rationale that builder-vendors have superior knowledge
of the construction process and materials, the ability to avoid
defects, and the ability to bear risk.
7.                                                                   Negligence-synthetic stucco-inspection by builder three
years after first sale-liability to subsequent purchaser
Summary judgment was properly granted for the builder of a
house in a synthetic stucco action by a subsequent purchaser
where plaintiffs contended that ATD was negligent in its
inspection of a window for the original purchaser.    The Court of
Appeals declined hold that the builder of a house owes a duty to
a subsequent owner where the builder was called upon by the
original owner to inspect the house for damage more than three
years after the house was completed and    performed    no repair
work at that time.
8.                                                                   Negligence-synthetic stucco-liability of contractor doing
                                                                     repairs to subsequent purchaser
The trial court did not err in a synthetic stucco action by
granting summary judgment for a company which performed
improvement work on the house for the original owners.    There is




no authority holding that a party which undertakes to repair a
house under contract with the original owner owes a duty of care
to a subsequent purchaser of the house.    Moreover, even if there
was a duty of care, there was no forecast of evidence of
negligence.
Appeal by plaintiffs from orders entered  18 May  2000 by Judge
Herbert  O.  Phillips,  III  in  New  Hanover  County  Superior  Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals  22 August  2001.
Lewis & Roberts, P.L.L.C., by Daniel K. Bryson  and F. Murphy
Averitt, III, for plaintiff-appellants.
Marshall,  Williams  &  Gorham,  L.L.P.,  by  John  L.  Coble,  for
defendant-appellees John Parkinson and Vicki T. Parkinson.
Dean  &  Gibson,  L.L.P.,  by  Christopher  J.  Culp;  Frost  Brown
Todd,  LLC,  by  Kathy  Kendrick  and  Carl  E.  Grayson,  for
defendant-appellees    A.T.    Dombroski,    Jr.    and    A.T.D.
Construction Company, Inc.
Bennett  &  Guthrie,  P.L.L.C.,  by  Rodney  A.  Guthrie,  for
defendant-appellee Prime South Construction, Inc.
HUNTER, Judge.
Ramon L. Everts and Regine M. Everts (“plaintiffs”) appeal from
three orders entered 18 May 2000 granting summary judgment in favor
of  five  defendants.    We  affirm  in  part,  and  reverse  in  part  and
remand for further proceedings.
This  case  involves  a  house  clad  with  Exterior  Insulation  and
Finish System (“EIFS”), also known as synthetic stucco.   By contract
dated                                                                         26  June   1993,  plaintiffs  purchased  the  house,  located  in
Wilmington, North Carolina, from defendants John Parkinson and Vicki
T.  Parkinson  (“the  Parkinsons”),  the  original  owners.    On  9  June
1997, plaintiffs filed this action against the Parkinsons, as well
as the builders of the house, A.T.D. Construction Company and its
president A.T. Dombroski, Jr.  (together  “ATD”), and a company that




performed improvement work on the house, Prime South Construction,
Inc.  (“PSC”).    The  complaint  alleges  that  plaintiffs  have  had  to
undertake extensive and costly repairs to the house as a result of
water intrusion and wood rot problems.   The complaint sets forth the
following  causes  of  action:                                               (1)  as  to  the  Parkinsons,  fraud,
negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach of express
warranty, and breach of implied warranty; (2) as to ATD, willful and
wanton  negligence;  and  (3)  as  to  PSC,  negligence.    The  complaint
also  sets  forth  a  claim  against  an  additional  defendant              (Ricks
Construction, Inc.) which is not at issue in this appeal.   The trial
court granted summary judgment in favor of the Parkinsons, ATD, and
PSC on all claims against them.    Plaintiffs appeal.
Rule 56 of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that   summary   judgment   will   be   granted                              “if   the   pleadings,
depositions,  answers  to  interrogatories,  and  admissions  on  file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.”    N.C.R. Civ. P.  56(c).    A defendant
may show that it is entitled to summary judgment by:
(1)  proving  that  an  essential  element  of  the
opposing  party’s  claim  is  nonexistent,  or  by
showing  through  discovery  that  the  opposing
party (2) cannot produce evidence to support an
essential  element  of  his  or  her  claim,  or  (3)
cannot  surmount  an  affirmative  defense  which
would bar the claim.
Bernick v. Jurden, 306 N.C. 435, 440-41, 293 S.E.2d 405, 409 (1982)
(citation omitted).    Furthermore,  “[t]he record is to be viewed in
the  light most favorable to the non-movant, giving it the benefit
of all inferences reasonably arising therefrom.”   Ausley v. Bishop,




133 N.C. App. 210, 214, 515 S.E.2d 72, 75 (1999).   Having carefully
reviewed  the  record,  we  reverse  in  part  the  trial  court’s  order
granting summary judgment in favor of the Parkinsons and we remand
for further proceedings on plaintiffs’ claim of fraud as against Mr.
Parkinson only.   As to the claim of fraud against Mrs. Parkinson and
all  remaining  claims  against the  Parkinsons, and  as  to the claims
against ATD  and  PSC, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment.
I.    The Parkinsons
[1]  We  first  address  plaintiffs’  five  claims  against  the
Parkinsons:   fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract,
breach of express warranty, and breach of implied warranty.
A.    Statute of Limitations
The Parkinsons contend, at the outset, that they are entitled
to summary judgment on all five claims because each is barred by the
three-year statute of limitations set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-
52  (1999).    We disagree.    It is well-established that:
Ordinarily,  the  question  of  whether  a
cause  of  action  is  barred  by  the  statute  of
limitations  is  a  mixed  question  of  law  and
fact.                                                                       However,  when  the  bar  is  properly
pleaded  and  the  facts  are  admitted  or  are  not
in conflict, the question of whether the action
is  barred  becomes  one  of  law,  and  summary
judgment is appropriate.
Pembee Mfg. Corp. v. Cape Fear Constr. Co.,  313 N.C.  488,  491,  329
S.E.2d  350,  353  (1985)  (citations omitted).    When the evidence is
sufficient to support an inference that the limitations period has
not expired, the issue should be submitted to the jury.    Little v.
Rose,  285 N.C.  724,  727,  208 S.E.2d  666,  668  (1974).
We  believe  that  the  Parkinsons  were  not  entitled  to  summary




judgment  on  the  basis  of  the  statute  of  limitations  because  the
facts  here  are  in  conflict  as  to  when  the  statute  of  limitations
period  started  to  run.    The  parties  do  not  dispute  that  all  of
plaintiffs’ claims against the Parkinsons are subject to the three-
year  statute  of  limitations  set  forth  in  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  1-52.
There is also no dispute that plaintiffs’ causes of action did not
accrue  until  the  defect  or  damage  to  plaintiffs’  property  became
apparent or ought reasonably to have become apparent to them.    See
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                             §           1-50(a)(5)(f)   (1999)        (“[f]or  purposes  of  the
three-year  limitation  prescribed  by  G.S.  1-52,  a  cause  of  action
based upon or arising out of the defective or unsafe  condition of
an improvement to real property shall not accrue until the injury,
loss, defect or damage becomes apparent or ought reasonably to have
become  apparent  to  the  claimant”);  Forsyth  Memorial  Hospital  v.
Armstrong  World  Industries,                                                 336  N.C.   438,            444  S.E.2d   423                          (1994)
(holding that N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  1-50  applies to any claim arising
out of an improvement to real property).   Thus, whether these claims
are  barred  by  the  statute  of  limitations  requires  a  determination
of  when  the  alleged  defect  or  damage  became  apparent,  or  ought
reasonably to have become apparent to plaintiffs.
The evidence produced during discovery indicates at least three
possible  points  in  time  at  which  it  might  be  determined  that  the
alleged damage or defects became apparent or reasonably should have
become apparent to plaintiffs.   First, Mrs. Everts testified during
her deposition that she discovered water intrusion in the garage and
living room within three months after the purchase of the house from
the  Parkinsons  in  August  of  1993.    Second,  Mrs.  Everts  testified




that in approximately March of 1994, plaintiffs hired a painter who
inspected the house and notified Mrs. Everts that he had worked on
the exterior of the house about two years before when the Parkinsons
were the owners, at which time he had painted  the exterior of the
house,  cleaned  the  roof,  and  sealed  the  roof  with  a                   “special
sealer.”    He  told  Mrs.  Everts  that  he  had  found  rot  on  certain
windows and that he had pointed this out to Mr. Parkinson at that
time.    He  also  told  her  that  he  had  noticed  Mr.  Parkinson  doing
“repair work on the windows quite often,” and that, as a result, “he
was under the impression that quite a number of windows had water
problems.”    The  Parkinsons  point  to  these  two  points  in  time  and
contend  that  by  at  least  March  of                                        1994  the  alleged  damage  was
apparent or reasonably should have been apparent to plaintiffs, and
that  their  claim  filed  on  9  June  1997  is  therefore  barred  by  the
three-year statute of limitations.
Plaintiffs, on the other hand, point to a third point in time,
February of 1996, and contend that they did not discover that their
home  suffered  significant  water  intrusion  damage  and  construction
defects  until this time.    Mr. Everts testified that he attended  a
meeting  about  synthetic  stucco  in  late  1995  or  early  1996,  after
which he followed the suggestion of the New Hanover County Building
Commission and hired an engineer who conducted a moisture test on
the home and provided a detailed report as to its condition.   Thus,
plaintiffs contend, they did not realize the nature of the defects
and the extent of the damage until February of 1996, and, therefore,
their complaint filed on  9 June  1997 is not barred.
We believe that the evidence produced during discovery allows




at least an inference that the alleged damage was not apparent, and
should  not  reasonably  have  been  apparent,  to  plaintiffs  prior  to
June of 1994.   Thus, the issue of whether plaintiffs’ claims against
the Parkinsons are barred by the statute of limitations is an issue
for  the  jury,  and  the  Parkinsons  are  not  entitled  to  summary
judgment on this basis.
B.    Causes of Action Against the Parkinsons
The Parkinsons further argue that there are no genuine issues
as  to  any  material  facts  and  that  they  are  entitled  to  summary
judgment  as  a  matter  of  law  on  all  five  causes  of  action.    See
N.C.R. Civ. P.  56(c).    We review each cause of action in turn.
1.    Fraud
[2]   The   essential   elements   of   fraud   are:                          “(1)   False
representation  or  concealment  of  a  material  fact,  (2)  reasonably
calculated to deceive,  (3)  made with intent to deceive,  (4) which
does in fact deceive, (5) resulting in damage to the injured party.”
Ragsdale v. Kennedy, 286 N.C. 130, 138, 209 S.E.2d 494, 500 (1974).
This State has long recognized that  “[w]here a material  defect is
known to the seller, and he knows that the buyer is unaware of the
defect  and  that  it  is  not  discoverable  in  the  exercise  of  the
buyer’s diligent attention or observation, the seller has a duty to
disclose  the  existence  of  the  defect  to  the  buyer.”    Carver  v.
Roberts,                                                                      78  N.C.  App.   511,   512-13,   337  S.E.2d   126,   128   (1985)
(citing Brooks v. Construction Co.,  253 N.C.  214,  217,  116 S.E.2d
454,  457  (1960)).    In  such  cases,  suppressio  veri  (a  failure  to
disclose  the  truth)  is  as  much  fraud  as  suggestio  falsi              (an
affirmative false representation).    Id. at  512,  337 S.E.2d at  128.




Thus,  as  the  sellers  of  the  house,  the  Parkinsons  were  under  an
affirmative  duty  to  disclose  to  plaintiffs,  as  the  buyers  of  the
house, the existence of any known material defects in the home which
were not known to plaintiffs and which were not discoverable by them
in the exercise of their diligent attention or observation.
a.    Intent to Deceive
The  Parkinsons  argue,  first,  that  plaintiffs  have  failed  to
show any genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Parkinsons
concealed any material fact with the intent to deceive.    As to Mr.
Parkinson, we disagree.    After the Parkinsons moved into the house
in  November  of  1988,  they  experienced  numerous  problems  with  the
house.    The first problem involved  “Becker window lights.”    Within
the  first year, Mr. Parkinson discovered that the seal in fifteen
to  twenty  window  lights  did  not  function  properly  and  allowed
moisture to enter the space  between the two panes of glass, which
caused  fogging  in  the  windows.     Mr.  Parkinson                        “viewed  it  as  a
problem” and wrote a letter to the Becker company, complaining that
“the seal failure problem in the Colonial Seal Windows is much worse
than originally believed,” and stating that repairing these windows
would be a “major undertaking.”   In response, a representative from
Becker  came  to  the  house  and  fixed  the  windows  by  replacing  the
glass.    Thereafter, in December of  1990 and at other times between
1988  and                                                                    1992,  additional  window  lights  became  fogged,  but  Mr.
Parkinson did not hire a professional to replace them, and instead
decided  to  replace  them  himself.    In  performing  this  work,  Mr.
Parkinson  did  not  use  butyl  bedding  compound,  as  recommended  by
Becker in the company’s literature; instead, he used a latex acrylic




caulking  compound.    Mr.  Parkinson  conceded  that  he  did  not  know
whether the latex acrylic caulking would work.
The  second  problem  involved  rotting  brick  mold.                         After
approximately  two  years,  Mr.  Parkinson  began  to  discover  rotting
pieces of brick mold around at least seven windows or doors.   At the
time, Mr. Parkinson believed that the brick mold was rotting because
the  house  was  built  such  that  the  brick  mold  extended  beyond  the
stucco and, as a result, was exposed to rain and the elements.   Mr.
Parkinson  did  not  hire  a  professional  to  replace  these  pieces  of
rotting  brick  mold;  instead  he  repaired  the  brick  mold  himself
because  “it  seemed  to  be  a  relatively  simple  type  of  maintenance
problem.”    However, Mr. Parkinson acknowledged that he has no idea
whether the caulk he used was compatible with the synthetic stucco
surface to which it was applied.
The  third  problem  involved  window  six.    In  early                      1992,  the
Parkinsons  hired  a  painter  who                                            “power  washed”  the  house  and
discovered  that  window  six,  which  was  one  of  the  windows  around
which  Mr.  Parkinson  had  previously  replaced  some  brick  mold,  was
rotted in the sash, jamb and part of the sill.   Mr. Parkinson became
concerned and called Mr. Dombroski.   Mr. Dombroski came to the house
and, after examining  window six, told Mr. Parkinson that the jamb
would have to be repaired, the sashes and the brick mold were going
to have to be replaced, and the sill was going to have to be spliced
or  replaced.     Mr.  Dombroski  told  Mr.  Parkinson  that  the  water
intrusion  at  window  six  was  coming  from  the  failure  of  the  caulk
joint located between the brick mold and the stucco.   Mr. Parkinson
testified that at this point, he “began to wonder what would happen




if this occurred at other places.”
Although Mr. Dombroksi examined the window, he did not repair
the window.   Instead, Mr. Parkinson again made the repairs himself.
This  repair  work  involved  removing  two  sashes  and  a  jamb,  sawing
through a portion of the sill to remove it, replacing that portion
of  the  sill  and  two  sashes  and  a  jamb,  and  resealing  the  window.
Mr. Parkinson testified that he performed the work himself because
“[i]t  didn’t  appear  that  complicated.”    However,  John  Bahr,  P.E.,
a   registered   professional   engineer   who   inspected   the   house,
testified  that  window  six  had  undergone  “extensive  repair”  behind
the surface cladding between the inner and outer walls.
After performing this repair work to window six, Mr. Parkinson
remained concerned  and  decided,  based  on  viewing  other houses,  to
attempt to protect the windows from water by having a band of stucco
built around the perimeter of each window extending beyond the brick
mold and covering up the caulk joint.   Mr. Parkinson testified that
he hired Mr. Ricks of Ricks Construction, Inc. (“Ricks”) to perform
this job.    However, Mr. Parkinson conceded that he did not ask Mr.
Ricks whether this idea  -- adding a band of stucco to protect the
windows  from  water  intrusion  --  would,  in  fact,  work.    Moreover,
although the contract  with Ricks provides that the purpose of the
work was “to create a waterproof barrier around the perimeter of all
windows and doors,” a memorandum attached to the contract, written
by Ricks, states:                                                              “To create a waterproof intersection, caulk is
necessary and is not included in our scope of work.”   Mr. Parkinson
proceeded to hire Ricks to perform this work despite the fact that
Ricks told him that the stucco bands would not protect the windows




from water intrusion without caulk.
Ricks  apparently started the job in March of  1993.    However,
Mr. Parkinson fired Ricks and hired PSC in April of 1993 to complete
the job.    The contract with PSC, dated  7 April  1993, provides the
following description of the work to be performed:
[1.]    Straightening  and  smoothing  previously
base  coated  window  bands  to  the  best  of  our
ability with the existing work[.]
[2.]     Additional  base  coat  applied  to  bands
where needed[.]
[3.]    Finish coat applied to window bands[.]
[4.]    Caulking  applied  where  requested  by  the
homeowner[.]
At the time he signed the contract, Mr. Parkinson attached a letter
to  the  contract,  dated                                                     12  April   1993,  which  states  that   “[t]he
purpose  of  the  scope  of  work  described  is  to  create  a  waterproof
perimeter on all doors and windows to which the banding is applied.”
This   letter   provided   a   space   for   the   signature   of   a   PSC
representative to indicate acceptance, but the letter was not signed
by anyone from PSC.
Mr. Best, the president of PSC, testified during his deposition
that Mr.  Parkinson hired PSC only  “to straighten up the bands and
put finish coat on a job that somebody else had started,” and that
the bands were for  “decorative” purposes only.    Mr. Best testified
that  PSC  did  receive  Mr.  Parkinson’s  letter  attached  to  the
contract, and that, in response, PSC  “informed Mr. Parkinson  .  .  .
that the coatings that go over the band aren’t waterproof and  .  .
. that the bands aren’t going to add any waterproofness to his house
and that  .  .  . all we were providing was decorative banding.”    Mr.




Best testified  that  this is why a representative from PSC did not
sign Mr. Parkinson’s letter.    According to Mr. Best, Mr. Parkinson
told  PSC  to  “go  ahead  with  the  work  anyway.”    Also,  although  the
contract  provides  that  PSC  was  to  apply  caulking  “where  requested
by   the   homeowner,”   Mr.   Parkinson   conceded   that   he   did   not
specifically  direct  PSC  to  apply  caulking  anywhere,  and  does  not
know  whether  they  ever  did  apply  caulking  anywhere.     Mr.  Best
testified that PSC did not use or apply any caulk in finishing these
stucco   bands.                                                                Finally,   Mr.   Best   also   testified   that   the
“decorative” stucco bands, once built, could have had the effect of
concealing the original sealant joint, or intersection, between the
EIFS  and the  window.    Engineer John  Bahr similarly  testified  that
the  decorative  band  of  synthetic  stucco  did,  in  fact,  “carefully
conceal[] the joints around each window and door.”
At the time of sale, the Parkinsons did not inform plaintiffs
about the Becker window lights that Mr. Parkinson had replaced, the
brick mold repair work that Mr. Parkinson had performed on a number
of  windows  and  doors,  or  the  extensive  repair  work  to  window  six
that  Mr. Parkinson  had performed.    Nor  did they inform plaintiffs
about the  construction of the stucco bands by Ricks and PSC.    Mr.
Parkinson  testified  that  he  did  not  disclose  this information,  or
provide  plaintiffs  with  any  of  the  documents  that  he  possessed
regarding  any  repair  work  that  had  been  done,  because  he  did  not
feel that he had an obligation to do so.   He also acknowledged that
the stucco bands that were added to all of the windows covered up
the same joint that had failed in window six, and that, in order for
plaintiffs  or  an  inspection  company  hired  by  plaintiffs  to  have




examined  those  joints,  they  would  have  had  to  remove  the  stucco
bands from each window.   He further acknowledged that the house had
not sold the first time it was put on the market, and that it was
put on the market a second time at almost exactly the time that the
stucco bands were completed, and acknowledged that at least one of
the  reasons  they  decided  to  sell  the  house  was  because  of  the
maintenance  and  repair  work  required  as  a  result  of  the  rotting
brick  mold  problem.     Viewing  the  evidence  in  the  light  most
favorable  to  plaintiffs,  we  believe  there  are  genuine  issues  of
material fact as to whether Mr. Parkinson  engaged in conduct with
the intent to deceive.   However, we believe there is no evidence in
the record that would support a finding that Mrs. Parkinson engaged
in  conduct  with  an  intent  to  deceive.     Thus,  we  address  the
remaining fraud issues only as to Mr. Parkinson.
b.    Reasonable Reliance
Mr. Parkinson contends that plaintiffs have failed to establish
reasonable reliance for purposes of their fraud claim.   In general,
the reason for requiring a showing of reasonable reliance in cases
of fraud has been explained in the following way:
The  right  to  rely  on  representations  is
inseparably   connected   with  the  correlative
problem  of  the  duty  of  a  representee  to  use
diligence in respect of representations made to
him.    The policy of the  courts is, on the one
hand, to suppress fraud and, on the other, not
to  encourage  negligence  and  inattention  to
one’s own interest.
Calloway v. Wyatt, 246 N.C. 129, 134-35, 97 S.E.2d 881, 886 (1957).
However, in the specific context of a claim of fraud based upon  a
breach of  a duty to disclose a material fact, we believe that the
reasonable  reliance  requirement  is  unnecessary  because  it  is




virtually  identical  to  what  is  already required  to  establish  that
a duty to disclose exists in the first place.
A  duty  to  disclose  material  facts  arises                                 “[w]here  material
facts are accessible to the vendor only, and  he knows them not to
be  within  the  reach  of  the  diligent  attention,  observation  and
judgment of the purchaser.”   Brooks, 253 N.C. at 217, 116 S.E.2d at
457  (emphasis added).    In other words, in order to establish fraud
based upon a seller’s failure to disclose material defects, a buyer
must, in part, show that the material defects were “not discoverable
in the exercise of the buyer’s diligent attention or observation.”
Carver,  78 N.C. App. at  512-13,  337 S.E.2d at  128.
This  requirement  serves  the  same  purpose  as  the  reasonable
reliance requirement in other fraud claims:    it precludes a claim
of fraud where a plaintiff has been negligent or inattentive to his
own interests.   This is because, if a defect is discoverable in the
exercise  of  a  buyer’s  diligent  attention  or  observation,  and  the
buyer  fails  to  employ  diligent  attention  or  observation  (and  thus
fails  to  discover  the  defect),  a  claim  for  fraud  will  not  stand
because  in  such  a  situation  there  is  no  duty  on  the  part  of  the
seller  to  disclose  the  defect.    See,  e.g.,  Clouse  v.  Gordon,  115
N.C. App.  500,  445 S.E.2d  428  (1994)  (seller did not disclose that
the  property  was  subject  to  flooding,  but  no  duty  to  disclose
because fact that property was located in flood plain was of public
record,  buyers  knew  creek  ran  through  property,  buyers  had  full
opportunity to view topography of property, including fact that mall
and  four-lane  thoroughfare  were  located  upstream  from  creek  on
property,  and  buyers  had  full  opportunity  to  inquire  of  other




residents whether there were flooding problems).
Our  holding                                                                  --  that  reasonable  reliance  is  a  redundant  and
unnecessary element in the context of a claim of fraud based on a
failure to disclose a material fact -- is supported by this Court’s
opinion  in  Rosenthal  v.  Perkins,  42  N.C.  App.  449,  257  S.E.2d  63
(1979).    In  Rosenthal,  this  Court held that the  plaintiffs’ fraud
claim  was  properly  dismissed  because,  among  other  things,  the
plaintiffs  had  failed  to  allege  in  their  pleadings  that  they
reasonably relied upon the defendants’ concealment.   See id. at 452,
257  S.E.2d  at                                                               66.                                                     However,  the  Court  then  stated  that  this
“reasonable  reliance”  requirement  would  have  been  sufficiently
pleaded  if  plaintiffs  had  alleged  that  the  material  fact  was  not
discoverable “by the exercise of reasonable diligence.”   Id. (citing
Calloway,                                                                     246  N.C.                                               129,                                             97  S.E.2d   881).   This  formulation  of
“reasonable reliance” is virtually identical to the requirement that
the seller know that a defect  “is not discoverable in the exercise
of the buyer’s diligent attention or observation,”   Carver, 78 N.C.
App. at 512-13, 337 S.E.2d at 128, and is therefore redundant to the
requirements  for establishing the  existence of a  duty  to  disclose
in the first place.
Our  holding  also  finds  persuasive  support  in  N.C.P.I.,  Civ.
800.00 (“Fraud”), which provides the following explanation regarding
the  element  of  reasonable  reliance  in  a  claim  for  fraud  based  on
concealment of a material fact:
The  plaintiff’s  reliance  would  be  reasonable
if, under the same or similar circumstances, a
reasonable person, in the exercise of ordinary
care  for  his  own  welfare,  would  not  have
discovered the concealment.




Again,  this  definition  of                                                “reasonable  reliance”  is  virtually
identical to the requirement that the material fact be a fact that
is  not                                                                     “discoverable  in  the  exercise  of  the  buyer’s  diligent
attention  or  observation.”    Carver,                                     78  N.C.  App.  at                                             512-13,       337
S.E.2d at  128.    Finally, our holding finds support in two cases in
which reasonable reliance was simply not required as an element in
establishing fraud based on a seller’s breach of a duty to disclose
material defects.   See Brooks, 253 N.C. 214, 116 S.E.2d 454; Carver,
78  N.C.  App.                                                              511,                                                           337  S.E.2d   126   (specifically  addressing  the
elements that must be alleged to withstand  a Rule  12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss a claim of fraudulent concealment of a material defect).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs,
we believe there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether
the alleged defects were discoverable in the exercise of plaintiffs’
diligent  attention  or  observation  and,  therefore,  whether  Mr.
Parkinson had a duty to disclose the defects.    The record contains
an  affidavit  from  John  Tullous,  a  licensed  residential  home
inspector who performed an inspection on the house in July of  1993
at the request of plaintiffs prior to purchase.   He testified that,
at the time of the inspection, he “did not observe any rot or water
infiltration,” or  “any problems with the exterior windows or doors
on the house.”    He further testified that the  “decorative bands,”
which had been installed around the windows before his inspection,
“concealed the joint where the synthetic stucco met the window brick
molding,”  and  that,  as  a  result,  he                                   “was  not  able  to  visually
observe  the  perimeter  joints  of  the  exterior  windows.”    He  also
stated that he “was not informed by the owner or the owner’s realtor




of any moisture intrusion problems involving the windows or window
joint   perimeter   prior   to                                                [his]   inspection,”   and   that   such
information is  “crucial information that  [he] would have needed to
know.”     He  testified  that  if  he  had  been  informed  of  moisture
intrusion  problems,  his  company  would  have  performed  an  intrusive
test  by  inserting a  moisture  probe into the  synthetic stucco,  but
that it was not the normal practice of his company to perform this
kind of test unless they were provided with information about water
intrusion problems.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiffs,
we  believe  that  a  jury  could  infer  from  the  evidence  that:    the
alleged material defects were known to Mr. Parkinson;   Mr. Parkinson
knew  that the defects, of which plaintiffs were unaware, were not
discoverable  in  the  exercise  of  plaintiffs’  diligent  attention  or
observation;  Mr.  Parkinson,  therefore,  had  a  duty  to  disclose  the
existence of the defects to plaintiffs, which he failed to do; Mr.
Parkinson’s breach of the duty to disclose was reasonably calculated
to  deceive  and  undertaken  with  the  intent  to  deceive;  plaintiffs
were  in  fact  deceived;  and  this  deception  resulted  in  damage  to
plaintiffs.    Therefore, as to Mr. Parkinson, we reverse the trial
court’s  grant  of  summary  judgment  on  the  claim  of  fraud,  and  we
remand so that this claim may be heard and determined by the trier
of fact.    As to Mrs. Parkinson, we affirm the trial court’s grant
of summary judgment.
2.    Negligent Misrepresentation
[3] “The tort of negligent misrepresentation occurs when in the
course of a business or other transaction in which an individual has




a pecuniary interest, he or she supplies false information for the
guidance  of  others  in  a  business  transaction,  without  exercising
reasonable  care  in  obtaining  or  communicating  the  information.”
Fulton v. Vickery, 73 N.C. App. 382, 388, 326 S.E.2d 354, 358, disc.
review  denied,                                                            313  N.C.                       599,   332  S.E.2d   178   (1985).   Here,
plaintiffs argue that the Parkinsons supplied false information to
them  by  representing  in  the  contract                                  (1)  that  the  structural
components of the home  “shall be performing the function for which
intended and shall not be in need of immediate repair,” and (2) that
“there  shall  be  no  unusual  drainage  conditions  or  evidence  of
excessive moisture adversely affecting the structure.”
These  statements  in  the  contract  appear  in  Paragraph  Eight,
which states:
INSPECTIONS:    Unless  otherwise  stated  herein:
(i)   the   electrical,   plumbing,   heating   and
cooling  systems  and  built-in  appliances,  if
any, shall be in good working order at closing;
(ii) the roof, gutters, structural components,
foundation,  fireplace(s)  and  chimney(s)  shall
be  performing  the  function  for  which  intended
and  shall  not  be  in  need  of  immediate  repair;
(iii)   there   shall   be   no   unusual   drainage
conditions  or  evidence  of  excessive  moisture
adversely affecting the structure(s); and  (iv)
the  well/water  and  septic/sewer  systems,  if
any,   shall   be   adequate,   not   in   need   of
immediate  repair  and  performing  the  function
for  which  intended.     Buyer  shall  have  the
option to have the above listed systems, items
and  conditions  inspected                                                 ,  but  such
inspections  must  be  completed  in  sufficient
time before closing to permit any repairs to be
completed  by  closing.     If  any  repairs  are
necessary, Seller shall have the option of  (a)
completing   them,                                                         (b)   providing   for   their
completion,  or  (c)  refusing  to  complete  them.
If Seller elects not to complete or provide for
the completion of the repairs, then Buyer shall
have  the  option  of  (d)  accepting  the  Property
in  its  present  condition,  or                                           (e)  terminating
this contract, in which case the earnest money




shall  be  refunded.    Closing  shall  constitute
acceptance  of  each  of  the  systems,  items  and
conditions listed in  (i),  (ii),  (iii) and  (iv)
above  in  its  then  existing  condition  unless
provision is otherwise made in writing.
Paragraph  Eight  essentially  provides  that  the  buyer,  after
signing the contract but prior to closing, is entitled to have the
structural  components  of  the house  inspected,  and  that,  following
any  such  inspection,  if  repairs  are  necessary  and  if  the  seller
refuses to complete  such repairs, the buyer may either accept the
property  or  terminate  the  contract.    Thus,  Paragraph  Eight  sets
forth  a  series  of  steps  which,  if  followed  by  the  buyer  but  not
complied  with  by  the  seller,  allow  the  buyer  to  terminate  the
contract.    In other words, Paragraph Eight, taken as a whole, is a
condition precedent.
“‘A condition precedent is an event which must occur before a
contractual   right   arises,   such   as   the   right   to   immediate
performance.’”    In re Foreclosure of C and M Investments,  346 N.C.
127,                                                                          132,        484  S.E.2d   546,   549         (1997)   (citation  omitted).   “In
negotiating  a  contract  the  parties  may  impose  any  condition
precedent, a performance of which condition is essential before the
parties  become  bound  by  the  agreement.”    Federal  Reserve  Bank  v.
Manufacturing  Co.,                                                           213  N.C.   489,          493,   196  S.E.   848,     850                    (1938).
“‘“Breach  or  non-occurrence  of  a  condition  prevents  the  promisee
from acquiring a right, or deprives him of one, but subjects him to
no liability.”’”    C and M Investments,  346 N.C. at  132,  484 S.E.2d
at  549  (citations omitted).
The    statements    which    plaintiffs    contend    constitute
representations by the Parkinsons are not representations upon which




liability may be based; instead, they are statements made within the
context of a condition precedent and, as such, may not be the basis
for  liability.    Because  we  hold  that  these  statements,  taken  in
context,  do  not  constitute  representations  by  the  Parkinsons  upon
which liability may be based, and because the record  discloses no
other representations by the Parkinsons, plaintiffs have failed to
establish  the  elements  of  negligent  misrepresentation  as  a  matter
of law.    Summary judgment as to this claim is therefore affirmed.
3.    Breach of Contract
[4]   The   contract   here   included   an   Addendum,   signed   by
plaintiffs and the Parkinsons, which provided in part:
1.                                                                            In  addition  to  the  Standard  Inspections
listed   in   Paragraph                                                       #8   in   the   Standard
Provisions,  it  is  also  a  condition  of  the
purchase that the following be performed:
D.    Seller to provide copies of builder’s
construction  records  pertaining  to
materials  and  type  of  construction
methods  used  to  prevent  excessive
moisture  build-up  and  damage  due  to
any wood destroying insect.
Plaintiffs  contend  that  the  Parkinsons  failed  to  provide  to
plaintiffs  certain  documents  that  were  in  their  possession,  which
documents should have been provided pursuant to Paragraph 1D of the
Addendum,  and  that  the  Parkinsons  thereby  breached  the  contract.
However, as expressly set forth at the outset of Paragraph 1 of the
Addendum,  the  items  listed  in  Paragraph  1  were  conditions  of  the
purchase.    As stated above, the failure of a seller to comply with
conditions precedent in a contract may allow the buyer to terminate
the  contract  prior  to  closing,  but  may  not  subject  the  seller  to




liability.     Id.     Thus,  the  Parkinsons  may  not  be  subjected  to
liability for breaching  the contract based on a failure to comply
with  Paragraph  1D,  since  Paragraph  1D  was  a  condition  precedent.
We therefore affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor  of  the  Parkinsons  as  to  plaintiffs’  claim  for  breach  of
contract.
4.    Breach of Express and Implied Warranties
[5] Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that the Parkinsons provided
an  express  warranty  to  plaintiffs  within  the  contract  that,  among
other things, the roof, gutters, and other structural components of
the  home  were  in  sound  condition.     Regardless  of  whether  this
allegation  may  be  true,  we  do  not  believe  plaintiffs  here  may
maintain  an  action  for  breach  of  express  warranty  against  the
Parkinsons based on this sale of real property.    Breach of express
warranty claims are generally governed by the North Carolina Uniform
Commercial  Code                                                                                                                                      (“UCC”),  codified  in  Chapter                       25  of  our  General
                                                                             Statutes.    See  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                        §§   25-1-101  to   25-11-108              (1999);
Charles E. Daye and Mark W. Morris, North Carolina Law  of Torts  §
26.32, at  459  (1991).    Article  2 of the UCC  (“Sales”) applies only
to contracts for the purchase or sale of  “goods,” and it is well-
established  that  “[r]eal  estate  does  not  fall  under  the  U.C.C.’s
definition of  ‘goods.’”    Cudahy Foods Company v. Holloway,  55 N.C.
App.  626,  628,  286 S.E.2d  606,  607  (1982)  (citing N.C. Gen. Stat.
§                                                                            25-2-105).    Plaintiffs  have  failed  to  cite,  and  we  have  been
unable  to find,  any authority  indicating that  a breach  of  express
warranty  claim  may  be  brought  based  upon  alleged  warranties  in  a
contract for the sale of a dwelling or real property, as opposed to




goods.     See  John  N.  Hutson,  Jr.  and  Scott  A.  Miskimon,  North
Carolina Contract Law § 15-2, at 698 (2001) (“[a]n express warranty
is a promise made by a seller to a buyer which relates to the title,
condition or quality of the goods being sold.”                                (Emphasis added)).
Indeed, at least one case has implied precisely the opposite.    See
Stanford v. Owens, 46 N.C. App. 388, 392-93, 265 S.E.2d 617, 620-21,
disc. review denied, 301 N.C. 95, ___ S.E.2d ___ (1980).   It appears
that a claim for breach of contract, rather than breach of express
warranty, is the proper cause of action available to plaintiffs in
such  cases.    We  conclude  that  the  trial  court  properly  granted
summary  judgment  in  favor  of  the  Parkinsons  on plaintiffs’  breach
of express warranty claim.
[6] The complaint also alleges that the Parkinsons breached an
implied warranty of habitability.
The   doctrine   of   implied   warranty   of
habitability  requires  that  a  dwelling  and  all
of  its  fixtures  be                                                         “sufficiently  free  from
major structural defects, and . . . constructed
in  a  workmanlike  manner,  so  as  to  meet  the
standard of workmanlike quality then prevailing
at  the  time  and  place  of  construction.”    The
test   for   breach   of   implied   warranty   of
habitability is  “whether there is a failure to
meet  the  prevailing  standard  of  workmanlike
quality”  in  the  construction  of  the  house  .  .
Allen  v.  Roberts  Constr.  Co.,  138  N.C.  App.  557,  571,  532  S.E.2d
534, 543 (citation omitted), disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 261, 546
S.E.2d  90  (2000).    A  review  of  our  case  law  indicates  that  this
cause of action may only be maintained against a defendant  who is
both the builder and the vendor of a dwelling.    See, e.g., Griffin
v.  Wheeler-Leonard  &  Co.,                                                  290  N.C.                   185,   225  S.E.2d   557   (1976);
Medlin  v.  Fyco,  Inc.,  139  N.C.  App.  534,  534  S.E.2d  622  (2000),




disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 377, 547 S.E.2d 12 (2001); Lumsden v.
Lawing, 107 N.C. App. 493, 421 S.E.2d 594 (1992); Lapierre v. Samco
Development Corp., 103 N.C. App. 551, 406 S.E.2d 646 (1991); George
v. Veach, 67 N.C. App. 674, 313 S.E.2d 920 (1984); Lyon v. Ward, 28
N.C.  App.                                                                   446,                                                   221  S.E.2d                                            727      (1976).                               The  Parkinsons  are  not
“builder-vendors,” but are merely ordinary vendors or casual sellers
of a single dwelling.    Thus, plaintiffs essentially ask this Court
to   dramatically   expand   the   implied   warranty   of   habitability
doctrine, and this we decline to do.   We note that this position is
consistent  with  the  approach  taken  in  other  jurisdictions.    See
Frona M. Powell and Jane P. Mallor, The Case for an Implied Warranty
of Quality in Sales of Commercial Real Estate, 68 Wash. U. L.Q. 305,
337  n.71                                                                    (1990)                                                 (“Courts  have  steadfastly  refused  to  apply  the
implied warranty in sales by ‘ordinary vendors’ or ‘casual sellers.’
This    is    consistent    with    the    supporting    rationale    that
builder-vendors have superior knowledge of the construction process
and  materials,  ability  to  avoid  defects,  and  ability  to  bear
risk.”);  William  K.  Jones,  Economic  Losses  Caused  by  Construction
Deficiencies:    The  Competing  Regimes  of  Contract  and  Tort,  59  U.
Cin.  L.  Rev.                                                               1051,                                                  1061                                                   (1991)   (“The  warranty  is  applicable  to
sellers engaged in the business of constructing houses for sale.  .
. .   Warranties are not implied in the sale of ‘used’ residences by
their owners.”                                                               (Footnotes omitted)).    Therefore, we conclude that
plaintiffs  may  not  maintain  an  action  against  the  Parkinsons  for
breach of an implied warranty of habitability, and summary judgment
was properly granted on this claim as well.
II.    ATD




[7]  We  next  review  plaintiffs’  claim  of  willful  and  wanton
negligence against ATD.   Plaintiffs’ complaint alleges that ATD was
negligent  in  two  separate  respects.    First,  the  complaint  alleges
that ATD was “willfully and wantonly negligent in [its] construction
of the house” in November of  1988.    Second, the complaint alleges
that  ATD  was  negligent  in  its  inspection  of  the  house  in  May  of
1992.    ATD  filed  a  motion  for  summary  judgment,  contending  that
there were no genuine issues of material fact, and that plaintiffs’
claim  was  barred  by  the  applicable  statutes  of  limitations  and
repose.    This motion was granted.
We  need  not  reach  the  question  of  whether  plaintiffs’  claim
against ATD is barred by the statute of repose because we believe
plaintiffs  are  unable  to  establish  an  essential  element  of  their
claim, namely  a  legal duty of care, and that summary judgment was
therefore properly granted.    In their brief, plaintiffs argue only
that ATD was willfully and wantonly negligent in its inspection of
a single window in May of  1992.    Plaintiffs do not argue that ATD
was negligent in its construction of the house in 1988.   Plaintiffs’
failure to present  any argument on appeal regarding  ATD’s alleged
negligence in constructing the house constitutes an abandonment of
one of the two theories upon which plaintiffs’ claim against ATD was
originally premised.   See   N.C.R. App. P. 28(a); Crockett v. Savings
&  Loan  Assoc.,                                                              289  N.C.   620,   632,   224  S.E.2d                                  580,   588   (1976)
(“[u]nder  Rule                                                               28,                       .  appellate  review  is  limited  to  the
arguments upon which the parties rely in their briefs”).    The only
contention before us, then, is that ATD was willfully and wantonly
negligent in its inspection of a window in  1992.




The complaint alleges that on this occasion, ATD was willfully
and wantonly negligent in “[f]ail[ing] to repair known leaks in the
EIFS  system,”  in  “[f]ail[ing]  to  adequately  investigate  potential
water  intrusion  into  the  home  and  damage  therefrom,”  and  in
“improperly  and  incorrectly  assess[ing]  the  nature  and  extent  of
said  intrusion and  damage.”    The evidence tends  to  establish that
in  approximately  May  of  1992, Mr. Parkinson  called  Mr.  Dombroski,
the president of A.T.D. Construction Company, and asked him to come
to the house to look at  “a problem with some brick molding” and to
“give him a price on replacing it.”   Mr. Dombroski went to the house
and  examined  a  particular  window  where  a  piece  of  brick  mold  had
been   removed   by   Mr.   Parkinson.                                        Mr.   Dombroksi   saw   “some
discoloration” in the “sheathing plywood” and some deterioration in
the left end of the window sill.    Mr. Dombroski told Mr. Parkinson
that he would  “put together  a  price” for replacing the brick mold
and replacing the sill.   Mr. Parkinson did not ask Mr. Dombroski to
look at any other windows, and Mr. Dombroski did not ultimately do
any repair work on any of the windows.    Based on these facts,  and
resolving   any   inconsistencies   in   the   evidence   in   favor   of
plaintiffs,  we  believe  ATD  was  entitled  to  summary  judgment  as  a
matter  of  law  because  plaintiffs  cannot  establish  that  ATD  owed
plaintiffs a legal duty of care under these circumstances.
The  law  imposes upon the builder of a house the general duty
of  reasonable  care  in  constructing  the  house  to  anyone  who  may
foreseeably be endangered by the builder’s negligence, including a
subsequent  owner who is not the original purchaser.    See Oates v.
JAG,  Inc.,                                                                   314  N.C.               276,    280-81,   333  S.E.2d   222,   225-26   (1985).




Pursuant to Oates, ATD, as the builder of the house, owed a general
duty  of  reasonable  care  to  plaintiffs  in  its  construction  of  the
house in 1988.   However, as noted above, plaintiffs on appeal argue
only that ATD was willfully and wantonly negligent in its inspection
of the window, which occurred over three years after the house was
constructed.    Thus,  plaintiffs  essentially  request  this  Court  to
significantly extend the rule in Oates and hold that the builder of
a  house,  who  is  called  upon  by  the  original  owner  to  inspect  the
house for damage more than three years after the house is completed,
and who performs no repair work on the house at that time, owes a
legal duty of care to a subsequent owner in its inspection of the
house.    This  we  decline  to  do.    Because  plaintiffs  are  unable  to
establish the existence of a legal duty of care owed to plaintiffs
by  ATD  under  the  circumstances,  summary  judgment  was  properly
granted.
III.    PSC
[8]  Finally,  we  review  plaintiffs’  negligence  claim  against
PSC.    Plaintiffs’  complaint  states  that  PSC  was  “retained  by  the
defendant  Parkinsons  to  conduct  certain  post-construction  repair
work on the EIFS system on the home” in 1993.   The complaint alleges
that PSC breached a duty of care to plaintiffs by
negligently  and  improperly  attempting  repairs
which  concealed,  rather  than  rectified,  the
damages resulting from [previous work performed
on  the  house];  negligently  failing  to  report
the defects in the EIFS system when called upon
to   inspect   and   repair   the   home;   and   by
negligently failing to advise the Parkinsons of
the need for further inspection and testing to
verify  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  water
intrusion and damage to the home.
PSC  denied  these  allegations  and  filed  a  motion  for  summary




judgment, contending that there were no genuine issues of material
fact,  and  that  plaintiffs’  claims  were  barred  by  the  statute  of
limitations.     This  motion  was  granted.     We  need  not  reach  the
question of whether plaintiffs’ claim is barred  by the statute of
limitations  because  we  believe  PSC  did  not  owe  a  duty  of  care  to
plaintiffs,  and  because,  even  if  it  did,  the  evidence  produced
during  discovery  fails  to  forecast  any  negligence  on  the  part  of
PSC.
We  are  unable  to  find,  and  plaintiffs  have  not  directed  our
attention  to,  any  cases  holding  that  a  party  who  undertakes  to
repair a house under contract with the original owner  owes a duty
of care to a subsequent purchaser of the house.   As with plaintiffs’
claim  against  ATD,  such  a  holding  would  require  us  to  extend  the
rule in Oates, in which case it was held that the law imposes upon
the  builder  of  a  house  the  general  duty  of  reasonable  care  in
constructing the house to anyone who may foreseeably be endangered
by  the  builder’s  negligence,  including  a  subsequent  owner.    See
Oates,  314 N.C.  276,  333 S.E.2d  222.    We decline to so extend the
rule in Oates.   We believe PSC did not owe plaintiffs a duty of care
recognized by law under the circumstances.
Moreover, even if we were to hold that PSC owed a duty of care
to plaintiffs, we believe plaintiffs failed to present any evidence
during  discovery  to  forecast  negligence  on  the  part  of  PSC.    Mr.
Everts testified during his deposition that he “didn’t really know”
what the role of PSC was in the construction of the home until he
received a copy of the contract between PSC and Mr. Parkinson.   Mr.
Everts then realized that PSC was hired only “to finish a job” that




another company had started, and that “the application of the stucco
was [already] there” at the time PSC performed its work.   Mr. Everts
testified  that  he  has  no  reason  to  believe  that  PSC  failed  to
perform the work that they had agreed to perform in their contract
with Mr. Parkinson.    In addition, when referred to the portions of
the  complaint  alleging  that  PSC  breached  a  duty  to  perform
“inspection”  work  on  the  house,  and  when  asked  what  “inspection”
work  he  believes  PSC  had  a  duty  to  perform,  Mr.  Everts  stated:
“Well,  I  can  tell  you  that  this  was  composed  before  we  had  the
information at hand, and, so, I would say  that, according to what
I’ve read, this wouldn’t apply.”    We believe that  the  trial court
properly  granted  summary  judgment  in  favor  of  PSC  on  plaintiffs’
negligence claim.
In summary, we reverse the trial court’s order granting summary
judgment on plaintiffs’ claim of fraud against Mr. Parkinson and we
remand for further proceedings on this claim.    As to the claim of
fraud against Mrs. Parkinson, and as to all other claims against the
Parkinsons (negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach
of express and implied warranties) we affirm the trial court’s grant
of summary judgment in favor of the Parkinsons.   We affirm the trial
court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants ATD
and PSC.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
Judges TYSON and SMITH concur.

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