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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA01-1331
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                                          31 December  2002
RICHARD GREEN and
DEBORAH DABNEY GREEN,
Plaintiffs
v.                                                                                              Guilford County
                                                                                                No.  00 CVD  10371
PICKERING & COMPANY,
Defendant
Appeal  by  defendant  from  judgment  entered  23  March  2001  by
Judge J. Bruce Morton in Guilford County District Court.   Heard in
the Court of Appeals  21 August  2002.
Richard Green and Deborah Dabney Green, pro se, for plaintiff-
appellees.
Pinto, Coates, Kyre & Brown, P.L.L.C., by Brady A. Yntema, for
defendant-appellant.
CAMPBELL, Judge.
Defendant,   Pickering   &   Company                                                            (“Pickering”)   appeals   a
judgment  entered  in  plaintiffs’  favor  and  an  order  denying  its
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) and motion
for new trial.    For the reasons stated herein, we affirm.
In response to a newspaper advertisement, Deborah Green (“Mrs.
Green”) met with Pickering representative Ken Baucom (“Mr. Baucom”)
in  July                                                                                        2000  regarding  a  house  rental  in  Greensboro,  North
Carolina.    After  viewing  the  house,  Mr.  Baucom  gave  Mrs.  Green  a




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Rental Application (“Application”), which Mrs. Green took home with
her to discuss with her husband, Richard Green  (“Mr. Green”).    On
20  July                                                                      2000,  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Green     (“the  Greens”)  submitted  the
completed, signed Application to Pickering along with a deposit of
$1,100.00  in  order  to  secure  the  house  for  their  tenancy.    Upon
receipt  of  the  Greens’  deposit,  Pickering  ceased  any  further
advertising of the house.
When  Mrs.  Green  arrived  on  18  August  2000  to  sign  the  lease
agreement and receive the keys to the house, a dispute arose over
the amount of rent owed to Pickering on that date.   Mrs. Green did
not agree that she owed Pickering the prorated amount of rent for
the month of August as well as the September rent.   Upon failing to
agree on any of the discussed options to remedy the rent dispute,
the Greens did not move into the house on 18 August or thereafter.
Pickering   then   retained   the   Greens’                                   $1,100.00   deposit,   re-
advertised  the  house  in  the  newspaper  and  rented  the  house  to
tenants  who  moved  in  on  15  September  2000.    After  deducting  from
the  deposit  the  prorated  amount  of  lost  rents  that  Pickering
incurred from  18 August  2000 through  14 September  2000, Pickering
then provided a refund check to the Greens for  $146.68.
At  a  non-jury  trial  on  plaintiffs’  suit  to  recover  their
deposit,  the  trial  court  entered  an  order  in  favor  of  plaintiffs
for  defendant  to  pay  plaintiffs                                           $1,100.00  plus  court  costs,
including the cost of arbitration.    Defendant’s subsequent motion
for JNOV and alternative motion for new trial were both denied in
an order entered 27 June 2001.   Defendant appeals the trial court’s




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judgment granted for plaintiffs.   Defendant also appeals the denial
of his post-trial motions.   Since we resolve defendant’s appeal of
the  final  judgment  in  plaintiffs’  favor,  we  conclude  that  the
appeal of the denial of his post-trial motions would not withstand
the  applicable  higher  standard  of  review.    Therefore,  we  dismiss
defendant’s  assignments  of  error  to  the  trial  court’s  ruling  on
defendant’s post-trial motions.
On  appeal  of  the  judgment,  defendant  argues  that  the  trial
court’s  findings  of  fact  are  not  supported  by  the  evidence
presented at trial and the conclusions of law are not in accordance
with  law.    Thus,  the  judgment  for  plaintiffs  is  erroneous.    We
disagree.
Standard of Review
“The  standard  of  review  on  appeal  from  a  judgment  entered
after a non-jury trial is  ‘whether there is competent evidence to
support the trial court's findings of fact and whether the findings
support the conclusions of law and ensuing judgment.’”    Cartin v.
Harrison, ___ N.C. App. ___, 567 S.E.2d 174 (2002), review denied,
___ N.C. App. ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (2002) (quoting Sessler v. Marsh,
144 N.C. App.  623,  628,  551 S.E.2d  160,  163, disc. review denied,
354  N.C.                                                                   365,   556  S.E.2d   577   (2001)).   “If  the  court's  factual
findings are supported by competent evidence, they are conclusive
on  appeal,  even  though  there  is  evidence  to  the  contrary.”
Pineda-Lopez v. North Carolina Growers Ass'n, Inc.,  ___ N.C. App.
___,  566 S.E.2d  162  (2002)  (citations omitted).
Findings of Fact




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Defendant argues that the trial court based its judgment for
plaintiffs on erroneous findings of fact regarding the terms of a
refund of the deposit and regarding the plaintiffs' belief of what
the                                                                          $1,100.00  represented.     The  trial  court  found   “that  the
Plaintiff's filled out a rental application which did not state a
rental  amount,  the  terms  of  the  proration  for  a  partial  month,
[and] the terms for a refund of a deposit[.]”
Prospective tenants of Pickering signed a Rental Application
that states in relevant part:
I  hereby  deposit:    Security  Deposit                                     $_____,
Application Fee (non refundable)                                             $_____, Other
$_____, for a total deposit of  $_____on_____,
19___.                                                                       .  If  for  any  reason  Management
decides   to   decline   my   application,   then
Management will refund this good faith deposit
to    me    except    for    the    non-refundable
application fee.
I  understand  I  may  cancel  this  application
within  seventy-two                                                          (72)  hours  and  receive  a
full refund except for application fee of this
good   faith   deposit.                                                      If   I   cancel   after
seventy-two (72) hours, or fail to execute the
attached rental agreement or refuse to occupy
the  premises  on  the  agreed  upon  date,  I
understand  this  deposit  will  be  held  until
Management  can  determine  if  it  has  incurred
any   expenses   or   rent   loss   due   to   my
cancellation.    These  costs  will  be  deducted
from  this  deposit  and  the  balance  will  be
refunded to me.
The  Application,  admitted  as  evidence  at  trial,  does  not  make  it
clear that the  $1,100.00 submitted to Pickering by the Greens was
a non-refundable security deposit.   The Application did not contain
any  writing  in  the  blank  spaces  indicating  amounts  paid  by
applicants.    At the top of the Application,  “Dep  1100” is written
underneath  a  printed  portion  that  says                                  “Rental  Rate:                                         ____.”




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Written  on  the  line  is  “1100.”    Thus,  it  is  unclear  whether  Mrs.
Green  submitted  a  deposit  that  would  be  credited  as  her  first
month’s rent or as a non-refundable security deposit if she did not
cancel within seventy-two hours of the Application.   This evidence
supports  the  trial  court’s  finding  that  the  Application  did  not
state the terms for a refund of the deposit because it is unclear
how Pickering applied the  $1,100.00 payment by the Greens.
Secondly,  the  trial  court's  finding  that  the  plaintiffs
believed  that  their                                                          $1,100.00  payment  represented  their  first
month's  rent  rather  than  a  deposit  is  supported  by  the  evidence.
Taking the Application alone as evidence of the Greens' belief with
respect to their $1,100.00 payment, it is not completely clear what
that  payment  represented.     Mrs.  Green's  testimony  at  trial,
however, indicates her understanding that the $1,100.00 check that
she  submitted  with  the  completed,  signed  Rental  Application  to
Pickering on  20 July  2000 represented a deposit towards the first
month's rent.   At trial, Mrs. Green testified on cross-examination
as follows:
Q.   But   to   your   knowledge,   there   was   no
discussion  as  to  how  much  rent  would  be  due
when you first took over that  .  .  .
A.    A proration amount was never discussed.
Q.    Was an initial rent amount discussed?
A.    Just eleven hundred.    That was the
only thing discussed.
Q.    And so your testimony today and what your




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memory is, is that you never had any discussion
as to a prorated amount---
A.    Exactly.
The  trial  court  found  as  a  matter  of  fact  that  plaintiffs  paid
eleven hundred dollars,  “which the  [p]laintiff believed to be the
first  month's  rent.”    We  conclude  that  the  testimony  during  the
bench trial supports this finding.
Conclusions of Law
Defendant's  second  argument  is  that  the  court  erred  in
entering   judgment   for   plaintiffs   on   the   grounds   that   the
conclusions  of  law  made  by  the  court  are  not  in  accordance  with
law.    We disagree.
The trial court concluded  “that the  [d]efendant's refusal to
return  the  entire                                                          $1,100.00  deposit  is  unjustified”  and  entered
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.   In the order, the trial court
stated this conclusion of law as a finding of fact.   This Court has
held that “‘[i]f [a] finding of fact is essentially a conclusion of
law                                                                          .  it  will  be  treated  as  a  conclusion  of  law  which  is
reviewable on appeal.’”   Smith v. Beaufort County Hosp. Ass'n, 141
N.C. App. 203,  214, 540 S.E.2d 775,  782 (2000), review denied, 353
N.C.                                                                         381,                                                              547  S.E.2d   435    (2001),  and  aff’d,   354  N.C.   212,   552
S.E.2d 139 (2001) (quoting Bowles Distributing Co. v. Pabst Brewing
Co.,                                                                         69  N.C.  App.                                                    341,          344,   317  S.E.2d            684,        686    (1984)).   We
conclude  that  the  trial  court's  decision  that  the  defendant  was
unjustified   in   retaining   plaintiffs'   security   deposit   is   a




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conclusion of law, which is supported by the findings of fact, and
based on the evidence presented at trial.
First,  we  note  that  Pickering’s  Rental  Application  is  in
accordance with the North Carolina Tenant Security Deposit Act.
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  42-51 limits the permitted landlord's uses of a
tenant's security deposit.    In relevant part,  §  42-51 states:
Security  deposits  for  residential  dwelling
units shall be permitted only for the tenant's
possible  nonpayment  of  base  rent,
nonfulfillment  of  rental  period,  .  .  .  [and]
costs of re-renting the premises after breach
by the tenant  .  .  .
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  42-51  (2001).                                          Pickering  complied  with  this
statute  insofar  as  it  included  terms  for  refund  of  a  security
deposit  in  its  Rental  Application.    Pickering,  however,  withheld
plaintiffs' $1,100.00 payment that was not specifically identified
to be a security deposit.   Defendant was not justified in applying
plaintiffs'  deposit  to  lost  rent  and  the  cost  of  re-renting  the
premises  when  defendant  did  not  specify  as  to  what  the  Greens’
$1,100.00 check applied.
Upon  deducting  the  amount  due  for  costs,  defendant  returned
the balance to plaintiffs along with a detailed accounting of how
defendant calculated the remaining amount.    Defendant argues that
it complied with  §  42-52, which states:
Upon termination of the tenancy, money held by
the  landlord  as  security  may  be  applied  as
permitted in G.S. 42-51 or, if not so applied,
shall  be  refunded  to  the  tenant.    In  either
case the landlord in writing shall itemize any
damage and mail or deliver same to the tenant,
together  with  the  balance  of  the  security
deposit,   no   later   than                                                30   days   after




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termination  of  the  tenancy  and  delivery  of
possession by the tenant.
Id.     Defendant’s  Rental  Application  complied  with  the  Tenant
Security  Deposit  Act  regarding  the  authority  to  collect  security
deposits  and  the  limitation  regarding  how  the  deposits  may  be
applied.     However,  based  on  the  evidence  presented  at  trial
regarding the Greens’ $1,100.00 payment, the trial court correctly
concluded that defendant was unjustified in failing to return the
full  $1,100.00 deposit to the Greens.
Applying the standard of review stated above, we conclude that
the   evidence   supports   the   trial   court's   findings   that   the
Application  does  not  state  terms  for  a  refund  of  the  deposit  and
that plaintiffs believed that their $1,100.00 payment was the first
month's  rent.    The  findings  of  fact  support  the  conclusion  that
defendant  was  unjustified  in  withholding  plaintiffs'  security
deposit.    Thus,  the  judgment  entered  in  favor  of  plaintiffs  was
correct.
Affirmed.
Judges WYNN and HUDSON concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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