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NO. COA09-942
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  20 July  2010
DOROTHY LEWIS GRIFFITH,
Plaintiff,
v.                                                                       Buncombe County
No.  07 CVD  6208
COLGATE MCSHANE CURTIS,
Defendant.
Appeal by plaintiff from order entered  13 March  2009 and the
amended order entered  16 March  2009 by Judge Rebecca B. Knight in
Buncombe County District Court.    Heard in the Court of Appeals  27
January  2010.
Respess & Jud, by W. Wallace Respess, Jr. and W. Russ Johnson,
III, for plaintiff-appellant.
Leake,  Scott  &  Stokes,  by  Ward  D.  Scott,  for  defendant-
appellee.
STEELMAN, Judge.
The  Consent  Judgment  entered  by  the  court  distributed  the
marital debt owed upon the parties’ Boone residence to plaintiff.
A  consent  judgment  properly  entered  by  the  court  may  not  be
subsequently attacked on the grounds of unconscionability.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
On                                                                       26  June                                              1993,  Dorothy  Lewis  Griffith     (plaintiff)  and
Colgate  McShane  Curtis                                                                                                       (defendant)  were  married.    On                      19  August
                                                                         2006,  plaintiff  and  defendant  separated.     On                                       6  December        2007,
plaintiff  filed  a  complaint  seeking  an  absolute  divorce,  joint
custody  of  the  minor  children,  and  an  unequal  distribution  of




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marital  property  in  favor  of  plaintiff.     On                           17  January   2008,
defendant  filed  an  answer  and  counterclaim  seeking  an  absolute
divorce, joint custody of the minor children, child support, post
separation support, an unequal distribution of marital property in
favor of defendant, and attorney’s fees.    On  11 February  2008, an
order  of  absolute  divorce  was  entered.    The  parties  went  to  pre-
trial  mediation  on  the  equitable  distribution  claims.    On  30  May
2008,  the  parties  entered  into  a  Memorandum  of  Judgment  that
resolved the claims for post separation support, retroactive child
support, and equitable distribution.   This Memorandum was presented
to Judge Knight as a consent judgment that was entered on  11 June
2008.
The  Consent  Judgment  was  signed  by  both  parties  and  their
respective  attorneys.     Paragraph  five  of  the  Consent  Judgment
states, “[t]he agreement is fair and equitable and the court should
adopt  the  agreement  as  set  forth  herein.”    Paragraph  ten  states,
“[t]he  parties  waive  further  findings  of  fact.”    Paragraphs  1(a)
and  1(h) state,
Defendant shall have as his sole and separate
property the following:
(a)  The  real  property  located  at                                         783  Wilson
Ridge Road, Boone, North Carolina.    Plaintiff
shall  be  responsible  for  removing  the  lien
against the property within a reasonable time
for  the  debt  owed  to  David  Griffith  in  the
approximate amount of  $160,000 plus interest.
Defendant shall be solely responsible for all
liabilities  including  taxes  that  may  be  due
for the property;
(h) All debts titled in his name.




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On  8 December  2008, defendant filed a motion seeking to have
plaintiff held in contempt of court for failure to remove the lien
against the real property located in Boone.    On  16 December  2008,
plaintiff’s  counsel  filed  a  motion  to  withdraw.    This  motion  was
granted on  5 January  2009.    On  14 January  2009, plaintiff filed a
motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), (4), and
(6).   Plaintiff asserted that the 11 June 2008 Consent Judgment and
Order  failed  to  distribute  significant  marital  debt  and  was
“completely and utterly unfair.”
On                                                                           20  February   2009,  Judge  Knight  held  plaintiff  to  be  in
willful contempt of court.    Judge Knight concluded as a matter of
law  that  the  Consent  Judgment  distributed  the  Boone  property  to
defendant free and clear of any lien, which would be accomplished
if plaintiff removed the lien.    Judge Knight found that plaintiff
had reasonable time and means to remove the lien, but refused to do
so  without  good  cause.    Judge  Knight  deferred  entering  an  order
setting  a  sanction  for  contempt  until  plaintiff’s  Rule  60  motion
was heard and ruled upon.
On  13 March  2009, the trial court denied plaintiff’s Rule  60
motion to set aside the Consent Judgment and ordered plaintiff to
remove the lien from the real property at  783 Wilson Ridge Road.
Plaintiff appeals from the orders denying her Rule 60 motion.
II.    Standard of Review
Because “a motion for relief under Rule 60(b) is addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial court  .  .  . appellate review is




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limited  to  determining  whether  the  court  abused  its  discretion.”
Sink v. Easter,  288 N.C.  183,  198,  217 S.E.2d  532,  541  (1975).
III. Distribution of Marital Debt
In her first argument, plaintiff contends that the trial court
abused  its  discretion  in  denying  plaintiff’s  Rule  60  Motion.    We
disagree.
Plaintiff  contends  that  the  phrase,                                      “[p]laintiff  shall  be
responsible  for  removing  the  lien,”  in  paragraph                       1(a)  of  the
Consent Judgment is ambiguous and fails to distribute significant
marital  debt  to  either  the  plaintiff  or  defendant.     Plaintiff
argues that  “removing the lien” could include merely transferring
the lien to another property rather than actually distributing this
marital  debt  to  either  spouse.  Plaintiff  contends  that  such  a
result would cause the Equitable Distribution Consent Judgment to
fail for not distributing all marital property.
The   parties’   mediated   settlement   agreement,   entitled
Memorandum  of  Judgment,  was  executed  30  May  2008,  and  was  wholly
incorporated into Judge Knight’s Consent Judgment and Order on  11
June 2008.   The Consent Judgment orders that “[p]laintiff shall be
responsible  for  removing  the  lien  against  the  property  within  a
reasonable  time  for  the  debt  owed  to  David  Griffith  in  the
approximate  amount  of  $160,000  plus  interest.”    Judge  Knight,  in
her order on plaintiff’s Rule 60 Motion, found that this paragraph
unambiguously  distributed  that  marital  debt  owed  to  plaintiff’s
father to plaintiff.




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It  must  be  presumed  that  the  parties  intended  what  the
language in the Memorandum of Judgment clearly expresses, and the
agreement must  “be construed to mean what on its face it purports
to  mean.”    Hartman  v.  Hartman,  80  N.C.  App.  452,  455,  343  S.E.2d
11, 13 (1986) (quoting Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Hood, 226
N.C.                                                                           706,                                                         710,   40  S.E.2d        198,    201   (1946)).     The  Memorandum  of
Judgment and the Consent Judgment were signed by both parties.   The
trial  court  properly  found  that  “removing  the  lien”  transferred
this  marital  debt  to  plaintiff.    See  Wiencek-Adams  v.  Adams,  331
N.C. 688, 694, 417 S.E.2d 449, 452 (1992) (referring to paying down
martial debt distributed to the husband as “payments to remove the
debt”);  Glaspy  v.  Glaspy,  143  N.C.  App.  435,  441-42,  545  S.E.2d
782, 786 (2001) (holding that a federal tax lien was marital debt).
Because there is competent evidence that plaintiff signed the
agreement  as                                                                  “fair  and  equitable”  to  both  parties  and  that
plaintiff  specifically  agreed  to  remove  the  lien  from  the  real
property  at                                                                   783  Wilson  Ridge  Road,  the  Consent  Judgment  is  not
ambiguous.    Hartman,                                                         80  N.C.  App.  at                                           454,   343  S.E.2d  at   12-13
(citations omitted).
Plaintiff further contends under Rule  60(b)(1) and  (6), that
the  Consent  Judgment  should  be  set  aside  because  she  mistakenly
signed the Memorandum of Judgment and the Consent Judgment.
To set aside a judgment based upon mistake, the moving party
must  prove  mutual  mistake  or  that  a  unilateral  mistake  was  made
because  of  some  misconduct.    In  re  Baity,  65  N.C.  App.  364,  368,
309 S.E.2d  515,  518 (1983), cert. denied,  311 N.C. 401, 319 S.E.2d




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266  (1984).    Although  Rule  60(b)(6)  grants  a  “vast  reservoir  of
equitable   power,”   a   consent   judgment   will   stand   absent
extraordinary  circumstances  beyond  lack  of  understanding.     See
Anderson  Trucking  Serv.,  Inc.  v.  Key  Way  Transp.,  Inc.,  94  N.C.
App.  36,  40,  379  S.E.2d  665,  667-68  (1989)  (citations  omitted).
Any mistake on the part of the plaintiff was a unilateral mistake
and not a mutual mistake.   Id.   Further, even if plaintiff executed
the Memorandum of Judgment at mediation by mistake, she  “ratified
her  original  consent  agreement  when  she  signed  the  Consent
Judgment” eleven days later.
The  trial  court  did  not  abuse  its  discretion  in  denying
plaintiff’s Rule  60 Motion.
This argument is without merit.
IV.    Unconscionability
In  her  second  argument,  plaintiff  contends  that  the  trial
court  abused  its  discretion  by  first  adopting  an  unconscionable
memorandum   of   judgment   and   then   failing   to   set   aside   an
unconscionable consent judgment.    We disagree.
A.    Memorandum of Judgment
Because the Memorandum was subsumed by the Consent Judgment,
we do not address plaintiff’s unconscionability argument as to the
Memorandum of Judgment.    Mitchell v. Mitchell,  270 N.C.  253,  256,
154 S.E.2d  71,  73  (1967).
This argument is dismissed.
B.    Consent Judgment




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Once a memorandum of judgment is incorporated into a consent
judgment, the parties lose their contract defenses.    Id.  (holding
that when the parties’ agreement is incorporated into a judgment,
the agreement is superseded by the court’s decree).    The doctrine
of res judicata bars those defenses that could have been addressed
before  the  entry  of  judgment,  including  unconscionability.    See
generally Wells v. Wells,  132 N.C. App.  401,  415,  512 S.E.2d  468,
476-77, disc. review denied,  350 N.C.  599,  537 S.E.2d  495  (1999);
see  also  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                               §                 52-10(c)   (2009)   (defense  of  public
policy   is  not  applicable  to  judgements  of  any  state  court
construing contracts between husband and wife).   Parties seeking to
set  aside  a  consent  judgment  are  limited  to  proving  lack  of
consent,  fraud,  mutual  mistake,  or  unilateral  mistake  under  some
misconduct.    Yurek v. Shaffer,  ___ N.C. App.  ___,  ___,  678 S.E.2d
738,  746  (2009)  (citations omitted); Coppley v. Coppley,  128 N.C.
App. 658, 663-64, 496 S.E.2d 611, 616 (1998)(holding that a consent
judgment  may  be  attacked  only  on  the  limited  grounds  of  fraud,
mutual   mistake,   duress,   or   undue   influence);   Stevenson   v.
Stevenson,                                                                 100  N.C.  App.   750,       752,     398  S.E.2d            334,   336   (1990).
Unconscionability   is   not   an   available   defense   because   the
Memorandum  of  Judgment  has  been  incorporated  into  the  Consent
Judgment.    Mitchell,  270 N.C. at  256,  154 S.E.2d at  73.
This argument is dismissed.
AFFIRMED.
Judges MCGEE and BEASLEY concur.

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