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KIMBERLY WHITE HAMBY, Plaintiff v. WILLIAM RICHARD HAMBY,
Defendant
No. COA00-151
(Filed 5 June 2001)
1.                                                                                                    Divorce--equitable distribution--valuation--insurance agency
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in an equitable distribution case by its
valuation of defendant husband’s insurance agency, because: (1) plaintiff’s expert testified that
even though defendant cannot sell his agency, the agency still has value to defendant above and
beyond a salary or the net worth of the agency’s fixed assets which could be sold; and (2)
plaintiff’s expert was in a position to assist the court as fact-finder based on his specialized
knowledge.
2.                                                                                                    Divorce--equitable distribution--extended earnings plan--deferred compensation
                                                                                                      benefit--pretrial agreement--marital property
The trial court did err in an equitable distribution case by its finding of fact that the
Nationwide Insurance extended earnings plan is a deferred compensation benefit under N.C.G.S.
§ 50-20(b)(3) and its value of $179,151.90 should be distributed as marital property, because: (1)
the parties’ pretrial agreement stipulating that the plan was marital property effectively waived
defendant husband’s right to a trial court’s later determination of whether the plan was marital
property and subject to the equitable distribution provisions of N.C.G.S. § 50-20; and (2) by
agreeing that the plan was marital and thereby subject to equitable distribution, defendant also
waived his right to retain as separate property that portion of deferred compensation which was
not yet vested as of the date of separation.
3.                                                                                                    Divorce--equitable distribution--valuation--deferred income compensation credits
The trial court did not err in an equitable distribution case by its valuation of defendant
husband’s deferred income compensation credits in the amount of $128,955.00 even though an
exact figure as of the date of separation was not given, because the trial court’s simple averaging
of the figures resulted in an equitable figure for the purposes of distribution.
4.                                                                                                    Divorce--equitable distribution--automobile--separate property
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in an equitable distribution case by finding that
the parties’ automobile was the separate property of plaintiff wife, because: (1) the 16 October
1996 consent judgment of the parties provides that defendant husband shall immediately execute
the title to the automobile to plaintiff subject to the terms and conditions of the parties’
separation agreement; and (2) there is no mention in the documents that the automobile shall be
subject to later division.
Appeal by defendant from orders entered 7 May 1999 and 14 July
1999  by  Judge  Gregory  R.  Hayes  in  Catawba  County  District  Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals  26 February  2001.
Tate,  Young,  Morphis,  Bach  &  Taylor,  LLP,  by  Thomas  C.
Morphis, Sr. and Paul E. Culpepper, for plaintiff-appellee.




Crowe  &  Davis,  P.A.,  by  H.  Kent  Crowe,  for  defendant-
appellant.
HUNTER, Judge.
Arguing  that  the  trial  court  failed  to  equitably  distribute
the marital assets of defendant-appellant William Richard Hamby and
plaintiff-appellee Kimberly White Hamby, Mr. Hamby appeals to this
Court.     Specifically,  Mr.  Hamby  contends  that  his  Nationwide
Insurance Agency and the deferred compensation plans therefrom were
improperly  valued  and  distributed  and  that  the  parties’  Isuzu
Trooper  automobile  was  marital  property,  and  not  the  separate
property of Mrs. Hamby as found by the trial court.   We affirm the
trial court’s orders.
Due to the nature of Mr. Hamby’s assignments of error, we need
relay only a few facts occurring prior to trial, none of which are
in  dispute.     The  parties  were  married  on                           27  February   1988,
separated on 17 August 1995, and divorced on 19 December 1996.   The
parties  had  two  children  born  within  the  marriage.     Mr.  Hamby
“sought and obtained primary custody of the[] children pursuant to
a Consent Judgment.”   Prior to the marriage, Mr. Hamby worked as an
Nationwide  Insurance  agent  in  an  employee/employer  relationship.
However  shortly  thereafter,  Mr.  Hamby  became  an  independent
contractor  with  Nationwide,  opening  his  own  office                   “to  sell
Nationwide products as an exclusive representative.”
Prior to trial,
the parties entered into a comprehensive Pre-
Trial  Order  for  Equitable  Distribution  of
Marital  Property                                                          [filed         29  July   1998
which] ma[de] substantial distribution of the
personal  property  of  the  parties.




[Additionally],  there  were  supplemental  Pre-
Trial Orders agreed upon by the parties prior
to  trial  .  .  .                                                         .    Certain  real  property  and
other  assets  of  the  parties  were  divided  by
the  parties  prior  to  trial  and  were  not  in
dispute.
Therefore,  the  only  assets  of  the  parties  in  question  at  trial
were:     Mr.  Hamby’s  Nationwide  Insurance  Agency,  his  Deferred
Compensation and Incentive Credits, his Extended Earnings, and the
parties’  1995 Isuzu Trooper automobile.
[1]  Mr.  Hamby’s  first  assignment  of  error  is  that  the  trial
court erred in its valuation of his insurance agency, in that the
valuation  was  not  supported  by  competent  evidence.     It  is  Mr.
Hamby’s position that since, pursuant to his agency agreement with
Nationwide,  he  cannot  transfer  or  sell  the  business,  the  trial
court should not have valued the agency as though it could be sold.
We begin by acknowledging that:
The  distribution  of  marital  property  is
vested  in  the  discretion  of  the  trial  courts
and  the  exercise  of  that  discretion  will  not
be upset absent clear abuse.                                               [Therefore, i]n
order  to  reverse  the  trial  court’s  decision
for abuse of discretion, we must find that the
decision  was  unsupported  by  reason  and  could
not  have  been  the  result  of  a  competent
inquiry.    Accordingly,  the  findings  of  fact
are   conclusive                                                           [on   appeal]   if   they   are
supported  by  any  competent  evidence  from  the
record.
Beightol  v.  Beightol,                                                    90  N.C.  App.                      58,   60,   367  S.E.2d   347,   348
(1988)  (citations omitted).    In making an equitable distribution,
the   trial   court   must   conduct   a   three-step   analysis:          (1)
determining which property is marital property; (2) calculating the
net value of the marital property -- which is the fair market value
less  any  encumbrance  on  the  property;  and,  (3)  distributing  the




property  in  an  equitable  manner.    Id.  at  63,  367  S.E.2d  at  350.
“An equal division of the marital property is mandatory, unless the
court  determines  in  the  exercise  of  its  discretion  that  such  a
distribution is inequitable.”    Id.  (emphasis added).
The parties do not dispute that Mr. Hamby’s insurance agency
is marital property.   However, Mr. Hamby argues that because he is
an  exclusive  agent,  representing  only  one  company,  he                    “has
virtually  no  business  to  sell.”    The  evidence  presented  at  trial
revealed that Mr. Hamby does not own the policies he sells and that
Nationwide  “ha[s]  the  authority  to  transfer  those  policies  or  do
anything                                                                        [with  them]  it  wishes  at  its  sole  discretion.”    Thus,
“with  respect  to  [Mr.  Hamby’s]  ability  to  sell  or  transfer  [the]
agency,” there was no controversy.
From the record, we see that Mr. Hamby’s expert witness, Mr.
Blanton,  valued  the  agency  at                                               $18,950.00  as  of  the  date  of
separation.                                                                     In  mentioning  the  various  valuation  methods  he
declined  to  use,  Mr.  Blanton  stated                                        “because  of  the  unique
situation that [Mr. Hamby]’s in, and the fact that he doesn’t have
control  over  many  areas,  .  .  .  you  can’t  be  sure  that  the  future
earnings  will  be  like  the  past  earnings.”    Mr.  Blanton  further
stated that he “made the determination that . . . the agency had no
right to future earnings.   It couldn’t sell its book of business to
anyone,  it  couldn’t  assign  the  income  stream  to  anyone  else.”
Thus, Mr. Blanton “gave the adjusted book value method an 85%.   And
.  .  . gave the capitalization of earnings method a  15% to come up
with a value of  $18,950.”
And  then  the  company  specific  premium  I
assigned it a value of  60%.    Why did I assign




it a value so high?   Mr. Hamby cannot sell the
agency.                                                                      The                          contract,   the   agency
administration  manual  makes  specific  points
that  he  cannot  sell  or  assign  policies  to
anyone.    The  lack  of  ownership,  the  lack  of
control over the income stream, the fact that
he  is  a  key  person,  without  him  there  is  no
agency,  there  is  no  earning’s                                            [sic]  stream
made me assign it a higher value.  .  .
Conversely, Mrs. Hamby’s expert witness, Mr. Whitt valued the
agency  at  $110,000.00  as  of  the  date  of  separation.    Disagreeing
with Mr. Blanton’s valuation and methods used, Mr. Whitt stated:
To  begin  with  I  valued  the  .  .  .  Agency
as a going concern.   It was a going concern on
date of separation.   And it’s my understanding
when we say we’re valuing at fair market value
we’re  trying  to  determine  what  if  the  entity
that’s being valued could have traded hands on
date  of  separation,  date  of  valuation.     We
don’t  have  to  know  there’s  a  buyer.    It’s  a
hypothetical  situation.  .                                                  [W]e  know  on
date   of   separation   that   the   sale   wasn’t
imminent nor was it necessary.    So my purpose
in   valuing,   and   I   think   the   appropriate
purpose  in  valuing  the  agency  at  date  of
separation is what is it worth to Mr. Hamby as
a  going  concern.    So  I  certainly  agree  with
the definition of a going concern, is one that
we do expect it is an operating entity and we
expect  it  to  continue  to  operate  as  it  has
been in the most recent past.
So  there  are  many  businesses  that  I
valued  that  might  not  be  able  to  trade  hands
that easily. . .                                                             [However,] there can still
be  a  value  to  having  a  practice                                        [or  agency]
over and above just earning a salary.
My approach to valuing  .  .  . was just to
determine  does  Mr.  Hamby  have,  by  creating
this  entity  of  an  insurance  agency,  has  he
created   something   of   value   to   himself.
Something  that  has  allowed  him  to  earn  an
above-average amount of earnings.  .  .
(Emphasis added.)    Mr. Whitt went further to explain that the
purpose of valuing a business is to say, . . .
if  I  owned  a  single  business,  if  I’m  working
there,  what  can  I  earn  if  I’m  working  for




somebody else?   Surely I’m entitled to have at
least that much for the efforts of my labors.
Anything   I   make   over   and   above   that   is
because, probably because I have this business
entity.    I’ve  got  name  recognition,  I’ve  got
the  Nationwide  name,  or  whatever.     If                                   [Mr.
Hamby]  had  worked  for  another  agency,  he
would’ve made something.
And    so    by    capitalizing    in    this
methodology   here   we   have   capitalized   his
actual  salary  as  well  as  any  earnings  that
come from the business.  .  .
We  agree  with  the  trial  court  and  Mr.  Whitt,  in  that  even  though
Mr.  Hamby  cannot  sell  it,  the  agency  still  has  value  as  to  Mr.
Hamby  above  and  beyond  a  salary  or  the  net  worth  of  the  agency’s
fixed assets which could be sold.
We note in the case at bar, Mr. Hamby does not argue that the
trial court failed to conduct the required three step analysis for
equitable  distribution.     Neither  does  Mr.  Hamby  argue  that  in
conducting its analysis, the trial court itself miscalculated the
net  value  of  the  agency  or  failed  to  distribute  that  value
equitably  based  on  expert  testimony  it  accepted.    What  Mr.  Hamby
does  argue  is  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  rejecting  the  expert
testimony  of  Mr.  Blanton  as  to  the  agency’s  valuation,  instead
accepting as true the testimony of Mrs. Hamby’s expert, Mr. Whitt.
Mr.  Hamby  argues  Mr.  Whitt’s  expert  opinion  was  incompetent  “at
best.”
“‘The decision to qualify a witness as an expert is ordinarily
within  the  exclusive  province  of  the  trial  judge  or  hearing
officer.’”    Hall  v.  Hall,  88  N.C.  App.  297,  308,  363  S.E.2d  189,
196  (1987)  (quoting State ex rel. Comr. of Insurance v. N.C. Rate
Bureau,  75  N.C.  App.  201,  230,  331  S.E.2d  124,  144,  disc.  review




denied,  314 N.C.  547,  335 S.E.2d  319  (1985)).    The record reveals
that  before  accepting  Mr.  Whitt  as  an  expert  in  the               “area  of
accounting and valuation of businesses,” the trial court admitted
Mr.  Whitt’s  resume  into  evidence,  which  listed  Mr.  Whitt’s
“activities as a CPA,  .  .  . the positions  [he has] held in various
professional and business organizations[] . . . [and] a listing of
the business valuations, litigation courses  [he has] taken.”    Mr.
Whitt  also  testified  that  he  had  been  similarly  tendered  as  an
expert  in  over                                                           100  cases.     Furthermore,  Mr.  Hamby’s  attorney
entered  “a stipulation to  [Mr. Whitt’s] information.”
In  its  order  of                                                         7  May                                                 1999,  the  trial  court  found,  in
pertinent part, that:
22.                                                                        Both  experts                                          [plaintiff’s  expert,  Mr.
Whitt    and    defendant’s    expert,    Mr.
Blanton]   made   assumptions   in   their
analysis  of  the  value  of  the
Insurance  Agency  that  Rick  Hamby  cannot
sell  his  Insurance  Agency.     The  Court
finds,  based  on  the  evidence  presented
.  that  the  Rick  Hamby  Insurance
Agency cannot be sold but that the Agency
still has value.
23.                                                                        [T]he  Court  does  not  accept  the
methodology  used  by  Mr.  Blanton  in  his
valuation  in  that  Mr.  Blanton  used  only
the capitalization of earnings method and
adjusted   book   value   method   or   going
concern  method  of  valuation  analysis.
The Court finds that Mr. Blanton did not
use  a  capitalization  of  excess  earnings
method in that Mr. Blanton testified that
the  capitalization  of  excess  earnings
method is appropriate to use when all net
tangible  and  intangible  assets  can  be
clearly  identified  and  that  he  was  not
furnished with the necessary information
to  identify  those  assets.    In  addition,
Mr. Blanton testified that he did not use
a  discounted  future  earnings  method  or
the public guideline company method, both
of which methods would seem to the Court




to  have  analytical  value  and  which  Mr.
Whitt testified should have been used.
24.                                                                            .   The   Court   accepts,   with   one
exception,  the  methodology  used  by  Mr.
Whitt.    The  Court  questions  Mr.  Whitt’s
valuation   based   on                                                         “Guideline   Market
Transactions”,  because  of  the  nature  of
the  comparables  used  by  Mr.  Whitt  in
that, the sale dates occurred in 1992 and
1988  and  that  the  location  of  the  sales
were out of the state of North Carolina.
For  that  reason,  the  Court  will  reduce
the value by $10,000.   The Court finds as
true  and  accepts  all  other  testimony  of
Mr.  Whitt  as  a  valid  method  of  valuing
the Rick Hamby Insurance Agency.  .  .
Thus, the trial court valued the agency at $100,000.00, $10,000.00
less than the value given by Mr. Whitt.
We hold therefore, that the record contains “evidence [which]
is   sufficient   to   permit   a   finding   that,   by   reason   of   his
specialized knowledge, [Mr. Whitt] was in a position to assist the
court,  as  fact  finder,  in  determining  relevant  facts,  i.e.,  the
value  of  certain  marital  assets,”  namely  the  insurance  agency.
Hall,  88 N.C. App. at  308,  363 S.E.2d at  196.    Hence, we find the
trial  court’s  “decision  was  []supported  by  reason  and  [was]  the
result of a competent inquiry.”   Beightol, 90 N.C. App. at  60,  367
S.E.2d at 348.   Further, in response to Mr. Hamby’s contention that
Mr. Whitt’s valuation was improper because it was not based on the
date  of  separation,  we  find  that  the  record  does  not  support  Mr.
Hamby’s  contention,  in  that  Mr.  Whitt  plainly  testified  that  his
“analysis and valuation  .  .  .  [was] as of August  17,  1995[]  .  .  .
the  date  of  separation  .  .  .                                             .”    Accordingly,  being  supported  by
competent  evidence  of  record,  the  trial  court’s  findings  of  fact
are conclusive on appeal.   Mr. Hamby’s objection is thus overruled.




[2] Mr. Hamby next assigns error to the trial court’s finding
as fact that the Nationwide Insurance Extended Earnings Plan is a
Deferred  Compensation  Benefit  Plan  pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §
50-20(b)(3) and as such, had a value of  $179,151.90, which should
be equitably distributed as it is marital property.    Although Mr.
Hamby  admits  that  he  stipulated  in  the  parties’  pre-trial  order
that  his  Deferred  Compensation  Plans  were  marital  property,  he
nevertheless  argues  in  his  brief  to  this  Court,  that  “[d]espite
this  stipulation,  .  .  .  neither  of  [his]  retirement  or  deferred
compensation  plans  with  Nationwide  are  marital  property  under
N.C.G.S.  §  50-20 as it existed in  1995.  .  .                            [I]t was a mistake
to  characterize  these  deferred  compensation  plans  as  marital
property.”   Thus, Mr. Hamby thereafter argues that the trial court
committed  reversible  error  in  finding  the  Plans  to  be  marital
property  and  subjecting  them  to  equitable  distribution.     We
disagree.
Because  the  applicable  statute  in  effect  at  the  time  the
parties separated plainly states that “[m]arital property includes
all  vested  pension,  retirement,  and  other  deferred  compensation
rights,”  we  understand  that  ordinarily,  Mr.  Hamby’s  nonvested
pension would not then be subject to equitable distribution.   N.C.
Gen.  Stat.  §  50-20(b)(1)  (1995)  (emphasis  added).    However,  this
Court  has  long  held  that  “[t]he  right  to  equitable  distribution
does not arise from the parties’ common law rights and obligations
as spouses, but is a statutory property right which may be waived
by a complete property settlement.”    Small v. Small,  93 N.C. App.
614,                                                                        621,                 379   S.E.2d   273,   277   (1989)   (emphasis   added).




Accordingly,  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                               §                       50-20(d)           (1995)  provides  for
“distribution of  .  .  . marital property in a manner deemed by the
parties to be equitable and the agreement shall be binding on the
parties.”    Id.
[A] married person is entitled to maintain an
action for equitable distribution upon divorce
if   it   is   properly   applied   for   and   not
otherwise    waived.                                                          However,    equitable
distribution is not automatic.  .  .
A   valid   separation   agreement   that   waives
rights   to   equitable   distribution   will   be
honored by the courts and will be binding upon
the parties.    N.C.G.S.  §  52-10  (1984); Blount
v.  Blount,                                                                   72  N.C.  App.  193,    323  S.E.2d  738
(1984);    Blankenship v. Blankenship,  234 N.C.
162,  66 S.E.2d  680  (1951).
Hagler  v.  Hagler,  319  N.C.  287,  290,  354  S.E.2d  228,  232  (1987)
(emphasis added).
In  the  present  case,  there  is  no  dispute  as  to  whether  the
parties  had  a  signed  and  binding  pre-trial  agreement  which  the
trial court incorporated into its pre-trial order.    Therefore, we
reject  Mr.  Hamby’s  argument  that  “neither  of  [his]  retirement  or
deferred compensation plans with Nationwide are marital property,”
and  subject  to  equitable  distribution.    We  hold  then  that  by  the
parties’  pre-trial    agreement,  Mr.  Hamby  effectively  waived  his
right to a trial court’s later determination of whether the Plans
were  marital  property  and  subject  to  the  equitable  distribution
statutory provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  50-20.    See Prevatte v.
Prevatte,                                                                     104  N.C.  App.         777,               781,                    411  S.E.2d   386,   388   (1991).
Furthermore, by agreeing that the Plans were marital property and
thereby  subject  to  equitable  distribution,  Mr.  Hamby  also  waived
his right to retain, as separate property, that portion of Deferred




Compensation which was not yet vested as of the date of separation.
Id.
We find Prevatte, supra, analogous.   In that case, this Court
held:
[W]e agree that the agreement released all the
wife’s property rights which arose out of the
marriage  and  also  operated  to  release  her
statutory right to equitable distribution.   We
hold  that  the  antenuptial  agreement  was  a
valid bar to wife’s claim and the trial court
erred  in  concluding  the  property  acquired
during  the  marriage  was  subject  to  equitable
distribution.
Id. at 782, 411 S.E.2d at 389.   Thus, just as in Prevatte where the
wife  was  able  to  sign  away  her  statutory  right  to  equitable
distribution, we believe that Mr. Hamby was able to sign away his
right to keeping separate property separate.   Therefore, it matters
not  that  pursuant  to  statutory  authority  in  place  at  the  time  of
separation                                                                      (17  August              1995),   “[t]he  expectation  of  nonvested
pension, retirement, or other deferred compensation rights [was to]
be considered separate property.”    N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  50-20(b)(2).
The  record  reflects  that  Ms.  Riggs,                                        “a  representative  of
Nationwide  Insurance  testified  that  she  was  familiar  with                [Mr.
Hamby’s] rights concerning . . . [his] Extended Earnings Plan,” and
she further testified as to the amounts Mr. Hamby would have been
entitled to receive had he “die[d], retire[d], or [been] otherwise
severed  from  service  with  Nationwide”  on  31  December  1994  and  31
December  1995.    Ms.  Riggs  went  on  to  testify  as  to  the  amount  to
which Mr. Hamby would have been entitled as of 31 December 1994 and
31  December  1995,  stating  that  there  was  no  way  to  calculate  the
exact   amount   as   of   the   date   of   the   parties’   separation.




Subsequently,  in  its  finding  of  fact  number  27,  the  trial  court
found that:
Pursuant  to  the  Pre-Trial  Order  the  parties
have  stipulated  that                                                        [Mr.  Hamby’s]  Extended
Earnings  [Plan] was marital property.  .  .
[Moreover,] the Nationwide Insurance Extended
Earnings   Plan   is   a   deferred   compensation
benefit  plan  under  the  provisions  of  North
Carolina  General  Statutes                                                   §                                                       50-20(b)(3)  and
that the same as of the date of separation had
a   value   of                                                                $179,151.90   and   is   marital
property.
(Emphasis in original.)   Additionally, the trial court set out its
method  of  calculating  the  value  of  the  Extended  Earnings  Plan  to
Mr. Hamby as of the date of separation.    By averaging the end-of-
year  Extended  Earnings’  amounts  of                                        $167,450.00  for                                        1994  and
$186,102.00  for                                                              1995,  the  trial  court  was  able  to  calculate  a
relatively  accurate  amount  that  the  Plan  increased  per  day
($51.10),  and  thereby  calculate  what  the  Plan  was  worth  as  of  17
August  1995,  the  parties’  date  of  separation.    Thus,  we  find  the
record supports the trial court’s findings as to the valuation of
Mr. Hamby’s Extended Earnings Plan.   Again, we are reminded that if
there  is  any  competent  evidence  of  record  to  support  the  trial
court’s   findings,   those   findings   are   conclusive   on   appeal.
Beightol,                                                                     90  N.C.  App.                                          58,  60,           367  S.E.2d  347,   348.    Having  so
held, we find no error in the trial court’s equitable distribution
of such asset.    Further, we find no merit in Mr. Hamby’s argument
that “it is impossible with any degree of accuracy to calculate the
value of extended earnings.”
[3]  Next,  Mr.  Hamby  assigns  error  to  the  trial  court’s
equitable distribution of his Deferred Income Compensation Credits




in  the  amount  of                                                          $128,955.00,  on  the  basis  that  there  is  not
competent  evidence  of  record  to  support  the  valuation  finding  of
fact.    We have already held that the Deferred Income Compensation
Plan  is  marital  property  pursuant  to  the  parties’  pretrial
agreement.    Therefore,  as  in  the  earlier  argument  regarding  the
Extended Earnings Plan, we need not address Mr. Hamby’s contention
as to whether his Income Compensation Credits had vested as of the
parties’ date of separation.
As to his argument that the trial court erred in its valuation
of the Plan, Mr. Hamby does not contend that the Court’s  “March  1,
1995 statement  [figures], which is for the period ending December
31, 1994 . . . [or] the March 1, 1996 statement [figures], which is
for the period ending December  31,  1995” are incorrect.    Instead,
Mr. Hamby simply argues that because neither the documents nor any
witness gave a specific figure for the Deferred Compensation as of
the  date  of  separation,  the  trial  court  erred  in  attempting  to
calculate  one.    We  find  that  if  we  were  to  follow  Mr.  Hamby’s
logic, a trial court could never calculate the equitable amount of
any asset for which a document or an expert witness was unable to
positively give an exact figure as of the date of separation.   This
Court,  like  the  trial  court  below,  refuses  to  accept  Mr.  Hamby’s
logic.     We  believe  the  trial  court’s  simple  averaging  of  the
figures  resulted  in  an  equitable  figure  for  the  purposes  of
distribution.    We hold that the record supports the trial court’s
findings and conclusions as to this issue.
[4]  Finally,  Mr.  Hamby  assigns  error  to  the  trial  court’s
finding that the parties’ Isuzu Trooper automobile was the separate




property of Mrs. Hamby.   In the parties’ 9 October 1995 Separation
Agreement,  under  the  heading  of                                     “Exclusive  Possession,”  it  was
stated that:
The  Husband  shall  have  as  his  sole  and
separate  property  that  certain                                       1995  Isuzu
Rodeo . . .                                                             .   The Husband agrees to indemnify
and hold the Wife harmless for the payment of
any  obligations  on  said  vehicle,  pursuant  to
the terms of this conveyance.    The Wife shall
have  as  her  sole  and  separate  property  that
certain                                                                 1995   Isuzu   Trooper   LS                                       (Limited),
                                                                        presently  used  by  the  Wife,  with                             [sic]  the
Husband shall assume all indebtedness on said
vehicle  including  taxes,  tag,  and  title,  and
maintenance on said vehicle during the one (1)
year   separation   agreement.                                          The   Husband
further agrees to indemnify and hold the Wife
harmless  from  any  payments  on  the  subject
vehicle   pursuant   to   the   terms   of   this
agreement.  .  .
(Emphasis added.)
In its order, the trial court found that:
While   there   is   language   in   said   article
referring to action to be taken by the Husband
during  the  one  (1)  year  separation  agreement
.  said  language  agrees  to  the  Husband’s
obligation   to   pay   taxes,   tag,   title   and
maintenance on said vehicle during the one (1)
year  separation  agreement  and  does  not  limit
the  prior  language  granting  the  Isuzu  to  the
Wife  “as her sole and separate property”.
Therefore, the trial court held the automobile to be Mrs. Hamby’s
separate property.    We agree.
The  law  has  long  been  that  where  the  plain  language  of  a
statute                                                                 (or  contract)  is  unambiguous  on  its  face,  the  court  is
bound by the clear meaning.    Roberts v. Young,  120 N.C. App.  720,
726,                                                                    464  S.E.2d                                                       78,          82   (1995).   “The  most  common  rule  of
construction used by the courts is to ‘gather the intention of the
parties from the four corners of the instrument.’”    Chicago Title




Ins. Co. v. Wetherington,  127 N.C. App.  457,  462,  490 S.E.2d  593,
597 (1997) (quoting Patrick K. Hetrick & James B. McLaughlin, Jr.,
Webster’s  Real  Estate  Law  in  North  Carolina                        §      10-36   (4th  ed.
1994)).    Thus, we hold that the record supports the trial court’s
finding that
the  October  16,  1996  Consent  Judgment  of  the
parties  .  .  . provides that  [Mr. Hamby] shall
immediately  execute  the  title  to  the                                1995
Isuzu  Trooper  to  [Mrs.  Hamby]  subject  to  the
terms    and    conditions    of    the    parties’
separation  agreement  and  there  is  no  mention
made  in  any  of  said  documents  that  the  Isuzu
shall be subject to later division.  .  .
Mr. Hamby’s assignment of error is therefore overruled.
Having  found  that  the  trial  court’s  findings  of  fact  are
supported  by  competent  evidence  in  the  record,  and  that  its
conclusions of law are supported by the findings of fact, the trial
court’s orders are,
Affirmed.
Chief Judge EAGLES and Judge CAMPBELL concur.

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