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TANESHA HARDESTY v. OSCAR ALDRIDGE
No. COA01-153
(Filed 18 December 2001)
Costs--attorney fees--personal injury--judgment finally obtained greater than offer of
judgment
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a personal injury action by awarding
attorney fees of $2,625.00 under N.C.G.S. § 6-21.1 to plaintiff even though defendant made a
settlement offer of $1,997.50 and plaintiff only received a jury verdict of $350.00, because: (1)
there is no allegation that the hours claimed or the amount per hour used in the calculation was
unreasonable; and (2) the judgment finally obtained was more favorable to plaintiff than
defendant’s offer of judgment since the final amount is not merely the jury’s verdict, but
includes the award of attorney fees making the total $2,975.00.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 25 September 2000 by
Judge Cheryl Spencer in Craven County District Court.   Heard in the
Court of Appeals  28 November  2001.
Chesnutt, Clemmons, Thomas & Peacock, by Gary H. Clemmons, for
plaintiff-appellee.
Walker,  Clark,  Allen,  Herrin  &  Morano,  by  Jeffrey  T.  Ammons
and Gay P. Stanley, for defendant-appellant.
THOMAS, Judge.
Defendant,  Oscar  Aldridge,  appeals  from  a  judgment  awarding
attorney fees to plaintiff, Tanesha Hardesty, in a personal injury
action  resulting  from  an  automobile  accident.    For  the  reasons
discussed herein, we affirm the trial court and remand the issue of
attorney fees pending appeal.
The facts are as follows: On 28 January 1997, a vehicle owned
and  operated  by  defendant  struck  the  vehicle  plaintiff  was




operating.    Plaintiff sustained injuries and was first treated at
the  Craven  Regional  Medical  Center  emergency  room  and  then  at  a
chiropractic center.
Subsequently,    defendant’s    insurance    carrier,    Allstate
Insurance   Company                                                          (Allstate),   engaged   in   negotiations   with
plaintiff’s  counsel.    Allstate  offered  to  settle  for  a  total  of
$1,997.50, which equaled the amount of medical bills, but the offer
was refused and suit was filed on  28 October  1997.
There was no answer to the complaint and plaintiff obtained a
default  judgment  of  $5,000  plus  $2,134  for  costs,  interest,  and
attorney fees against defendant.   Allstate, however, filed a motion
to vacate the judgment because plaintiff had never forwarded a copy
of the complaint to the company.   Plaintiff signed a consent order
to  both  vacate  the  entry  of  default  and  set  aside  the  judgment.
Defendant then filed an answer, which included a Rule  68 offer of
judgment for  $1,997.50.
                                                                                                                                      In  May  2000,  a  jury  returned  a  verdict  for  plaintiff  in  the
amount  of                                                                   $350.    On                                              25  September                                                            2000,  the  trial  court  granted
                                                                             plaintiff’s  motion  for  attorney  fees  and  awarded                                                                                                                $2,625.00.
Defendant appeals the order.
By defendant’s sole assignment of error, he argues the trial
court  abused  its  discretion  in  granting  plaintiff’s  motion  for
attorney fees pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  6-21.1.    We disagree.
The North Carolina General Statutes provide:
In  any  personal  injury  or  property  damage
suit,  or  suit  against  an  insurance  company




under   a   policy   issued   by   the   defendant
insurance company and in which the insured or
beneficiary  is  the  plaintiff,  upon  a  finding
by  the  court  that  there  was  an  unwarranted
refusal by the defendant insurance company to
pay  the  claim  which  constitutes  the  basis  of
such  suit,  instituted  in  a  court  of  record,
where the judgment for recovery of damages is
ten  thousand  dollars                                                         ($10,000)  or  less,  the
presiding judge may, in his discretion, allow
a reasonable attorney fee to the duly licensed
attorney representing the litigant obtaining a
judgment   for   damages   in   said   suit,   said
attorney's  fee  to  be  taxed  as  a  part  of  the
court costs.
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  6-21.1  (1999).    Under  this  statute,  the  trial
court  is  given  the  discretion  to  award  attorney  fees  to  the
prevailing party.   See Porterfield v. Goldkuhle, 137 N.C. App. 376,
528  S.E.2d                                                                    71                          (2000).   The  trial  court's  ruling  will  not  be
disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion.   West
v.  Tilley,  120  N.C.  App.  145,  461  S.E.2d  1  (1995).    An  abuse  of
discretion  occurs  when  the  trial  court's  ruling  “is  so  arbitrary
that  it  could  not  have  been  the  result  of  a  reasoned  decision.”
Chicora  Country  Club,  Inc.  v.  Town  of  Erwin,  128  N.C.  App.  101,
109, 493 S.E.2d 797, 802 (1997), disc. review denied, 347 N.C. 670,
500 S.E.2d  84  (1998)(citations omitted).
When  determining  whether  to  award  attorney  fees,  the  trial
court  must  consider  the  entire  record,  including  the  following
factors:  (1)  settlement  offers  made  prior  to  institution  of  the
action; (2) offers of judgment made pursuant to Rule 68 and whether
the judgment finally obtained was more favorable than such offers;
(3) whether defendant unjustly exercised superior bargaining power;




(4) in a case of unwarranted refusal by an insurance company to pay
the claim, the context in which the dispute arose;  (5) the timing
of settlement offers; and  (6) the amounts of settlement offers as
compared to the jury verdict.   Washington v. Horton, 132 N.C. App.
347,  351-52,  513 S.E.2d  331,  334-35  (1999).
The trial court made findings as to those factors as follows:
(1)  Allstate  engaged  in  settlement  negotiations  with  plaintiff
before the institution of suit and offered  $1,997.50.    Plaintiff,
in  turn,  rejected  it.                                                      (2)  After  suit  had  been  filed,  defendant
served  an  offer  of  judgment  for  the  same  amount.    It  was  also
rejected  by  plaintiff.    Plaintiff  had  incurred  costs  of  $67,  her
counsel  had  expended  a  total  of                                          17.50  hours,                                         $150  per  hour  was
reasonable as attorney fees, and plaintiff was in sum entitled to
$2,625  in  attorney  fees.    Attorney  fees  plus  the  jury  verdict  of
$350  totals  $2,975,  which  is  the  judgment  finally  obtained.    The
judgment finally obtained is more favorable to plaintiff than the
offer  of  $1,997.50.                                                         (3)    The  trial  court’s  findings  of  fact  did
not mention whether defendant may have unjustly exercised superior
bargaining  power.    However,  “‘the  absence  of  such  a  finding  does
not require reversal when the trial court made adequate findings on
the whole record to support an award of attorney’s fees.’”    Davis
v.  Kelly,                                                                    147  N.C.  App.                                       102,                   554  S.E.2d   402   (Nov.   6,   2001)(No.
COA00-1360)(quoting Olson v. McMillan, 144 N.C. App. 615, 619, 548
S.E.2d 571, 573-74 (2001).                                                    (4) There was no unwarranted refusal by
Allstate to pay the claim.   This finding is not necessary since the




suit  was  not  on  an  insurance  policy.    See  Crisp  v.  Cobb,  75  N.C.
App. 652, 331 S.E.2d 255 (1985).                                                (5)   One of the settlement offers
was  made  before  suit,  and  one  after,  both  in  the  amount  of
$1,997.50.                                                                      (6) The jury verdict was  $350.
Detailed  findings  are  not  required  for  each  factor.    Tew  v.
West, 143 N.C. App. 534, 546 S.E.2d 183 (2001).   These excerpts are
adequate findings of fact based on the whole record.   Additionally,
we  note  an  award  of  attorney  fees  must  be  reasonable.    The  trial
court found here that the award was reasonable and, further, there
is no allegation that the hours claimed or the amount per hour used
in the calculation was unreasonable.
Lastly, defendant argues the judgment finally obtained was not
more favorable to plaintiff than defendant’s offer of judgment.   We
disagree.    In  Tew,  where  the  offer  amount  was  $5,000,  the  jury’s
verdict was  $5,000, and the trial court had awarded the plaintiff
$555 in costs and $3,937.50 in attorney fees, this Court held that
the  judgment  finally  obtained  “is  not  merely  the  jury’s  verdict”
but the final amount awarded to the plaintiff, $9,492.50.   Id.   Our
Supreme Court has defined  “judgment” as  “‘[t]he final decision of
the  court  resolving  the  dispute  and  determining  the  rights  and
obligations  of  the  parties,’  and                                            ‘[t]he  law’s  last  word  in  a
judicial  controversy.’”    Poole  v.  Miller,  342  N.C.  349,  352,  464
S.E.2d  409, 411  (1995), reh’g denied, 342 N.C. 666, 467 S.E.2d 722
(1996)                                                                          (quoting  Black’s  Law  Dictionary   841-42   (6th  ed.   1990)).




Because the order contains the $350 jury verdict and attorney fees
of  $2,625, we hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
awarding attorney fees to plaintiff.
Furthermore,   plaintiff   has   moved,   in   this   Court,   for
attorney’s  fees  for  work  performed  during  the  appellate  process.
This Court has held that the trial court has authority, pursuant to
section 6-21.1 to award such fees.   See Hill v. Jones, 26 N.C. App.
168,  215  S.E.2d  168,  cert.  denied,  288  N.C.  240,  217  S.E.2d  664
(1975).    Accordingly, we remand this case for the limited purpose
of allowing the trial court, in its discretion and upon plaintiff’s
motion,  to  make  findings  of  fact  relevant  to  a  determination  of
reasonable attorney’s fees for services rendered on appeal and to
enter an award consistent with those findings.   See Davis v. Kelly,
147 N.C. App.  102,  554 S.E.2d  402  (Nov.  6,  2001)(No. COA00-1360).
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED.
Judges WYNN and WALKER concur.

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