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NO. COA10-636
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                       21 December  2010
RAYMOND BILL HARTMAN,
Petitioner,
v.                                                                           Iredell County
                                                                             No.  09 CVS  4135
MICHAEL ROBERTSON,
COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES,
NORTH CAROLINA DIVISION OF
MOTOR VEHICLES,
Respondent.
Appeal  by  petitioner  from  order  entered  11  February  2010  by
Judge W. David Lee in Iredell County Superior Court.   Heard in the
Court of Appeals  3 November  2010.
Homesley, Goodman & Wingo, PLLC, by Ronnie D. Crisco, Jr., for
petitioner-appellant.
Attorney  General  Roy  A.  Copper,  III,  by  Assistant  Attorneys
General  Christopher  W.  Brooks  and  William  P.  Hart,  Jr.,  for
the State, respondent-appellee.
JACKSON, Judge.
Raymond Bill Hartman  (“petitioner”) appeals an order entered
11 February  2010 affirming the revocation of his driver’s license
pursuant  to  North  Carolina  General  Statutes,  section  20-16.2(e).
For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
On                                                                           24  April           2009,  Mooresville  Police  Dispatch  received  an
anonymous  call  reporting  that  a  driver  of  a  silver  Mercedes  Benz
(“the Mercedes”) was driving erratically near a Citgo gas station




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off Williamson Road and possibly was intoxicated.   Officers Richard
Kratz                                                                         (“Officer   Kratz”)   and   Darren   Furr   (“Officer   Furr”)
(collectively  “the officers”) responded to the call and proceeded
toward  the  Citgo  gas  station  parking  lot.    As  the  officers  were
entering the parking lot, the dispatch told the officers that the
anonymous tipster, who still was on the phone line, said that the
Mercedes  was  leaving  the  gas  station  parking  lot.    Officer  Kratz
saw a silver Mercedes Benz that matched the caller’s description;
the Mercedes exited the parking lot, and the officers followed it.
As the Mercedes approached a red traffic signal to turn right
onto  Alcove  Road,  Officer  Kratz  observed  it  cross  over  the  stop
line  and  partially  enter  the  intersection  prior  to  stopping
completely.    The Mercedes then turned right onto Alcove Road, and
the officers followed it down that road.    Officer Kratz estimated
the  speed  of  the  Mercedes  at  approximately  sixty-five  miles  per
hour  in  a  forty-five  miles  per  hour  zone  and  initiated  a  traffic
stop.    Petitioner  was  the  driver  of  the  Mercedes.    Officer  Furr
first  approached  petitioner  and  asked  him  for  his  license  and
registration.     He  then  asked  if  petitioner  had  been  drinking.
Petitioner responded that he had had two beers and was on his way
home.    Officer  Furr  asked  petitioner  to  step  out  of  the  car  and
approach  the  rear  of  the  car  where  Officer  Kratz  was  standing.
Officer  Kratz  noticed  that  petitioner  was  “very  unsteady”  on  his
feet,  “had glassy eyes,” and had “a strong odor” of alcohol on his
breath.   As Officer Furr ran a diagnostic on petitioner’s license,
Officer  Kratz  asked  petitioner  to  submit  to  two  field  sobriety




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tests.     Petitioner  failed  the  field  sobriety  tests,  and  the
officers arrested petitioner for driving while impaired.    When he
arrived at the Mooresville Police Department, petitioner refused to
submit to a chemical analysis.
In a letter dated 8 March 2009, the North Carolina Division of
Motor Vehicles (“respondent”) notified petitioner that, pursuant to
North  Carolina  General  Statutes,  section                                  20-16.2,  petitioner’s
license would be suspended for one year for refusing to submit to
a  chemical  test.    Petitioner  requested  a  hearing  to  contest  the
revocation,  and  on  16  November  2009,  respondent  entered  an  order
upholding the revocation.   On 25 November 2009, petitioner filed a
petition  for  de  novo  hearing.    On  11  February  2010,  the  superior
court affirmed the revocation.    Petitioner appeals.
Petitioner  first  argues  that  Officer  Kratz  did  not  have
reasonable and articulable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop of
the Mercedes on  24 April  2009.    We disagree.
“On appeal to this Court, the trial court’s Findings of Fact
are  conclusive  if  supported  by  competent  evidence,  even  though
there may be evidence to the contrary.   We review whether the trial
court’s Findings of Fact support its conclusions of law de novo.”
Steinkrause v. Tatum,  ___ N.C. App.  ___,  ___,  689 S.E.2d  379,  381
(2009)                                                                        (internal  citations  omitted),  aff’d,   364  N.C.   419,   700
S.E.2d  222  (2010)  (per curiam).                                            “Where no exception is taken to a
finding of fact by the trial court, the finding is presumed to be
supported by competent evidence and is binding on appeal.”   Koufman




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v. Koufman,  330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731  (1991) (citations
omitted).
North Carolina General Statutes, section  20-16.2(a) provides
that  “[a]ny law enforcement officer who has reasonable grounds to
believe that the person charged has committed the implied-consent
offense may obtain a chemical analysis of the person.”    N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 20-16.2(a) (2007).   If the person charged refuses to submit
to  a  chemical  analysis,  his  or  her  license  will  be  revoked  for
twelve months.   N.C. Gen. Stat. §  20-16.2(d) (2007).   However, the
person charged may request a hearing before the DMV to contest the
revocation.    Id.    If  the  revocation  is  sustained  following  the
hearing, the person charged has the right to file a petition in the
superior  court  whereupon                                                   “[t]he  superior  court  review  shall  be
limited  to  whether  there  is  sufficient  evidence  in  the  record  to
support  the  Commissioner’s  findings  of  fact  and  whether  the
conclusions  of  law  are  supported  by  the  findings  of  fact  and
whether the Commissioner committed an error of law in revoking the
license.”    N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  20-16.2(e)  (2007).
North Carolina General Statutes, section  20-16.2(d) provides
that the hearing before the DMV with respect to a revocation of a
license
shall be limited to consideration of whether:
(1)                                                                          The    person    was    charged    with    an
implied-consent offense  .  .  .  ;
(2)  A  law  enforcement  officer  had  reasonable
grounds   to   believe   that   the   person   had
committed an implied-consent offense  .  .  .  ;




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(3)   The   implied-consent   offense   charged
involved  death  or  critical  injury  to  another
person,   if   this   allegation   is   in   the
affidavit;
(4)  The  person  was  notified  of  the  person’s
rights as required by subsection  (a); and
(5) The person willfully refused to submit to
a chemical analysis.
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  20-16.2(d)  (2007)  (emphasis added).
“In                                                                         [the  license  revocation]  context,  the  term                                                ‘reasonable
                                                                            grounds’ is treated the same as ‘probable cause.’”   Rock v. Hiatt,
                                                                            103 N.C. App. 578, 584, 406 S.E.2d 638, 642 (1991) (citing State v.
                                                                            Eubanks,  283 N.C.  556,  196 S.E.2d  706, reh’g denied,  285 N.C.  597
(1973);  State  v.  Adkerson,                                               90  N.C.  App.                                                            333,   368  S.E.2d   434
(1988)).                                                                    “[P]robable cause exists if the facts and circumstances
at that moment and within the arresting officer’s knowledge and of
which the officer had reasonably trustworthy information are such
that a prudent man would believe that the  [suspect] had committed
or was committing a crime.”   Id. (citing State v. Eubanks, 283 N.C.
556,  559,  196 S.E.2d  706,  708, reh’g denied,  285 N.C.  597  (1973))
(second alteration in original).
Here,  defendant  challenges  the  officers’  reasonable  and
articulable  suspicion  for  initiating  a  traffic  stop.     However,
reasonable and articulable suspicion for the initial stop is not an
issue to be reviewed pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes,
section  20-16.2.    According  to  section  20-16.2,  the  only  inquiry
with respect to the law enforcement officer is the requirement that
he                                                                          “ha[ve]  reasonable  grounds  to  believe  that  the  person  had




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committed   an   implied-consent   offense[.]”                                 N.C.   Gen.   Stat.
§  20-16.2(d)(2)  (2007).
Defendant’s contention is similar to the defendant’s argument
in Quick v. N.C. Division of Motor Vehicles, 125 N.C. App. 123, 479
S.E.2d 226, disc. rev. denied, 345 N.C. 643, 483 S.E.2d 711 (1997).
In  Quick,  the  petitioner  argued  that,  because  his  arrest  was
illegal,  his  subsequent  willful  refusal  to  submit  to  a  chemical
analysis could not be the basis for the revocation of his license
pursuant to section 20-16.2(d).   Id. at 125, 479 S.E.2d at 227.   In
that case, we held that even if the arrest had been illegal,
because   petitioner   was                                                     “charged   with   an
implied-consent  offense”  after  driving  on  a
“highway or public vehicular area” and because
[the   officer]   had                                                          “reasonable   grounds   to
                                                                               believe  [the  petitioner]  ha[d]  committed  the
implied -consent                                                               offense , ”                                         N .C .G .S .
§                                                                              20-16.2(a),   the   trial   court   correctly
affirmed  the  revocation  of  the  petitioner’s
license  on  the  basis  of  his  refusal  to  take
the chemical analysis.
Id.  (third alteration in original).    We further held that  “‘[t]he
question of the legality of [petitioner’s] arrest . . . [is] simply
not  relevant  to  any  issue  presented  in’  the  hearing  to  determine
whether his license was properly revoked.”   Id. at 126, 479 S.E.2d
at  228  (quoting  In  re  Gardner,  39  N.C.  App.  567,  574,  251  S.E.2d
723,                                                                           727                                                 (1979))        (ellipsis  and  third  alteration  in  original).
“[The] administration of the breathalyzer test . . . hinges solely
upon the . . . law-enforcement officer having reasonable grounds to
believe  the  person  to  have  been  driving  or  operating  a  motor
vehicle  on  a  highway  or  public  vehicular  area  while  under  the
influence  of  intoxicating  liquor.”    In  re  Gardner,  39  N.C.  App.




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567, 573, 251 S.E.2d 723, 727 (1979) (quoting State v. Eubanks, 283
N.C.                                                                       556,                                              561,                                             196  S.E.2d   706,                                    709,  reh’g  denied,   285  N.C.               597
(1973))                                                                                                                                                                                     (internal  quotation  marks  omitted)                          (second  ellipsis  in
original).    Accordingly, the propriety of the initial stop is not
within the statutorily-prescribed purview of a license revocation
hearing.
Furthermore, pursuant to our standard of review, the hearing
officer’s   findings   are   supported   by   the   evidence   and   his
conclusions are supported by the findings.    Petitioner challenges
only  two  findings  of  fact:                                             “6.  The  Petitioner  stopped  past  the
intersection midway into it then turned right onto Alcove Road” and
“7.  Officer  Kratz  followed  the  Petitioner  and  estimated  the
Petitioner’s speed to be  65/45mph zone at the time of the initial
a                                                                          [sic]   stop.”                                    However,  competent  evidence  supports  these
findings.    Officer  Kratz  testified  that  petitioner  “stopped  with
the vehicle in the intersection. It actually crossed the stop bar
angled  to  the  right  in  the  intersection.”     Officer  Kratz  also
testified  that  he                                                        “followed  the  vehicle,  caught  up  to  it[,]
estimated  speed  was  approximately                                       65mph,  that’s  a                                 45mph  zone.”
Officer Kratz’s testimony is competent evidence that supports both
of the challenged findings.
Petitioner  also  challenges  the  hearing  officer’s  second
conclusion of law, which reads, “A law enforcement officer, Richard
Kratz  and  Officer  Darren  Furr  had  reasonable  grounds  to  believe
that  the  Petitioner  had  committed  an  implied-consent  offense.”
This conclusion is supported by the findings of fact.   The hearing




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officer made the following relevant findings of fact, none of which
are disputed by petitioner:
3.                                                                        Officer Kratz came into contact with the
Petitioner  on  April  24,  2009  at  07:30PM  when
he  and  Officer  Darren  Furr,  Field  Training
Officer,   received   a   call   from   Dispatch
indicating  someone  in  a  silver  Mercedes  Benz
near exit  33 and Williamson Road near a Citgo
Gas  Station  displaying  erratic  driving  and
possibly intoxicated.
4.                                                                        Officer  Kratz  proceeded  to  the  area  and
observed  the  Petitioner  exiting  a  Citgo  Gas
Station PVA driving a silver Mercedes Benz.
9.                                                                        Officer  Furr  asked  the  Petitioner  if  he
had   consumed   any   alcohol;   the   Petitioner
answered                                                                  “yes,  I  drank  two  beers  and  was  on
[my] way home.”
10.   Officer Furr asked the Petitioner to step
out of the vehicle.
11.   The Petitioner got out of the vehicle and
was unsteady on his feet; had glassy eyes; and
a  strong  odor  of  alcohol  emitting  from  his
breath.
12.   The  Petitioner  did  not  advise  of  any
disabilities   or   injuries   upon   request   to
perform Field Sobriety Tests.
13.   Officer Kratz demonstrated and explained
and then asked the Petitioner to perform these
Field Sobriety Tests on a smooth level asphalt
surface:                                                                  Walk-and-Turn/Failed;                           One-Leg
Stand/Failed; no Alco-Sensor was done.
We hold that these findings of fact support the conclusion of law
that “[a] law enforcement officer, Richard Kratz and Officer Darren
Furr  had  reasonable  grounds  to  believe  that  the  Petitioner  had
committed an implied-consent offense.”   Accordingly, we affirm the




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superior   court’s   order,   which   affirmed   the   revocation   of
petitioner’s license.
Petitioner’s second argument is that, because the traffic stop
was  illegal,  the  evidence  gathered  subsequent  to  the  stop  should
have been suppressed.    We disagree.
“‘We review questions of law de novo.’”    Davis v. N.C. Dep’t
of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 151 N.C. App. 513,  516, 565 S.E.2d
716,  719  (2002)  (quoting Staton v. Brame,  136 N.C. App.  170,  174,
523 S.E.2d  424,  427  (1999)).
“The  Fourth  Amendment                                                       [to]  the  United  States  Constitution
secures  the  ‘right  of  the  people  to  be  secure  in  their  persons,
houses,  papers,  and  effects,  against  unreasonable  searches  and
seizures  .  .  .                                                             .’”    In  re  Freeman,  109  N.C.  App.  100,  103,  426
S.E.2d 100, 101 (1993) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV).   Article I,
section  20  of  our  North  Carolina  Constitution  provides  the  same
protections  as  the  federal  Fourth  Amendment.    In  re  Murray,  136
N.C.  App.  648,  652,  525  S.E.2d  496,  500  (2000)  (citing  State  v.
Hendricks,  43  N.C.  App.  245,  251-52,  258  S.E.2d  872,  877  (1979),
disc. rev. denied,  299 N.C.  123,  262 S.E.2d  6  (1980)).
“Separate  and  apart  from  the  question  of  whether  a  party’s
Fourth  Amendment  rights  have  been  violated  is  the  question  of
whether  a  violation  requires  the  exclusion,  in  any  civil  or
criminal  proceeding,  of  evidence  obtained  as  a  result  of  the
violation.”   In re Freeman, 109 N.C. App. at 103, 426 S.E.2d at 101
(citing  Illinois  v.  Gates,  462  U.S.  213,  223,  76  L.  Ed.  2d  527,
538-39,  reh’g  denied,  463  U.S.  1237,  77  L.  Ed.  2d  1453  (1983)).




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According  to  our  Supreme  Court,                                             “[i]n  deciding  whether  the
exclusionary  rule  should  be  applied  .  .  .  ,  we  must  keep  in  mind
its  purpose.”    State  v.  Lombardo,  306  N.C.  594,  599,  295  S.E.2d
399,  403  (1982).                                                              “Its purpose is  ‘not to redress the injury’” but
“‘to  deter  future  unlawful  police  conduct’  by  removing  the
incentive to disregard the fourth amendment.”   Id. (quoting United
States  v.  Calandra,                                                           414  U.S.                                           338,              347,                                                      38  L.  Ed.                  2d   561,   571
(1974)).                                                                                                                                              “The deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule is based
on the assumption that a police officer realizes that his duty is
to  conduct  searches  and  seizures  only  in  a  manner  that  will  help
secure  a  conviction.”    Id.    Our  Supreme  Court  then  declined  to
extend the exclusionary rule to probation revocation hearings.   Id.
When this Court previously has applied our precedent in this
area,  it  noted  that  evidence  in  a  license  revocation  hearing
similarly is not subject to the exclusionary rule.   Quick, 125 N.C.
App.  at                                                                        127  n.3,                                           479  S.E.2d  at   228-29                                                    (declining  to  apply  the
exclusionary  rule  in  a  license  revocation  hearing  because  “[t]he
United  States  Supreme  Court  has  held  that  the  exclusionary  rule
does not apply in the context of civil proceedings, United States
v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 459-60, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1046, 1064 (1976), and
our own Supreme Court has held that a license revocation proceeding
is civil in nature. State v. Oliver,  343 N.C. 202,  207, 470 S.E.2d
16,  20  (1996).”).   Accordingly, whether or not the officers in the
case  sub  judice  had  reasonable  and  articulable  suspicion  to  stop
petitioner, the evidence that resulted from the stop is not subject




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to the exclusionary rule.   Therefore, petitioner’s second argument
must fail.
Affirmed.
Judges HUNTER and ELMORE concur.

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