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NO. COA01-25
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  16 April  2002
BRENDA HARVEY,
Employee; Plaintiff,
v.
CEDAR CREEK BP,
Employer;
and
CASUALTY RECIPROCAL EXCHANGE,
Carrier; Defendants.
Appeal  by  defendants  from  order  filed  17  August  2000  by  the
North  Carolina  Industrial  Commission.     Heard  in  the  Court  of
Appeals  4 December  2001.
Maxwell    &    Melvin,    by    Stephen    R.    Melvin,    for
plaintiff-appellee.
Young  Moore  and  Henderson,  P.A.,  by  Joe  E.  Austin,  Jr.,  and
Tina Lloyd Hlabse, for defendant-appellants.
GREENE, Judge.
Cedar Creek BP and Casualty Reciprocal Exchange (collectively,
Defendants)  appeal  an  order  filed                                     17  August                                                     2000  by  the  Full
                                                                          Commission  of  the  North  Carolina  Industrial  Commission   (the
Commission)  vacating:                                                    (a)  an  order  by  the  deputy  commissioner
dismissing   a   workers’   compensation   claim   by   Brenda   Harvey
(Plaintiff) and  (b) a subsequent order by the executive secretary
allowing  Defendants’  motion  to  strike  Plaintiff’s  request  for  a
hearing.
On                                                                        19  May                                                        1995,  Plaintiff,  an  employee  of  Cedar  Creek  BP,
                                                                                                                                         filed a workers’ compensation claim, alleging she had injured her




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foot when she fell at work.   Plaintiff submitted a Form 33 dated 13
October 1998 requesting her claim be assigned for hearing before a
deputy commissioner.   A hearing was scheduled for 15 November 1999;
however,  neither  Plaintiff  nor  her  attorney  appeared  before  the
deputy  commissioner  on  that  date.    When  Defendants  moved  for  a
dismissal   of   Plaintiff’s   workers’   compensation   claim   with
prejudice,  the  deputy  commissioner  entered  an  order  filed            22
November 1999 dismissing Plaintiff’s claim without stating whether
he was doing so with or without prejudice.
In  a  second  Form  33  dated  19  January  2000,  Plaintiff  again
requested  her  claim  be  assigned  for  a  hearing.                                  Defendants
responded  by  filing  a  motion  dated                                     3  March   2000  requesting
Plaintiff’s Form  33 be stricken.   In an order filed 27 March 2000,
the  executive  secretary  granted  Defendants’  motion,  noting  the
deputy commissioner had dismissed Plaintiff’s claim with prejudice.
On  3 April  2000, Plaintiff appealed this order to the Commission.
In an order filed  17 August  2000, the Commission vacated both the
deputy  commissioner’s  dismissal  of  Plaintiff’s  claim  and  the
executive  secretary’s  order  striking  Plaintiff’s  request  for  a
hearing  on  the  grounds  that:  (1)  no  statutory  authority  for  the
dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim existed at the time of the hearing
on 15 November 1999; and (2) in the alternative, “the dismissal of
[P]laintiff’s  claim  terminated  [her]  exclusive  remedy  when  other
lesser  sanctions  were  appropriate  and  available”  and  therefore
constituted an abuse of discretion.




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The  dispositive  issue  is  whether  the  deputy  commissioner’s
dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim was with or without prejudice.
We  first  note  that  even  prior  to  the  enactment  of  Workers’
Compensation  Rule                                                            613(1)           (c), 1 the  Industrial  Commission,  which
includes  the  deputy  commissioner,  had  the  inherent  authority  to
dismiss a claim with or without prejudice for failure to prosecute.
“[T]he  Industrial  Commission  possesses  such  judicial  power  as  is
necessary to administer the Workers’ Compensation Act.”    Hogan v.
Cone  Mills  Corp.,  315  N.C.  127,  138,  337  S.E.2d  477,  483  (1985);
N.C.G.S. §  97-83  (1999).   One of the powers inherent in the courts
and  thus  also  in  the  Industrial  Commission  is  the  “power  of  the
court  to  dismiss  a  case  for  want  of  prosecution.”    Swygert  v.
Swygert,                                                                      46  N.C.  App.   173,                                         178,   264  S.E.2d   902,   905,  appeal
dismissed, 270 S.E.2d 116 (1980).   Accordingly, the Commission, in
falsely believing the Industrial Commission lacked such authority,
erred  in  setting  aside  on  this  basis  the  orders  by  the  deputy
commissioner and the executive secretary.
With  respect  to  an  involuntary  dismissal,  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §
1A-1,  Rule                                                                   41(b)  states:   “Unless  the  court  in  its  order  for
dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this section and
any dismissal not provided for in this rule,  .  .  . operates as an
adjudication upon the merits.”   N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 41(b) (1999).
1
Rule  613(1)(c) was enacted in June  2000 and provides:  “Upon
proper  notice  and  an  opportunity  to  be  heard,  any  claim  may  be
dismissed with or without prejudice by the Industrial Commission on
its own motion or by motion of any party for failure to prosecute
or  to  comply  with  these  Rules  or  any  Order  of  the  Commission.”
Workers’ Comp. R. N.C. Indus. Comm’n  613(1)(c),  2002 Ann. R. N.C.
770.




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In other words, an involuntary dismissal which fails to state that
it is without prejudice will be construed as being with prejudice.
While  “[t]he Rules of Civil Procedure are not strictly applicable
to  proceedings  under  the  Workers’  Compensation  Act,”  they  may
provide  guidance  in  the  absence  of  an  applicable  rule  under  the
Workers’ Compensation Act.   See Hogan, 315 N.C. at 137, 337 S.E.2d
at                                                                             483           (determining  the  Industrial  Commission  has  the  inherent
power, analogous to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 60(b)(6), to grant
relief from judgment).    The Workers’ Compensation Act provides no
direction for the proper interpretation of an involuntary dismissal
that  is  silent  on  whether  the  dismissal  is  with  or  without
prejudice.    Thus,  this  Court  may  look  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  1A-1,
Rule  41(b) for guidance.
Accordingly,  the  involuntary  dismissal  of  Plaintiff’s  claim
entered  by  the  deputy  commissioner  upon  Plaintiff’s  failure  to
prosecute,  which  does  not  mention  whether  it  was  entered  with  or
without  prejudice,  must  be  construed  as  having  been  entered  with
prejudice.     Because  the  dismissal  with  prejudice                        “terminated
[P]laintiff’s  exclusive  remedy  when  other  lesser  sanctions  were
appropriate   and   available,”   we   agree   with   the   Commission’s
alternative   conclusion   that   the   deputy   commissioner’s   order
dismissing  Plaintiff’s  claim  and  the  executive  secretary’s  order
allowing  Defendants’  motion  to  strike  Plaintiff’s  request  for  a
hearing  should  be  vacated  based  on  an  abuse  of  discretion  by  the




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deputy  commissioner 2 and  Plaintiff’s  claim  should  be  reset  for
hearing.    See  Matthews  v.  Charlotte-Mecklenburg  Hosp.  Auth.,  132
N.C. App. 11, 17, 510 S.E.2d 388, 393 (in reviewing a dismissal for
abuse of discretion, the exclusivity of the plaintiff’s remedy and
the appropriateness of alternative sanctions must be considered),
disc.  review  denied,                                                     350   N.C.   834,   538   S.E.2d   197   (1999).
Accordingly, we affirm the    Commission.
Affirmed.
Judges McCULLOUGH and CAMPBELL concur.
2
The Commission has the inherent power, analogous to N.C. Gen.
Stat.  §  1A-1, Rule  60(b)(6), to strike an order based on an abuse
of discretion.    See Hogan,  315 N.C. at  137,  337 S.E.2d at  483.

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