Preview:

An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA08-579
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                                          7 April  2009
CHARLES T. HOLT, Employee,
Plaintiff,
v.                                                                                              Industrial Commission
I.C. No.  024253
PETE WALL PLUMBING, Employer,
KEY                                                                                             K INSURANCE, Carrier,
Defendants.
Appeal by defendants from opinion and award filed  24 January
2008  by  Commissioner  Christopher  Scott  for  the  Full  Commission.
Heard in the Court of Appeals  19 November  2008.
Oxner, Thomas & Permar, PLLC, by Todd Oxner, for plaintiff.
Prather Law Firm, by J.D. Prather, for defendants.
ELMORE, Judge.
Pete Wall Plumbing (defendant employer) and Key Risk Insurance
Company (defendant carrier; together, defendants) appeal an opinion
and award issued by the Full Commission in favor of Charles T. Holt
(plaintiff).
Background
The following facts are undisputed: Plaintiff attended school
through the eighth grade and did not obtain a GED certificate.   He




-2-
has no vocational or technical training, but has gained substantial
plumbing  knowledge  by  working  as  a  plumber.     Plaintiff  was  a
plumber with defendant employer for seventeen years.    At the time
of his injury, he was earning a weekly wage of  $561.09.
On 13 March 2000, plaintiff picked up a pedestal lavatory bowl
and felt a sudden onset of pain in his lower back. James E. Nitka,
M.D., diagnosed plaintiff as having a lumbar sprain/strain.    On  7
April                                                                          2000,  defendants  filled  out  a  Form                               60, 1 admitting  the
injury’s   compensability.                                                     Upon   Dr.   Nitka’s   recommendation,
plaintiff did not work from  27 March  2000 until  3 July  2000, when
he returned to work for defendant employer as a “plumber’s helper.”
Plaintiff received temporary total disability benefits of  $386.69
during  that  time.    Dr.  Nitka  gave  plaintiff  the  following  work
restrictions: no lifting over 10-15 pounds, no bending or stooping,
and alternating sitting, standing, and walking.   Dr. Nitka’s final
restrictions,  dated  23  May  2001,  placed  plaintiff  on  light  duty
indefinitely, limiting his lifting to 25 pounds, barring bending or
stooping, and requiring plaintiff to alternate sitting, standing,
and  walking.     The  plumber’s  helper  job  was  beyond  plaintiff’s
physical limitations as set forth by Dr. Nitka, and therefore was
not suitable.
On  or  about                                                                  10  August                                                            2002,  the  employment  relationship
                                                                               between plaintiff and defendant employer ended.   Plaintiff alleges
1
“N.C.G.S.  §  97-18(b) permits an employer to admit that the
injury suffered by the employee is compensable, that the employer
is  liable  for  compensation,  and  to  notify  the  Commission  of  such
action  by  use  of  a  Form  60.”    Effingham  v.  Kroger  Co.,  149  N.C.
App.  105,  111-12,  561 S.E.2d  287,  292  (2002)  (citation omitted).




-3-
that he was fired, while defendant employer alleges that plaintiff
quit.  2 From  3 July  2000 until  10 August  2002, defendant employer
paid plaintiff approximately $8.00 per hour for his services.   The
parties  dispute  the  nature  of  plaintiff’s  work  during  that  time
period.   However, the Full Commission found the following relevant,
though challenged, facts:
4.   When   plaintiff   returned   to   work   for
defendant-employer  on  July                                               3,             2000,  he  was
assigned  to  work  in  the  warehouse  as  an
assistant to Norman Talbot and classified as a
“plumber’s helper.”    This warehouse assistant
job  was  not  a  position  that  was  normally
filled   by   defendant-employer.                                          While   Mr.
Talbot  had  an  assistant  in  the  past,  this
position  had  been  vacant  for  two  years  prior
to  plaintiff’s  filling  it,  and  it  was  not
filled after plaintiff left.   Plaintiff’s work
assignments were ambiguous and irregular.   His
tasks    included    sweeping,    cleaning    the
bathrooms,   unloading   supply   trucks,   and
putting up stock.   Defendant-employer produced
no   written   job   description.                                          Because   of
plaintiff’s  physical  limitations  as  a  result
of  the  March                                                             13,            2000[,]  injury,  defendant-
employer accommodated plaintiff and permitted
him to spend large portions of the workday in
a  reclined  position  with  his  shoes  and  socks
off.
5.  Significant  portions  of  plaintiff’s  work
duties in the “plumber’s helper” warehouse job
exceeded the restrictions given to him by Dr.
Nitka and several times per week plaintiff was
asked  to  perform  tasks  that  exceeded  his
restrictions.     For  instance,  plaintiff  was
sent by defendant-employer to pick up 80-pound
bags  of  sackcrete  as  well  as  heavy  pieces  of
sheetrock.
6.   In   addition   to   working   inside   the
warehouse, plaintiff was often sent to Lowe’s
or  plumbing  supply  stores  to  pick  up  items
2
We note, however, that defendants do not argue this issue in
their brief, nor is it the basis of any argument.




-4-
necessary   for   defendant-employer’s   use   on
various jobs.   Many times the weights of these
items                                                  exceeded                            plaintiff’s                     lifting
restrictions.                                                                              Defendant-employer’s   owner,
Jimmy  Wall,  testified  that  he  assumed  that
plaintiff  had  a  cashier  or  someone  help  him
lift  these  items.    After  plaintiff  obtained
items  from  the  store,  he  was  required  by
defendant-employer to deliver them to various
worksites.    Although  purported  by  defendants
to   be   a   light-duty   job,   the   warehouse
assistant  job  given  plaintiff  violated  the
lifting restrictions imposed by Dr. Nitka.
7.  Upon  plaintiff’s  return  to  work  in  the
“plumber’s  helper”  warehouse  job,  defendant-
employer  paid  plaintiff  exactly                     50%  of  his
pre-injury  hourly  rate.     Defendants  offered
the testimony of Etta Bridge, a bookkeeper for
defendant-employer.   Ms. Bridge testified that
the  company  policy  was  to  assess  a               50%  wage
loss  to  light  duty  workers  without  regard  to
prevailing  pay  rates  for  plumber’s  helpers.
The wages defendant-employer paid plaintiff to
perform  the  warehouse  “plumber’s  helper”  job
were  not  reflective  of  what  other  plumbing
companies would pay plaintiff to do plumber’s
helper work.
9.  Following  the  severance  from  defendant-
employer,  plaintiff  attempted  to  return  to
work for another plumbing company.    Plaintiff
was physically unable to perform the work and
quit within a few months.
10. Kristen Fountain testified as an expert in
the   field   of   vocational   rehabilitation.
Plaintiff    has    little    in    the    way    of
transferable  skills,  has  limited  education,
and is physically incapable of performing any
of  the  jobs  in  which  he  has  previously  been
employed.                                              Ms.   Fountain   testified   that
plaintiff  would  be  unable  to  secure  suitable
employment  because  of  plaintiff’s  physical
condition, education, and transferable skills.
While  Ms.  Fountain  believed  that  it  might  be
possible  for  plaintiff  to  obtain  a  position
such   as   a   parking   lot   attendant,   these
positions pay between $6.00 and $8.00 per hour
and are, therefore, not suitable.




-5-
12.   In   order   to   accommodate   plaintiff’s
medical                                                                        limitations,   defendant-employer
modified   the   warehouse                                                                    “plumber’s   helper”
position by allowing him frequent rest breaks
and   the   opportunity   to   recline.                                        This
employment,  as  modified,  is  not  available  in
the  competitive  employment  market  and  is,
therefore, not suitable.
13. The warehouse  “plumber’s helper” position
plaintiff  performed,  even  as  modified  for
plaintiff  with  the  addition  of  frequent  rest
breaks  and  the  ability  to  recline,  required
him  to  complete  duties  that  were  beyond  his
medical  restrictions.    Accordingly,  this  job
is not indicative of his wage earning capacity
and does not constitute suitable employment.
It  is  undisputed  that,  as  a  result  of  his  injury,  plaintiff  has
only been able to earn wages as a plumber’s helper with defendant
employer  and  as  a  plumber  for  a  few  months  at  the  other  plumbing
company.
Defendants  last  paid  disability  compensation  on                           11  August
2002.    Plaintiff  filed  his  request  for  a  hearing  on  10  February
2006; he asked for additional disability compensation.    On  1 June
2007,  Deputy  Commissioner  James  C.  Gillen  filed  an  opinion  and
award  in  favor  of  plaintiff.     He  ordered  defendants  to  pay
plaintiff  temporary  total  disability  compensation  at  a  rate  of
$374.08  per  week  for  the  period  from                                     27  March      2000  until  he
returned to work or the Commission ordered otherwise.    Defendants
then  appealed  to  the  Full  Commission,  which  affirmed  the  Deputy
Commissioner’s opinion and award.    Defendants now appeal the Full
Commission’s opinion and award.
Arguments




-6-
“This Court’s review is limited to a consideration of whether
there was any competent evidence to support the Full Commission’s
findings  of  fact  and  whether  these  findings  of  fact  support  the
Commission’s conclusions of law.”   Johnson v. Charles Keck Logging,
121  N.C.  App.                                                               598,                                      600,   468  S.E.2d   420,   422   (1996)   (emphasis
omitted)  (citing McLean v. Roadway Express,  307 N.C.  99,  102,  296
S.E.2d  456,  458  (1982)).                                                   “[S]o long as there is some evidence of
substance  which  directly  or  by  reasonable  inference  tends  to
support  the  findings,  this  Court  is  bound  by  such  evidence,  even
though there is evidence that would have supported a finding to the
contrary.”    Shah  v.  Howard  Johnson,  140  N.C.  App.  58,  61-62,  535
S.E.2d 577, 580 (2000) (quotations and citation omitted).                     “Thus,
on appeal, this Court does not have the right to weigh the evidence
and decide the issue on the basis of its weight. The court’s duty
goes no further than to determine whether the record contains any
evidence tending to support the finding.”   Adams v. AVX Corp., 349
N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998) (quotations   and citation
omitted).
A. Disability Award
Defendants  first  argue  that  the  Full  Commission  erred  by
concluding  as  a  matter  of  law  that  plaintiff  was  temporarily
totally  disabled  and  is  entitled  to  temporary  total  disability
compensation for the period beginning 27 March 2000 and continuing
until plaintiff returns to work or further order of the Industrial
Commission.   Defendants specifically argue that the Full Commission




-7-
improperly  placed  the  burden  of  rebutting  a  presumption  of
plaintiff’s disability upon defendants; they argue that plaintiff
bore the burden of proving his disability.
We agree that plaintiff bore the initial burden of proving his
disability and that the Full Commission did not clearly state that
plaintiff bore this burden.   Without holding that it is judicially
required for the Full Commission to explicitly state the burden of
proof   in   its   award,   we   remand   to  the  Full   Commission   for
clarification.
“In   order   to   obtain   compensation   under   the   Workers’
Compensation  Act,  the  claimant  has  the  burden  of  proving  the
                                                                              existence   of   his   disability   and   its   extent.”                                  Hendrix   v.
Linn-Corriher  Corp.,                                                         317  N.C.                                                  179,   185-86,   345  S.E.2d   374,           378
(1986) (citations omitted).   To support a conclusion of disability,
the plaintiff must prove and the Full Commission must find:
(1)  that  plaintiff  was  incapable  after  his
injury of earning the same wages he had earned
before his injury in the same employment,  (2)
that plaintiff was incapable after his injury
of earning the same wages he had earned before
his  injury  in  any  other  employment,  and                                 (3)
that this individual’s incapacity to earn was
caused by plaintiff’s injury.
Hilliard  v.  Apex  Cabinet  Co.,  305  N.C.  593,  595,  290  S.E.2d  682,
683  (1982)  (citation  omitted).    After  the  plaintiff  proves  these
elements,  the  burden  shifts  to  the  employer  to  show  that  the
plaintiff  is  employable.    Effingham  v.  Kroger  Co.,  149  N.C.  App.
105,  111,  561  S.E.2d  287,  292  (2002).                                   “Admitting  compensability
and  liability,  through  the  use  of  a  Form                               60,  does  not  create  a




-8-
presumption of continuing disability”; the burden is still on the
plaintiff.    Id. at  112,  561 S.E.2d at  292  (citation omitted).
Here,  plaintiff  presented  competent  evidence  of  the  three
Hilliard factors, which the Full Commission recited in its opinion
and  award,  and  acknowledged  in  conclusion  of  law  8  —  “Given  the
credible medical and vocational evidence of record, and as a result
of  his  compensable  injury  of  March                                       13,                                                      2000,  plaintiff  was
temporarily  totally  disabled  and  is  entitled  to  temporary  total
disability                                                                    .  for  the  periods  from  March                        27[,]                   2000,  and
continuing until plaintiff returns to work[.]”   Kristin Fountain’s
initial vocational report made the following relevant conclusions:
(1)  “According to the job duties described by Mr. Holt, the return
to   work   position   of   Warehouse   Assistant 3 was   not   a   viable
position.”                                                                    (2)  “Based on the contacts made with other employers,
it  does  not  appear  that  they  would  be  able  to  hire  Mr.  Holt  to
perform  duties  as  a  Warehouse  Assistant  as  business  is  slow  or
[they]  are  family  owned  and  operated.”                                   (3)  “No  appropriate  job
alternatives  were  identified  matching  [plaintiff’s]  transferable
skills, physical limitations, education and work history.”
Ms.  Fountain  confirmed  these  conclusions  in  her  deposition,
during which defendants accepted Ms. Fountain as an expert in the
area of vocational rehabilitation.   Ms. Fountain testified that, in
her  opinion,  the  pay  cut  of  one-third  to  one-half  incurred  by
plaintiff  did  not  constitute  suitable  employment.    He  had  made
3
Ms. Fountain used the term “warehouse assistant” to describe
the job that the parties refer to as a  “plumber’s assistant.”    We
use the terms interchangeably.




-9-
$14.50  per  hour  as  a  plumber,  but  dropped  to  $7.25 per hour  as  a
warehouse assistant.    Ms. Fountain testified that the  2004 median
range  for  warehouse  assistants  in  North  Carolina  was                   $9.67  per
hour, but that warehouse assistant job descriptions usually include
lifting in excess of twenty-five pounds.
Ms. Fountain testified that, given plaintiff’s education, age,
work   history,   physical   restrictions,   and   pre-injury   earning
capacity,   he   would   not   likely   be   able   to   obtain   suitable
employment.    She  testified  that  he  could  probably  find  work  as  a
parking lot attendant, a position that typically pays between $6.00
and                                                                           $8.00  per  hour,  or  other  positions  that  are  similarly  low-
paying  but  sedentary.    Ms.  Fountain’s  testimony,  which  the  Full
Commission  found  credible, 4 establishes  the  first  two  Hilliard
factors.   The third Hilliard factor, whether plaintiff’s incapacity
to  earn  was  caused  by  his  injury,  is  clearly  established  by  Dr.
Nitka’s medical reports.   These reports state that plaintiff’s work
restrictions are the result of his lower back injury.
Although  it  appears  that  the  Full  Commission’s  opinion  and
award  is  based  upon  a  proper  examination  of  competent  evidence
presented by plaintiff, and that this evidence satisfies the three
Hilliard factors, there is also evidence that the Full Commission
misunderstood  who  bore  the  burden  of  proof.    Conclusion  of  law  4
states, in relevant part:
4
“The Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of the
witnesses  and  the  weight  to  be  given  their  testimony.”    Adams  v.
AVX   Corp.,                                                                  349   N.C.                                                            676,   680,   509   S.E.2d   411,   413   (1998)
(quotations and citation omitted).




-10-
[A]n  employer  may  rebut  the  presumption  of
continuing  disability  through  evidence  “that
suitable  jobs  are  available  to  the  employee
and  that  the  employee  is  capable  of  getting
one,   taking   into   account   the   employee’s
physical                                                                     and                                       vocational   limitations.”
Franklin v. Broyhill Furniture Industries, 123
N.C.  App.                                                                   200,                                      206,         472  S.E.2d     382,          386
(1996).  “[M]ere  proof  of  a  return  to  work  is
insufficient to rebut the  .  .  . presumption,”
because                                                                      “capacity  to  earn  is  the  benchmark
test  of  disability.”    Kisiah  v.  W.R.  Kisiah
Plumbing,                                                                    124  N.C.  App.                           72,          81,             476  S.E.2d
434,  439  (1996).
These references to a rebuttable presumption suggest that the Full
Commission  may  have  shifted  the  burden  of  proof  of  plaintiff’s
disability  from  plaintiff  to  defendants.                                 This  language  of
presumption is contrary to the substance of the Full Commission’s
findings  and  conclusions,  which  met  its  obligation                     “to  make
specific  findings  regarding  the  existence  and  extent  of  any
disability suffered by plaintiff.”   Clark v. Wal-Mart, 360 N.C. 41,
44,  619 S.E.2d  491,  493  (2005)  (quotations and citation omitted).
Accordingly, we remand to the Full Commission to allow it to state
clearly which party had the burden of proof and what that party had
the burden to prove.
B. Time Limitations
Defendants  next  argue  that  plaintiff                                     “was  not  timely  in
alleging make-work as a basis for the present claim for benefits.”
Defendants argue that plaintiff cannot rely on the protections of
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  97-32.1  because  “more  than  nine  months  elapsed
before  plaintiff  quit  his  job  and  several  years  passed  before  he




-11-
asserted a claim for additional benefits.”    N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  97-
32.1 states, in its entirety:
Notwithstanding the provisions of G.S.  97-32,
an employee may attempt a trial return to work
for  a  period  not  to  exceed  nine  months.
During  a  trial  return  to  work  period,  the
employee shall be paid any compensation which
may be owed for partial disability pursuant to
G.S.  97-30.    If  the  trial  return  to  work  is
unsuccessful,    the    employee’s    right    to
continuing compensation under G.S. 97-29 shall
be  unimpaired  unless  terminated  or  suspended
thereafter pursuant to the provisions of this
Article.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-32.1 (2007).  5 Form 28T, which provides notice
of  an  employee’s  disability  compensation  by  reason  of  a  trial
return  to  work  pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §§  97-18.1(b)  and  97-
32.1 includes the following notice to the employee:
You are entitled to a trial return to work for
a period not to exceed nine (9) months .  . .
During  your  trial  return  to  work  you  may  be
entitled  to  partial  disability  compensation
if,  because  of  your  on  the  job  injury,  you
earn  less  wages  now  than  before  your  injury.
In order to request that your compensation be
reinstated  if  your  trial  return  to  work  is
unsuccessful, you should complete Form  28U.
We  agree  with  defendants  that  the  trial  return  to  work  period  is
limited  to  nine  months.    However,  at  the  end  of  that  nine-month
period,  an  employee   does  not  lose  his  right  to  disability
compensation;   he   only   loses   the   right   to   have   disability
5
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                             §   97-32  states,  in  its  entirety:   “If  an
injured  employee  refuses  employment  procured  for  him  suitable  to
his  capacity  he  shall  not  be  entitled  to  any  compensation  at  any
time during the continuance of such refusal, unless in the opinion
of  the  Industrial  Commission  such  refusal  was  justified.”    N.C.
Gen.  Stat.  §  97-32  (2007).    Section  97-29  sets  the  compensation
rates for total incapacity.    N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  97-29  (2007).




-12-
compensation automatically reinstated.   Section 97-32.1 is intended
to  encourage  employees  to  return  to  work  without  fear  of  losing
their disability benefits by specifying that the benefits will be
automatically  reinstated  if  the  return  to  work  fails  within  nine
months.   It does not extinguish an employee’s other existing rights
under the Workers’ Compensation Act.
Defendants  also  contend  that  plaintiff  was  time-barred  from
arguing   that   the   plumber’s   assistant   job   was   unsuitable.
Defendants  do  not  point  to  any  authority  that  supports  this
position, but rather reason that “[t]o rule otherwise would permit
the plaintiff to remain out of work indefinitely with no statute of
limitations[.]”                                                             “Until  all  of  an  injured  employee’s  compensable
injuries and disabilities have been considered and adjudicated by
the Commission, the proceeding pends for the purpose of evaluation,
absent  laches  or  some  statutory  time  limitation.”     Wilhite  v.
Veneer  Co.,                                                                303  N.C.                                               281,   284,   278  S.E.2d   234,   236   (1981)
(quotations  and  citations  omitted).     Defendants  do  not  make  a
serious  laches  argument  nor  do  they  point  to  any  statutory  time
limitation.   Consequently, we find that this argument lacks merit.
We remand to the Full Commission for clarification as to the
burden  of  proof  consistent  with  this  opinion.    The  remainder  of
defendants’ arguments are without merit.
Remanded.
Judges HUNTER, Robert C., and JACKSON concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

Download 08-579-5.pdf

South Carolina Law