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NO. COA02-610
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                       18 February  2003
ESTATE OF THOMAS GRAHAM, and KAY FRANCES FOX TAYLOR,
Plaintiffs
v.
LUCILLE MORRISON, JOHN HALLMAN, and LADD MORRISON,
Defendants
Appeal by defendants from judgment entered 21 February 2002 by
Judge Timothy L. Patti in Mecklenburg County Superior Court.   Heard
in the Court of Appeals  8 January  2003.
Samuel A. Wilson, III for plaintiffs-appellees.
Lawrence U. Davidson, III for defendants-appellants.
TYSON, Judge
Defendants appeal from a grant of partial summary judgment in
favor of the plaintiff.    We reverse and remand for trial.
I.    Background
In  May  2000,  Thomas  Graham,  a  diabetic  amputee,  was  in  poor
health.    Mr. Graham’s niece, Lucille Morrison  (“Lucille”), helped
care  for  Mr.  Graham  and  often  stayed  with  him  during  the  night.
Lucille  also  cared  for  Mr.  Graham’s  wife,  Melinda,  prior  to  her
death in  1991.
On                                                                           31  May             2000,  Mr.  Graham  granted  Lucille  a  durable  and
general power of attorney.   Lucille signed Mr. Graham’s name to the
power  of  attorney  at  his  request.    The  power  of  attorney  grants
Lucille  broad  powers  and  discretion  in  Mr.  Graham’s  affairs  but
does  not  expressly  contain  the  authority  to  make  gifts  of  real
property.   The power of attorney was notarized and recorded in the




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Mecklenburg County Register of Deeds on  1 June  2000.
On                                                                            26  October           2000,  Lucille,  as  attorney-in-fact  for  Mr.
Graham,  executed  a  general  warranty  deed  of  a  portion  of  Mr.
Graham’s  real  property  to  herself  as  Grantee.     This  deed  was
recorded  on                                                                  31  October           2000.                                               After   26  October   2000,  Lucille
continued to provide care and assistance to Mr. Graham.
Around                                                                        1  June               2001,  Plaintiff  Kay  Frances  Taylor,  (“Kay”),
moved   into  Mr.  Graham’s  house,  known  as                                “Coronet  Way”,  in
Charlotte.   Kay was   assumed to be the illegitimate daughter of Mr.
Graham, but their relationship had not been close.      Kay found Mr.
Graham through the help of a relative.
After  moving  into  the  house,  Kay  limited  Mr.  Graham’s
visitors.  Within  the  next  week,  Kay  admitted  Mr.  Graham  to  the
hospital under an assumed name.
On  5  June  2001,  Lucille,  as  attorney-in-fact  for  Mr.  Graham
executed  a  general  warranty  deed  on  Coronet  Way  to  her  son,  Ladd
Morrison,  (“Ladd”).    On  that  date,  Lucille,  as  attorney-in-fact,
also  conveyed  other  property  of  Mr.  Graham  to  John  Hallman  for
$3,000.00.    According  to  Lucille,  this  money  was  used  to  pay  her
attorney to defend this action.    Lucille contends that Mr. Graham
asked her to make the conveyances.
On  15  June  2001,  an  application  and  order  extending  time  to
file  a  complaint  was  filed  in  the  name  of  “Thomas  Graham  versus
Lucille Morrison, John Hallman, and Ladd Morrison” alleging fraud
in  creating  a  power  of  attorney  and  making  gifts  with  such
fraudulent  power.     The  complaint  in  this  action  was  filed  and




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verified  by  Kay,  based  upon  a  power  of  attorney  naming  Kay  as
attorney in fact for Mr. Graham.    A power of attorney executed on
20  June  2001  named  Kay  as  attorney  in  fact.    It  was  marked  by  a
crudely formed “X” on the signature line.   The power of attorney to
Kay  did  not  revoke  the  power  of  attorney  previously  granted  to
Lucille.
Defendants attempted but were unable to take the deposition of
Mr.  Graham  on  18  July  2001  and  19  July  2001  due  to  Mr.  Graham’s
illness and his attorney’s schedule.    Mr. Graham died on  7 August
2001.     Kay  entered  his  will  into  probate  that  day.    Plaintiff
amended its complaint on 10 August 2001 to substitute the estate of
Thomas Graham and herself as party plaintiffs.
Plaintiff  filed  a  motion  for  partial  summary  judgment  on  9
November  2001. Defendants filed notice of intent to offer hearsay
evidence  on                                                                    30  November   2001,  and  filed  a  motion  for  summary
judgment on 7 December 2001.   Partial summary judgment was granted
for  plaintiff  voiding  the  deeds  on  the  basis  that  the  power  of
attorney did not specifically authorize gifts.   Plaintiff’s motion
to  strike  the  hearsay  evidence  was  granted.    Defendants’  summary
judgment  motion  was  denied,  and  plaintiff’s  motion  for  summary
judgment on her claim of conversion was denied.   Defendants appeal,
and plaintiff asserts a cross-assignment of error.
II.    Issues
The  defendants’  issues  are  (1)  whether  the  deeds  to  Lucille
Morrison and Ladd Morrison from Thomas Graham, executed by Lucille
Morrison  as  attorney-in-fact,  are  void  because  the  power  of




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attorney contained no authority to gift, (2) whether Lucille’s and
Ladd’s actions caring for Thomas and his wife constitute adequate
consideration to support the transfers, and  (3) whether the trial
court  properly  excluded  hearsay  evidence  offered  by  defendants.
Plaintiff  assigns  error  to  the  trial  court’s  denial  of  summary
judgment on the  $3,000 conversion claim.
III.    Appellate Rule Violations
After defendants filed their original brief, plaintiff moved
to  dismiss  “Plaintiff’s  Appeal”  and  impose  sanctions  pursuant  to
Rule                                                                           34  of  the  North  Carolina  Rules  of  Appellate  Procedure  for
failure  to  comply  with  the  required  format  and  contents  of  an
appellate  brief  as  required  by  N.C.  R.  App.  P.  28(b)  (2001).    We
perceive plaintiff moved to dismiss “Defendants’ Appeal” for those
reasons.
Defendants  filed  a  replacement  brief  which  sufficiently
complies  with  the  Rules  of  Appellate  Procedure.    We  decline  to
dismiss the appeal, but note the poor quality of defendants’ brief
with  its  multitude  of  mistakes  that  could  have  easily  been
corrected through a mere proofread prior to filing.    N.C. R. App.
P. appendix B, E  (2001).
IV.    Interlocutory Appeals
Defendants appeal from a grant of partial summary judgment to
plaintiff  voiding  their  deeds.                                              “A  grant  of  partial  summary
judgment, because it does not completely dispose of the case, is an
interlocutory  order  from  which  there  is  ordinarily  no  right  of
appeal.”   Liggett Group v. Sunas,  113 N.C. App.  19, 23, 437 S.E.2d




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674,                                                                            677                     (1993)                                      (citations  omitted).     Interlocutory  orders  are
                                                                                appealable  where                                                   (1)  the  denial  of  an  appeal  would  affect  a
                                                                                                        substantial  right,  N.C.G.S.   §   1-277   (2001);  or                                            (2)  in  cases
involving multiple claims or parties, a final judgment is entered
as to one claim or party and the trial court certifies pursuant to
Rule  54(b) that there is no just reason for delay. N.C. R. Civ. P.
54(b)  (2001).
The summary judgment order affects a substantial right because
it declares defendants’ deeds void.   To deny appellate review would
allow  the  judgment  to  strip  defendants  of  their  property  without
any possible redress except another lawsuit.                                    “[T]he right to avoid
the  possibility  of  two  trials  on  the  same  issues  can  be  such  a
substantial  right.”    Green  v.  Duke  Power  Co.,  305  N.C.  603,  606,
290 S.E.2d  593,  595  (1982).
IV.    Standard of Review
Summary  judgment  is  appropriate  where  no  genuine  issues  of
material  fact  exist.    N.C.  R.  Civ.  P.  56(c)  (2001).    We  view  the
evidence in the light most favorable to defendants, the nonmoving
parties.   Hinson v. Hinson,  80 N.C. App. 561, 563,  343 S.E.2d  266,
268  (1986).
V.    Voided Deeds
Defendants  argue  that  the  trial  court  erred  in  voiding  the
deeds executed by Lucille, as attorney-in-fact, for Mr. Graham to
Lucille and Ladd.    The trial court based its decision on N.C.G.S.
§  32A-14.1(b) which states  “unless gifts are expressly authorized
by  the  power  of  attorney,  a  power  described  in  subsection  (a)  of




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this section may not be exercised by the attorney-in-fact in favor
of the attorney-in-fact or the estate, creditors, or the creditors
of  the  estate  of  the  attorney-in-fact.”    This  Court  previously
reviewed  this  statute  and  affirmed  summary  judgment  against  an
attorney-in-fact  who  transferred  her  principal’s  property  to
herself.   See Honeycutt v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 126 N.C. App.
816,  487 S.E.2d  166  (1997).
In  Honeycutt,  a  mother  granted  her  daughter  a  durable  and
general  power  of  attorney.    Id.  at  817,  487  S.E.2d  at  166.    The
mother later opened a trust account in her name at the local bank,
naming her son as the sole beneficiary with right of survivorship.
Id.    The  daughter  and  attorney-in-fact  for  the  mother  executed  a
new  signature  card  naming  herself  as  the  sole  beneficiary  of  the
account.    Id.,  487  S.E.2d  at  166-67.    After  the  mother  died,  the
son closed the account and received the balance.    Id.,  487 S.E.2d
at  167.    The  daughter  filed  suit  against  the  bank  for  breach  of
contract, negligence, and unfair business practice.   Id. at 817-18,
487  S.E.2d  at  167.    The  bank  joined  the  brother  as  a  third-party
defendant.    Id.  at  818,  487  S.E.2d  at  167.    The  brother  moved  to
dismiss  his  sister’s  claim  against  the  bank,  and  the  trial  court
granted  summary  judgment  in  favor  of  the  bank  and  the  brother,
holding that her power of attorney did not expressly allow her to
make gifts.    Id.
This  Court  relied  upon  the  analysis  in  Whitford  v.  Gaskill,
345 N.C.  475,  480 S.E.2d  690  (1997).    Id.
In  Whitford  v.  Gaskill,  345  N.C.  475,  [478],
480 S.E.2d  690,  692  (1997), our Supreme Court




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upheld  this  Court's  determination  that                                  “an
attorney-in-fact  acting  pursuant  to  a  broad
general power of attorney lacks the authority
to   make   a   gift   of   the   principal's   real
property   unless   that   power   is   expressly
conferred . . .                                                             .” In its rationale, the Court
noted that almost every jurisdiction which had
considered the issue has held that  “[a]
general power of attorney authorizing an agent
to  sell  and  convey  property,  even  though  it
authorizes  him  to  sell  for  such  price  and  on
such  terms  as  to  him  shall  seem  proper,
implies   a   sale   for   the   benefit   of   the
principal, and does not authorize the agent to
make  a  gift  of  the  property,  or  to  convey  or
transfer  it  without  a  present  consideration
inuring to the principal.”    Id. at  [477],  480
S.E.2d  at                                                                  691.  The  Court  further  noted  that
the  underlying  premise  behind  the  majority
rule is that  “an attorney-in-fact is presumed
to act in the best interests of the principal”
and  because  the  power  to  make  a  gift  of  the
principal's property is potentially adverse to
the principal, “such power will not be lightly
inferred from broad grants of power contained
in  a  general  power  of  attorney.”     Id.  at
[478],  480 S.E.2d at  692.
Honeycutt,  126  N.C.  App.  at  818-19,  487  S.E.2d  at  167  (emphasis
supplied).
These deeds are void if the conveyances are determined to be
gifts.     Lucille’s broad power of attorney did not expressly grant
her  the  right  to  make  gifts  of  real  property  on  behalf  of  Mr.
Graham.
VI.    Acts of Service As Consideration
Genuine issues of material fact exist whether the conveyances
were  gifts  or  were  transferred  for                                     “valuable  consideration”  as
recited  in  the  deeds.     We  reverse  the  trial  court’s  grant  of
summary  judgment.     The  trial  court  did  not  reach  these  issues
during the summary judgment hearing. The court apparently presumed




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the  deeds  to  be  gifts  because  no  excise  tax  appeared  on  either
deed.    Omission  of  excise  tax  does  not  per  se  transform  a  deed
given for valuable consideration into a deed of gift.    Recitation
of  valuable  consideration  within  the  deed  and  recording  create  a
rebuttable  presumption  that  the  conveyance  was  valid.     Chicago
Title Ins. Co. v. Wetherington, 127 N.C. App. 457, 463, 490 S.E.2d
593, 598 (1997), disc. review denied, 347 N.C. 574, 498 S.E.2d  380
(1998) (quoting Pelaez v. Pelaez, 16 N.C. App. 604, 606 192 S.E.2d
651, 652 (1972))(stating “‘[o]rdinarily, the consideration recited
in a deed is presumed to be correct.’”); Lance v. Cogdill, 236 N.C.
134,  136,  71 S.E.2d  918,  920  (1952)  (recordation of a deed raises
a  presumption  that  the  deed  was  duly  executed).                        There  is
substantial  evidence  in  the  depositions  of  Lucille  and  Ladd
Morrison  of  services  performed  for  Mr.  Graham.    Testimony  shows
that  Lucille  and  Ladd  helped  in  the  restoration  of  Mr.  Graham’s
home and cared for him and his wife before their deaths.   The deeds
do  not  purport  to  be  deeds  of  gift  but  recite  the  property  was
conveyed in exchange for  “valuable consideration.”
Past  consideration  or  moral  obligation  is  not  adequate
consideration  to  support  a  contract.    See  Jones  v.  Winstead,  186
N.C.  536,  540,  120  S.E.  89,  90-91  (1923).    Services  performed  by
one family member for another, within the unity of the family, are
presumptively                                                                 “rendered  in  obedience  to  a  moral  obligation  and
without expectation of compensation.”   Jones v. Saunders, 254 N.C.
644,  649,  119 S.E.2d  789,  793 (citing Allen v. Seay, 248 N.C.  321,
323,                                                                          103  S.E.2d                                               332,   333).   “[T]his  principle  of  law  does  not




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prevent a parent from compensating a child for such services, and
does  not  render  consideration  for  a  compensating  conveyance
inadequate.”    Id.
A genuine issue of material fact remains to determine whether
Lucille’s services rendered after the conveyance of real property
to  her  on                                                                  26  October                                                  2000  constitutes   “valuable  consideration”
bargained for by Mr. Graham which supports a purchased conveyance
and not a gift.   A similar issue exists concerning Ladd’s services
to  Mr.  Graham.    These  questions  of  fact  are  not  appropriate  for
determination upon a motion for summary judgment.
VII.    Admissibility of Hearsay Evidence
Defendants contend that statements of the decedent made in the
presence  of  Hattie  Kennedy  and  W.B.  Fuller  are  admissible  as
exceptions  to  the  hearsay  rule  pursuant  to  either  N.C.  R.  Evid.
804(b)(3)  or                                                                804(b)(5).    In  light  of  our  reversal  of  the  trial
court’s  partial  summary  judgment  order  and  remand  for  trial,  we
need  not  address  the  admissibility  of  the  affidavits  of  alleged
hearsay at the summary judgment hearing.
VIII. Plaintiff’s Cross-Assignment of Error
Plaintiff argues that the trial judge erred in denying summary
judgment on her conversion claim.   We decline to address this issue
as it is interlocutory.
IX.    Conclusion
We reverse the trial court’s order voiding the deeds as gifts
and  remand  for  a  factual  determination  of  whether  the  deeds  were
gifts or conveyances supported by  “valuable consideration.”




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REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and ELMORE concur.

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