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IN THE MATTER OF: Daniel Glenn Griffin, Juvenile.
NO. COA02-1592
Filed:                                                                                               3 February  2004
Juveniles--delinquency--first-degree sexual offense--fatal variance between petition and
evidence
The Court of Appeals exercised its discretionary authority under N.C. R. App. P. 2 and
determined that a juvenile order adjudicating respondent a delinquent for commission of first-
degree sexual offense and the subsequent dispositional order should be vacated because a fatal
variance existed between the juvenile petition and the evidence upon which respondent was
adjudicated delinquent, including that: (1) the petition alleged only sexual offense by force
against the victim’s will; (2) there was no evidence presented at the adjudicatory hearing which
tended to show respondent committed forcible sexual offense; and (3) the hearing transcript
indicates the trial court adjudicated respondent a juvenile first-degree sex offender based on the
respective ages of respondent and the victim, despite the petition’s failure to allege either the
victim’s age or the difference in age between respondent and the victim.
Appeal by respondent from juvenile adjudication order entered
12  February                                                                                         2002  by  Judge  Shirley  H.  Brown  in  Buncombe  County
District Court and from juvenile disposition order entered 14 June
2002  by  Judge  Bradley  B.  Letts  in  Haywood  County  District  Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals  28 October  2003.
Attorney  General  Roy  Cooper,  by  Assistant  Attorney  General
Neil Dalton, for the State.
James L. Goldsmith, Jr. for respondent-appellant.
Appellate  Defender  Staples  Hughes  and  Assistant  Appellate
Defender Matthew D. Wunsche, amicus curiae.
ELMORE, Judge.
Daniel Glenn Griffin (respondent) appeals from juvenile orders
adjudicating him delinquent for commission of first-degree sexual
offense in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  14-27.4, and imposing a
probationary sentence.   Respondent brings forth a single assignment
of error, asserting the trial court erred by denying his motion to
suppress a statement respondent gave to the detective investigating




this  case.     However,  we  do  not  address  this  issue  because  we
conclude  that  a  fatal  variance  existed  between  the  juvenile
petition  filed  herein  and  the  evidence  upon  which  respondent  was
adjudicated  delinquent,  in  that                                          (1)  the  petition  alleged  only
sexual offense “by force against the victim’s will;” (2) there was
no evidence presented at the adjudicatory hearing which tended to
show  respondent  committed  forcible  sexual  offense;  and                (3)  the
hearing transcript indicates the trial court adjudicated respondent
a juvenile first-degree sex offender based on the respective ages
of  respondent  and  the  victim,  despite  the  petition’s  failure  to
allege  either  the  victim’s  age  or  the  difference  in  age  between
respondent  and  the  victim.     This  fatal  variance  between  the
juvenile  petition  and  the  evidence  upon  which  respondent  was
adjudicated  delinquent  compels  us  to  vacate  the  adjudication  and
disposition orders.
Evidence presented at the adjudicatory hearing tended to show
that  respondent,  who  was  then  twelve  years  old,  respondent’s
sixteen-year-old half-brother, and the victim, then four, spent the
weekend   of                                                                10   November                       2000   at   their   grandmother’s   home.
Respondent  and  the  victim  were  cousins.     The  victim’s  mother
testified  that  upon  returning  home,  the  victim  told  her  that
respondent                                                                  “stuck   his                        [penis]   in                                [the   victim’s]   butt.”
Respondent’s half-brother testified that on the weekend in question
he heard the victim say respondent had “licked [the victim’s penis]
and stuck [respondent’s penis] in [the victim’s] butt.”   Dr. Cindy
Brown  examined  the  victim  on  13  November  2000  and  noted  redness
around his anal opening, which she testified was  “consistent with




penetration” but could also be caused by poor hygiene.    During an
interview with Detective Preston Hunnicutt of the Buncombe County
Sheriff’s Department on 16 November 2000, respondent stated that he
“licked                                                                   [the  victim]  on  his  private”  and         “stuck                                     [respondent’s]
private in  [the victim’s] butt.”
On  or  about                                                             1  October                                    2001,  a  juvenile  petition  was  filed
seeking adjudication of respondent as delinquent pursuant to N.C.
Gen. Stat. §  7B-1501(7) (2003).   The petition alleged only that on
or about 10 November 2000, in Buncombe County, respondent, then 12
years old,  “unlawfully, willfully, and feloniously engage[d] in a
sex offense with [the victim] by force against the victim’s will.”
At the adjudicatory hearing on 12 February 2002, after the close of
the  State’s  evidence,  the  following  exchange  took  place  between
respondent’s trial counsel, the prosecutor, and the trial court:
BY MR. WILLIAMS  [Respondent’s trial counsel]:
Your Honor, at this time I would like to make a motion to
dismiss. . .                                                              . Having reviewed the juvenile petition, it
is  clear  that  the  --  it  clearly  states  .  .  .  that  the
juvenile  Daniel  Griffin  did  unlawfully  and  willfully
engage  in  a  sex  offense  with                                         [the  victim]  by  force
against the victim’s will.    The petition alleges force,
and I don’t believe the Court can find any evidence as to
force that has been presented on record this morning or
this afternoon.
BY THE STATE:
Your Honor  .  .  .                                                       . Guilty of first degree sex offense is
(inaudible) who is a child under the age of  13  --
and if he’s 12 years old, he’s four years older than the
victim  --  (inaudible).    The  statute  is  clear,  14-27.4,
also  in  terms  of  amending  a  petition  when  it  does  not
change the nature of offense [sic] alleged.                               (Inaudible)
It does not change the nature of the offense as alleged.
.  .  . This case petition is valid.   There is no error in
the petition.




BY THE COURT:
Are  you  making  a  motion  to  amend  the  petition  at  this
time?
BY THE STATE:
If  that’s  the  case,  the  State  would  amend  just  the
language that said “with [the victim].”   We would delete
“by  force  against  the  victim’s  will”  in  terms  of  that
case,  Judge.     But  in  terms  of                                 --  in                                             70.2400,  the
amendment                                                            --  the  petition  could  be  amended  when  the
amendment  does  not  change  the  nature  of  the  offense
alleged.                                                             (Inaudible) In this case it does not change the
nature of the offense.
BY THE COURT:
Nor does it seem to change the  -- I mean, he had notice
all along that this is what the offense was concerning.
BY THE STATE:
The offense was concerning  14-27.4, first degree sexual
offense.   It’s an “or.”   It’s not an “and.”   So the State
does not have to elect to proceed under one or the other.
It could go with both.  .  .
BY MR. WILLIAMS:
.  There  are  two  theories  refined  in                            [N.C.  Gen.
Stat.  §  14-27.4].    One  is  --  one  concern  is  age.    I’ll
point  out  in  the  petition  there  is  nothing  as  to  [the
victim’s]  age  representing  [sic]  therein.  .                     .  There
hasn’t been one iota of evidence presented that any force
was used.  .  .                                                      .    The petition should  [be] dismissed.
BY THE COURT:
Are  you  telling  me  that  until  today  when  the  case  went
for  trial  that  you  had  no  idea  the  victim  was  a  four-
year-old child and a cousin of your client?   Is that what
you’re telling me?    You keep talking about no notice.  .
.  .  So  you’re  not  --  you’re  acknowledging  that  you  had
discovery  and  information  about  this  case,  that  it
involved a four-year-old child?
BY MR. WILLIAMS:




I’m just  -- I’m just asking the Court to take notice of
the procedures.
BY THE COURT:
And I’m asking you a question.   Did you have notice that
it involved a four-year-old child?
BY MR. WILLIAMS:
We  certainly  had  cause  to  believe  that  it  was  a  four-
year-old child.
BY THE COURT:
Did  you  have  --  did  you  receive  any  discovery  from  the
State such as a C and E and your client’s statement and
statements made by other?
BY MR. WILLIAMS:
Yes.
BY THE COURT:
Okay.    Your motion to dismiss is denied.    Will there be
evidence for your client?
After respondent declined to present any evidence, the trial court
again denied respondent’s renewed motion to dismiss and proceeded
to hear the State’s closing argument, as follows:
BY THE STATE:
. I’ll argue first in this case, Judge, there are
instructions on this offense. . .                                    . First, the defendant
engages  in  a  sexual  act  with  the  victim.  .  .                .  Second,
(inaudible) the victim was a child under the age of  13.
Third,  at  the  time  the  defendant                                --  in  this  case  the
juvenile defendant was at least 12 years old and was four
years  older  than  the  victim.    In  this  case,  Judge,  we
have -- every element has been satisfied in this case. .
. .   Under 14.27.41 [sic], a sexual act has occurred with
a  victim  who  is  a  child  under  the  age  of                    12  and  a
defendant -- excuse me -- a juvenile of at least 12 years
old  and  at  least  four  years  older  than                        --  that’s  the
evidence from the State, Judge.  .  .                                . The fact that the
sexual offense of someone that is  12 years old uses his
influence  over  a  person  who’s  four  is  why  our  statutes




have these types of laws in them.  .  .                                       . The State would
ask you to find him delinquent beyond a reasonable doubt.
Thereafter, the trial court ruled from the bench as follows:
BY THE COURT:
. In this matter, after hearing all of the evidence
and  arguments  of  counsel,  this  Court  finds  beyond  a
reasonable  doubt  that  on  November                                         10,                                                           2000,  Daniel
Griffin, who was then a  12-year-old child having a date
of  birth  of  9-2-88,  did  commit  a  sex  offense  upon  the
body  of                                                                      [the  victim],  who  was  a  four-year-old  child
having   a   date   of   birth                                                9-16-96,   the   sex   offense
consisting of licking the private part of that child as
well  as  penetrating  the  anus  of  that  child  with  his
penis,  and  adjudicates  him  delinquent  by  reason  of
committing a first degree sexual offense.  .  .
By written order entered the same day as the adjudicatory hearing,
using  the                                                                    “Juvenile  Adjudication  Order”  form  promulgated  by  the
Administrative  Office  of  the  Courts,  the  trial  court  made  the
following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
That  the  juvenile  through  his  attorney  denies  the
allegations  alleged  in  the  petition  filed  October                       1,
2001.                                                                         The  Court  finds  after  hearing  the  evidence
presented  that  the  juvenile  did  commit  the  act  alleged
and  finds  him  to  be  delinquent  by  reason  of  felony  sex
offense in violation of G.S.  14-27.4, felony class B1.
From  this  order  and  the  subsequent  disposition  order  entered  14
June  2002, respondent appeals.
At the outset we note that respondent, by choosing to assign
error  only  to  the  trial  court’s  denial  of  his  motion  to  suppress
respondent’s  statement  to  Detective  Hunnicutt,  has  not  raised  on
appeal  the  issue  of  whether  a  fatal  variance  existed  between  the
petition  and  the  evidence  upon  which  respondent  was  adjudicated




delinquent.   This issue has instead been presented by the Appellate
Defender’s amicus curiae brief, the filing of which was authorized
by N.C.R. App. P. 28(i) and allowed by this Court’s 10 October 2003
order.    While  N.C.R.  App.  P.                                            10(a)  provides  that                “the  scope  of
review   on   appeal   is   confined   to   a   consideration   of   those
assignments  of  error  set  out  in  the  record  on  appeal,”  we  are
mindful that N.C.R. App. P.  2 vests this Court with the authority
to  “suspend or vary the requirements or provisions of any of  [the
Rules  of  Appellate  Procedure]  in  a  case  pending  before  it  upon
application of a party or upon its own initiative” in order  “[t]o
prevent  manifest  injustice  to  a  party[.]”     In  light  of  the
potential  for  manifest  injustice  if  the  issue  raised  by  the
Appellate Defender’s amicus brief  - i.e., whether there existed a
fatal variance between the petition’s allegations and the evidence
presented  at  the  adjudication  hearing,  such  that  respondent  was
adjudicated  delinquent  for  commission  of  a  crime  that  was  not
properly  charged  in  the  petition                                         -  is  not  addressed,  we  hereby
exercise  our  authority  pursuant  to  N.C.R.  App.  P.  2  and  consider
1
the  “fatal variance” issue.
“Notice must be given in juvenile proceedings which would be
deemed constitutionally adequate in a civil or criminal proceeding;
that  is,  notice  must  be  given  the  juvenile  and  his  parents
1
We note that the certificate of service accompanying the
amicus brief indicates a copy was properly served upon the
assistant attorney general representing the State on appeal, and
that the State, though permitted by our appellate rules to do so,
chose not to file a reply brief to the amicus brief.    See N.C.R.
App. P.  28(i)  (“Reply briefs of the parties to an amicus curiae
brief will be limited to points or authorities presented in the
amicus curiae brief which are not presented in the main briefs of
the parties.”)




sufficiently  in  advance  of  scheduled  court  proceedings  to  afford
them  reasonable  opportunity  to  prepare,  and  the  notice  must  set
forth  the  alleged  misconduct  with  particularity.”     State  v.
Drummond,                                                                     81  N.C.  App.             518,        520,   344  S.E.2d   328,          330    (1986)
(quoting  In  re  Burrus,                                                                                275  N.C.   517,   530,          169  S.E.2d   879,   887
(1969)).   We have previously stated that a valid bill of indictment
is  necessary  in  order  to  properly  obtain  jurisdiction  over  a
criminal defendant charged with a felony.   State v. Poole, 154 N.C.
App.  419,  422,  572 S.E.2d  433,  436  (2002), cert. denied,  356 N.C.
689,  578  S.E.2d  589  (2003).    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  14-27.4(b)  (2003)
provides that any person who commits a first-degree sexual offense
“is guilty of a Class B1 felony.”   The pleading in felony cases is
an indictment, unless there is a waiver, in which case the pleading
is  an  information.    See  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  15A-923(a)  (2003).        “A
criminal  pleading  must  contain                                             [a]  plain  and  concise
factual  statement  in  each  count  which                                    .  asserts  facts
supporting every element of a criminal offense and the defendant’s
commission thereof with sufficient precision clearly to apprise the
defendant or defendants of the conduct which is the subject of the
accusation.”    N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  15A-924(a)(5)  (2003).    Similarly,
the petition in a juvenile action serves as the pleading, see N.C.
Gen.  Stat.  §  7B-1801  (2003),  and  a  petition  alleging  delinquency
must  “contain a plain and concise statement  .  .  . asserting facts
supporting every element of a criminal offense and the juvenile’s
commission thereof with sufficient precision clearly to apprise the
juvenile  of  the  conduct  which  is  the  subject  of  the  allegation.”
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  7B-1802  (2003)  (emphasis  added).    Therefore,  a




petition in a juvenile action serves essentially the same function
as an indictment in a felony prosecution and is subject to the same
requirement that it aver every element of a criminal offense, with
sufficient specificity that the accused is clearly apprised of the
conduct for which he is being charged.
As  noted  above,  the  juvenile  petition  in  the  present  case
alleged  only  that  respondent,  then                                      12  years  old,   “unlawfully,
willfully,  and  feloniously  engage[d]  in  a  sex  offense  with  [the
victim] by force against the victim’s will.”   Pursuant to N.C. Gen.
Stat.  §  14-27.4,
(a) A person is guilty of a sexual offense in the first
degree if the person engages in a sexual act:
(1) With a victim who is a child under the age of  13
years and the defendant is at least  12 years old and is
at least four years older than the victim; or
(2) With another person by force and against the will
of the other person, and:
a. Employs or displays a dangerous or deadly weapon
or an article which the other person reasonably believes
to be a dangerous or deadly weapon; or
b. Inflicts serious personal injury upon the victim
or another person; or
c. The person commits the offense aided and abetted
by one or more other persons.
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  14-27.4(a)  (2003).
After  a  thorough  review  of  the  record  and  transcript,  we
conclude that the State has failed to bring forth any evidence that
respondent  “engage[d] in a sex offense with  [the victim] by force
against  the  victim’s  will,”  as  alleged  in  the  juvenile  petition.
There was simply no evidence presented that respondent either used
or threatened physical force against the victim, as is required for




conviction of first-degree sexual offense under N.C. Gen. Stat.  §
14-27.4(a)(2).    Instead,  we  conclude  from  our  examination  of  the
transcript  that  the  State’s  contention  that  respondent  committed
first-degree sex offense was based entirely on the relative ages of
respondent  and  the  victim,  as  provided  in  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  14-
27.4(a)(1).   Where the illegality of sexual activity is based upon
the  relative  ages  of  the  parties,  age  is  an  essential  element  of
the offense.   State v. Locklear, 138 N.C. App. 549, 531 S.E.2d 853,
disc.  review  denied,                                                        352  N.C.   359,   544  S.E.2d   553   (2000).   A
juvenile  petition  which  purports  to  charge  first-degree  sexual
offense based on the ages of the parties is fatally defective if it
does not allege the ages of both the victim and the defendant.   In
re Jones,  135 N.C. App.  400,  409,  520 S.E.2d  787,  792  (1999).    As
noted  above,  the  petition  in  the  present  case  contained  no
allegations as to the victim’s age or the difference in age between
respondent and the victim.
The juvenile adjudication order which is the subject of this
appeal  states,  in  broad  terms,  that  the  trial  court                   “finds
[respondent]  to  be  delinquent  by  reason  of  felony  sex  offense  in
violation of G.S. 14-27.4, felony class B1.”   However, we conclude
from our examination of the hearing transcript that the trial court
determined respondent committed a first-degree sexual offense based
solely  on  the  relative  ages  of  respondent  and  the  victim,  rather
than, as alleged in the petition, on use of force by respondent to
overcome  the  victim’s  will.    The  trial  court  denied  respondent’s
motion  to  dismiss  after  establishing  that  respondent’s  trial
counsel was aware of the victim’s age.   Moreover, the trial court’s




oral  ruling  from  the  bench  contained  specific  findings  regarding
the ages of both respondent and the victim, but lacked any findings
concerning use of force by respondent.
For the reasons stated above, the juvenile order adjudicating
respondent  delinquent  and  the  subsequent  dispositional  order  are
vacated.
Vacated.
Judges WYNN and TIMMONS-GOODSON concur.

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