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NO. COA02-1265
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                       21 October  2003
IN RE THE MATTER OF:
Yancey County
No.  00  SP  13
WILLIAM BROOKS HIGGINS
Appeal  by  petitioner  from  order  dismissing  petition  for
adjudication  of  incompetence  entered                                      13  November       2000  by  Judge
James U. Downs in Yancey County Superior Court.   Heard in the Court
of Appeals  15 September  2003.
Wade Hall for petitioner-appellant.
Donny J. Laws for respondent-appellee.
EAGLES, Chief Judge.
This is an appeal from an order dismissing a N.C. Gen. Stat.
§  35A-1105 petition for adjudication of incompetence.    Petitioner
sought to have her brother, the respondent, declared incompetent.
At  the  time  of  the  hearing,  the  respondent,  William  Brooks
Higgins, was a seventy-six year old man who resided by himself in
Yancey  County.     Petitioner  is  the  respondent’s  sister,  Linda
Waldrep.   Petitioner visited respondent at his home in late January
or early February 2000 and decided that her brother did not need to
be living by himself.    Petitioner opined that respondent appeared
dirty, undernourished and in poor health and that the house was “a
wreck.”    Petitioner  took  respondent  to  her  home  and  attempted  to




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care for him there, but because she worked full time, was unable to
provide  adequate  attention  to  respondent’s  care.    Petitioner  had
respondent, a veteran, admitted to the Asheville VA Medical Center
on                                                                             10  February   2000.    The  staff  of  the  medical  center  did  not
address  competency  on  the  day  they  admitted  respondent,  but  did
note  that  his  mental  status  exam  revealed  orientation                   “only  to
person” and severe deficits in short term memory.
At  some  point  in  February  2000,  while  respondent  was  in  the
hospital, petitioner and Estel Higgins, the respondent’s brother,
each  obtained  a  power  of  attorney  for  respondent.    This  led  to  a
dispute  over  who  was  authorized  to  manage  respondent’s  care  and
financial affairs.   On 3 March 2000, petitioner filed a petition to
have  respondent  declared  incompetent,  in  Buncombe  County.    On  17
March 2000, Estel Higgins sought to intervene and moved to have the
venue changed to Yancey County.    On  29 March  2000, the matter was
transferred to Yancey County for a hearing before the Yancey County
Clerk of Superior Court.
In  July  2000,  the  clerk  conducted  the  hearing  and  dismissed
the  petition  because  he  did  not  find  by  clear,  cogent  and
convincing  evidence  that  respondent  was  incompetent.    Petitioner
then  appealed  to  have  the  matter  reheard  in  Superior  Court.
Respondent filed a motion to dismiss and petitioner filed a motion
for summary judgment before the Superior Court, both were denied.
The matter was then heard by the Superior Court in a bench trial.
On 13 November 2000, the Superior Court concluded that “Respondent
is    not  incompetent  and  declines  to  find  that  the  Respondent  is




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incompetent” and dismissed the petition.    Petitioner appeals this
decision.    During the pendency of this appeal, respondent died on
26 December  2002.
Petitioner argues on appeal that: (1) the trial court erred in
allowing  evidence  to  be  presented  by  individuals  other  than  the
petitioner  and  respondent,  (2)  the  trial  court  erred  in  denying
her motion for summary judgment, and  (3) the trial court erred in
dismissing the petition for adjudication of incompetence.   However,
the dispositive issue is whether, when the trial court dismisses a
petition for adjudication of incompetence, the action abates upon
the death of the respondent during the pendency of the petitioner’s
appeal.    We conclude that it does.
We note that the respondent died during the pendency of this
appeal.                                                                    “No action abates by reason of the death of a party while
an  appeal  may  be  taken  or  is  pending,  if  the  cause  of  action
survives.”   N.C.R. App. P. 38(a).   Consequently, we must determine
whether  the  cause  of  action  survived  respondent’s  death.     The
survival of causes of action is governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. §  28A-
18-1:
(a)  Upon  the  death  of  any  person,  all
demands whatsoever, and rights to prosecute or
defend   any   action   or   special   proceeding,
existing  in  favor  of  or  against  such  person,
except  as  provided  in  subsection  (b)  hereof,
shall  survive  to  and  against  the  personal
representative or collector of his estate.
(b)  The  following  rights  of  action  in
favor of a decedent do not survive:
(1) Causes of action for libel and
for slander, except slander of
title;
(2) Causes of action for false
imprisonment;




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(3) Causes of action where the
relief    sought could not be
enjoyed, or granting it would
be nugatory after death.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28A-18-1 (2001).   Here, the first two exceptions
clearly do not apply.    However, the third exception does apply.
The third exception provides that a cause of action does not
survive  a  party’s  death  where  the  relief  sought  could  not  be
enjoyed  or  granting  it  would  be  nugatory  after  death.                (Nugatory
meaning  “[o]f no force or effect; useless; invalid.”    Black’s Law
Dictionary  1093  (7 t ed.  1999)).    In  deciding  whether  the  reliefh
could not be enjoyed or granting it would be nugatory, this court
has  looked  at  the  purpose  or  the  desired  end  result  of  a
proceeding.   In Elmore v. Elmore,  67 N.C. App. 661, 313 S.E.2d  904
(1984), this Court found that a divorce action did not survive the
death  of  a  party  because  the  main  purpose  of  a  divorce,  the
dissolving of the marital state, was accomplished by the death of
a party.      Therefore, we examine the main purpose of incompetency
proceedings  for  adults  to  determine  whether     the  death  of  the
respondent obviates that purpose.
Chapter                                                                      35A  of  the  North  Carolina  General  Statutes  governs
incompetency  proceedings.    An  incompetent  adult  is  “an  adult  or
emancipated  minor  who  lacks  sufficient  capacity  to  manage  the
adult’s own affairs or to make or communicate important decisions
concerning the adult’s person, family, or property whether the lack
of capacity is due to mental illness, mental retardation, epilepsy,
cerebral  palsy,  autism,  inebriety,  senility,  disease,  injury,  or
similar cause or condition.”   N.C. Gen. Stat. § 35A-1101(7) (2001).




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When an adult is adjudicated incompetent, a guardian is appointed.
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  35A-1120  (2001).    The  guardian  is  to  help  the
incompetent   individual   exercise   their   rights,   including   the
management of their property and personal affairs, and to replace
the  individual’s  authority  to  make  decisions  when  the  individual
does not have adequate capacity to make those decisions.   N.C. Gen.
Stat.  §  35A-1201(a)  (2001).    As the guardian helps the individual
exercise their rights and makes decisions that the individual would
otherwise make, a guardian is essential only while the individual
is  still  alive.    After  the  individual  dies,  there  is  no  longer  a
need for a guardian to help the individual.   Thus, the result that
the  petition  seeks  to  accomplish  is  no  longer  necessary  after  a
respondent dies.
This  is  a  cause  of  action  where  granting  the  relief  sought
would  be  nugatory  after  the  death  of  the  respondent.    We  do  not
address the issue of whether there is an appeal of right from the
denial  of  a  petition  to  declare  a  person  incompetent.    See  N.C.
Gen.  Stat.  §  35A-1115.    We  conclude  that  a  petition  to  declare  a
respondent incompetent does not survive the death of the respondent
under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 28A-18-1.   Thus, the appeal abated upon the
26  December  2002  death  of  the  respondent.    The  appeal  has  become
moot and is accordingly dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
Judges McCULLOUGH and STEELMAN concur.

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