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NO. COA13-35
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  4 June  2013
In re: J.P. and P.F.
Rowan County
Nos.  12 JA  23,  22
Appeal  by  respondents  from  orders  entered  13  June  2012  and
11  October  2012  by  Judge  Charlie  Brown  in  Rowan  County  District
Court.    Heard in the Court of Appeals  8 May  2013.
Assistant    Appellate    Defender    Joyce    L.    Terres    for
respondent-appellant mother.
Ryan McKaig for respondent-appellant father.
Rowan  County  Department  of  Social  Services,  by  Cynthia  Dry,
petitioner-appellee.
Parker  Poe  Adams  &  Bernstein  LLP,  by  Katie  M.  Iams,  for
guardian ad litem.
HUNTER, Robert C., Judge.
Respondent-mother,  M.F.,  appeals  from  the  trial  court’s
order  adjudicating  her  minor  child  J.P.                                (“Jane”)  to  be  abused
and  neglected.     Respondent-mother  and  respondent-father,  J.F.,
(collectively  “respondents”)  appeal  from  the  trial  court’s  order




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adjudicating  their  minor  child  P.F.                                     (“Penny”)  to  be  neglected.1
Respondents  also  appeal  from  the  disposition  order  which  ceased
reunification  efforts  by  DSS  and  entered  a  permanent  plan  as  to
Penny   and   Jane.                                                         After   careful   review,   we   affirm   the
                                                                            adjudication  order.    As  to  the  disposition  order,  we  affirm  in
part and reverse in part.
                                                                            Background
                                                                            The  Rowan  County  Department  of  Social  Services                       (“DSS”)
filed  a  juvenile  petition  on                                            20  February                                                               2012  alleging  that
Penny  was  a  neglected  juvenile  and  that  Jane  was  an  abused  and
neglected  juvenile.    A  non-secure  custody  order  was  entered  for
both children on the same day.
On  10  May  2012,  respondents  and  Jane’s  father,  J.P.,  signed
a  consent  order  acknowledging  that  Penny  and  Jane  were  neglected
juveniles  and  that  Jane  was  an  abused  juvenile  based  on  clear,
cogent,  and  convincing  evidence.     On  the  same  day,  the  trial
court  entered  an  adjudication  order  which  created  a  concurrent
plan   of   reunification   with   respondent-mother   and   custody/or
guardianship  with  a  family  member  or  court-approved  caretaker  as
1                                                                           “Penny”  and  “Jane”  are  pseudonyms  used  to  protect  the  identity
of  the  minor  children.    Respondent-mother,  M.F.,  and  respondent-
father,   J.F.,   are   the   parents   of   the   minor   child   Penny.
Respondent-mother  and  J.P.  are  the  parents  of  the  minor  child
Jane; however, the father, J.P., is not a party to this appeal.




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a  temporary  permanent  plan  for  the  children.     The  order  also
provided  that  a  dispositional  hearing  was  to  be  scheduled  for
August  2012.
At  the  dispositional  hearing,  the  trial  court  considered
the  testimony  of  seven  witnesses  and  the  written  recommendations
of  DSS  and  the  children’s  guardian  ad  litem  (“GAL”).    The  trial
court   concluded   that   efforts   to   reunite   the   children   with
respondents  would  be  futile  and  inconsistent  with  the  children’s
safety  and  their  need  for  a  permanent  home  within  a  reasonable
period  of  time.    In  its  order  entered  11  October  2012,  the  trial
court  ruled  that  reunification  efforts  should  cease  and  set  a
permanent  plan  of  custody  or  guardianship  of  Penny  and  Jane  with
a  relative  or  court-approved  caretaker.    Custody  of  the  children
remained  with  DSS,  and  the  trial  court  ordered  that  a  permanency
planning   review   was   to   be   calendared   for   December                2012.
Respondents  filed  notices  of  appeal  from  the  trial  court’s
orders.     Acknowledging  that  their  notices  did  not  comply  with
the   Rules   of   Appellate   Procedure,   respondents   also   filed
petitions  for  writ  of  certiorari.     Although  we  granted  DSS’s
motions  to  dismiss  respondents’  appeals,  we  granted  respondents’
petitions for writ of certiorari.




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Discussion
Respondents  argue  that  the  trial  court  erred  by  adopting  a
temporary   permanent   plan   at   the   adjudication   hearing   and
permanent  plan  for  Penny  and  Jane  at  the  disposition  hearing
without  giving  respondents  the  statutorily  required  notice  of
its  intent  to  create  a  permanent  plan  as  required  by  N.C.  Gen.
Stat.  §  7B-907(a).    We disagree.
“We   review   a   dispositional   order   only   for   abuse   of
                                                                                                         discretion.”     In  re  B.W.,                                                          190  N.C.  App.                                                              328,                                             336,                               665  S.E.2d
462,                                                                        467                          (2008).                                                                                                                                                              “Questions  of  statutory  interpretation  are
                                                                                                                                                                                                 questions  of  law,  which  are  reviewed  de  novo  by  an  appellate
                                                                                                                                                                                                 court.”    In  re  A.C.F.,  176  N.C.  App.  520,  522,  626  S.E.2d  729,
                                                                                                                                          732  (2006)  (citation and quotation marks omitted).
                                                                                                         N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                §                                                      7B-507(c)                                                                                                                     (2011)  provides,  in  pertinent
part:
When  the  court  determines  that  reunification
efforts  are  not  required  or  shall  cease,  the
court  shall  order  a  plan  for  permanence  as
soon  as  possible,  after  providing  each  party
with  a  reasonable  opportunity  to  prepare  and
present    evidence.                                                        If    the    court’s
determination  to  cease  reunification  efforts
is  made  in  a  hearing  that  was  duly  and
timely   noticed   as   a   permanency   planning
hearing,   then   the   court   may   immediately
proceed   to   consider   all   of   the   criteria
contained  in  G.S.                                                         7B-907(b),  make  findings
of  fact,  and  set  forth  the  best  plan  of  care
to  achieve  a  safe,  permanent  home  within  a




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reasonable  period  of  time.     If  the  court’s
decision   to   cease   reunification   efforts
arises  in  any  other  hearing,  the  court  shall
schedule  a  subsequent  hearing  within  30  days
to  address  the  permanent  plan  in  accordance
with G.S.  7B-907.
(Emphasis  added.)    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  7B-907(a)  further  provides
that  when  the  trial  court  conducts  a  permanency  plan  hearing
“[t]he  clerk  shall  give                                                     15  days’  notice  of  the  hearing  and  its
purpose  to  the  parent  .  .  .  indicating  the  court’s  impending
review.”
The   adjudication   order   purports   to   enter   a                         “temporary
permanent   plan”   of   reunification   of   Penny   and   Jane   with
respondent-mother  concurrent  with  custody  or  guardianship  with  a
family   member   or   other   court-approved   caretaker.                     Although
respondents  contend  it  was  error  for  the  trial  court  to  enter
the  “temporary  permanent  plan”  at  adjudication  without  providing
notice  of  its  intent  to  do  so,  we  conclude  that  respondents
cannot  demonstrate  any  prejudice  by  this  alleged  error.    See  In
re  H.T.,                                                                      180  N.C.  App.                                 611,   613-14,   637  S.E.2d   923,   925   (2006)
(“[I]n  general,  technical  errors  and  violations  of  the  Juvenile
Code  will  be  found  to  be  reversible  error  only  upon  a  showing  of
prejudice   by   respondents.”).                                               To   the   extent   that   the
adjudication  order  did  so  without  notice,  the  alleged  error  was
rendered  harmless  by  the  trial  court’s  entry  of  a  permanent  plan




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at  disposition.    As  discussed  below,  respondents  did  not  object
to the creation of the permanent plan in the disposition order.
As  to  the  disposition  hearing,  respondents  contend  they
were  provided  no  notice  of  the  trial  court’s  intent  to  enter  a
permanent   plan,   which   is   required   by   section                      7B-907(a).
However,  in  In  re  J.S.,  165  N.C.  App.  509,  514,  598  S.E.2d  658,
662                                                                           (2004),  this  Court  held  that  a  party  waives  its  right  to
notice  under  section  7B-907(a)  by  attending  the  hearing  in  which
the  permanent  plan  is  created,  participating  in  the  hearing,  and
failing  to  object  to  the  lack  of  notice.    See  also  In  re  C.W.,
__   N.C.   App.                                                              __,                                                                  723   S.E.2d         582   (No.   COA11-1325)   (2012)
(unpublished)                                                                 (concluding  that  the  respondent-mother  waived  her
right  to  notice  that  a  permanent  plan  would  be  created  in  a
hearing  scheduled  only  for  adjudication  and  disposition  where
the  mother  and  her  counsel  attended  and  participated  in  the
hearing  without  objecting  to  the  lack  of  notice  required  by  N.C.
Gen. Stat.  §  7B-907(a)).
The   transcript   from   the                                                 6   September                                                        2006   disposition
hearing  establishes  that  the  trial  court  announced  its  finding
that  reunification  would  be  inconsistent  with  Penny’s  and  Jane’s
safety  and  announced  its  intent  to  enter  a  permanent  plan
without objection by respondents:




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THE  COURT:  The                                                            [c]ourt                                    .  further  bases
[i]ts  decision  to  issue  a  disposition  with  a
permanent    plan    of    custody    to                                    [sic]
guardianship.
Further for the Department?
[Counsel  for  DSS]:  No,  your  Honor.     Thank
you.
THE COURT: Further for the guardian?
[Counsel for GAL]: Thank you.
THE COURT: Further for Respondents?
[Counsel for respondents]: No, your Honor.
THE COURT: Thank you.
It  is  apparent  that  respondents  and  their  counsel  attended
and  participated  in  the  disposition  hearing  in  which  the  trial
court  announced  its  intention  to  enter  a  permanent  plan,  and
they  did  not  object  to  the  trial  court’s  failure  to  give  the
notice  required  by  section                                               7B-907(a).     In  accordance  with  our
holding  in  In  re  J.S.,  respondents  waived  any  objection  to  lack
of  notice  of  a  hearing  on  a  permanent  plan,  and  their  argument
is overruled.
II. Findings of Fact
Respondent-mother  contends  the  trial  court  erred  in  ceasing
reunification  efforts  without  making  findings  that  such  efforts
would  be  futile  or  would  be  inconsistent  with  the  children’s




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health,  safety,  and  need  for  a  safe,  permanent  home  within  a
reasonable period of time.    We disagree.
In a dispositional order, a trial court may direct
that   reasonable   efforts   to   eliminate   the
need  for  placement  of  the  juvenile  shall  not
be  required  or  shall  cease  if  the  court
makes written findings of fact that:
(1)  Such  efforts  clearly  would  be  futile  or
would  be  inconsistent  with  the  juvenile’s
health,   safety,   and   need   for   a   safe,
permanent  home  within  a  reasonable  period  of
time[.]
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                             §            7B-507(b)(1).   “This  Court  reviews  an  order
that  ceases  reunification  efforts  to  determine  whether  the  trial
court  made  appropriate  findings,  whether  the  findings  are  based
upon  credible  evidence,  whether  the  findings  of  fact  support  the
trial  court’s  conclusions,  and  whether  the  trial  court  abused
its  discretion  with  respect  to  disposition.”     In  re  C.M.,           183
N.C. App.  207,  213,  644 S.E.2d  588,  594  (2007).
Respondent-mother  contends  the  trial  court’s  order  does  not
make  an  ultimate  finding  relating  to  the  two  prongs  in  N.C.  Gen.
Stat.                                                                         §                            7B-507(b)(1),  that:                                                                                                        (1)  attempted  reunification  efforts
                                                                                                                                                            would  be  futile  or  (2)  reunification  would  be  inconsistent  with
                                                                                                                                                            the  juvenile’s  health,  safety,  and  need  for  a  safe,  permanent
                                                                                                                                                            home  within  a  reasonable  period  of  time.    In  In  re  I.R.C.,                                               __
                                                                              N.C.  App.   __,             __,                                714  S.E.2d   495,                                                                       498                                      (2011),  we  reversed  the




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trial  court’s  order  ceasing  reunification  because  the  trial
court  there  recited  allegations  against  the  respondent  but  did
not  “link”  any  of  those  allegations  to  the  two  prongs  of  section
7B-507(b)(1).    We  contrasted  the  order  at  issue  in  In  re  I.R.C.
with  orders  upheld  by  this  Court   as  meeting  the  statutory
requirements  upon  the  basis  that  “the  trial  court  in  those  cases
related  the  findings  to  a  conclusion  of  law  that  specifically
set  forth  the  basis  for  ceasing  reunification  efforts  under  N.C.
Gen. Stat.  §  7B-507(b).”    Id.
Here,   the   trial   court’s   order   contains   the   following
findings of fact:
60.                                                                           [Respondent-mother]  continues  to
live   with                                                                   [respondent-father]   even   though
she  understands  that  [Jane]  cannot  be  placed
with  her  since                                                              [respondent-father]  has  a  no
contact  order  with  [Jane],  and  [respondents]
have not complied with the court’s order.
61.    Based  upon  [respondent-father’s]  guilty
plea  to  Misdemeanor  Child  Abuse  in  district
court,   his   violation   or                                                 [sic]   probation
after   having   been   serving   probation   only
about  ninety  days,  the  changing  intentions
of  reconciliation  between  [respondents],  and
the  substantial  risk  to                                                    [Jane  and  Penny]  if
reunified   with                                                              [respondents],   a   permanent
plan  of  custody  or  guardianship  represents
the  safest  and  most  appropriate  permanent
plan for the juveniles.




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65.                                                                           It   would   be   contrary   to   the   best
interests  and  welfare  of  the  juveniles  to  be
returned   to   the   custody   of                                            [respondents]
since  the  issue  of  child  abuse  has  not  yet
been addressed by  [respondents].
These  findings  are  not  challenged  by  respondents  as  lacking
competent  evidentiary  support,  and  they  are  therefore  binding  on
appeal.    In  re L.A.B.,  178  N.C. App.  295,  298,  631  S.E.2d  61,  64
(2006).2                                                                                                                                                 These  findings  of  fact  support  the  trial  court’s
ultimate  conclusion:                                                                                                                                                                                                        “Continuing  a  plan  of  reunification  for
                                                                              the  juveniles  is  futile  based  on  the  findings  at  adjudication
                                                                              and   those   enumerated   above   and   is   inconsistent   with   the
                                                                              juveniles’  safety  and  their  need  for  a  permanent  home  within  a
reasonable  period  of  time.”                                                                                                                                                                                               (Emphasis  added.)    Thus,  the  trial
court                                                                                                                                                    “related   the   findings   to   a   conclusion   of   law   that
                                                                              specifically   set   forth   the   basis   for   ceasing   reunification
efforts  under  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                                                                                                                                            §                                              7B-507(b)[,]”  In  re  I.R.C.,   __
N.C.  App.  at                                                                __,                                                                        714  S.E.2d  at                                                                                                    498,  and  respondent-mother’s
argument is overruled.
2  We  note  that  respondent-mother  challenges  the  second  finding
contained  in  finding  No.  65——that  the  trial  court  found  that  the
Family  Reunification  Assessment  yields  a  high  risk  of  harm  to
the   juveniles   if   they   are   returned   to   respondents’   home.
However,  she  does  not  challenge  the  first  finding  that  the  issue
of child abuse has not been addressed by respondents.




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III. Visitation Plan
Respondent-father  argues,  and  GAL  agrees,  that  the  trial
court  failed  to  adopt  a  proper  visitation  plan  in  accordance
with  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                 §                                                                         7B-905(c)  as  the  plan  provided  in  the
                                                                        disposition  order  does  not  sufficiently  set  forth  the  time,
                                                                        place,   or   conditions   of   respondent-father’s   visitation   with
Penny.    We agree.
                                                                        Pursuant  to  the  Juvenile  Code,                                                                                      “[a]ny
                                                                        dispositional  order                                                      .  .  .  under  which  the
juvenile’s   placement   is   continued   outside
the   home   shall   provide   for   appropriate
visitation  as  may  be  in  the  best  interests
of   the   juvenile   and   consistent   with   the
juvenile’s  health  and  safety.”     N.C.  Gen.
Stat.                                                                   §                                                                         7B-905(c)                                     (2009).   “An  appropriate
visitation  plan  must  provide  for  a  minimum
outline  of  visitation,  such  as  the  time,
place,  and  conditions  under  which  visitation
may  be  exercised.”     In  re  E.C.,                                  174  N.C.
App.  517,  523,  621 S.E.2d  647,  652  (2005).
In  re  S.C.R.,                                                         __  N.C.  App.                                                            __,                                           __,       718  S.E.2d        709,   713   (2011)
(emphasis added).
In  In  re  T.B.,                                                       203  N.C.  App.                                                           497,                                          508-09,   692  S.E.2d        182,
189-90                                                                  (2010),  we  concluded  that  the  provisions  in  the  trial
court’s    dispositional    order    regarding    visitation    were
inadequate.     The  order  provided  that  the  mother’s  visitation
with  her  children  would   be   left  to  the  discretion  of  the
treatment  team,  must  be  supervised,  and  that  the  visitations




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must  adhere  to  the  rules  established  by  DSS.    Id.    We  remanded
the  order  to  the  trial  court  for  the  entry  of  additional
findings   and   conclusions   regarding   the   time,   place,   and
conditions  under  which  visitation  could  be  exercised.    Id.;  see
also  In  re  W.V.,                                                           204  N.C.  App.                                                290,     295,            693  S.E.2d               383,   387
(2010)                                                                        (remanding  for  proceedings  to  clarify  the  respondent’s
visitation  rights  with  her  child  where  the  trial  court’s  order
provided  that  the                                                           “respondent  shall  have  weekly  visitations
supervised  by  [DSS]”);  In  re  I.S.,  209  N.C.  App.  470,  708  S.E.2d
214                                                                           (No.  COA10-902)                                               (2011)   (unpublished)   (concluding  provisions
of  the  trial  court’s  order  regarding  visitation  were  inadequate
where  the  order  provided  that  respondent  was                            “entitled  to  at
least  two  visits  per  month”  that  were  to  take  place  at  the  home
of the child’s caregiver).
Here,  the  trial  court’s  order  provides  that  DSS                        “shall
offer  supervised  visitation”  for  respondent-father  with  Penny
“every-other  week”  and  that  visitation  will  be  reduced  to  once  a
month   if   respondent-father                                                “acts   inappropriately   during   a
visitation  or  does  not  attend  a  visit”  without  prior  notice.
Based  on  this  Court’s  holdings  in  In  re  T.B., in  In  re  W.V., and
in  In  re  I.S.,  we  reverse  and  remand  that  portion  of  the
disposition  order  regarding  respondent-father’s  visitation  with




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Penny.     We  remand  for  the  entry  of  additional  findings  and
conclusion   as   to   the   time,   place,   and   conditions   of   an
appropriate visitation plan.
Conclusion
Respondents  waived  their  right  to  notice  of  the  trial
court’s  intent  to  enter  a  permanent  plan,  as  required  by  N.C.
Gen.  Stat.                                                                §§                      7B-507(c)  and                                         7B-907(a).   The  trial  court’s
                                                                                                   decision  to  cease  reunification  efforts  in  its                11  October           2012
disposition  order  is  supported  by  sufficient  findings  of  fact.
We  reverse  and  remand  that  portion  of  the  disposition  order
regarding   respondent-father’s   visitation   with   Penny   for   the
making  of  additional  findings  and  conclusions  as  to  the  time,
place,  and  conditions  of  an  appropriate  visitation  plan.     The
remainder of the disposition order is affirmed.
The  13 June  2012 adjudication order is AFFIRMED.
The                                                                        11  October             2012  disposition  order  is  AFFIRMED  in  part
                                                                           and REVERSED in part.
Judges STROUD and ERVIN concur.

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South Carolina Law