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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal  authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule  30(e)(3) of the  North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA13-84
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  18 June  2013
In the matter of K.P.
Wake County
No.  11 JA  52
Appeal  by  Respondent  from  order  entered  2  November  2012  by
Judge  Margaret  P.  Eagles  in  Wake  County  District  Court.    Heard
in the Court of Appeals  9 May  2013.
Jennifer   M.   Jones,   for   petitioner-appellee   Wake   County
Human Services.
David A. Perez, for respondent-appellant mother.
Administrative  Office  of  the  Courts,  by  Appellate  Counsel
Tawanda N. Foster, for guardian ad litem.
DILLON, Judge.
Ashley  P.                                                                                      (Respondent)  appeals  from  a  permanency  planning
order   placing   K.P.1   into   the   guardianship   of   his   paternal
grandfather.    We affirm in part, and reverse and remand in part.
1  A  pseudonym  is  used  for  ease  of  reading  and  to  protect  the
juvenile’s privacy.




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The   evidence   of   record   tends   to   show   the   following:
Respondent,   the   mother   of   K.P.,   has   struggled   with   drug
addiction  for  nine  years.     On                                          18  February                                           2011,  Wake  County
Human  Services                                                              (WCHS)  filed  a  juvenile  petition  alleging  that
K.P.  was  neglected.    An  order  for  non-secure  custody  was  entered
the  same  day,  placing  K.P.  into  the  custody  of  WCHS  due  to
Respondent’s  drug  abuse  issues  and  domestic  violence  allegations
                                                                                                                                    involving   Respondent   and   K.P.’s   father.                             On                                              18   May   2011,
                                                                                                                                    Respondent  entered  into  a  consent  order,  which  found  K.P.  to  be
                                                                                                                                    a  neglected  juvenile.     The  consent  order  was  filed  on                                                             25  May
2011.                                                                        In  September                                                                                                                      2011,  K.P.  was  placed  with  his  paternal
grandfather.                                                                 On                                                     26   September                                                              2011,   following  a  permanency
planning  hearing,  the  trial  court  entered  an  order  ceasing
reunification  efforts.     Respondent  admittedly  had  developed  a
pattern   of   entering   substance   abuse   treatment   programs   but
thereafter relapsing into drug abuse.
In  January                                                                  2012,  Respondent  transferred  to  Kelly  House,  a
resident  substance  abuse  treatment  facility  in  Wilmington,  for  a
year-long  program.    While  at  Kelly  House,  Respondent  gave  birth
to  another  child,  which  she  was  allowed  to  keep  with  her.
However,  K.P.  could  not  be  placed  with  her  at  Kelly  House,  as
the program did not allow children over six months old.




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On                                                                            5  March                                         2012,  the  trial  court  entered  a  juvenile  order
noting   that   there   was   no   evidence   the   mother   had   made
substantial  progress  in  her  case  plan  and  that  the  permanent
plan  was  guardianship.    However,  in  April  2012,  Respondent  began
to  have  monitored  visitation  with  K.P.    Ann  Slaughter  of  the  New
Hanover  County  Department  of  Social  Services                             (NHDSS)  monitored
the  visitations.                                                             Ms.  Slaughter  expressed  no  concerns  about
Respondent  having  unsupervised  contact  with  K.P.     On                  30  July
2012,  the  trial  court  entered  a  juvenile  order  stating  that
Respondent  was  satisfied  with  K.P.’s  placement  with  his  paternal
grandfather.
Debbie  Reynolds,  Respondent’s  therapist,  contacted  Grace
Court,  another  substance  abuse  treatment  residential  program,
which   would   have   allowed   for   the   placement   of   K.P.   with
Respondent.    Ms.  Reynolds  testified  at  the  placement  review  and
permanency  planning  hearing  held  on                                       11  and                                          12  September                                           2012
that  Grace  Court  possibly  would  have  an  opening  that  would  allow
for  Respondent’s  residence  there  in  December                             2012  or  January
2013.
On                                                                            2  November                                      2012,  the  trial  court  entered  a  juvenile
order   placing   K.P.   into   the   guardianship   of   his   paternal
grandfather.    In  the  2  November  2012  order,  the  trial  court  made




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a  number  of  findings  of  fact.     Based  on  the  findings  of  fact
contained  in  the  order,  the  trial  court  concluded  that  it  was  in
K.P.’s  best  interest  to  assign  his  guardianship  to  the  paternal
grandfather.    From this order, Respondent appeals.
I:    Standard of Review
“Appellate  review  of  a  permanency  planning  order  is  limited
to  whether  there  is  competent  evidence  in  the  record  to  support
the  findings  and  the  findings  support  the  conclusions  of  law.”
In  re  R.A.H.,                                                               182  N.C.  App.                               52,    57-58,         641  S.E.2d    404,              408
(2007)                                                                        (citation  and  quotation  marks  omitted).                                        “If  the  trial
court’s   findings   of   fact   are   supported   by   any   competent
evidence,  they  are  conclusive  on  appeal.”     In  re  J.C.S.,            164
N.C.   App.                                                                   96,                                           106,   595   S.E.2d   155,           161               (2004)   (citation
omitted).     Unchallenged  findings  of  fact                                “are  presumed  to  be
supported  by  competent  evidence  and  are  binding  on  appeal.”    In
re  I.T.P-L.,  194  N.C.  App.  453,  462,  670  S.E.2d  282,  287  (2008),
disc. review denied,  363 N.C.  581,  681 S.E.2d  783  (2009).
“We  review  a  trial  court’s  determination  as  to  the  best
interest  of  the  child  for  an  abuse  of  discretion.”     In  re
D.S.A.,                                                                       181   N.C.  App.                              715,   720,           641   S.E.2d   18,               22       (2007)
(citation and quotation marks omitted).
II:    N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  7B-907(b)




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In  Respondent’s  first  argument,  she  contends  the  trial
court  erred  by  entering  a  permanency  planning  order  without
                                                                                                            making  the  findings  of  fact  required  by  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                               §                                                                             7B-
907(b)                                                                        (2011).                                                                                          Specifically,  Respondent  contends  that   “the
trial  court  made  no  finding  as  to  whether  it  was  possible  for
[K.P.]  to  be  returned  home  within  six  months.”     We  find  this
argument without merit.
“The  purpose  of  the  permanency  planning  hearing                         [is]  to
develop  a  plan  to  achieve  a  safe,  permanent  home  for  the
juvenile  within  a  reasonable  period  of  time.”    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §
7B-907(a)                                                                     (2011).                       “Pursuant   to   N.C.G.S.                                          §                                           7B-907(a),   in
determining  whether  it  is  possible  for  the  children  to  return
home  within  six  months  of  the  permanency  planning  hearing,  the
court  must  look  at  the  progress  the   parents  have  made  in
eliminating  the  conditions  that  lead  to  the  removal  of  the
                                                                              children.”    In  re  T.K.,                                                                                                                  171  N.C.  App.                                                               35,   39,                                          613  S.E.2d     739,
741,  aff’d,                                                                                                360  N.C.                                                          163,                                        622  S.E.2d                                                                   494   (2005)                                       (citing  N.C.
Gen.  Stat.                                                                   §                             7B-907(a)).                                                                                                                                                                                        “Further,  if  the  court  determines  it
                                                                                                                                                                                                                           is  not  possible  for  the  juvenile  to  return  home  within  that
                                                                                                                                                                                                                           time,  the  court  must  then  make  findings  as  to  why  it  is  not  in
                                                                                                                                                                                                                           the  juvenile’s  best  interest  to  return  home.”    Id.  (citing  N.C.
                                                                              Gen.  Stat.  §  7B-907(a)).                                                                                                                                                                                                      “In  determining  the  best  interests  of




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the  child,  the  trial  court  should  consider  the  parents’  right  to
maintain  their  family  unit,  but  if  the  interest  of  the  parent
conflicts  with  the  welfare  of  the  child,  the  latter  should
prevail.”    Id.  (quoting  In  re  Parker,  90  N.C.  App.  423,  431,  368
S.E.2d  879,  884  (1988)).
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  7B-907(b),  requires  a  trial  court  to  make
written  findings  on  all  of  the  relevant  criteria  as  provided  in
                                                                               the   statute.                                                                                                                                                                                                “The   trial   court   may   not   simply   recite
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  allegations,  but  must  through  processes  of  logical  reasoning
                                                                                                                                                                                                                  from  the  evidentiary  facts  find  the  ultimate  facts  essential  to
                                                                                                                                                       support  the  conclusions  of  law.”     In  re  Harton,                                                                                                                                    156  N.C.  App.
655,                                                                           660,                                                      577  S.E.2d   334,                                                       337                                                                        (2003)                                                (citation  and  quotation
                                                                               marks   omitted).                                                                                                                                                                                             “The   resulting   findings   of   fact   must   be
sufficiently  specific  to  enable  an  appellate  court  to  review  the
decision  and  test  the  correctness  of  the  judgment.”    In  re  J.S.,
165  N.C.  App.  509,  511,  598  S.E.2d  658,  660  (2004)  (citation  and
quotation  marks  omitted).    However,  “[t]his  Court  previously  has
not  required                                                                  .  a  strict  interpretation  of  section                 7B-
907(b)(1)[;]                                                                   [i]n  fact,  we  have  not  required  trial  courts  to
specifically  identify  the  factors  set  forth  in  section                  7B-
907(b),  provided  that  the  record  demonstrates  that  the  factors




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were  taken  into  account.”    In  re  T.R.M.,  188  N.C.  App.  773,  779,
656 S.E.2d  626,  630  (2008).
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  7B-907(b) requires the following:
.  At  the  conclusion  of  the  hearing,  if
the  juvenile  is  not  returned  home,  the  court
shall  consider  the  following  criteria  and
make  written  findings  regarding  those  that
are relevant:
(1)                                                                            Whether  it  is  possible  for  the  juvenile
to   be   returned   home   immediately   or
within  the  next  six  months,  and  if  not,
why  it  is  not  in  the  juvenile’s  best
interests to return home;
(2)                                                                            Where   the   juvenile’s   return   home   is
unlikely   within   six   months,   whether
legal  guardianship  or  custody  with  a
relative  or  some  other  suitable  person
should  be  established,  and  if  so,  the
rights    and    responsibilities    which
should remain with the parents;
(3)                                                                            Where   the   juvenile’s   return   home   is
unlikely   within   six   months,   whether
adoption  should  be  pursued  and  if  so,
any    barriers    to    the    juvenile’s
adoption;
(4)                                                                            Where   the   juvenile’s   return   home   is
unlikely  within  six  months,  whether  the
juvenile  should  remain  in  the  current
placement   or   be   placed   in   another
permanent living arrangement and why;
(5)                                                                            Whether  the  county  department  of  social
services    has    since    the    initial
permanency  plan  hearing  made  reasonable
efforts  to  implement  the  permanent  plan
for the juvenile;




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(6)   Any   other   criteria   the   court   deems
necessary.
Id.
In  this  case,  Respondent  contends  the  trial  court  erred  by
failing  to  make  findings  of  fact  regarding  whether  it  was
possible  for  K.P.  to  be  returned  home  within  six  months.    After
our  review  of  the  record  in  this  case,  we  conclude  that  even
though   the   trial   court   did   not                                       “specifically   identify   the
factors  set  forth  in  section  7B-907(b),”  the  record  demonstrates
that  the  factors  were  taken  into  account.    See  In  re  T.R.M.,  188
N.C.  App.  at  779,  656  S.E.2d  at  630;  see  also  In  re  J.C.S.,  164
N.C.  App.                                                                     96,                                                         595  S.E.2d                                                     155   (2004)   (stating  that   “[w]hile  the
permanency  planning  order  does  not  contain  a  formal  listing  of
the                                                                            §                                                           7B-907(b)(1)-(6)  factors,  expressly  denominated  as  such,
among  its                                                                     27  comprehensive  findings  of  fact,  we  conclude  the
trial  court  nevertheless  did  consider  and  make  written  findings
regarding  the  relevant                                                       §                                                           7B-907(b)  factors”).     Specifically,
among  other  findings,  the  trial  court  found  that  Respondent
“continues   to   have   unstable   housing,”   that                           “her   income   is
unknown,”  and  that  Respondent  does  not  have  a  plan  for  housing
if  she  is  not  accepted  into  the  Grace  Court  program,  a  program
for  which  she  had  not  yet  applied.     Because  the  record  shows
that  the  trial  court  took  into  account  the  factors  in  section




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7B-907(b),  we  conclude  Respondent’s  argument  pertaining  to  N.C.
Gen. Stat.  §  7B-907(b) is without merit.
II:    N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  7B-906(b)
In  Respondent’s  second  argument,  she  contends  the  trial
court  erred  by  waiving  further  review  hearings  in  this  matter
without  making  the  findings  of  fact  required  by  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.
§  7B-906(b)  (2011).    We  agree  and  remand  for  findings  of  fact  in
compliance with the mandate of N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  7B-906(b).
“The  general  rule  is  that  following  a  permanency  planning
hearing,                                                                       ‘[s]ubsequent  permanency  planning  hearings  shall  be
held  at  least  every  six  months  thereafter                                .  to  review  the
progress  made  in  finalizing  the  permanent  plan  for  the  juvenile,
or   if   necessary,   to   make   a   new   permanent   plan   for   the
juvenile.’”    In  re  R.A.H.,  182  N.C.  App.  52,  61,  641  S.E.2d  404,
410                                                                            (2007)                                                     (quoting  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                  §                                                                         7B-907(a)).                “These
                                                                                                                                                                                       hearings  may  be  combined  with  review  hearings  under  N.C.  Gen.
Stat.                                                                          §                                                          7B-906[;]                                    [moreover][,]                                                             [t]he  trial  court  may
                                                                                                                                                                                       dispense  with  these  hearings  under  certain  circumstances.”    Id.
                                                                                                                                          (citation  omitted).     N.C.  Gen.  Stat.   §                                                                         7B-906(b)  requires,  in
                                                                                                                                          relevant part, as follows:
Notwithstanding   other   provisions   of   this
Article,  the  court  may  waive  the  holding  of
review  hearings  required  by  subsection                                     (a)
of  this  section  .  .  .  if  the  court  finds  by




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clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that:
(3)   Neither  the  juvenile’s  best  interests
nor  the  rights  of  any  party  require
that  review  hearings  be  held  every  six
months;
(4)   All  parties  are  aware  that  the  matter
may  be  brought  before  the  court  for
review  at  any  time  by  the  filing  of  a
motion  for  review  or  on  the  court’s  own
motion;
Id.
In  the  case  sub  judice,  Respondent  contends  the  trial  court
failed  to  make  findings  of  fact  addressing  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  7B-
906(b)(3)  and  (4).    We  agree.    The  trial  court  made  no  finding
of  fact  that  neither  K.P.’s  best  interests  nor  the  rights  of
Respondent   require   that   review   hearings   be   held   every   six
months,  or  that  all  parties  are  aware  that  the  matter  may  be
brought  before  the  court  for  review  at  any  time  by  the  filing  of
a  motion  for  review  or  on  the  court’s  own  motion.     Without
making   the   requisite   findings,   the   trial   court   erred   by
dispensing  with  six-month  permanency  planning  hearings.    Because
the  trial  court  failed  to  find  the  criteria  required  by  N.C.
Gen.  Stat.  §  7B-906(b),  we  reverse  on  this  issue  and  remand  with
instructions  to  make  the  findings  of  fact  outlined  in  the
statute.    See  In  re  R.A.H.,  182  N.C.  App.  at  62,  641  S.E.2d  at




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410;  see  also  In  re  L.B.,                                              184  N.C.  App.                                   442,                 449,                        646  S.E.2d
411,  415  (2007).
III:    Best Interest
In  Respondent’s  third  argument,  she  contends  the  trial
court  erred  by  concluding  that  the  best  interest  of  K.P.  would
be   served   by   creating   a   guardianship   with   K.P.’s   paternal
grandfather.    We disagree.
In  the  case  sub  judice,  Respondent  challenges  four  of  the
findings  of  fact  made  by  the  trial  court,  contending  that  they
are   not   supported   by   competent   and   credible   evidence.
Respondent   also   specifically   argues   that   the   trial   court’s
conclusion  that  it  is  in  the  best  interest  of  K.P.  to  give
“guardianship  to  the  paternal  grandfather”  is  “simply  not  at  all
supported by any proper findings of fact by the trial court.”
Respondent  specifically  challenges  findings  of  fact  number
4,   number                                                                 14,   number                                      17,   and   number   26,   which   state   the
following:
4.                                                                          That  it  is  in  the  best  interests  of  the
child  that  this  Court  adopt  as  its  Order  the
plan  proposed  by  Wake  County  Human  Services
to  achieve  a  safe,  permanent  home  for  the
child  within  a  reasonable  period  of  time,  to
wit:  -  to  return  home  continues  not  to  be  in
the   child’s   best   interests   because   the
parents  have  not  made  sufficient  progress  in
changing   the   conditions   that   caused   the
child to be removed from their care.




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14.   That                                             [Respondent]   has   not   obtained
stable  housing.                                       [Respondent]  is  residing  in
                                                       the    Kelly    House    residential    treatment
program,  and                                          [K.P.]  could  not  reside  with
[Respondent]  in  that  program.                                                                           [Respondent]
has   not   secured   housing   for   herself   or
[K.P.]                                                 upon    completing    the    program.
[Respondent]  intends  to  apply  for  admission
to   Grace   Court.                                    Grace   Court   is   a
residential   treatment   facility   that   would
permit                                                 [Respondent],  her  infant  child,  and
[K.P.]  to  reside  together  if  accepted  into
the  program.     Ms.  Reynolds  testified  that
Grace  Court  is  a  year[-]long  program  that
focuses  on  providing  another  level  of  care
for  treatment  of  women  with  substance  abuse
issues.                                                                                                    The   program   focuses   on   gender
                                                       specific   issues,   and   helps   residents   to
become                                                 self-sufficient                                                                                        and                                       maintain
sobriety.                                                                                                  Ms.    Reynolds    stated    that
[Respondent]  could  not  parent  on  her  own
without continued support.
17.   That  Ann  Slaughter,  social  worker  from
New  Hanover  Department  of  Social  Services,
supervised  visits  between                            [Respondent]  and
[K.P.]  on  behalf  of  WCHS  from  May  2012  until
                                                       September                                           2012.                                              Ms.  Slaughter  transported
                                                                                                           [K.P.]  to  the  Kelly  House  for  visitation.
                                                                                                           Ms.  Slaughter  stated  she  supervised  eight
                                                       visits,  and  that                                                                                     [Respondent]  cancelled  the
July                                                   9,                                                                                                     2012   visitation   because   she   was
                                                                                                           giving  birth  to  her  infant  child,  who  now
                                                                                                           resides   with   her   at   Kelly   House.         Ms.
                                                                                                           Slaughter    stated    that                        [Respondent]    was
                                                                                                           appropriate  during  visitation,  and  that  she
                                                                                                           felt   comfortable   with                          [Respondent]   having
                                                                                                           unsupervised  visitation  with                     [K.P.]  in  the
community.     Ms.  Slaughter  was  unaware  that




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[K.P.]  has  a  food  allergy  to  dairy  products,
until  the  date  of  this  hearing.                                         [In]  August
2012,                                                                        [Respondent],  who  was  aware  of  the
allergy,  fed                                                                [K.P.]  pizza  with  cheese.    Ms.
Slaughter  indicated  that  she  was  not  aware
of                                                                           [K.P.]  having  any  food  allergies  at  the
time  of  the  visits,  but  otherwise  had  no
comment about the incident.
26.   That                                                                   [Respondent]   continues   to   have
unstable  housing                                                            [Respondent]  has  begun  to
work,  but  she  is  employed                                                20  hours  a  week,
and her income is unknown.
After  our  review  of  the  record  in  this  case,  we  believe  the
four  findings  of  fact  challenged  by  Respondent  are  supported  by
competent  evidence,  and  we  believe  the  findings  of  fact  in  the
trial  court’s  order  are  sufficient  to  support  the  trial  court’s
conclusion  that  the  best  interest  of  K.P.  is  guardianship  to  the
paternal  grandfather.     The  evidence  in  this  case  shows  that
Respondent  was  largely  uninvolved  in  K.P.’s  life  until  she  began
visitations  approximately  five  months  prior  to  the  September
2012  permanency planning hearing, did not have stable housing2 or
2  During  the  first  year  of  K.P.’s  life,  Respondent  moved  many
times  in  and  out  of  residential  treatment  facilities  or  homeless
shelters  with  K.P.  and  was  incarcerated.     At  the  time  of  the
hearing,  Respondent  was  residing  in  the  Kelly  House  residential
treatment  program,  in  which  K.P.  could  not  reside,  as  the
facility  would  not  allow  children  over  six  months  old.     If
Respondent   is   not   accepted   into   the   Grace   Court   program,
Respondent  has  no  alternative  plan  to  provide  stable  housing  for
herself  or  K.P.     Respondent  has  three  other  children  who  were




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income3 to provide for K.P.’s welfare, and had been in and out of
treatment   facilities   without   finishing   a   program   before
relapsing  into  drug  use.    The  evidence  also  shows  that  K.P.  had
been  in  a  stable  placement  with  his  paternal  grandfather  in
Wilmington,  that  K.P.  is  thriving  in  this  placement,  and  that
his  needs  are  being  met;  moreover,  K.P.  is  bonded  to  his
paternal  grandfather,  and  the  grandfather  has  stable  employment,
in  a  position  in  which  he  has  been  working  for  nine  years,  and
housing.                                                                      K.P.   is   provided   his   own   room   in   his   paternal
grandfather’s  house.    We  believe  that  based  on  the  evidence  in
this  case,  which  is  competent  to  support  the  challenged  findings
of  fact,   the  trial  court  did  not  abuse  its  discretion  in
determining  that  it  was  in  K.P.’s  best  interest  to  create  a
guardianship  with  K.P.’s  paternal  grandfather.    See  In  re  T.K.,
171  N.C.  App.  35,  38,  613  S.E.2d  739,  741,  aff’d,  360  N.C.  163,
622  S.E.2d                                                                   494                                                             (2005)   (stating  that   “the  court  considered  that
some  progress  had  been  made  by  respondent-mother  and  father
toward  correcting  the  conditions  which  lead  to  removal  of  the
children; however that progress was not nearly enough”).
removed from her care due to substance abuse issues.
3  Testimony  is  conflicting  regarding  Respondent’s  income  and  the
incident  involving  K.P.’s  food  allergy;  however,  it  is  the  trial
judge’s  duty  to  pass  upon  the  credibility  of  the  witnesses  and
resolve  any  conflicts  in  the  evidence.    In  re  Whisnant,  71  N.C.
App.  439,  441,  322 S.E.2d  434,  435  (1984)  (citation omitted).




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AFFIRMED, in part; REVERSED and REMANDED, in part.
Judge GEER and Judge ELMORE concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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South Carolina Law