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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA01-752
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  7 May  2002
IN RE: JOSEPH RAY MURRAY                                                                        Cabarrus County
No.  00 J  85
Appeal  by  respondent  from  order  filed  12  September  2000  by
Judge Donna H. Johnson in Cabarrus County District Court.   Heard in
the Court of Appeals  26 March  2002.
Kathleen Arundell Widelski, for Cabarrus County Department of
Social Services, petitioner-appellee.
Sam S. Spagnola, for respondent-appellant.
GREENE, Judge.
James Demond Murray (Repondent), the putative father of Joseph
Ray Murray (Joseph), appeals an order filed 12 September 2000 (the
adjudication  order)  adjudicating  Joseph  neglected  and  awarding
custody  of  Joseph  to  the  Cabarrus  County  Department  of  Social
Services                                                                                        (DSS)  and  a  concurrent  order  terminating  his  parental
rights as to Joseph  (the termination order).1
On  2 May  2000, DSS filed a petition alleging Joseph had been
neglected  by  Respondent  and  a  second  petition  requesting  the
1
While  the  record  is  not  clear  as  to  Respondent’s  notice  of
appeal, we read it as relating to both the adjudication order and
the termination order.




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parental  rights  of  Respondent  be  terminated  based  on  neglect.    A
hearing  was  held  on  11  May  2000  wherein  the  trial  court  ordered
custody of Joseph be placed with DSS.   On 24 August and 8 September
2000,   the   petition   alleging   neglect   and   the   petition   for
termination of parental rights were heard simultaneously before the
trial  court.                                                                 The  evidence  presented  during  this  proceeding
revealed  Joseph  was  born  with  numerous  health  problems  on             9
December                                                                      1999 2 and  required  continued  hospitalization  for  seven
months.    DSS  began  its  investigation  based  on  a  report  dated  17
March 2000 alleging: Joseph’s mother (the mother) was homeless; her
father  refused  to  allow  her  to  bring  Joseph  home;  the  mother  did
not  have  a  plan  for  Joseph’s  care;  and  the  mother  and  Respondent
had broken up.    The mother subsequently relinquished her parental
rights.
From  the  time  of  Joseph’s  birth  through                                 17  April                                                      2000,
Respondent  visited  Joseph  only  a  few  times.    The  investigating
social  worker  made  several  attempts  to  locate  Respondent  and
finally made contact with Respondent on 17 April 2000.   Respondent
entered into a protection plan with DSS, agreeing to visit Joseph
on  certain  days  selected  by  Respondent.     While  Respondent’s
visitation was not restricted, he nevertheless failed to visit as
planned.
When Joseph was released from the hospital into foster care on
13 July 2000, DSS again contacted Respondent.   Respondent arranged
2
These health problems included respiratory distress disease,
episodes of apnea and bradycardia, sepsis, jaundice, patent ductus
arteriosus, anemia, and early chronic lung disease.




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with DSS to visit Joseph on 2 August 2000 but subsequently canceled
the visit.    Respondent thereafter never requested visitation.    In
addition,  Respondent  failed  to  avail  himself  of  opportunities  to
learn  how  to  properly  care  for  Joseph’s  ongoing  health  needs  as
suggested to him by DSS.
In the adjudication order filed  12 September  2000, the trial
court found in pertinent part that:
6.  [Joseph] does not receive the proper care,
supervision   or   discipline   from
Respondent.
i)                                                                          [O]n  April  17,  2000,  as  a  result  of
[DSS’]  efforts,                                                            [Respondent]  contacted
[DSS] for the first time and during that
conversation  he  was  told  that  upon  his
next   visit   to   Joseph,   he   needed   to
identify himself [as] Joseph’s father and
ask the hospital staff about the training
he needed to care for Joseph.
o)                                                                          [Respondent]   was   made   aware   of
Joseph’s   medical   and   other   special
needs[,]  such  as  the  need  to  bond  with
the  child  and  the  need  to  learn  how  to
care for him.
u)                                                                          [A]t  the  time  of  his  discharge  on
July 13, 2000, Joseph[’s] needs included,
but w[ere] not limited to, the following:
1)  A  g-tube  in  his  stomach  for
feedings for his oral aversion,
2)  An apnea monitor,
3)  Oxygen,
4)  Physical therapy,




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5)  Early  intervention  services  for
developmental   problems,   some   of
which   were   due   to   his   lack   of
bonding    with    his    mother    and
[Respondent,]
6)  Numerous   weekly   visits   with
specialists[,]
7)  A caretaker with skills in CPR,
and  training  in  how  to  care,  feed,
hold, comfort and monitor Joseph.
z)   August                                                         2,                                                                 2000,      [when   Respondent
telephoned   to   cancel   a   visit   with
Joseph,]  was  the  last  time  [Respondent]
contacted  [DSS] about Joseph.
The trial court concluded Respondent had neglected Joseph in that
Joseph                                                              “does   not   receive   the   proper   care,   supervision,   or
discipline.”
In the termination order, filed the same day, the trial court
found that:
11.                                                                 [E]ach of the following grounds exist to
                                                                    terminate  .  .  .    Respondent’s parental rights
                                                                    pursuant to N.C.G.S.  §  7B-1111(1)  [sic]:
a.                                                                  [Respondent]  has  neglected                                       [Joseph]
and                                                                 [Joseph]  is  neglected  within  the
meaning  of  N.C.G.S.  §  7B-101  in  that  he
does   not   receive   the   proper   care,
supervision  or  discipline  from
Respondent    as    adjudicated    in                               [the
adjudication  order]  dated  September  12,
2000 and the  [findings of] facts of  [the
adjudication   order]   are   adopted   and
incorporated   as                                                   [the   trial   court’s]
findings of fact.
12.                                                                 [P]ursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7B-1110[,] it is
in  the  best  interest  of  [Joseph]  that  .  .  .
Respondent’s parental rights be terminated.




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a.                                                                       [Respondent] visited with Joseph less
than  eight                                                              (8)  times  since  his  birth,
with  the  last  visit                                                   [being]  on  May                        17,
2000,   and   therefore,   Joseph   has   not
bonded with him.
b.  Joseph  still  has  extensive  medical
needs[,]  and  he  is  still  on  oxygen  and
continues  to  suffer  from  oral  aversion
and requires specialized care during his
feedings.
c.                                                                       [A]lthough                              [Respondent]    has    the
ability  to  learn  to  care  for  Joseph,  he
has  not  taken  steps  to  learn  how  to
administer that care.
d.  Joseph is currently in a foster home
where he receives the care and nurturing
that he needs.
The  trial  court  concluded  that  statutory  grounds  existed  to
terminate  Respondent’s  parental  rights,  among  these  Respondent’s
continued neglect of Joseph.
The  dispositive  issue  is  whether  the  neglect  found  by  the
trial  court  in  the  adjudication  order  and  relied  upon  in  the
termination  order  was  present  at  the  time  of  the  termination
proceeding.
                                                                                                                                                                                                                   Neglect,  within  the  meaning of  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  7B-101(15),
                                                                                                                                              constitutes one of the grounds that can support the termination of
parental  rights.    N.C.G.S.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                §   7B-1111(a)(1)                                           (1999).    In  order  to
                                                                         prove neglect in a termination case:
                                                                                                                                              there  must  be  clear  and  convincing  evidence:
                                                                                                                                              (1)  the  juvenile  has  not,  at  the  time  of  the
                                                                                                                 termination   proceeding,                                                                                                                                                                                                       “receive[d]   proper
                                                                                                                                              care,   supervision,   or   discipline   from   the
                                                                                                                                              juvenile’s parent  .  .  .”; and  (2) the juvenile
                                                                                                                 has   sustained                                                                                                                                                          “some   physical,   mental,   or
                                                                                                                 emotional  impairment                                                                                                                                                                                                           .  or                  [there  is]  a




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substantial   risk   of   such   impairment   as   a
consequence of  [such] failure.”
In  re  Pope,  144  N.C.  App.  32,  37,  547  S.E.2d  153,  156  (citations
omitted)                                                                       (emphasis  added),  aff’d,                                              354  N.C.   359,   554  S.E.2d   644
(2001).
In this case, Respondent did not assign error to any findings
or  conclusions  of  the  trial  court’s  order  adjudicating  Joseph  a
neglected juvenile.    Respondent’s assignments of error deal solely
with the termination order.   Accordingly, the trial court’s findings
and   conclusions   in   the   adjudication   order,   which   were   also
incorporated into the termination order, are presumed to be correct
and supported by the evidence.   See In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 404,
293 S.E.2d  127,  133  (1982), appeal dismissed,  459 U.S.  1139,  74 L.
Ed.  2d  987  (1983).    Hence, we  need not consider whether the trial
court’s  findings  were  sufficient  to  support  its  conclusion  that
Respondent neglected Joseph.3
The only question properly considered by this Court is whether
the  neglect  existed  at  the  time  the  termination  proceeding  came
before the trial court.    See Pope,  144 N.C. App. at  37,  547 S.E.2d
at                                                                             156.     The  sole  evidence  of  neglect  consists  of  Respondent’s
failure, beginning in April  2000, to avail himself of the training
available through the hospital and necessary for the proper care of
Joseph.    This  failure  to  avail  himself  of  the  necessary  training
continued  up  to  and  including  the  date  of  the  adjudication
3
Specifically, we need not address Respondent’s argument made
in  his  brief  to  this  Court  that  we  must  reverse  the  termination
order because the trial court failed to find Joseph was impaired as
a consequence of Respondent’s failure to provide proper care.




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termination hearing.    Thus, the neglect was ongoing at the time of
the  termination  proceeding  and  the  trial  court  did  not  err  in
terminating Respondent’s parental rights on this basis.4
Affirmed.
Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and HUNTER concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).
4
Because we have determined that one of the grounds set forth
in  section                                                               7B-1111(a)  supports  the  trial  court’s  conclusion  to
terminate  Respondent’s  parental  rights,  we  need  not  address
Respondent’s challenge to his termination of parental rights by the
trial court based on other grounds.   See In re Nolen, 117 N.C. App.
693,  700,  453 S.E.2d  220,  225  (1995).

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