Preview:

NO. COA01-1223
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                       31 December  2002
IN THE MATTER OF THE WILL OF GLADYS BAARS CAMPBELL
Appeal by caveators Fred Baars, Carole Baars, Sue Baars Smith
and Emerson Campbell from order and judgment entered 25 April 2001
by  Judge  John  R.  Jolly,  Jr.,  in  Harnett  County  Superior  Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals  5 June  2002.
Johnson and Johnson, P.A., by Sandra L. Johnson and Rebecca J.
Davidson for propounder appellee.
Everett  &  Everett  by  Robinson  O.  Everett;  Everett,  Gaskins,
Hancock & Stevens by Hugh Stevens; and Newsom, Graham, Hedrick
&  Kennon,  P.A.,  by  Josiah  S.  Murray,  III,  for  caveator
appellants.
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
This case arises out of a challenge to the will and codicil of
Mrs. Gladys Baars Campbell who, at the time of her death on  16 May
1996, was a widow with no children.    Caveators Fred Baars, Carole
Baars, and Sue Baars Smith are siblings, and the nephew and nieces
of  Mrs.  Campbell.    Caveator  Emerson  Campbell  is  Mrs.  Campbell’s
brother-in-law.    The facts leading to this appeal are as follows:
Mrs.  Campbell  was  born  in  1906  in  Duplin  County,  North  Carolina,
and attended both Buies Creek Academy (which later became Campbell
University),  and  a  nursing  school  in  Charlotte,  North  Carolina.
Mrs. Campbell devoted her entire working career to nursing.    Mrs.
Campbell  and  her  first  husband,  Albert  Ezell,  lived  in  North
Carolina for several years, but later moved to Florida, where Mrs.
Campbell  resided  for  approximately  fifty  years.  During  their




-2-
marriage,  Mrs.  Campbell  was  the  primary  breadwinner;  she  managed
her  own  money  and  planned  for  her  financial  security.     Mrs.
Campbell continued working as a nurse after Mr. Ezell died in 1971.
She met and married Harold Campbell several years later.
During Mrs. Campbell’s marriage to Harold Campbell, the couple
lived  primarily  in  Florida,  but  also  spent  part  of  each  year  in
Pennsylvania,  where  Mr.  Campbell’s  family  was  located.    On  trips
between  Pennsylvania  and  Florida,  Mr.  and  Mrs.  Campbell  often
stopped in North Carolina to visit Mrs. Campbell’s siblings, nieces
and  nephews,  and  their  families.     The  Baars  caveators  did  not
visit, call, or write to Mrs. Campbell while she was married to Mr.
Campbell, nor did they contact her when Mr. Campbell died.   Emerson
Campbell  kept  in  touch  with  his  brother  and  sister-in-law  and
visited at least once a year until Harold Campbell passed away in
April  1984.
Mrs. Campbell asked her niece, Ruth Meissner, to accompany her
to  Pennsylvania  for  Mr.  Campbell’s  funeral  in  April  1984.    Mrs.
Campbell  was  particularly  close  to  Mrs.  Meissner,  and  stated  to
others that Mrs. Meissner was the only one of her nieces or nephews
that cared about her and tried to find out what she needed.    Mrs.
Meissner  later  accompanied  Mrs.  Campbell  on  another  trip  to
Pennsylvania, so that Mrs. Campbell could handle the business and
personal matters relating to Mr. Campbell’s death on her own.
On  6 June  1984, a few months after her husband’s death, Mrs.
Campbell executed a will in Florida which gave most of her estate
to two charities, her brother-in-law Emerson, and a number of her




-3-
nieces  and  nephews.    The  named  executors  were  Ruth  Meissner  and
Mrs.  Campbell’s  Florida  attorney.    In  an  effort  to  better  manage
her  money,  Mrs.  Campbell  executed  a  Revocable  Assets  Management
Trust in  1985 and named both herself and Florida National Bank as
trustees.    The  beneficiaries  of  the  trust  were  the  same  as  those
mentioned  in  her  1984  will,  as  well  as  one  more  niece;  however,
Mrs. Campbell did change what each would receive.
In  April                                                                     1986,  Mrs.  Campbell  contacted  her  nephew  Davis
Bulluck  to  come  to  Miami  and  help  her  resolve  a  matter  with  her
bankers, whom she suspected had misplaced some of her money.   After
Mr. Bulluck reviewed and organized her records, he agreed with Mrs.
Campbell  that  the  bank  had  misplaced  several  thousand  dollars.
During his review of Mrs. Campbell’s financial records, Mr. Bulluck
saw a copy of his aunt’s will and encouraged her to move her money
into  more  lucrative  accounts.    Mrs.  Campbell  sent  her  nephew  a
$3,000.00 check to thank him for his assistance.
In  December                                                                  1986,  Mrs.  Campbell  donated                         $10,000.00  to  the
scholarship  fund  at  Campbell  University,  located  in  Buies  Creek,
North Carolina.    This event marked the first contact between Mrs.
Campbell and the University since she attended Buies Creek Academy
(the  University’s  predecessor)  in  the                                     1920s.     Apparently,  Mrs.
Campbell’s  name  appeared  on  Campbell  University’s  mailing  list
because  she  attended  Buies  Creek  Academy.     Shortly  after  her
donation was received, Mrs. Campbell received a phone call from Mr.
Frank  Upchurch,  the  University’s  Vice  President  of  Advancement.
During her dealings with Campbell University, Mrs. Campbell became




-4-
friends  with  Mr.  Upchurch.    As  part  of  his  duties,  Mr.  Upchurch
contacted  contributors,  thanked  them  for  their  support,  and  kept
them informed of happenings at the University.   Mr. Upchurch called
Mrs.  Campbell  periodically  and  sent  her  publications  about  the
University and about charitable contribution opportunities.
The following April, Mrs. Campbell established a scholarship
trust agreement in her name and gave a $30,000.00 phonathon pledge
and gift to the University.   Within the month, Mr. Upchurch flew to
Miami  to  meet  Mrs.  Campbell  in  person  and  spent  a  few  hours  with
her.    It  was  during  this  visit  that  Mrs.  Campbell  first  told  Mr.
Upchurch that she was thinking of moving to North Carolina.    They
saw each other again in June  1987, when Mrs. Campbell visited the
University during a stay in North Carolina.
Over  time,  Mr.  Upchurch  kept  in  frequent  contact  with  Mrs.
Campbell.    In  October  1987,  Mr.  Upchurch  and  his  wife  took  Mrs.
Campbell and her niece Ruth Meissner on a two-day sightseeing trip
to the Outer Banks, just after Mrs. Campbell and her niece attended
Homecoming at the University.   Mrs. Campbell told Mr. Upchurch that
she was seriously contemplating a move to North Carolina, and the
two  discussed  possible  arrangements  with  the  University  for  Mrs.
Campbell’s  home  and  long-term  care.    Mr.  Upchurch  also  answered
Mrs.  Campbell’s  questions  regarding  revocable  trusts  and  other
estate planning documents.    Between  1986 and  1988, officials from
the  University  (primarily  Mr.  Upchurch)  called  Mrs.  Campbell  and
gave her small gifts, honors, and awards, thereby creating what Mr.
Upchurch described as a  “continuing cultivation of relationship.”




-5-
Mrs. Campbell had been contemplating a move to North Carolina
since approximately 1986.   After her husband’s death, she no longer
had  family  in  Florida,  and  she  also  became  dissatisfied  with  the
changes occurring in her neighborhood.   Her family members in North
Carolina had been urging her to move back to the state since 1984.
Some family members, including Mrs. Campbell’s sister Ruth Bulluck
and her niece Ruth Meissner, asked Mrs. Campbell to live with them.
Mrs. Campbell refused and expressed her desire to live on her own
and  not  be  a  burden  to  anyone.     Mrs.  Campbell  flew  to  North
Carolina,  rented  a  car,  and  looked  at  properties  on  her  own.    On
another occasion, she and Ruth Meissner drove around Fayetteville,
Dunn,  and  surrounding  areas  to  look  for  suitable  property.    Mrs.
Campbell  also  considered  moving  to  the  family  farm  in  Duplin
County, but ultimately decided against it.   After weighing all the
factors,  Mrs.  Campbell  chose  to  live  on  property  adjacent  to
Campbell  University.    However,  she  remained  in  Miami  until  July
1988,  where  she  wrapped  up  her  affairs,  handled  the  sale  of  her
Miami home, and prepared for her move to North Carolina.
In  January                                                                    1988,  Mrs.  Campbell  told  Mr.  Upchurch  of  her
finalized  plans  to  move  to  Buies  Creek,  as  well  as  her  opinions
regarding  arrangements  between  herself  and  Campbell  University.
Mrs.  Campbell  also  told  Mr.  Upchurch  she  wanted  to  visit  an
attorney  to  prepare  necessary  estate  planning  documents.     Mr.
Upchurch  informed  her  there  were  several  attorneys  in  the  nearby
cities  of  Lillington  and  Dunn,  including  William  A.  Johnson,  a
general practitioner in Lillington.   Campbell University was one of




-6-
Mr.  Johnson’s  regular  clients.     Though  Mr.  Johnson  served  as
“General Counsel” for the University, he was paid for his work on
a case-by-case basis, rather than a retainer system.   Mrs. Campbell
asked  Mr.  Upchurch  to  make  an  appointment  for  her  to  see  Mr.
Johnson,  which  he  did.    On  4  January  1988,  Mr.  Upchurch  sent  Mr.
Johnson a memo explaining the types of agreements Mrs. Campbell was
interested in and asking Mr. Johnson to prepare proposed documents
for the University to discuss with Mrs. Campbell.    Mr. Upchurch’s
memo also informed Mr. Johnson that Mrs. Campbell was planning to
make  a  will,  and  that  “Campbell  University  will  draft  a  Will  for
Mrs. Campbell upon her directions.”
Mrs. Campbell visited North Carolina for nearly two weeks in
January  1988.    During  that  time,  she  stayed  with  relatives,  but
made trips to Campbell University and made decisions pertaining to
the construction and location of her house.    University employees
drove  Mrs.  Campbell  around  during  this  time.    Mrs.  Campbell  also
met   with   Mr.   Johnson   to   redraft   her   will   and   make   other
arrangements  with  the  University.     She  asked  Mr.  Upchurch  to
accompany her to the meeting and asked him to stay with her during
the actual discussion.    During the meeting, both Mr. Upchurch and
Mr.  Johnson  apprised  Mrs.  Campbell  of  Mr.  Johnson’s  ties  to  the
University.   Mrs. Campbell indicated she understood, and proceeded
to use Mr. Johnson as her attorney.   Mrs. Campbell gave Mr. Johnson
a  typed  list  which  described  how  she  wanted  her  property  to  be
divided upon her death.   Mr. Johnson also discussed lapsed bequests
and inheritance tax issues.   Mrs. Campbell did not consult with Mr.




-7-
Johnson  regarding  how  to  dispose  of  her  property  and  did  not  ask
him to provide any estate planning service beyond the drafting of
the will.   Mr. Johnson, Mr. Upchurch, and Mrs. Campbell agreed that
Mr. Johnson would bill the University for his services.
Thereafter,  Mr.  Johnson  drafted  the  will  in  accordance  with
Mrs. Campbell’s instructions.   Mrs. Campbell reviewed the document,
but made no changes. The will contained bequests to several nieces
and nephews, two sisters, and bequests of $25,000.00 to each of two
charities.    It  also  included  a  bequest  of  $100,000.00  to  a  trust
for Mrs. Campbell’s sister, Marie Baars.    Campbell University was
named  as  the  residual  beneficiary  and  executor.    On                    25  January
1988, Mr. Upchurch drove Mrs. Campbell to a bank in Lillington to
execute her will.   Mrs. Campbell and her witnesses appeared before
a  notary  and  made  the  will  self-proving.    The  total  value  of  the
estate  disposed  of  by  the  will  was  less  than                           $350,000.00.    The
remainder  of  Mrs.  Campbell’s  assets                                        (about                $1,000,000.00)  was
governed by the terms of the Florida trust she had created in 1985.
When Mrs. Campbell returned to Miami in late January 1988, she
took  with  her  a  number  of  house  plans,  as  well  as  drafts  of  the
proposed  contracts  with  the  University.    A  few  days  later,  she
contacted  Mr.  Upchurch  and  told  him  she  wanted  to  revoke  the
Florida trust.   Mr. Upchurch discussed the matter with Mr. Johnson,
who advised him to prepare a revocation letter for Mrs. Campbell.
Mr.  Upchurch  subsequently  took  the  letter  to  Florida,  where  Mrs.
Campbell reviewed it, signed it before a notary, and mailed it to
her Florida trust officer, Mr. Dave Couch.   Mr. Couch contacted Mr.




-8-
Upchurch  for  information  regarding  the  relationship  between  Mrs.
Campbell  and  the  University.    On  17  February  1988,  Mr.  Upchurch
sent Mr. Couch a letter describing two University trusts into which
the  Florida  trust  assets  would  be  transferred,  if  Mrs.  Campbell
approved.    On  29  February  1988,  the  trust  officer  wrote  a  letter
revoking  the  trust  and  sent  the  letter  to  Mrs.  Campbell  for  her
signature.
Within  the  next  several  months,  Mrs.  Campbell  executed  a
number of documents.   Each document was prepared by Mr. Johnson and
executed  by  Dr.  Norman  A.  Wiggins,  the  President  of  Campbell
University.    On  10  March  1988,  Mrs.  Campbell  executed  a  Contract
and  Agreement,  in  which  she  agreed  to  move  to  Buies  Creek,  North
Carolina, buy or build a home at her own expense, provide for her
own living expenses, and pay her nursing home expenses (should they
arise).    Campbell  University  agreed  to  provide  her  with  live-in
care  at  its  own  expense.    On  the  same  date,  Mrs.  Campbell  also
executed a Charitable Remainder Annuity Trust Agreement.   Under the
Agreement,  Mrs.  Campbell  made  a  deposit  of                              $350,000.00  and  the
University  agreed  to  pay  her  $28,000.00  per  year  in  twelve  equal
monthly  installments,  beginning  1  May  1988.    Upon  her  death,  the
remainder of the money was to go to the University for its general
purposes.   Mrs. Campbell also executed a Revocable Asset Management
Trust Agreement on 1 April 1988 and made an initial deposit of over
$638,000.00.     Mrs.  Campbell  agreed  to  allow  the  University  to
invest  the  funds,  and  the  University  agreed  to  provide  Mrs.
Campbell with quarterly reports, pay all interest and/or principal




-9-
to  her  upon  her  request,  and  allow  the  funds  to  be  used  to
supplement  the  estate  to  satisfy  specific  bequests  under  Mrs.
Campbell’s will.   Any funds remaining at Mrs. Campbell’s death were
to go to the University for its general purposes.
Mrs. Campbell spent the spring and early summer of 1988 taking
care  of  her  affairs  in  Miami.     In  July                               1988,  officials  from
Campbell  University  drove  a  University-owned  truck  to  Florida,
packed  Mrs.  Campbell’s  belongings,  and  settled  her  into  an
apartment  near  the  campus  while  her  house  was  being  built  in  the
Keith  Hills  Subdivision.     The  title  work  associated  with  Mrs.
Campbell’s land purchase was done by Mr. Johnson.
On 7 April 1989, Mrs. Campbell executed a power of attorney in
favor  of  Mr.  Upchurch  and,  in  the  alternative,  Dr.  Wiggins.    Mr.
Johnson  again  handled  the  preparation  of  the  document.    Upon  the
death  of  her  sister  Marie  Baars  in                                      1989,  Mrs.  Campbell  was
nominated by her relatives (including the caveators in the present
action and her other heirs) to serve as executrix of her sister’s
estate.    She  did  so  without  incident.    On  11  January  1990,  Mrs.
Campbell  executed  a  codicil  to  her                                       1988  will,  in  which  the
$100,000.00 originally intended for Marie was instead given to the
building  fund  for  the  University’s  School  of  Law.    The  codicil
expressly  ratified  and  affirmed  all  other  provisions  of  her  1988
will.   Mrs. Campbell executed the codicil in Mr. Johnson’s office,
and she and her witnesses also took steps to make it self-proving.
In  return,  the  University  agreed  to  have  a  portrait  of  Mrs.
Campbell  painted  and  hung  in  the  law  school;  a  floor  in  that




-10-
building was also named for her first husband, Albert Ezell.    The
University  held  a  banquet  and  dinner  in  Mrs.  Campbell’s  honor  in
July 1990, during which her portrait was unveiled.   Several family
members attended the banquet, including three of the caveators.
Mrs. Campbell lived in her home in the Keith Hills Subdivision
for  the  next  several  years.     She  remained  active,  alert,  and
independent  through  the  early  1990s.    On  28  November  1990,  Mrs.
Campbell executed a Deed Reserving a Life Estate for her home; the
document  deeded  the  house  to  Campbell  University.    In  1993,  Mrs.
Campbell gave the University a gift of approximately  $180,000.00.
The power of attorney in favor of Dr. Wiggins was activated on  30
June  1993.
As Mrs. Campbell grew older, University employees increasingly
assisted  her  with  her  finances,  transportation,  and  daily  living
needs.   Around 1993, Mrs. Campbell began exhibiting some short-term
memory loss.   Some of Mrs. Campbell’s relatives noticed the change,
though  they  disagreed  as  to  the  cause  of  the  problem.    During  a
March  1994 visit to the Geriatric Clinic at Duke University, Mrs.
Campbell  was  diagnosed  with  Alzheimer’s  Disease;  the  doctors
estimated  that  she  could  have  suffered  from  the  disease  for
approximately  five  years.    The  doctors  also  stated  that  it  was
necessary  for  Mrs.  Campbell  to  have  someone  with  her  24  hours  a
day.                                                                          In  keeping  with  the  previously  executed  Contract  and
Agreement, Campbell University maintained a staff of people in Mrs.
Campbell’s home around the clock.    Mrs. Campbell was upset by the
constant   companionship   and   informed   the   University   of   her




-11-
unhappiness.   Ultimately, however, she acquiesced and accepted, to
an  extent,  the                                                              24  hour  a  day  care  provided  by  her  companions.
Though  Mrs.  Campbell’s  family  knew  University  companions  were
tending to her around the clock, they were not notified that Mrs.
Campbell had been diagnosed with Alzheimer’s Disease until sometime
after her visit to the Geriatric Clinic in March of  1994.
Mrs. Campbell became noticeably weaker from 1994 to 1996.   Her
appearance became more unkempt, and she resisted suggestions from
her companions and family members to buy new clothing and practice
good hygiene.   The University companions had some success with Mrs.
Campbell, but she continued to argue each time these subjects were
broached.    During  these  years,  caveators  Fred  and  Carole  Baars
began inquiring about their aunt’s health and financial well-being.
They were told by University officials that Mrs. Campbell was being
cared for to the best of their ability.   In May 1996, Mrs. Campbell
fell  and  broke  her  hip  and  was  taken  to  a  local  hospital.    She
subsequently died in the hospital on  16 May  1996.
Upon  Mrs.  Campbell’s  death,  Dr.  Wiggins  presented  her                  1988
will and the 1990 codicil to the probate court.   The Harnett County
Clerk of Superior Court issued Letters Testamentary which appointed
Dr.  Wiggins,  in  his  capacity  as  President  and  Chief  Executive
Officer of Campbell University, as the executor of Mrs. Campbell’s
estate.    Soon thereafter, Dr. Wiggins took the  “Oath of Executor”
and has served in that capacity up to the present time.
Caveators  filed  a  caveat  to  Mrs.  Campbell’s  will  on  16  May
1999.   During discovery, they learned for the first time about some




-12-
of the documents which Mrs. Campbell had signed and the extent to
which  Campbell  University  benefitted  from  her  will  and  codicil.
After  discovering  this  information,  caveators  filed  a  civil
complaint in Harnett County on 15 June 2000.   The complaint alleged
that  defendants  Campbell  University,  Inc.,  Norman  A.  Wiggins
(individually  and  in  his  capacity  as  executor  of  Mrs.  Campbell’s
estate), and William A. Johnson unduly influenced Mrs. Campbell and
breached  their  fiduciary  duty  to  her  while  acquiring  inter  vivos
transfers of her assets in favor of Campbell University.
Defendants  Johnson,  Wiggins,  and  Campbell  University  filed
answers  which  contained  both  responses  to  the  allegations  of  the
complaint and motions to dismiss.   On 7 November 2000, the Harnett
County  Superior  Court  filed  two  orders  which  dismissed  the
complaint against defendants Wiggins and Campbell University with
prejudice,  and  dismissed  the  complaint  against  defendant  Johnson
with prejudice in its entirety.   The dismissals were based upon the
statutes  of  limitations,  lack  of  subject  matter  jurisdiction,  a
noncognizable  cause  of  action,  and  a  failure  by  Fred  and  Carole
Baars  to  allege  misconduct  on  Wiggins’  part  in  his  role  as  Mrs.
Campbell’s attorney-in-fact.    When Fred and Carole Baars appealed
to  this  Court,  we  affirmed  the  trial  court’s  dismissal  of  their
complaint.    Baars v. Campbell Univ., Inc.,  148 N.C. App.  408,  558
S.E.2d 871 (2002).   The Baars’ Petition for Rehearing was denied by
this Court, and the North Carolina Supreme Court later denied the
Baars’ Petition for Discretionary Review.   Baars v. Campbell Univ.,
Inc.,  355 N.C.  490,  563 S.E.2d  563  (2002).




-13-
Caveators  pursued  their  caveat  proceeding  in  Harnett  County
Superior  Court.     The  parties  employed  a  number  of  discovery
devices,  including  interrogatories  and  depositions.    On  15  March
2001,  Campbell  University                                                   (the  propounder)  moved  for  partial
summary judgment on the issue of undue influence as to the will and
the  codicil.    Attached  to  the  motion  were  a  number  of  supporting
affidavits from Campbell University employees and Mrs. Campbell’s
family  members.    On  18  April  2001,  caveators  filed  a  response  in
opposition  to  the  University’s  motion  for  summary  judgment  and
included supporting affidavits from each caveator, as well as two
expert  witnesses.    Mr.  John  Huggard,  an  expert  witness  on  estate
planning,  opined  that  the  documents  comprising  Mrs.  Campbell’s
estate  plan  were  not  in  her  best  interests  and  were  improperly
procured by Campbell University.   Mr. Bradley Bodager, an expert on
the  principles  and  standards  of  fundraising,  believed  Campbell
University’s    actions    constituted    overreaching    and    were
questionable.
On                                                                            24  April                                2001,  the  trial  court  granted  the  motion  for
partial summary judgment and dismissed the caveat.   Later the same
day,  the  trial  court  conducted  a  jury  trial  to  determine  whether
the  documents  offered  by  Campbell  University  were  the  valid  will
and  codicil  of  Mrs.  Campbell.    As  part  of  its  instructions,  the
trial  court  instructed  the  jury  that  the  will  and  codicil  were
“executed according to the requirements of law[.]”   The jury found
that the will and codicil were valid and belonged to Mrs. Campbell.
On 25 April 2001, the trial court entered a judgment ordering that




-14-
the documents be probated in solemn form.   Caveators appealed from
both  the  summary  judgment  order  dated                                    24  April                                                    2001  and  the
judgment dated  25 April  2001.
On  appeal,  caveators  argue  that  the  trial  court  committed
reversible error by  (I) entering summary judgment against them on
the   issue   of   undue   influence   by   the   propounder,   Campbell
University; and (II) instructing the jury that the will and codicil
were  validly  executed.     For  the  reasons  set  forth  herein,  we
disagree  with  caveators’  arguments  and  uphold  both  the  order  and
the judgment of the trial court.
Summary   judgment   is   appropriate   when                                  “the   pleadings,
depositions,  answers  to  interrogatories,  and  admissions  on  file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and that any party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law.”    N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  1A-1, Rule  56(c)
(2001).                                                                       “Where a motion for summary judgment is supported by proof
which would require a directed verdict in  [the movant’s] favor at
trial he is entitled to summary judgment unless the opposing party
comes  forward  to  show  a  triable  issue  of  material  fact.”    In  re
Will of Edgerton,  29 N.C. App.  60,  63,  223 S.E.2d  524,  526, disc.
review  denied,                                                               290  N.C.                                                    308,             225  S.E.2d   832   (1976).   Summary
judgment should be entered cautiously.    Volkman v. DP Associates,
48 N.C. App. 155, 157, 268 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1980).   However, if the
party with the burden of proof cannot prove the existence of each
essential  element  of  its  claim  or  cannot  produce  evidence  to
support each essential element, summary judgment is warranted.   See




-15-
Development Corp. v. James, 300 N.C. 631, 638, 268 S.E.2d 205, 210
(1980).                                                                        “[T]he standard of review on appeal from summary judgment
is whether there is any genuine issue of material fact and whether
the  moving  party  is  entitled  to  a  judgment  as  a  matter  of  law.”
Bruce-Terminix Co. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 130 N.C. App. 729, 733, 504
S.E.2d  574,  577  (1998).
Caveators  first  argue  that  partial  summary  judgment  is  not
authorized  in  caveat  proceedings  because  the  filing  of  a  caveat
necessitates a probate proceeding in solemn form with a jury trial.
Caveators note such a proceeding is in rem and believe the Rules of
Civil  Procedure  provide  no  authority  for  a  judge,  rather  than  a
jury, to determine that the will is valid.    While it is true that
the issue of devisavit vel non (a determination of whether the will
is valid) must be tried by a jury, In re Will of Roediger, 209 N.C.
470,  476,  184 S.E.  74,  77  (1936), it does not follow that partial
summary  judgment  as  to  other  issues  (such  as  undue  influence)  is
prohibited.    Our  Court  has  previously  upheld  grants  of  partial
summary  judgment  or  directed  verdict  on  the  issue  of  undue
influence.    See  In  re  Estate  of  Whitaker,  144  N.C.  App.  295,  547
S.E.2d                                                                         853,  disc.  review  denied,                                354  N.C.                                                              218,   555  S.E.2d   278
                                                                                                                                           (2001); and In re Will of Sechrest,  140 N.C. App.  464,  537 S.E.2d
511                                                                            (2000),  disc.  review  denied,                             353  N.C.                                                              375,   547  S.E.2d   16
(2001).                                                                                                                                    Having  determined  that  partial  summary  judgment  is
authorized  in  caveat  proceedings,  we  turn  to  the  substantive
arguments presented by the parties.
“The  purpose  of   a   caveat  is  to  determine  whether  the




-16-
paperwriting purporting to be a will is in fact the last will and
testament of the person for whom it is propounded.”   In re Spinks,
7 N.C. App.  417,  423,  173 S.E.2d  1,  5, cert. denied,  276 N.C.  575
(1970).                                                                        “The  filing  of  a  caveat  is  the  customary  and  statutory
procedure   for   an   attack   upon   the   testamentary   value   of   a
paperwriting which has been admitted by the clerk of superior court
to  probate  in  common  form.”    Id.    A  direct  attack  by  caveat  has
been  held  a  complete  and  adequate  remedy  at  law,  such  that  a
                                                                                                                                                 plaintiff  is  not  entitled  to  equitable  relief.                                     Johnson  v.
Stevenson,                                                                     269  N.C.                                                         200,                                                   204,   152  S.E.2d   214,   217   (1967).     We
further  note  that                                                            “[a]n  attack  on  the  validity  of  a  will  most
commonly   deals   with   issues   involving   undue   influence   and
testamentary  capacity.”    Brickhouse  v.  Brickhouse,  104  N.C.  App.
69,  72,  407 S.E.2d  607,  609  (1991).
Fiduciary Relationship
By  filing  a  caveat  to  Mrs.  Campbell’s  will  and  codicil,
caveators undertook the burden of proving that undue influence was
exerted upon Mrs. Campbell by the propounders.   Caveators maintain
the  University                                                                (and  its  General  Counsel,  Mr.  Johnson)  had  a
fiduciary duty toward Mrs. Campbell which began when she executed
the  will  Mr.  Johnson  prepared  for  her.    Because  of  the  fiduciary
relationship, caveators argue that the University bore the burden
of  proving,  by  the  greater  weight  of  the  evidence,  that  the
transaction  was  open,  fair  and  honest.    Caveators’  filing  of  the
caveat and their allegation of a fiduciary relationship result in
the following burdens upon the parties:




-17-
In  a  proceeding  to  caveat  a  will,  the
caveators are required to handle the laboring
oar  on  the  issue  of  undue  influence  .  .  .
True, in certain fiduciary relations, if there
be dealings between the parties, on complaint
of  the  party  in  the  power  of  the  other,  the
relation of itself, and without more, raises a
presumption of fraud or undue influence, as a
matter  of  law,  and  annuls  the  transaction
unless  such  presumption  be  rebutted  by  proof
that  no  fraud  was  practiced  and  no  undue
influence was exerted.  .  .
It  is  sufficient  to  rebut  a  presumption  by
evidence  of  equal  weight  rather  than  by  a
preponderance   of   the   evidence,   where   the
burden of the issue is on the opposite party.
.  .  .    Strictly  speaking,  the  burden  of  the
issue,  as  distinguished  from  the  duty  to  go
forward with evidence, does not shift from one
side  to  the  other,  for  the  burden  of  proof
continues  to  rest  upon  the  party  who  alleges
facts  necessary  to  enable  him  to  prevail  in
the  cause.    It  is  required  of  him  who  thus
asserts such facts to establish them before he
can become entitled to a verdict in his favor;
and,  as  to  these  matters,  he  constantly  has
the  burden  of  the  issue,  whatever  may  be  the
intervening   effect   of   different   kinds   of
evidence  or  of  evidence  possessing  under  the
law varying degrees of probative force.
In re Will of Atkinson, 225 N.C. 526, 530-31, 35 S.E.2d 638, 640-41
(1945)  (citations omitted).    Stated another way,
“The  burden  of  the  issue                                          --  that  is,  the
burden  of  proof  in  the  sense  of  ultimately
proving  or  establishing  the  issue  or  case  of
the  party  upon  whom  such  burden  rests,  as
distinguished from the burden or duty of going
forward   and   producing   evidence                                  --   never
shifts,  but  the  burden  or  duty  of  proceeding
or  going  forward  often  does  shift  from  one
party to the other, and sometimes back again.
Thus, when the actor has gone forward and made
a   prima   facie   case,   the   other   party   is
compelled  in  turn  to  go  forward  or  lose  his
case,  and  in  this  sense  the  burden  shifts  to
him.    So  the  burden  of  going  forward  may,  as
to some particular matter, shift again to the
first party in response to the call of a prima




-18-
facie  case  or  presumption  in  favor  of  the
second  party.    But  the  party  who  has  not  the
burden  of  the  issue  is  not  bound  to  disprove
the  actor’s  case  by  a  preponderance  of  the
evidence, for the actor must fail if upon the
whole    evidence    he    does    not    have    a
preponderance, no matter whether it is because
the weight of evidence is with the other party
or because the scales are equally balanced.”
Winslow  v.  Hardwood  Co.,                                                   147  N.C.                    275,   277,   60  S.E.     1130,   1131
(1908)  (quoting  1 Elliott on Evidence,  139).
The  law  is  well  settled  that  in  certain
known  and  definite                                                          “fiduciary  relations,  if
there  be  dealing  between  the  parties,  on  the
complaint  of  the  party  in  the  power  of  the
other,  the  relation  of  itself  and  without
other evidence, raises a presumption of fraud,
as  a  matter  of  law,  which  annuls  the  act
unless  such  presumption  be  rebutted  by  proof
that  no  fraud  was  committed,  and  no  undue
influence  or  moral  duress  exerted.”    Lee  v.
Pearce,  68 N.C.,  76.    Among these, are,  .  .  .
(2)  attorney  and  client,  in  respect  of  the
matter wherein the relationship exists . . .
“When   one   is   the   general   agent   of
another,  who  relies  upon  him  as  a  friend  and
adviser,  and  has  entire  management  of  his
affairs,  a  presumption  of  fraud,  as  a  matter
of law, arises from a transaction between them
wherein the agent is benefited, and the burden
of  proof  is  upon  the  agent  to  show  by  the
greater  weight  of  the  evidence,  when  the
transaction  is  disputed,  that  it  was  open,
fair   and   honest.”                                                         Smith   v.   Moore           (7th
syllabus), 149 N.C., 185, 62 S.E., 892 [1908].
McNeill  v.  McNeill,                                                         223  N.C.                    178,   181,   25  S.E.2d   615,    616-17
(1943); see also In re Will of Amelia Everett, 153 N.C. 83, 68 S.E.
924  (1910).
The   University   has   admitted   that   it   had   a   fiduciary
responsibility  to  Mrs.  Campbell  as  of  10  March  1988,  a  date  that
fell after the execution of the will, but before the execution of




-19-
the codicil.    The University also admitted that Mr. Johnson had a
fiduciary  relationship  with  Mrs.  Campbell  with  respect  to  the
drafting of her will.    However, the University denied that it had
a fiduciary relationship with Mrs. Campbell as of  25 January  1988
(the date the will was executed).
Even  if  we  agree  that  a  fiduciary  relationship  between  Mrs.
Campbell  and  the  University  existed  as  of  the  date  her  will  was
executed                                                                     --                                                         25  January   1988   --  we  believe  the  University  has
offered  sufficient  evidence  to  rebut  the  presumption  of  undue
influence  and  has  shown  that  the  transaction  was  open,  fair,  and
honest.                                                                      Mrs.  Campbell  freely  discussed  her  estate  planning
concerns with Mr. Upchurch and inquired about possible arrangements
between herself and the University.    Though Mr. Johnson served as
General Counsel for Campbell University at the time he drafted Mrs.
Campbell’s will and codicil, his relationship to the University was
fully  explained  to  Mrs.  Campbell  by  both  Mr.  Upchurch  and  Mr.
Johnson.   Mrs. Campbell indicated she understood, but chose to use
Mr.  Johnson  as  her  attorney.    Mr.  Upchurch’s  involvement  in  the
meeting  between  Mrs.  Campbell  and  Mr.  Johnson  was  expressly
requested  by  Mrs.  Campbell.    Mrs.  Campbell  asked  Mr.  Johnson  to
prepare all the documents she eventually signed, and he did so at
her request.    Though the University paid Mr. Johnson for drafting
Mrs.  Campbell’s  will,  Mrs.  Campbell  was  aware  of  the  arrangement
and agreed to it.   Before going to the meeting with Mr. Johnson in
January 1988, Mrs. Campbell considered bequests she wanted to make
and gave Mr. Johnson a list of her decisions.   Even though the list




-20-
was probably typed by someone in the Advancement Office at Campbell
University,   it   represented   Mrs.   Campbell’s   wishes   for   the
distribution of her estate upon her death.
Finally, though caveators seek to cast doubt upon the quality
of advice and representation given to Mrs. Campbell by Mr. Johnson
and  the  University,  we  do  not  believe  these  arguments  are
persuasive.   Mr. Johnson drafted Mrs. Campbell’s will based on his
discussions with her and the list of bequests she wished to make.
Caveators  also  point  to  the  changes  between  Mrs.  Campbell’s  1984
and 1988 wills and have speculated as to why Mrs. Campbell changed
or  eliminated  bequests  from  her  earlier  will.     However,  the
University has come forward with sufficient evidence showing that
Mrs.  Campbell  was  aware  of  Mr.  Johnson’s  relationship  with  the
University; that she nonetheless wanted to use him as her attorney,
and did so; and that her wishes were reflected in the will and all
the  other  estate  planning  documents  prepared  for  her  by  Mr.
Johnson.
Based  upon  the  record,  we  hold  the  University  carried  its
burden  of  proving  that  its  fiduciary  relationship  with  Mrs.
Campbell  was  open,  fair,  and  honest.    We  therefore  turn  to  the
central  issue  presented  by  this  appeal;  namely,  whether  Mrs.
Campbell was unduly influenced by the propounder.
Undue Influence
To prevent partial summary judgment against them on the issue
of undue influence, caveators had to prove the existence of “(1) a
person  who  is  subject  to  influence;  (2)  an  opportunity  to  exert




-21-
influence;  (3) a disposition to exert influence; and  (4) a result
indicating  undue  influence.”    In  re  Will  of  Dunn,  129  N.C.  App.
321,  328,  500  S.E.2d  99,  104  (quoting  Griffin  v.  Baucom,  74  N.C.
App.  282,  286,  328  S.E.2d  38,  41,  disc.  review  denied,  314  N.C.
115, 332 S.E.2d 481 (1985)), disc. review denied, 348 N.C. 693, 511
S.E.2d 645 (1998).   Caveators assert that they have proven the four
elements of undue influence.    We recognize that
[b]ecause the existence of undue influence is
usually  difficult  to  prove,  our  courts  have
recognized  that  it  must  usually  be  proved  by
evidence   of   a   combination   of   surrounding
facts, circumstances and inferences from which
a  jury  could  find  that  the  person’s  act  was
not   the   product   of   his   own   free   and
unconstrained will, but instead was the result
of  an  overpowering  influence  over  him  by
another.
Dunn,  129  N.C.  App.  at  328,  500  S.E.2d  at  104.    See  also  In  the
Matter of the Will of Everhart,  88 N.C. App.  572,  574,  364 S.E.2d
173, 174, disc. review denied, 322 N.C. 112, 367 S.E.2d 910 (1988).
The influence exerted upon Mrs. Campbell had to be “of a kind which
operates on the mind of the testator at the very time the will is
made, and causes its execution.”   In re Will of Thompson, 248 N.C.
588,  593,  104 S.E.2d  280,  284  (1958).    Moreover, caveators had to
prove  that  each  time  an  instrument  was  executed,  undue  influence
was exerted upon Mrs. Campbell.    For influence to be undue,
“there  must  be  something  operating  upon  the
mind  of  the  person  whose  act  is  called  in
judgment, of sufficient controlling effect to
destroy   free   agency   and   to   render   the
instrument, brought in question, not properly
an expression of the wishes of the maker, but
rather the expression of the will of another.
It  is  the  substitution  of  the  mind  of  the




-22-
person  exercising  the  influence  for  the  mind
of the testator, causing  [her] to make a will
which                                                                          [she]  otherwise  would  not  have  made.
(citations omitted).”
In re Will of Prince,  109 N.C. App.  58,  61,  425 S.E.2d  711,  713-14
(1993)  (quoting  In  re  Will  of  Kemp,  234  N.C.  495,  498,  67  S.E.2d
672,  674  (1951)).    Undue influence has also been described as
“a    fraudulent    influence,    or    such    an
overpowering  influence  as  amounts  to  a  legal
wrong.    It is close akin to coercion produced
by  importunity,  or  by  a  silent,  resistless
power, exercised by the strong over the weak,
which  could  not  be  resisted,  so  that  the  end
reached  is  tantamount  to  the  effect  produced
by  the  use  of  fear  or  force.    To  constitute
such undue influence, it is not necessary that
there   should   exist   moral   turpitude,   but
whatever  destroys  free  agency  and  constrains
the person, whose act is brought in judgment,
to  do  what  is  against  his  or  her  will,  and
what he or she otherwise would not have done,
is  a  fraudulent  influence  in  the  eye  of  the
law.”
In re Will of Harris,  218 N.C.  459,  461,  11 S.E.2d  310,  311  (1940)
(citations omitted)  (quoting In re Will of Turnage,  208 N.C.  130,
179 S.E.  332  (1935)).
Our  Supreme  Court  has  identified  seven  factors  that  are
probative on the issue of undue influence:
1.                                                                             Old age and physical and mental weakness
of the person executing the instrument.
2.                                                                             That  the  person  signing  the  paper  is  in
the  home  of  the  beneficiary  and  subject
to    his    constant    association    and
supervision.
3.                                                                             That others have little or no opportunity
to see him.
4.                                                                             That  the  instrument  is  different  and
revokes a prior instrument.




-23-
5.                                                                             That it is made in favor of one with whom
there are no ties of blood.
6.                                                                                                                              That  it  disinherits  the  natural  objects
of his bounty.
7.                                                                                                                              That  the  beneficiary  has  procured  its
execution.
                                                                                                                                Hardee v. Hardee, 309 N.C. 753, 756-57, 309 S.E.2d 243, 245 (1983);
see  also  In  re  Andrews,                                                    299  N.C.                                        52,                                                                   55,   261  S.E.2d   198,   200
(1980).                                                                                                                         “[T]he  caveator  need  not  prove  the  existence  of  every
factor.   However, the caveator must present sufficient evidence to
make  out  a  prima  facie  case.”    In  re  Estate  of  Forrest,  66  N.C.
App. 222, 225, 311 S.E.2d 341, 343, aff’d, 311 N.C. 298, 316 S.E.2d
55  (1984).
As to the first factor, caveators point to the fact that Mrs.
Campbell  was  81  years  old  when  she  signed  her  will,  and  83  years
old when she signed the codicil.   They also argue that she may have
been  suffering  from  Alzheimer’s  Disease  when  she  executed  those
documents.    According  to  caveators,  Mrs.  Campbell  was  lonely  and
vulnerable  in  Florida  when  she  first  met  Campbell  University
employees   and   lacked   the   ability   to   handle   and   understand
complicated legal and financial documents.   Caveators also believe
Mrs.   Campbell   could   have   been   easily   influenced   and   felt
overwhelmed  by  her  financial  situation,  as  evidenced  by  her  1986
call to her nephew Davis Bulluck for assistance with her finances.
With  regard  to  the  second  factor,  caveators  point  to  the
frequent association and supervision of Mrs. Campbell by agents of
the  University.                                                               Caveators  trace  the  association  from  Mrs.
Campbell’s January  1988 visit to North Carolina, through her move




-24-
to Buies Creek in July  1988, and onward until her death on  16 May
1996.    They further believe that Mrs. Campbell was in the company
of Mr. Upchurch  “at every critical step of the way[.]”
With regard to factor three, caveators argue that, even though
they were able to visit Mrs. Campbell in her home in Buies Creek,
there  was                                                                  “almost  always”  a  Campbell  University  representative
present during the visits.   For this proposition, caveators rely on
testimony from Mrs. Campbell’s relatives.
As   to   factors   four   and   five,   caveators   point   to   the
differences between Mrs. Campbell’s 1984 and 1988 wills.   They also
note that the 1988 will was made in favor of one with no blood ties
to Mrs. Campbell, i.e., the University.
As to factor six, caveators maintain the 1988 will and codicil
effectively  disinherited  the  natural  objects  of  Mrs.  Campbell’s
bounty -- namely, blood relatives and relatives by marriage.   They
argue there was no change in any of their relationships with Mrs.
Campbell  between                                                           1984  and                                                   1988;  thus,  they  believe  the  only
explanation  for  the  differences  in  the  two  wills  was  undue
influence exerted by the University upon Mrs. Campbell.   Caveators
also point to the affidavits of Emerson Campbell and his wife Edith
and  a  letter  written  by  one  of  Mrs.  Campbell’s  sisters;  these
individuals  believed  Mrs.  Campbell  did  not  understand  the  legal
effects  of  the  documents  she  signed,  particularly  with  regard  to
ownership of her home in the Keith Hills Subdivision.
Lastly, with regard to factor seven, caveators argue the 1988
will was procured by Campbell University, the primary beneficiary.




-25-
In  sum,  caveators  believe  their  evidence  would  permit  a  jury  to
infer that the will and the other documents signed by Mrs. Campbell
were  not  the  result  of  her  free  will,  but  rather  the  intent  of
Campbell  University.     Thus,  they  believe  summary  judgment  was
precluded as a matter of law.
While caveators have made the arguments set forth above, we do
not  believe  they  have  carried  their  burden  of  proving  undue
influence.    Specifically, caveators have failed to show that Mrs.
Campbell was susceptible to undue influence when she executed her
will in  1988 and her codicil in  1990.   Our case law has noted that
the  mental  condition  of  a  testator  at  the  time  he  or  she  makes  a
will or codicil is  “‘perhaps, the strongest factor leading to the
answer to the  [fraud and undue influence] issue.’”    In re Will of
Ricks,                                                                          292  N.C.           28,          37-38,   231  S.E.2d   856,   863   (1977)   (quoting
Goins  v.  McLoud,  231  N.C.  655,  658,  58  S.E.2d  634,  637  (1950)).
Without evidence that the testator is susceptible to fraud or undue
influence, evidence of undue influence itself is often too tenuous
for consideration.    Id. at  37,  231 S.E.2d at  863.
The evidence of record indicates that Mrs. Campbell possessed
a  sharp  mind,  a  quick  wit,  and  a  good  sense  of  humor.    She  was
physically  healthy  through  the  late                                         1980s  and  early   1990s,  as
evidenced by the fact that she traveled great distances on her own
and  managed  her  own  business,  personal,  and  financial  affairs.
Mrs.  Campbell  was  opinionated  and  made  her  wishes  known  to  those
with whom she dealt.   She was quite active and many people had the
opportunity  to  see  her.    Those  that  did  see  her  described  her  as




-26-
“spunky,”  “sharp,”  “mentally  alert,”  “intelligent,”  “competent,”
“prudent,”                                                                     “strong-willed,”  and                                “level-headed.”     Mrs.  Campbell
deliberated  for  some  time  over  her  move  to  North  Carolina  and
considered several possible relocation sites before settling down
in Buies Creek.    Even though several close relatives asked her to
move in with them, Mrs. Campbell refused and expressed her desire
to  live  on  her  own  and  remain  independent  as  long  as  she  could.
Her  close  family  relatives,  including  Mrs.  Meissner  and  Mr.
Bulluck, knew some of the details of Mrs. Campbell’s dealings with
Campbell University, but trusted her to make her own decisions and
expressed  no  concern  regarding  the  agreements  Mrs.  Campbell  was
contemplating.
Mrs. Campbell had a lifetime of dealing with complex financial
issues.   She was the primary breadwinner during her first marriage
to Albert Ezell and dealt with business and personal matters after
the death of her second husband, Harold Campbell.   Even though she
called  her  nephew  Davis  Bulluck  for  assistance  in                       1986,  he
ultimately concurred with her belief that her bank was withholding
money  it  owed  to  her.    Mrs.  Campbell  also  served  as  executrix  of
her  sister  Marie  Baars’  estate  after  Marie  died  in  1989;  none  of
the  caveators  ever  objected  to  her  handling  of  Marie’s  estate.
Significantly, this date occurred over a year after Mrs. Campbell
executed her will.
Though caveators argue Mrs. Campbell was in the custody of and
subject  to  the                                                               “constant”  association  of  representatives  from
Campbell University for a number of years, this argument does not




-27-
reflect  the  entire  scenario  then  taking  place.    The  record  and
affidavits  indicate  Mrs.  Campbell  made  three  visits  to  the
University  between  June                                                      1987  and  January   1988,  and  that  Mr.
Upchurch visited her in Miami in April 1987.   Mrs. Campbell made an
additional   visit   with   Mrs.   Meissner   to   the   University   for
Homecoming in October  1987; a few days later, Mrs. Campbell, Mrs.
Meissner, and Mr. and Mrs. Upchurch went to the Outer Banks for a
short visit.
Mrs. Campbell spent the remainder of her time from  1986-1988
in Miami, where she continued to manage her affairs and conduct her
life as she saw fit.    During  1988, Mrs. Campbell made one trip in
January  to  execute  her  will  and  moved  to  Buies  Creek  for  good  in
July.    Between  January  and  July  1988,  Mr.  Upchurch  visited  Miami
for one day and later made a brief unofficial visit with his wife
while they were vacationing in Florida.    Once Mrs. Campbell moved
to  North  Carolina,  University  employees  checked  on  her  and  drove
her  around  as  needed.     However,  part-time  companions  were  not
employed  until  after  the  codicil  was  executed  in  early  1990,  and
full-time companions did not begin staying with Mrs. Campbell until
March 1994.   Thus, it appears Mrs. Campbell was not under anyone’s
custody or supervision when she executed her will and codicil.   We
also  discern  no  instances  in  which  Mrs.  Campbell’s  family  was
prevented  from  seeing  her  and  communicating  with  her.    In  fact,
when   Mrs.   Campbell   moved   to   Buies   Creek,   caveators   had
opportunities to see her and did so on numerous occasions.




-28-
We  also  note  that  caveators  had  little  to  do  with  Mrs.
Campbell  over  the  years,  especially  while  she  lived  in  Florida.
Mrs. Campbell told others that only Mrs. Meissner cared about her
and tried to find out if she needed anything; she did not say the
same about any of the caveators.    Though Emerson Campbell and his
wife kept in touch with Mrs. Campbell around once a year, they did
not visit her for many years after Harold Campbell died; moreover,
the  main  purpose  of  their  one  visit  to  North  Carolina  was  to
retrieve a china cabinet Mrs. Campbell agreed to give them.    Over
time,  they  assumed  she  was  dead,  while  she  was  in  fact  alive  and
living in North Carolina.   When Mrs. Campbell moved to Buies Creek,
caveators had opportunities to see her; the fact that they did not
see her more frequently was not the University’s doing.
We believe caveators failed to present specific facts showing
that  Mrs.  Campbell’s  will  and  codicil  were  executed  solely  as  a
result  of  fraudulent  and  overpowering  influence  by  Campbell
University that controlled Mrs. Campbell at the time she executed
the documents.   See Whitaker,  144 N.C. App. at 299-302, 547 S.E.2d
at                                                                             857-59.   Upon  review,  caveators’  evidence  appears  to  be
comprised of conclusions rather than statements of fact.   As such,
they do not assist caveators in carrying their considerable burden.
We  note  that  mere  opportunity  to  exert  undue  influence  does
not prove its existence; rather, the effects must be evident in the
documents.    The  University  argues,  and  we  agree,  that  caveators’
evidence  of  procurement  was  not  sufficient  to  establish  undue
influence  and  did  not  preclude  summary  judgment  on  that  issue.




-29-
While  we  appreciate  the  difficulties  inherent  in  undue  influence
cases, we are guided by past decisions of this Court where stronger
evidence  than  that  presented  by  caveators  was  still  deemed
insufficient to prove undue influence.    See In re Will of Prince,
109 N.C. App.  58,  425 S.E.2d  711; and In re Will of Sechrest,  140
N.C. App.  464,  537 S.E.2d  511.
Before meeting with Mr. Johnson, Mrs. Campbell made a list of
bequests  she  wanted  to  make  to  two  charities  and  a  number  of  her
relatives.    Mr. Johnson formalized her wishes into the  1988 will.
When  Mrs.  Campbell’s  sister  Marie  died  in                                1989,  Mrs.  Campbell
considered  what  to  do  with  the  money  she  had  set  aside  for  Marie
and ultimately decided to execute a codicil bequeathing the money
to the University’s Law School Building Fund.
Mrs. Campbell had an absolute right to disinherit anyone she
chose.    In re Will of Edgerton,  29 N.C. App. at  63,  223 S.E.2d at
527; Kidder v. Bailey, 187 N.C. 505, 507, 122 S.E.2d 22, 23 (1924).
Moreover,  a  will  is  not  void  if  it  has  been  obtained  by  fair
argument  or  persuasion,  even  if  an  unequal  disposition  of  the
testator’s property is the end result.    See In re Will of Franks,
231  N.C.  252,  260,  56  S.E.2d  668,  675  (1949),  reh’g  denied,  231
N.C.                                                                           736,                    57  S.E.2d   315   (1950).   “It  is  not  necessary  that  the
testator  should  be  able  to  dispose  of  his  property  with  judgment
and discretion -- wisely or unwisely, for he may do with his own as
he  pleases;  but  it  is  enough  if  he  understands  the  nature  and
effect of his act and knows what he is about.”    In re Craven,  169
N.C.  561,  567,  86  S.E.2d  587,  591  (1915).  Caveators  cannot  prove




-30-
undue influence, so long as Mrs. Campbell understood the nature and
effect of her acts and what she was about to do when she executed
her will and codicil.
The  fact  that  Mrs.  Campbell’s                                            1984  and                                            1988  wills  were
different does not, without more, show that the  1988 will was the
product of undue influence.   Likewise, the facts that the 1988 will
benefits one with whom Mrs. Campbell had no blood ties  (i.e., the
University)   cannot   alone   show   undue   influence.   Given   Mrs.
Campbell’s relationship with her relatives and the fact that they
were  not  the  direct  sort  of  “natural  objects  of  her  bounty,”  we
cannot say the will and codicil were unnatural or irrational.
When Mrs. Campbell executed her  1984 will, she had only been
widowed  for  two  months  and  her  husband’s  estate  had  not  been
administered.   She made bequests to two charities, her brother-in-
law,  and  several  relatives.    By                                         1988,  she  was  not  particularly
close  to  any  of  her  nieces  and  nephews,  except  Mrs.  Meissner.
Despite this fact, all individual bequests in her 1988 will were to
blood relatives and included her sisters, nieces and nephews.   The
1984 will did not provide for all her blood relatives.    While she
had  a  warm  relationship  with  her  brother-in-law  Emerson  Campbell
and  his  wife  during  Harold  Campbell’s  lifetime,  she  saw  less  of
Emerson and Edith Campbell after Harold’s death, and he was not a
blood   relative.                                                            The   evidence   indicates   Mrs.   Campbell   was
especially  fond  of  her  sister  Marie  and  was  concerned  about  her
well-being.   Her concern over Marie was evidenced by the fact that
the 1984 will gave her $5,000.00, while the 1988 will increased the




-31-
bequest to  $100,000.00.    Indeed, all the individual beneficiaries
in the  1988 will were blood relatives.
Mrs.  Campbell’s  interest  in  charity  was  evident  in  both  her
1984  and  her                                                             1988  wills.     Mrs.  Campbell  was  impressed  by  the
University  and  believed  it                                              “was  really  a  good  place  and  doing
really  good  things.”    Mrs.  Campbell  appreciated  the  University’s
acknowledgment of her gifts and contrasted that response to those
of  her  relatives,  who  were  more  distant  in  their  communications
with her.   Mrs. Campbell confided to some people that her relatives
were not very interested in her life and that she had negotiated a
good arrangement with Campbell University for her care.   She stated
that she wanted the University to have what she had, and her  1988
will  and  codicil  reflected  that  testamentary  intent.     We  hold
caveators  have  failed  to  carry  their  burden  of  showing  undue
influence upon Mrs. Campbell by Campbell University.   Accordingly,
caveators’ first assignment of error is overruled.
Peremptory Jury Instruction
By their second assignment of error, caveators argue the trial
court erred by instructing the jury that the will and codicil were
duly executed.    Again, we disagree.
At  trial,  the  propounder  called  all  the  witnesses  to  Mrs.
Campbell’s will and codicil, as well as the notaries who took down
the acknowledgments.   Although the trial took place a decade after
the   execution   of   the   documents,   the   witnesses   presented
uncontroverted testimony that all statutes governing the execution
of wills and codicils were complied with by Mrs. Campbell and her




-32-
witnesses.     Both  the  will  and  the  codicil  were  self-proving.
Caveators presented no contrary evidence to the jury.
We have carefully reviewed the record and conclude the trial
court  properly  instructed  the  jury  on  this  issue,  as  competent,
uncontroverted evidence of proper execution of both documents was
presented.   See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 31-3.3 and 31-11.6 (2001).   This
assignment of error is therefore overruled.
Upon  thoughtful  review  of  the  record  and  the  arguments
presented by the parties, we conclude the trial court did not err
in  granting  partial  summary  judgment  on  the  issue  of  undue
influence and did not err in its instruction to the jury regarding
the execution of the will and the codicil.   The trial court’s order
granting  partial  summary  judgment  for  Campbell  University  on  the
issue of undue influence is affirmed.    We discern no error in the
trial  court’s  instruction  to  the  jury  and  in  the  jury’s  verdict
finding  the  proffered  will  and  codicil  to  be  the  valid  will  and
codicil of Gladys Baars Campbell.
As to order entered  24 April  2001  -- affirmed.
As to judgment entered  25 April  2001  -- no error.
Judges WALKER and BRYANT concur.

Download 01-1223-6.pdf

South Carolina Law