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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA10-775
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  21 December  2010
IN THE MATTER OF:
W.S.P., Jr.                                                                                     Rowan County
No.  08 JT  103
Appeal   by   respondent-mother   and   respondent-father   from
judgment entered  25 March 2010 by Judge Beth Dixon in Rowan County
District Court.    Heard in the Court of Appeals  22 November  2010.
Cynthia Dry for petitioner-appellee, Rowan County Department
of Social Services.
Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, P.L.L.C., by Carrie A.
Hanger, for Guardian ad litem.
J. Thomas Diepenbrock for respondent-appellant, mother.
Rebekah W. Davis for respondent-appellant, father.
BRYANT, Judge.
Because  respondent-mother  conceded  that  she  willfully  left
juvenile in foster care for more than twelve months and the trial
court’s  findings  of  fact  support  the  conclusion  that  respondent-
mother  failed  to  make  reasonable  progress  in  correcting  the
conditions  that  led  to  the  juvenile’s  removal  from  the  home,  we
affirm the trial court’s conclusion that sufficient grounds existed
to terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights.




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Where  the  trial  court  held  a  hearing  on  respondent-father’s
competency  and  thereafter  concluded  respondent-father  did  not
require the appointment of a guardian ad litem, there was no abuse
of discretion.
Respondent-mother    and    respondent-father                                   (collectively
“respondents”) are the parents of W.S.P., Jr.,  (juvenile) who was
born six weeks premature on 21 May 2008.   After his birth, juvenile
was placed in the neonatal unit until he gained weight and was no
longer  jaundiced.    During  this  monitoring  period,  hospital  staff
became  concerned  about  respondent-mother’s  ability  to  care  for
juvenile  and  respondent-father’s  behavior.                                   Respondent-mother
frequently left the hospital for extended periods of time, without
leaving her contact information, and acknowledged to hospital staff
that  she  had  fed  her  son  and  changed  his  diaper  no  more  than  six
times  since  his  birth  six  days  earlier.    Respondent-father  was
escorted out of the hospital after threatening staff and demanding
to  take  juvenile  home  despite  the  newborn’s  medical  condition.
Hospital staff reported their concerns to Rowan County Department
of Social Services  (DSS).
A DSS investigation revealed that respondent-father had been
incarcerated on an assault conviction from 23 January 2008 until 6
May                                                                             2008;  that  he  had  a  significant  criminal  history;  and,
according to respondent-mother’s family, respondent-father had been
violent toward respondent-mother.   DSS’s investigation also raised
concerns about respondent-mother’s living situation.   The Cemetery
Street residence listed by respondent-mother on hospital admission




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forms  was  raided  by  police  on  23  May  2008.      Police found  stolen
firearms,  drugs  and  drug  paraphernalia  in  the  residence,  and
arrested  several  of  respondent-mother’s  relatives.    Respondent-
mother informed DSS that she was living with respondent-father on
East Lafayette Street.
DSS told respondents that they would need to take drug tests
before juvenile would be released to them.    Until the drug screen
results  came  back,  respondent-mother  entered  into  a  voluntary
placement  agreement  with  DSS  pursuant  to  which  juvenile  was
released from the hospital and placed in a licensed foster home on
30  May  2008.    Respondent-mother’s  drug  screen  came  back  negative
and,  on                                                                       20  June   2008,  she  terminated  the  voluntary  placement
agreement.   Respondent-mother named Deborah D. as a safety resource
with whom she and juvenile could reside.   Respondent-mother signed
a  safety  assessment  stating  that  she  would  remain  in  the  home  of
Deborah D., and Deborah agreed to be her safety resource.   Because,
respondent-father  tested  positive  for  cocaine,  respondent-mother
agreed not to allow respondent-father contact with juvenile.    DSS
placed juvenile with respondent-mother at Deborah’s home on 20 June
2008.    The  next  day,  Deborah  informed  DSS  that  respondent-mother
and juvenile left her home, and she did not know their whereabouts.
On 25 June 2008, DSS social workers located respondent-mother
and juvenile at the E. Lafayette Street home of respondent-father.
Respondent-mother  fled  with  the  newborn.     Law-enforcement  soon
found  respondent-mother  hiding  in  a  nearby  house.    Juvenile  was
taken  into  nonsecure  custody  and  returned  to  foster  care.    Law




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enforcement also discovered a large bundle of cash in respondent-
mother’s purse.   Respondent-mother stated that respondent-father’s
primary source of income came from dealing drugs.   On 26 June 2008,
DSS filed a juvenile petition alleging that juvenile was neglected.
After  holding  a  hearing  on                                              7  August   2008,  the  trial  court
adjudicated juvenile a neglected juvenile.   The trial court ordered
DSS to retain legal custody of juvenile but allow a trial placement
with respondent-mother.   The trial court ordered respondent-mother
to: obtain and maintain suitable housing and employment; complete
the  Parents  as  Teachers  in  home  services  program;  cooperate  with
DSS as it pertained to child care services; and cooperate with DSS
and other involved agencies.    The trial court ordered respondent-
father to have no contact with juvenile until he completed a safety
assessment  and  a  case  plan  service  agreement.    Respondent-mother
was ordered to contact DSS and law enforcement if respondent-father
attempted to visit the minor child.
The  day  after  the  adjudication  hearing,  DSS  placed  juvenile
with  respondent-mother  on  a  trial  basis.     Within  a  month,  DSS
terminated the trial placement upon learning that respondent-mother
and juvenile were living with respondent-father.
The  trial  court  held  a  permanency  planning  hearing  on               11
December 2008.   The trial court found that juvenile’s pediatrician
referred juvenile to the Child Developmental Services Agency after
his  foster  care  provider  related  concerns  about  juvenile’s  gross
motor skills.    The trial court found that it was  “contrary to the
best interest of  [juvenile] for custody to return to  [respondent-




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mother] at this time as a trial placement needs to be effectuated
and  monitored,  and                                                         [respondent-mother]  continues  to  need  the
support  and  assistance  of  the                                            [DSS]”;  however,                               “[t]he  permanent
plan  should  remain  reunification  with  [respondent-mother].”    The
trial   court   ordered   respondent-mother   to:   comply   with   all
treatment, evaluations, and appointments made by Child Development
Services; maintain suitable housing and employment; provide for all
of juvenile’s needs; complete the 12-week parenting program through
the Adolescent and Family Enrichment Council; cooperate with DSS as
it pertains to child care services; take all prescribed medication;
cooperate  with  DSS  and  other  involved  agencies;  have  no  contact
with   respondent-father;   contact   DSS   and   law   enforcement   if
respondent-father attempted to visit juvenile; and strictly comply
with  and  adhere  to  the  court’s  orders  and  further  orders  of  the
court.     The  trial  court  ordered  respondent-father  to  have  no
contact with juvenile “unless and until he presents himself to the
court and agrees to complete any orders of the court.”
Child Development Services found that juvenile was in need of
physical  therapy  twice  per  week  for  decreased  age  appropriate
skills in gross motor development.    However, on  18 February  2009,
respondent-mother missed an appointment, and in following up, DSS
discovered  an  eviction  notice  posted  on  the  door  of  respondent-
mother’s listed residence.   Respondent-mother thereafter missed two
home visits scheduled with DSS.
During a permanency planning hearing conducted on 26 February
2009, the trial court reprimanded respondent-mother for her evasive




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conduct and ordered respondent-mother to maintain suitable housing
and   employment,   cooperate   with   DSS,   have   no   contact   with
respondent-father, not change residences without prior approval of
DSS,  keep  DSS  apprised  of  where  juvenile  was  staying,  and  comply
with and adhere to the court’s orders.     Respondent-mother informed
the  court  that  she  moved  to  an  address  on  Henderson  Street  on  17
February 2009.   The trial court again ordered respondent-father not
to have contact with his son  “unless and until he presents himself
to the court and agrees to complete recommendations.”
Following  the                                                                 26  February   2009  hearing,  DSS  went  to  the
Henderson  Street  address  and  learned  respondent-mother  had  given
false  information  about  her  living  situation.    DSS  subsequently
located  respondent-mother  and  juvenile  at  an  apartment  on  North
Main  Street.    After  DSS  learned  the  apartment  was  rented  in  the
names of both respondent-mother and respondent-father, DSS returned
to the North Main Street home to take custody of juvenile but was
met at the door by respondent-father, who was uncooperative.   DSS,
with the landlord, later returned to the North Main Street home and
determined that respondent-mother and juvenile had left.
On  5 March 2009, the trial court held a hearing to review its
February  2009  permanency  planning  order.    The  trial  court  found
that  respondent-mother  and  juvenile  had  contact  with  respondent-
father  in  violation  of  the  court’s  order  and  that  the  current
whereabouts  of  respondent-mother  and  juvenile  were  unknown.    The
trial  court  concluded  that  the  trial  placement  of  juvenile  with
respondent-mother was no longer appropriate.




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On                                                                            4   April                                                    2009,   respondent-mother   and   juvenile   were
discovered  in  Chester,  South  Carolina.     Respondent-mother  and
juvenile had been living with respondent-mother’s father.   At that
residence,  a  DSS  agent  observed  beer  bottle  caps  and  empty
cigarette  cartons  littering  the  edge  of  the  house,  as  well  as  a
strong  smell  of  smoke.    Juvenile  was  clean  but  could  not  take
snacks  with  his  hand  or  feed  himself.    Upon  return,  juvenile  was
placed in the foster home of Cindy B., who had cared for juvenile
prior  to  his  trial  placement  with  respondent-mother  beginning  12
December  2008.
Cindy B. observed that juvenile was very quiet and pale, his
mouth had a bad odor, and juvenile had seemingly regressed in his
gross motor development.   Also, there was a large flat spot in the
back  of  juvenile’s  head.    The  day  after  being  placed  into  foster
care, juvenile developed a fever and was diagnosed with pneumonia.
After a permanency planning hearing on 30 July 2009, the trial
court found that juvenile was progressing well in foster care and
that respondent-mother had not made progress in the last thirteen
months.    The  trial  court  also  found  that  respondent-father  had
several  pending  drug  charges.                                              The  trial  court  changed  the
permanent   plan   from   reunification   with   respondent-mother   to
adoption.    The  trial  court  ordered  DSS  to  file  a  termination  of
parental rights petition.
On  22  September  2009,  DSS  filed  a  petition  to  terminate  the
parental rights of respondent-mother and respondent-father.    On  7
January                                                                       2010,  the  trial  court  continued  the  hearing  on  the




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termination  petition  when  counsel  for  respondent-father  informed
the  trial  court  of  “serious  concerns  about  [respondent-father’s]
capacity.”    The  trial  court  ordered  that  a  Rule                      17  guardian  ad
litem hearing regarding respondent-father’s capacity be conducted
on  21 January  2010.   By  order  filed                                     3  February  2010, the trial
court  found  that  the  documentary  evidence  revealed  “[respondent-
father]  is  competent  to  participate  in  the  legal  system  by  the
current  legal  standards.     He  possesses  sufficient  capacity  to
understand  the  nature  of  the  termination  of  parental  rights
proceeding  and  to  assist  his  attorney  in  his  response  to  the
petition.”    The  trial  court  concluded  that  respondent-father  was
not  in  need  of  a  guardian  ad  litem  and  set  the  termination  of
parental rights hearing for  4 February  2010.
Following  the  termination  of  parental  rights  hearing,  the
trial  court  found  grounds  to  terminate  the  parental  rights  of
respondent-father as to juvenile for neglect, for willfully leaving
juvenile in foster care, for failing to pay a reasonable portion of
the  cost  of  care  for  juvenile,  and  for  willful  abandonment  of
                                                                             juvenile, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.  §§                                                            7B-1111(a)(1),  (2),  (3)
and                                                                          (7).                                        The  trial  court  also  found  grounds  to  terminate
respondent-mother’s parental rights for neglect and for willfully
leaving  juvenile  in  foster  care,  pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §§
7B-1111(a)(1)  and  (2).    The  trial  court  concluded  it  was  in  the
best  interests  of  juvenile  to  terminate  the  parental  rights  of
respondents.    Respondent-mother  and  respondent-father  separately
appeal.




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On appeal, respondent-father questions whether the trial court
erred by failing to appoint him a guardian ad litem.    Respondent-
mother questions whether the trial court had sufficient evidence to
terminate her parental rights on the basis of (I) neglect; and (II)
willfully leaving her child in foster care.
Respondent-Father’s Appeal
Respondent-father  contends  the  trial  court  erred  in  denying
his motion for appointment of a guardian ad litem.    We disagree.
Appointment of a guardian ad litem for a parent is governed by
Section  7B-1101.1, which, in relevant part, states:
(c)  On  motion  of  any  party  or  on  the  court’s
own  motion,  the  court  may  appoint  a  guardian
ad litem for a parent in accordance with G.S.
1A-1,  Rule                                                                    17  if  the  court  determines  that
there  is  a  reasonable  basis  to  believe  that
the  parent  is  incompetent  or  has  diminished
capacity  and  cannot  adequately  act  in  his  or
her  own  interest.  The  parent’s  counsel  shall
not  be  appointed  to  serve  as  the  guardian  ad
litem.
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  7B-1101.1(c)  (2009)  (emphasis added).    Pursuant
to N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  7B-1101.1(c),  “[a] trial judge has a duty to
properly inquire into the competency of a litigant in a civil trial
or  proceeding  when  circumstances  are  brought  to  the  judge’s
attention,  which  raise  a  substantial  question  as  to  whether  the
litigant  is  non  compos  mentis.”    In  re  J.A.A.,  175  N.C.  App.  66,
72,                                                                            623  S.E.2d                            45,   49   (2005).   Whether  the  circumstances  are
sufficient  to  raise  a  substantial  question  as  to  the  party’s
competency  is  a  matter  to  be  initially  determined  in  the  sound
discretion of the trial judge. In re C.G.A.M.,  193 N.C. App.  386,




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390,  671 S.E.2d  1,  4  (2008).    As this Court has stressed, a trial
court is not required to appoint a guardian ad litem in every case
in  which  cognitive  limitations  or  substance  abuse  is  alleged  to
exist. J.A.A.,  175 N.C. App. at  71,  623 S.E.2d at  49.
Here,  the  trial  court  postponed  the  hearing  on  respondent-
father’s termination of parental rights based on counsel’s “serious
concerns about  [respondent-father’s] capacity.”    Through counsel,
respondent-father  filed  a  motion  to  appoint  a  Rule  17  Guardian.
The trial court held a hearing in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat.
§                                                                           7B-1101.1  to  inquire  about  respondent-father’s  capacity.    The
trial court considered several assessments conducted in preparation
for a trial on respondent-father’s criminal charges, including: a
Forensic  Consultation  Summary,  dated                                     15  July                                                               2009,  prepared  by
Forensic Psychiatrist Dr. Nicole Wolfe at Central Regional Hospital
in   Raleigh,   who   concluded   that                                      “despite   his   difficulties,
[respondent-father] is able to understand the nature and object of
the                                                                         .  proceedings  against  him,  is  able  to  comprehend  his
position relative to those proceedings, and is capable of assisting
in  his  defense”;  and  a  forensic  consultation  summary  prepared  by
Dr.  Heather  Ross,  Senior  Psychologist  at  Central  Hospital,  who
concluded that respondent-father  “show[ed] an adequate ability to
process information, to reason logically, and to comprehend legal
concepts.”
The trial court concluded that respondent-father was
competent  to  participate  in  the  legal  system
by  the  current  legal  standards.  He  possesses
sufficient  capacity  to  understand  the  nature
of   the   termination   of   parental   rights




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proceedings and to assist his attorney in his
response  to  the  petition.  He  has  a  different
perspective on the world than most, but it is
a reasoned, intelligent perspective.
And,  “[b]ased on the documentary evidence presented,  [respondent-
father] is not in need of a Rule  17 Guardian ad Litem  [sic].”    We
cannot   say   that   the   trial   court   abused   its   discretion.
Accordingly,                                                                 respondent-father’s    argument    is    overruled.
Respondent-father does not otherwise challenge the findings of fact
and  conclusions  of  law  in  the  order  terminating  his  parental
rights.    Therefore,  we  affirm  the  trial  court’s  termination  of
parental rights as to respondent-father.
Respondent-Mother’s Appeal
Respondent-mother  contends  the  trial  court  erred  by  finding
and  concluding  that  sufficient  grounds  exist  to  terminate  her
parental  rights  on  the  basis  of                                         (I)  neglect  and                                     (II)  willfully
leaving her child in foster care.   We initially address respondent-
mother’s  second  (II)  issue,  that  she  did  not  willfully  leave  her
child in foster care for more than  12 months in violation of N.C.
Gen.  Stat.  §  7B-1111(a)(2).    As  to  this  issue,  respondent-mother
contends that her progress in correcting those conditions which led
to the removal of the juvenile was reasonable.    We disagree.
Termination of parental rights involves a two-stage process.
In  re  Blackburn,                                                           142  N.C.  App.                                       607,              610,   543  S.E.2d   906,   908
(2001).   At the adjudicatory stage, “the petitioner has the burden
of establishing by clear and convincing evidence that at least one
of  the  statutory  grounds  listed  in  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                   §                                                     7B-1111
exists.”   In re Anderson, 151 N.C. App. 94, 97, 564 S.E.2d 599, 602




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(2002)  (citation  omitted).                                                   “If  the  trial  court  determines  that
grounds  for  termination  exist,  it  proceeds  to  the  dispositional
stage, and must consider whether terminating parental rights is in
the  best  interests  of  the  child.”    Id.  at  98,  564  S.E.2d  at  602
(citation  omitted).     On  appeal,  the  trial  court’s  decision  to
terminate parental rights is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard.   Id.   The trial court’s findings of fact, if supported by
clear and convincing evidence, are binding.    In re Williamson,  91
N.C.  App.                                                                     668,                                       674,            373  S.E.2d   317,                       320   (1988).   Unchallenged
findings  of  fact  are  also  binding.    See  In  re  Humphrey,  156  N.C.
App.  533,  540,  577 S.E.2d  421,  426  (2003).
North   Carolina   General   Statutes,   section                               7B-1111(a)(2),
provides that a court may terminate parental rights where:
The parent has willfully left the juvenile in
foster care or placement outside the home for
more  than                                                                     12  months  without  showing  to  the
satisfaction  of  the  court  that  reasonable
progress under the circumstances has been made
in  correcting  those  conditions  which  led  to
the removal of the juvenile.
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                              §                                          7B-1111(a)(2)   (2009).       “[T]o  find  grounds  to
terminate a parent’s rights under G.S.  §  7B-1111(a)(2), the trial
court must perform a two part analysis.” In re O.C., 171 N.C. App.
457,  464,  615  S.E.2d  391,  396,  disc.  review  denied,  360  N.C.  64,
623  S.E.2d  587  (2005).    The  trial  court  must  determine  by  clear,
cogent,   and   convincing   evidence   that:                                  (1)   the   respondent
“willfully” left the juvenile in foster care or placement outside
the home for more than twelve months, and (2) that s of the time of
the hearing the respondent failed to make “reasonable progress” in




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correcting the conditions that led to the juvenile’s removal from
the  home.    Id.  at  464-65,  615  S.E.2d  at  396.    Respondent-mother
does  not  contest  that  she  willfully  left  juvenile  in  foster  care
for more than  12 months.
The  trial  court  made  numerous  unchallenged  findings  of  fact
regarding respondent-mother’s failure to make reasonable progress.
On                                                                           7  August                           2008,  juvenile  was  initially  adjudicated  neglected
based on findings that
[respondent-mother]                                                          was                                 not                                                       spending
appropriate  time  with  the  juvenile  following
his premature birth,  [and] hospital staff did
not  know  how  to  contact                                                  [respondent-mother]
while  she  was  away  for  long  periods  of  time
from the hospital . . .                                                      [P]olice raided the
address  listed  by  [respondent-mother]  as  her
address  on  hospital  paperwork  and  charged
[respondent-mother’s]   mother,   sister,   and
brother with various crimes including drug and
firearms  charges,                                                           [respondent-mother]  failed
to attend properly to own health condition,  .
[respondent-mother]  violated  a  safety
assessment with  [DSS] by failing to remain in
the  home  where  she  agreed  to  stay  with  the
juvenile    after    terminate    the    placement
agreement,                                                                   [respondent-mother]    and    the
juvenile   were   located   in   the   home   of
[respondent-father]  after                                                   [respondent-mother
had  agreed  not  to  have  any  contact  with
[respondent-father],                                                         [respondent-mother]  had
no formula for the juvenile when located . . .
The  trial  court  ordered  respondent-mother  to  obtain  and  maintain
suitable housing and employment, complete the Parents as Teachers
in  home  services  program,  cooperate  with  DSS  as  it  pertained  to
child  care  services,  cooperate  with   DSS  and  other  involved
agencies, and contact DSS and law enforcement if respondent-father
attempted to visit the minor child.




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The trial court found that since the initial adjudication of
neglect
[respondent-mother]   has   not   completed   the
Court’s  orders,  allowed  contact  between  the
juvenile and his father in direct violation of
the   Court’s   orders,   failed   to   maintain
necessary   developmental   physical   therapy
appointments  for  the  juvenile,  was  dishonest
with  the  Court  and  the                                                   [DSS]  during  the
reunification process to the detriment of the
juvenile,    failed    to    maintain    medical
appointments  for  the  juvenile,  and  left  the
state with the juvenile in violation of court
order.
Further,  the  trial  court  found  that,  while  respondent-mother
“maintained  suitable  housing  for  a  time,  she  left  that  housing
without  the  knowledge  or  permission  of  the  [DSS],  was  dishonest
about  the  reasons  she  left  and  pretended  to  live  at  a  different
residence  where  she  and  the  juvenile  did  not  live”;  respondent-
mother has  “lived in at least six different residences during the
period of less than a year[,]” and “did not complete the Parents as
teachers in-home services program as ordered.                                [And,] has [had] no
parenting training from August 2008 until October 2009, a delay of
fourteen months.”
The trial court’s findings of fact support its conclusion that
respondent-mother  willfully  left  juvenile  in  foster  care  without
showing  reasonable  progress  had  been  made  in  correcting  those
conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile.   See N.C.G.S.
§ 7B-1111(a)(2) (2009).   Therefore, we hold the trial court did not
err  in  concluding  that  sufficient  grounds  existed  to  terminate
respondent-mother’s parental rights as to juvenile pursuant to N.C.




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Gen.  Stat.                                                                    §                        7B-1111(a)(2).     Accordingly,  respondent-mother’s
                                                                               argument is overruled.
Because  sufficient  grounds  existed  to  terminate  respondent-
mother’s parental rights as to juvenile on the basis of   N.C. Gen.
Stat.                                                                          §                        7B-1111(a)(2),  we  do  not  address  respondent-mother’s
remaining  arguments  challenging  the  termination  of  her  parental
rights  on  the  basis  of  neglect.    See  In  re  Pierce,  67  N.C.  App.
257,  261,  312  S.E.2d  900,  903  (1984)  (a  finding  of  one  statutory
ground  is  sufficient  to  support  the  termination  of  parental
rights).
Affirmed
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge McGEE concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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South Carolina Law