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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA07-926
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  18 December  2007
IN RE:                                                                                          A.W.T., L.O.L.                                                               Catawba County
Nos.  05 JT  048-49
Appeal  by  respondent  from  judgment  and  order  entered  3  May
2007  by  Judge  Robert  M.  Brady  in  Catawba  County  District  Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals  13 November  2007.
Susan J. Hall, for respondent-appellant.
J. David Ab                                                                                     tioner-appellee.
Melanie Stewart Cranford, for appellee Guardian ad Litem.
Elmore, Judge.
Della W. (respondent) appeals from a judgment and order of the
district  court  terminating  her  parental  rights  to  the  minor
children  A.W.T.  and  L.O.L.,  who  were  born  in  2000  and  2002.    We
note that the children’s biological father, Billy T., is deceased
and not a party to the instant proceeding.
                                                                                                The  Catawba  County  Department  of  Social  Services                       (DSS)
                                                                                                obtained  non-secure  custody  of  A.W.T.  and  L.O.L.  on  22  February
                                                                                                2006,  and  filed  a  petition  alleging  that  they  were  neglected  and
                                                                                                dependent juveniles as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  7B-101(9) and
(15)                                                                                            (2005).                                                                      The   district   court   entered   adjudications   of




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dependency  and  neglect  on                                                 18  May                          2006,  finding  that  the  minor
children had been exposed to a series of violent assaults between
respondent and her mother, Connie W., in their home in February of
2006.    During  these  incidents,  respondent  hit  Connie  W.  in  the
mouth, struck her “with the handle of a knife so hard that the blow
took Connie [W.] to her knees and knocked the breath out of her[,]”
broke  a  window  in  Connie  W.’s  home,  smashed  two  glass  goblets
against  the  wall  while  the  children  were  barefoot  in  the  room,
pulled  a  phone  cord  from  the  wall,                                     “chased  Connie  W[.]  with  a
butter knife and a steak knife[, and]  .  .  . screamed, cursed, and
argued”  with  Connie  W.    The  court  noted  that  respondent  had  “an
extensive  criminal  history  which  includes  [s]imple  [a]ssault  and
several  convictions  for  possession  of  drug  paraphernalia  and
possession of marijuana[,]” and had refused drug screens requested
by DSS.   The court further found that A.W.T. had fourteen unexcused
absences from school and several tardies between 30 August 2005 and
2 February 2006.   In November of 2005, a Child Protective Services
investigator  found  respondent  living  with  the  children  in  a  home
without  electricity,  relying  on  an  extension  cord  connected  to  a
neighbor’s outlet for power.    The court placed the minor children
in  DSS  custody.     It  ordered  respondent  to  complete  a               “Family
Services  Case  Plan  which  includes  stable  housing  and  employment,
random drugs screens, and [a] complete psychological evaluation[].”
Respondent  signed  a  case  plan  on  24  March  2006,  but  did  not
attend a review hearing held on 6 June 2006.   She told DSS that she
was working through a temporary agency but had yet to obtain stable




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housing.    In  its  review  order  entered  3  July  2006,  the  district
court found that respondent  “has not begun to work on the items in
her case plan.”   The court further noted that respondent’s “social
worker  does  not  have  information  on  how  to  contact  the  mother  to
send  for  random  drug  screens.”    Accordingly,  the  court  suspended
respondent’s visitation with the minor children until she notified
DSS  of  her  whereabouts  and  submitted  to  random  drug  screens.    It
reiterated its prior order that respondent comply with the terms of
her case plan.
The  court  held  a  permanency  planning  hearing  on                        29  August
2006.   Respondent attended the hearing but was incarcerated, having
chosen to activate a suspended sentence rather than submit to the
conditions of probation.   The court construed respondent’s decision
as evincing an unwillingness “to cooperate with this Court’s orders
or  her  case  plan.”     The  court  found  that  respondent  had  done
nothing  toward  the  completion  of  her  case  plan  and  had  never
provided  DSS  with  contact  information.    In  an  order  entered          12
September                                                                     2006,  the  court  determined  that  further  efforts  to
reunify  respondent  with  the  minor  children  would  be  futile  and
changed the permanent placement plan for the children to adoption.
DSS filed a motion to terminate respondent’s parental rights
on  18  October  2006,  on  grounds  that  she  had  neglected  the  minor
children and for a period of six months prior to the filing of the
motion  had  willfully  failed  to  pay  a  reasonable  portion  of  their
cost  of  care.    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  7B-1111(a)(1),  (2)  (2005).    In
support  of  its  claim  of  neglect  under  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                §                                                           7B-




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1111(a)(1),  DSS  noted  the  minor  children’s  prior  adjudication  of
neglect and dependency on  9 May  2006, and alleged that respondent
had  failed  to  (1)  “address  or  remedy  the  issues  which  led  to  the
initial  adjudication[,]”                                                      (2)                                                               “maintain  regular  visitation  and
contact  with  the  minor  children[,]”                                                                                                          (3)                                   “maintain  consistent
contact with the social worker in order to address the issues which
led to the adjudication  .  .  . or to work toward reunification[,]”
and (4) “submit to drug screens” on five occasions from 24 March to
24 May  2006.
Following  a  review  on  12  November  2006,  the  district  court
entered an order finding that respondent had been released from her
incarceration and had contacted DSS to schedule an appointment for
28  November                                                                   2006.                                                             Inasmuch  as  respondent  had         “not  made  any
progress on her case plan[,]” the court found it unlikely that the
minor  children  could  be  returned  to  her  care  within  six  months.
The  review  order  noted  the  death  of  the  children’s  father,  Billy
T., on  22 September  2006.
At  the  19  March  2007  termination  hearing,  DSS  Social  Worker
Tina  McRary  testified  that  respondent  signed  a  case  plan  on           24
March                                                                          2006,  but  did  nothing  toward  its  fulfillment  before  she
elected   to   activate   her   suspended   sentence   in   July,              2006.
Respondent had attended half of her scheduled visitations until 24
May 2006, and brought food, clothing, and “stuff from home” for the
children.   She also gave the children stuffed animals and candy at
Easter.    However,  respondent  failed  to  attend  her  psychological
evaluation  and  had  refused  drug  screens  at  her  visitations  in




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February,  March,  and  May  of  2006.    Because  respondent  would  not
provide DSS with contact information, McRary was unable to arrange
for  drug  screens  for  respondent  other  than  at  her  visitations.
Respondent never reinstated her visitation rights by submitting to
random drug screens after the  6 June  2006 review hearing.    Social
worker Cheryl Brock handled respondent’s case while McRary was on
maternity leave from  23 October 2006 until  2 January 2007.   McRary
notified respondent’s parents of her maternity leave and provided
the necessary information to her clients on her voice mail message.
Respondent’s father scheduled an appointment for her with Brock on
28  November                                                                  2006,  for  the  purpose  of  discussing  her  case  plan.
Respondent  did  not  attend  the  appointment  or  contact  DSS  to
reschedule  it.    Since  her  release  from  incarceration,  respondent
had not provided McRary with her contact information or spoken to
McRary.    When  McRary  called  respondent’s  father  in  an  attempt  to
reach  her,  he  said  that                                                   “she  was  not  there.”     McRary  asked
respondent’s father  “to have her contact” DSS, but respondent did
not  do  so.    In  December  of  2006,  respondent  registered  for  child
support and made an initial payment of $105.00.   At the time of the
hearing,  she  had  made  no  subsequent  support  payments  and  was
$210.00 in arrears.    Connie W. also delivered Christmas gifts for
the children from respondent in December of  2006.    At the time of
the   termination   hearing,   respondent   had   yet   to   obtain   a
psychological  evaluation,  attend  a  single  random  drug  screen,  or
provide  any  information  to  DSS  regarding  stable  employment  or
housing.




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Respondent  testified  that  she  was  unable  to  comply  with  her
case plan prior to her incarceration in July of  2006, because she
was  dependent  upon  her  father  for  transportation.    She  attended
visitations with her children when she was able.   Prior to July of
2006,  respondent  lived  with  friends  or  her  father.    She  provided
both addresses and phone numbers to McRary and left monthly phone
messages for her; but McRary  “never returned  [her] calls to where
[she] was staying.”    Although she failed to submit to random drug
screens arranged by McRary, respondent had been subject to monthly
drug  tests  at  her  scheduled  appointments  with  her  probation
officer.    She had asked her probation officer to forward her test
results to McRary.    Until July of  2006, respondent worked through
a temporary agency, Catawba Valley Staffing.   On the advice of her
probation  officer,  she  chose  to  activate  and  serve  her  suspended
sentence, because her  “bond was so high.”   She had been unaware of
McRary’s  maternity  leave  and  received  no  information  from  DSS
during  her  incarceration  other  than  notice  of  her  permanency
planning  hearing.     Since  January  of                                    2007,  respondent  had  been
working at a laundromat and earned $100.00 per week.   Her neighbor
drove  her  to  work.     Respondent  was  living  in  an  apartment  in
Connelly  Springs  with  a  monthly  rent  of                                $350.00,  and  had  paid
$300.00  in  child  support.     She  had  received                          “two  thousand  and
something”  dollars  from  a                                                                                                $4,000.00  insurance  settlement  in
November  of                                                                 2006,  but  had  exhausted  these  funds  on   “[r]ent  and
power”  and  the  security  deposit  for  her  apartment.    Respondent
lacked phone service but  “had  [her] father call  [DSS] a couple of




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times”  on  her  behalf.     Despite  living  within  a  block  of  her
father’s  residence,  which  she  described  as  “walking  distance[,]”
respondent had never used his phone to call McRary or to check his
answering  machine  to  determine  if  McRary  had  returned  his  calls.
Respondent remained dependent upon her father and grandfather for
transportation,  both  of  whom  were  unreliable  due  to                    “health
problems.”   She had never asked DSS for transportation assistance.
After hearing the parties’ evidence, the district court found
grounds to terminate respondent’s parental rights for neglect under
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                             §                         7B-1111(a)(1).     The  court  entered  findings
depicting the events that led to the prior adjudication of neglect
and dependency on  18 May  2006, as well as respondent’s subsequent
failure to cooperate with DSS or to work toward the fulfillment of
her case plan.   The court noted respondent’s failure to contact her
social worker and expressly found that “[h]er explanation that she
left messages once per month for the worker is not . . . credible.”
The  court  determined  that  respondent’s  conduct                           “constitute[d]
neglect”  of  her  children  and  demonstrated                                “a  strong  probability
that  neglect  would  continue  if  the  children  were  returned  to  the
home  of  [respondent]  at  this  time  or  any  time  in  the  foreseeable
future.”
Following its adjudication under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a),
the  district  court  heard  additional  testimony  and  received  into
evidence the written reports of DSS and the Guardian ad Litem.   The
court   entered   a   separate   dispositional   order   terminating
respondent’s  parental  rights.    The  court  made  findings  of  fact




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regarding the minor children’s developmental delays, their progress
in foster care, and their satisfactory transition into an adoptive
foster placement.   The court found that the children had expressed
no  interest  in  further  contact  with  respondent  and  had  a  good
relationship with their prospective parents.    The court concluded
that  termination  of  respondent’s  rights  would  serve  the  best
interests  of  the  minor  children  by  removing  the  sole  remaining
obstacle to their permanent placement plan of adoption.
On  appeal,  respondent  claims  that  the  district  “court  erred
when  it  concluded  that  [she]  had  neglected  the  children.”    While
purporting to encompass seven of her assignments of error, however,
her  briefed  argument  quotes  the  entirety  of  the  findings  of  fact
and  conclusions  of  law  in  the  adjudicatory  order,  with  several
paragraphs of  “contested” findings and conclusions highlighted in
bold  text.                                                                  Rather  than  address  any  individual  finding  or
conclusion  with  a  corresponding  argument,  respondent  offers  an
alternative version of events, much of which involves assumptions
or  inferences  unsupported  by  evidence.                                   Moreover,  only  one
paragraph in the body of respondent’s argument — listing her gifts
to  the  children  —  cites  the  hearing  transcript.    The  subsequent
three pages of narrative lack any supporting citations to evidence,
either  from  the  transcript  or  the  record  on  appeal.                  This
constitutes a violation of N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6), which requires
summaries  of  evidence  to  include                                         “appropriate  reference  to  the
record  on  appeal  or   the  transcript  of  proceedings,  or  the
exhibits.”   N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2007).   Accordingly, although




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respondent  has  assigned  error  individually  to  five  enumerated
findings in the adjudicatory order, she has failed to present this
Court  with  a  properly-briefed  argument  as  to  any  particular
finding.   See In re H.L.A.D.,  __ N.C. App.  __, __,  646 S.E.2d  425,
436 (2007) (“[R]espondent does not bring forward her assignments of
error  with  specific  arguments  challenging  these  findings  of
fact.”);  In  re  P.M.,  169  N.C.  App.  423,  424,  610  S.E.2d  403,  404
(2005)  (holding  that  the  respondent  abandoned  her  assignments  of
error to findings of fact when she “failed to specifically argue in
her brief that they were unsupported by evidence”).    We therefore
deem  the  district  court’s  findings  of  fact  to  be  binding  for
purposes  of  our  review.     Id.     Accordingly,  we  must  determine
whether  the  court’s  findings  support  its  conclusion  of  law  that
grounds  for   termination  exist  under  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                    §                                                             7B-
1111(a)(1).    In  re  Huff,  140  N.C.  App.  288,  291,  536  S.E.2d  838,
840  (2000).
A  court  may  terminate  parental  rights  pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), if it finds by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence that the parent has “neglected the juvenile.”   A child is
neglected  if  he  is  denied  of                                              “proper  care,  supervision,  or
discipline” or “lives in an environment injurious to [his] welfare
.”    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                        §                                                             7B-101(15)   (2005).    To  constitute
neglect, the parent’s actions must place the child at “substantial
risk”  of                                                                      “physical,  mental,  or  emotional  impairment.”     In  re
Beasley,                                                                       147  N.C.  App.                                               399,         403,                        555  S.E.2d   643,   646   (2001)
(quotations and citations omitted).   Where a child has been placed




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outside of the parent’s care for a significant period prior to the
hearing, “a trial court may find that grounds for termination exist
upon  a  showing  of  a  history  of  neglect  by  the  parent  and  the
probability  of  a  repetition  of  neglect.”    In  re  L.O.K.,  J.K.W.,
T.L.W.,  &  T.L.W.,                                                            174  N.C.  App.                           426,                                 435,                        621  S.E.2d   236,   242
(2005) (quotations and citation omitted).   The court must consider
any changed conditions since the children’s removal from the home,
In re Ballard,  311 N.C.  708,  715,  319 S.E.2d  227,  232  (1984), but
may  terminate  a  parent’s  rights  “if  there  is  a  showing  of  a  past
adjudication  of  neglect  and  the  trial  court  finds  by  clear  and
convincing evidence a probability of repetition of neglect if the
juvenile[s] were returned to  [their] parent[].”    In re Reyes,  136
N.C. App. 812, 815, 526 S.E.2d 499, 501 (2000) (citation omitted).
Here, the court supported its adjudication of neglect with the
following findings:
6.                                                                                                                       [T]he  mother’s  criminal  history
includes                                                                       simple                                                                         assault    and    several
convictions                                                                    for                                       possession                                                       of            drug
paraphernalia and possession of marijuana.   As
of  November                                                                   28,                                       2005,                                [she]  was  living  with
the children in a home to which the power had
been  cut  off,  and  power  was  being  provided
from  a  neighbor’s  home  through  an  extension
cord.                                                                          Several   days   after   striking   the
maternal grandmother, Connie W[.], on February
16,  2006, the mother hit Connie W[.] with the
handle  of  a  knife  when  the  children  were
present.     On  February                                                      20,                                       2006,  the  mother
broke  out  a  window  and  smashed  two  large
goblets in the home in which the children were
present  bare-footed,  and  chased  Connie  W[.]
with  knives.                                                                  .  .  .  [Respondent]  was  ordered
to obtain stable housing and employment, take
random    drug    screens,    and    complete    a
psychological evaluation.




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7.   The mother did not appear for the [review]
hearing  on  June                                       6,                                         2006.    She  had  signed  a
case  plan,  but  had  not  begun  to  work  on  it.
She  did  not  have  stable  housing  and  was
employed  by  a  temporary  agency,  and  had  not
given    the    social    worker    her    contact
information.    Visitation  with  the  mother  was
suspended  at  that  time.    She  was  living  with
friends  who  had  a  telephone,  but  she  didn’t
contact  the  social  worker.    Her  explanation
that she left messages once per month for the
worker is not found credible.
8.    As of August  29,  2006, the mother had not
begun to work on her case plan and had chosen
to  activate  a  criminal  sentence  even  though
she knew of the things that had been required
of her.    The court  .  .  . ordered that further
efforts with the mother cease.   On October 18,
2006,                                                   [DSS]  filed  its  motion  to  terminate
parental rights.
9.   The mother was released from incarceration
in  early  November  of  2006.    She  did  not  meet
with  a  child  support  agent  until  after  her
release.    She  set  up  an  appointment  with  the
social worker scheduled for November 28, 2006,
but                                                     .   failed   to   appear   for   the
appointment.     As  of  this  time,  she  has  not
completed any of the items which were ordered
by the court and are in her case plan.
10.   Even as of the time of the hearing on the
motion   to   terminate   parental   rights,   the
mother  has  not  had  the  ordered  psychological
evaluation,  much  less  comply                         [sic]  with  any
recommendations  for  counseling  or  treatment
that such an evaluation might order.    She has
had one counseling session at Family Net.
11.   That the mother took drug screens for her
probation  officer  did  not  relieve  her  of  the
responsibility to take random drug screens as
requested  by  the  social  worker.    The  mother
knew   when   her   probation   meetings   were
scheduled  and  that  there  was  a  good  chance
that she would be tested.
12.  [DSS]  attempted  to  maintain  contact  with
the mother.   A replacement worker was assigned
while  the  regularly  assigned  worker  was  on
maternity  leave.     By  the  time  the  mother




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learned  of  the  worker’s  maternity  leave,  the
regularly  assigned  worker  was  back  on  the
case.                                                                          After   the   mother’s   release   from
                                                                               incarceration,  the  mother  has  not  personally
contacted her social worker.
13.    The  mother  received  more  than                                       $2000.00
from   her                                                                     $4,000.00   insurance   settlement
arising  from  a  car  accident.     She  has  paid
some money on her child support, but is still
one  or  two  months  in  arrears.    After  living
with her father for a short time, she obtained
an apartment.    Her rent is  $350.00 per month.
She earns around  $100.00 per week cleaning in
a laundromat.    As of this time, she has spent
all  of                                                                        .  her  settlement  funds.    She  is
unable to support herself and the child[ren].
These  findings  are  fully  supported  by  the  hearing  testimony  of
McRary and respondent, as well as the prior orders entered in this
cause.    We  note  that  the  district  court  was  entitled  to  accept
McRary’s account of events and to disbelieve respondent’s competing
                                                                                                                                   testimony,   in   its   capacity   as   the   trier   of   fact.                                                                                             In   re
Oghenekevebe,                                                                  123  N.C.  App.                                     434,                                                               439,                                                           473  S.E.2d   393,         397-98
(1996).                                                                                                                                                                                               In  light  of  the  prior  adjudication  of  dependency  and
neglect  on                                                                    18  May                                                                                                                2006,  the  court  further  found                                            “a  strong
probability  that  neglect  would  continue  if  the  children  were
returned  to  the  home  of  [respondent]  at  this  time  or  any  time  in
the foreseeable future.”
We  hold  that  the  facts  found  by  the  district  court  are
sufficient  to  establish  grounds  for  termination  under  N.C.  Gen.
Stat.  §  7B-1111(a)(1).    At  the  time  of  the  prior  adjudication  of
neglect,  respondent  had  exposed  A.W.T.  and  L.O.L.  to  a  series  of
violent  acts  in  the  home  against  their  grandmother,  placing  the
children  at  risk  of  physical  or  emotional  harm.     There  was




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additional evidence that she had failed to tend to the children’s
educational and developmental needs and lacked appropriate housing.
Moreover,  respondent’s  criminal  history  suggested  a  problem  with
substance abuse.    Respondent entered into a case plan with DSS on
24 March  2006, but had made no attempt to complete her plan or to
remain  in  contact  with  DSS  regarding  the  fate  of  her  children  at
the time of the termination hearing on  19 March  2007.   She had not
visited  with  the  children  since  24  May  2006,  having  refused  the
random drug screens that were required for further visitation.   At
the   time   of   the   hearing,   respondent   had   yet   to   obtain   a
psychological evaluation or to provide her contact information to
McRary.    She  failed  to  attend  or  reschedule  a                         28  November                                   2006
appointment with DSS arranged by her father following her release
from incarceration.   Moreover, although respondent claimed to have
part-time  work  earning                                                      $100.00  per  week,  her  monthly  rent  was
$350.00;  she  had  already  expended  the  proceeds  of  a                   $4000.00
insurance  settlement  obtained  in  November  of  2006.    Respondent’s
lack  of  effort  toward  correcting  the  conditions  which  led  to  the
prior  adjudication  of  neglect  was  sufficient  to  support  the
district court’s finding of a probability of further neglect if the
children were placed in her care.    See In re Davis,  116 N.C. App.
409,  413-14,  448 S.E.2d  303,  306  (1994).
Respondent  next  claims  that  the  district  court  abused  its
discretion  by  concluding  that  termination  of  her  parental  rights
would serve the best interests of the minor children.   We note that
respondent’s  brief  to  this  Court  fails  to  present  any  cognizable




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challenge  to  the  findings  of  fact  in  the  dispositional  order,
notwithstanding her nine corresponding assignments of error in the
record on appeal.   After articulating the legal standard applicable
to dispositions under N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  7B-1110, and the abuse of
discretion standard of review, respondent again simply quotes the
entirety of the findings and conclusions in the dispositional order
and highlights in bold text the findings and conclusions with which
she  disagrees.                                                               After  more  than  two  pages  of  single-spaced
quotations, she presents a short paragraph of argument unsupported
by  any  citation  to  the  evidence  or  to  any  legal  authority.    The
findings are therefore binding on appeal.   N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6)
(2007).
Once  the  district  court  finds  grounds  for  termination  under
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                             §                                                           7B-1111(a),  it  must  select  an  appropriate
disposition based upon an assessment of the best interests of the
minor  child.    In  re  Nesbitt,  147  N.C.  App.  349,  352,  555  S.E.2d
659, 662 (2001); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110 (2005).   The decision to
terminate  parental  rights  under  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                         §                                                           7B-1110  is
reviewed  only  for  manifest  abuse  of  discretion.    In  re  J.A.A.  &
S.A.A.,  175  N.C.  App.  66,  75,  623  S.E.2d  45,  51  (2005)  (citation
omitted).
In  claiming  an  abuse  of  discretion  by  the  district  court,
respondent                                                                    “reincorporate[s]”    her    argument    regarding    the
adjudication of neglect.   Inasmuch as we have affirmed the court’s
adjudication under N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  7B-1111(a)(1), this argument
is unavailing.    Respondent also notes McRary’s testimony that she




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had   interacted   appropriately   with   the   children   during   her
visitations and “had a close relationship with the children at that
time.”   As noted in the adjudicatory order, however, respondent had
not visited with the children since  24 May  2006.
We  find  no  abuse  of  discretion  by  the  district  court.    The
dispositional  order  includes  findings  on  each  of  the  relevant
factors  set  forth  in  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  7B-1110(a),  including  the
minor  children’s  ages  and  prospects  for  adoption;  their  lack  of
apparent  interest  in  further  contact  with  respondent;  and  their
good  relationship  with  their  adoptive  parents.    The  court  noted
that termination would further the children’s permanent placement
plan  of  adoption.    It  also  took  into  account  the  developmental
needs  of  the  children,  noting  L.O.L.’s  diagnosis  as  borderline
autistic  and  A.W.T.’s  “delays  in  school  due  to  his  having  missed
days in school” while in respondent’s care.    The court found that
the children were receiving counseling and speech therapy and had
successfully  transitioned  into  an  adoptive  foster  placement  with
parents who were aware of their special needs.   Finally, the court
deemed it  “unlikely that  [respondent] would be a proper custodian
even  should  the  current  adoptive  placement  disrupt.”    The  order
reflects a reasoned decision by the court properly focused on the
children’s well-being and need for permanency.
Affirmed.
Judges WYNN and STROUD concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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