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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA04-18
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                                          7 December  2004
IN THE MATTER OF:
F.M.L.W.                                                                                        Wake County
F.J.S.                                                                                          No.  02 J  625
Appeal by respondent from order entered  23 May  2003 by Judge
Michael  R.  Morgan  in  Wake  County  District  Court.    Heard  in  the
Court of Appeals  7 June  2004.
Corinne G. Russell and Anne W. Brill for petitioner-appellee
Wake County Human Services.
Patricia K. Gibbons for Guardian ad Litem-appellee.
Terry F. Rose for respondent-appellant.
TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge.
Respondent  appeals  the  trial  court  order  terminating  her
parental rights to her eight-year-old son, Frazier, 1and her six-
year-old  son,  Franklin.  2  For  the  reasons  discussed  herein,  we
affirm the trial court order.
The  facts  and  procedural  history  pertinent  to  the  instant
appeal  are  as  follows:     On                                                                4  October                              2002,  Wake  County  Human
Services                                                                                        (“petitioner”)   filed   a   petition   (“the   petition”)
1
For the purposes of this opinion, we will refer to the
minor child by the pseudonym  “Frazier.”
2
For the purposes of this opinion, we will refer to the
minor child by the pseudonym  “Franklin.”




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requesting termination of respondent’s parental rights to Frazier
and  Franklin.    The  petition  further  requested  that  the  parental
rights  of  the  fathers  of  Frazier  and  Franklin  be  terminated  as
well.   The petition contained the following pertinent allegations:
12.   That   there   are   facts   sufficient   to
warrant   a   determination   that   grounds
exist  for  the  termination  of  parental
rights, said grounds as follows:
b.                                                                         That                      [respondent]    abused    the
                                                                                                     children   within   the   meaning   of
                                                                           N.C.G.S.                  Section                                  7B-101(1):
                                                                           physical  abuse  on                                                [Franklin]  was
                                                                           adjudicated   on   June                                            6,                2001   as
evidenced by the attached order from
the  hearing;                                                              [respondent]  sexually
abused [Frazier] as disclosed by him
during    a    Child    Mental    Health
Evaluation  by  Dr.  Teresa  Poole  in
December,  2001.
c.                                                                         That                      [respondent]    and    fathers
neglected  the  children  within  the
meaning   of   N.C.G.S.   Section                                          7B-
101(15),  and  it  is  probable  that
there  would  be  a  repetition  of  the
neglect if the children returned to
the care of the mother or father.
d.                                                                         That                      [respondent]    and    fathers
willfully   left   the   children   in
foster  care  for  more  than  twelve
(12)  months  without  showing  to  the
satisfaction   of   the   court   that
reasonable    progress    under    the
circumstances   has   been   made   in
correcting the conditions which led
to  the  removal  of  the  children.
Poverty is not the sole reason that
the  parents  are  unable  to  care  for
the children.
On  4  November  2002,  respondent  filed  an  answer  denying  the
allegations of the petition.   The case proceeded to trial, and the




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trial  court  conducted  hearings  and  received  evidence  from  the
parties on  27 February  2003 and  24 April  2003.    On  24 April  2003,
Frazier  Sr., 3Frazier’s  father,  executed  a  relinquishment  of  all
parental  rights  to  Frazier.    Following  the  hearings,  the  trial
court  concluded  as  a  matter  of  law  that  respondent  had  abused
Frazier and Franklin as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(1) and
had neglected Frazier and Franklin as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat.  §
7B-101(15).    The trial court further concluded as a matter of law
that respondent had left the children in foster care for more than
twelve  months,  without  showing  to  the  satisfaction  of  the  trial
court  that  reasonable  progress  had  been  made  to  correct  the
conditions which led to the children’s removal.    After concluding
that it was in the best interests of Frazier and Franklin to do so,
the trial court issued an order terminating respondent’s parental
rights to the children on 23 May 2003.   It is from this order that
respondent appeals.
We note initially that respondent’s brief contains arguments
supporting only sixteen of her original twenty-one assignments of
error.     Pursuant  to  N.C.R.  App.  P.                                   28(b)(6)                      (2004),  the  five
omitted assignments of error are deemed abandoned.    Therefore, we
limit  our  present  review  to  those  assignments  of  error  properly
preserved by respondent for appeal.
The issues on appeal are whether:                                           (I) a new trial is required
3
For the purposes of this opinion, we will refer to
Frazier’s father by the pseudonym  “Frazier Sr.”




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due  to  an  incomplete  recordation  of  the  trial  court  proceedings;
(II) the trial court erred by failing to hold a special hearing to
determine the issues raised by the petition to terminate parental
rights;  (III) the trial court erred by concluding that sufficient
grounds exist to terminate respondent’s parental rights; and  (IV)
the  trial  court  erred  by  taking  judicial  notice  of  an  underlying
case file in the matter.
I.
Respondent  first  argues  that  she  is  entitled  to  a  new  trial
because  the  transcript  of  the  termination  hearing  is  incomplete.
We disagree.
This   Court   has   previously   held   that                                 “[w]here   a   trial
transcript  is                                                                ‘entirely  inaccurate  and  inadequate,’  precluding
formulation of an adequate record and thus preventing appropriate
appellate  review,  a  new  trial  may  be  granted.”    In  re  Lineberry,
154 N.C. App.  246,  257,  572 S.E.2d  229,  237  (2002)  (quoting State
v.  Sanders,                                                                  312  N.C.                                                           318,     320,                                             321  S.E.2d   836,   837   (1984)   (per
curium)), cert. denied,  356 N.C.  672, 577 S.E.2d 624 (2003).   N.C.
Gen.  Stat.                                                                   §                                                                   7B-806   (2003)  requires  that  all  adjudicatory  and
dispositional juvenile hearings be recorded by stenographic notes
or  electrical  or  mechanical  means.    However,  in  In  re  Clark,  159
N.C. App. 75, 80, 582 S.E.2d 657, 660 (2003), this Court concluded
that  the                                                                     “[m]ere  failure  to  comply  with  this  statute  standing
alone, is  .  .  . not by itself grounds for new hearing.”    Instead,
“in  order  to  prevail  on  an  assignment  of  error  under  section  7B-
806,                                                                          [the  appellant]  must  also  demonstrate  that  the  failure  to




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record the evidence resulted in prejudice to that party.”    Id.
In  the  instant  case,  respondent  makes  general  allegations
regarding the trial court’s findings of fact and asserts that  “it
is  impossible  for                                                          [her]  to  adequately  perfect  her  appeal.”
However,  “the  use  of  general  allegations  is  insufficient  to  show
reversible  error  resulting  from  the  loss  of  specific  portions  of
testimony caused by gaps in recording.”   Id. (citing In re Peirce,
53  N.C.  App.  373,  382,  281  S.E.2d  198,  204  (1981)  (no  prejudice
shown  where  party  failed  to  allege  or  show  in  the  record  the
contents of the lost testimony)).                                            “Where a verbatim transcript of
the  proceedings  is  unavailable,  there  are  ‘means  .  .  .  available
for                                                                          [a  party]  to  compile  a  narration  of  the  evidence,  i.e.,
reconstructing the testimony with the assistance of those persons
present at the hearing.’”    Clark,  159 N.C. App. at  80,  582 S.E.2d
at 660 (quoting Miller v. Miller, 92 N.C. App. 351, 354, 374 S.E.2d
467,  469  (1988));  see  N.C.R.  App.  P.  9(c)  (2004)  (providing  for
narration  of  the  evidence  in  the  record  on  appeal  and,  if
necessary, settlement of the record by the trial court in the form
of narration of testimony).
In the instant case, respondent fails to demonstrate that she
attempted to reconstruct the missing testimony or made any effort
to  engage  the  trial  court  and  petitioner  in  narration.    Although
respondent contends that petitioner made no effort to reconstruct
the  missing  testimony  prior  to  appeal,  we  note  that  it  is  the
responsibility of the appellant, not the appellee, to ensure that
the record on appeal is complete and the transcript constituted in




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accordance with Rule 9.   Miller, 92 N.C. App. at 353, 374 S.E.2d at
468.    Moreover, as in Clark, the trial court’s extensive findings
of  fact  in  the  instant  case  indicate  that  the  trial  court
considered and evaluated all the evidence.   Without the benefit of
a  narration,  respondent  has  failed  to  demonstrate  that  any
prejudice  occurred  as  a  result  of  the  improper  recordation.
Therefore, we overrule respondent’s first argument.
II.
Respondent   next   argues   that   the   trial   court   committed
reversible  error  by  failing  to  hold  a  special  hearing  prior  to
trial  in  order  to  determine  the  issues  raised  by  the  petition.
Although  we  note  that  respondent  failed  to  object  to  the  trial
court’s  alleged  error  prior  to  appeal,  this  Court  has  previously
held that, where the trial court acts in contravention of a statute
to the prejudice of a party, the right to appeal the trial court’s
error  is  preserved  notwithstanding  the  respondent’s  failure  to
enter an objection.   In re Taylor, 97 N.C. App.  57, 61, 387 S.E.2d
230,  232  (1990) (citing State v. Ashe,  314 N.C.  28, 39, 331 S.E.2d
652, 659 (1985)).   Thus, we will address the merits of respondent’s
assignment of error.
Where  a  respondent  denies  in  his  or  her  answer  any  material
allegation   contained   within   a   petition   to   terminate   the
respondent’s parental rights, N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  7B-1108(b)  (2003)
requires  the  trial  court  to  conduct  a  “special  hearing  .  .  .  to
determine the issues raised by the petition and answer[.]”   In the
instant case, there is no indication in the record that the trial




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court conducted the special hearing required by N.C. Gen. Stat.  §
7B-1108(b).   However, because we conclude that there were no issues
that needed to be resolved in a special hearing, we hold that the
trial  court’s  failure  to  conduct  the  special  hearing  was  not
prejudicial.
In Peirce,  53 N.C. App. at 383,  281 S.E.2d at  204, this Court
held  that                                                                  “[t]he  fact  that  the  hearing  was  brief  and  held  just
prior   to   the   trial   does   not   conflict   with   the   statutory
requirements                                                                [of  G.S.                                                       7A-289.29(b)   (now  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.   §   7B-
1108(b))].”   We recognize that the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat.
§  7B-1108(b) are general, and, as we noted in Peirce, the statute
“does not prescribe the exact form the special hearing is to take
except that it is to be used to determine the issues raised by the
pleadings.”    Id. at  382,  281 S.E.2d at  204.    The clear purpose of
the special hearing is to establish which issues remain between the
parties after the petition and answer have been filed.   Thus, where
a  respondent  agrees  with  or  stipulates  to  one  or  more  of  the
allegations  of  a  petition,  the  trial  court  may,  in  a  special
hearing,  dispose  of  those  issues  prior  to  trial  and  further
determine which issues remain for trial.
In  the  instant  case,  respondent’s  answer  denied  each  of  the
allegations  of  the  petition,  thereby  indicating  that  each  of  the
issues presented in the petition were in dispute.   Thus, there were
no issues remaining for the trial court to dispose of at a special
hearing,  and  therefore,  we  are  not  convinced  the  trial  court’s
failure  to  conduct  a  special  hearing  prejudiced  respondent.




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Accordingly, respondent’s second argument is overruled.
III.
Several  of  respondent’s  next  arguments  concern  findings  of
fact and trial testimony related to the trial court’s determination
that  Frazier  was  sexually  abused.    As  discussed  above,  the  trial
court  determined  that  sufficient  grounds  exist  to  terminate
respondent’s  parental  rights  pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.              §                                          7B-
1111(a)(1), which allows a trial court to terminate parental rights
upon a finding that a parent has abused or neglected a child within
the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  7B-101.    Specifically, the trial
court  concluded  that  respondent  had  inflicted  serious  physical
injury  upon  Franklin  and  had  committed  acts  upon  Frazier  that
violated  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                  §                                          14-202.1,  which  prohibits  indecent
liberties being taken with children.   However, the trial court also
determined that sufficient grounds exist to terminate respondent’s
parental  rights  pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                            §                                          7B-1111(a)(2).
Specifically, the trial court concluded that respondent willfully
left  Frazier  and  Franklin  in  foster  care  for  more  than  twelve
months  without  showing  to  the  trial  court’s  satisfaction  that
reasonable  progress  under  the  circumstances  had  been  made  in
correcting the conditions which led to the removal of the children.
In   a   termination   of   parental   rights   proceeding,   a
determination  that  any  one  of  those  grounds  listed  in  N.C.  Gen.
Stat.                                                                        §                                          7B-1111  exists  is  sufficient  to  support  termination  of
                                                                             parental  rights.    In  re  Williamson,   91  N.C.  App.                                                  668,   678,   373




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S.E.2d 317, 322-23 (1988).   If on appeal this Court determines that
one  of  the  grounds  found  by  the  trial  court  exists,  we  need  not
consider  whether  the  trial  court  erred  in  its  findings  or
conclusions  regarding  other  grounds  for  termination.    See  In  re
Shepard, 162 N.C. App. 215, 225, 591 S.E.2d 1, 8 (2004) (concluding
that  where  the  trial  court  properly  terminated  parental  rights
pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2), “we need not consider
any other ground of termination found by the trial court.”).   Thus,
in the instant case, because we conclude that the trial court did
not err in determining that sufficient grounds exist to terminate
respondent’s  parental  rights  pursuant  to  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                §                                        7B-
1111(a)(2),  we  need  not  address  respondent’s  arguments  regarding
termination pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  7B-1111(a)(1).
Termination of parental rights involves a two-stage process.
In re Locklear, 151 N.C. App. 573, 575, 566 S.E.2d 165, 166 (2002).
At the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner must establish by clear,
cogent,  and  convincing  evidence  that  sufficient  grounds  exist  to
terminate parental rights pursuant to one of the grounds listed in
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  7B-1111.    In  re  Young,  346  N.C.  244,  247,  485
S.E.2d  612,  614  (1997).    On  appeal,  this  Court  reviews  the  trial
court’s  findings  of  fact  to  determine  whether  the  findings  are
supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and whether the
findings support the trial court’s conclusions of law.   In re Huff,
140  N.C.  App.                                                                288,                                     291,   536  S.E.2d   838,        840    (2000),  appeal
                                                                               dismissed  and  disc.  review  denied,                        353  N.C.   374,   547  S.E.2d       9
(2001).




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In  the  instant  case,  as  discussed  above,  the  trial  court
determined that sufficient grounds exist to terminate respondent’s
parental rights pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) (2003),
which authorizes termination upon a finding that
The parent has willfully left the juvenile in
foster care or placement outside the home for
more  than                                                            12  months  without  showing  to  the
satisfaction  of  the  court  that  reasonable
progress under the circumstances has been made
in  correcting  those  conditions  which  led  to
the   removal   of   the   juvenile.   Provided,
however,  that  no  parental  rights  shall  be
terminated   for   the   sole   reason   that   the
parents are unable to care for the juvenile on
account of their poverty.
Following  the  adjudicatory  stage  in  the  instant  case,  the
trial court made the following pertinent findings of fact:
25.   That   the   circumstances   which   caused
[Franklin  and  Frazier]  to  be  placed  in
foster care were:   on or around April 25,
2001,                                                                 [respondent]  beat                                [Franklin]  and
EMS  was  called  to  address  his  injuries.
He had knots on the left and right sides
of  his  head,  a  split  lip,  a  knot  on  his
forehead, a large bump on the back of his
head, and loop shaped cut marks under his
left eye.                                                             [Respondent] tried to cover up
these injuries with make-up.
                                                                      26.   That  [respondent] admitted that she made
                                                                      a mistake when she beat  [Franklin].
27.   That                                                            [respondent]   has   a   history   of
improper   discipline.                                                                                                                                On   or   about
September                                                             18,                                               2000,  Wake  County  social
worker   Susanne   Canoutas   went   to   the
daycare    of                                                         [Frazier]    and    observed
him  .  .  . to have marks on his back from
a   belt   or   a   strap.                                            [Respondent]
acknowledged inflicting these marks with
a belt or strap, stating it was her right
to spank.




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34.   That  as  a  result  of  the  injuries  to
[Franklin] on April 25, 2001, Wake County
Human    Services    obtained    non-secure
custody of  [Franklin and Frazier].
35.   That                                             [respondent]   informed   Treatment
worker, Susanne Canoutas, that she had a
right  to  hit  the  children  and  did  not
consider the manner in which she had left
marks on  [Franklin] to be abuse.
41.   That  as  part  of  a  plan  to  reunify  with
her                                                    children,                             [respondent]                    was
ordered                                                                                      .  to  successfully  complete
nurturing/parenting classes, demonstrate
and                                                    apply                                 positive                        discipline
consistently, successfully complete anger
management   classes,   demonstrate   self-
control    in    response    to    stressful
situations,  submit  to  a  Psychological
Evaluation                                             and    comply    with    all
recommendations,  pay  child  support  and
participate in supervised visitation with
her children.
45.   That                                             [respondent]    completed    anger
management  classes  though  Wake  County
Human  Services  had  concerns  about  her
failure   to   do   any   homework   and   her
attitude   toward   corporal   punishment;
[respondent]   indicated   to   both   Joyce
Wall,   social   worker   supervisor,   and
Susanne    Canoutas,    Treatment    social
worker, that corporal punishment was what
she   needed   to   do   and   how   she   was
punished.
48.   That Maris[h]a Hart, psychotherapist with
Triangle  Family  Services,  tried  to  work
with  [respondent] to provide counseling,
seeing [respondent] on September 26, 2002
for  first  screening,  seeing  her  for  a
second screening on October  16,  2002 and
seeing  her  for  an  intake  appointment  on
October  24,  2002.




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49.                                                                                             That Maris[h]a Hart made a treatment plan
                                                 for                                            [respondent],   with   the   goals   of
                                                 addressing                                     anger                                       management                                     and
                                                 frustration,                                   discussing                                                                                 concerns
associated with Child Protective Services
and addressing medication management with
Dr. Golding until [respondent] was stable
for                                              [a]  minimum  period  of  at  least  six
months.
50.                                              That Maris[h]a Hart was not successful in
achieving the goals of the treatment plan
                                                 with                                           [respondent],  in  that                                                                    [respondent]
                                                                                                                                            vehemently denied abusing her son.   While
                                                                                                                                            she did say she hit her son, [respondent]
                                                                                                                                            noted that the belt buckle snapped up.
51.                                                                                                                                         That  Ms.  Hart  had  two  therapy  sessions
                                                 with                                           [respondent]  on  October                   30,                                            2002,
                                                 and  November                                  19,                                         2002.                                          [Respondent]
                                                                                                missed  appointments  on  November                                                         12  and
                                                 December  11,  2002.
52.                                                                                                                                         That two therapy sessions did not involve
                                                                                                                                            enough  time  for  Ms.  Hart  to  dig  into
                                                                                                                                            [respondent’s]    behaviors    and    what
                                                 happened in her life.
53.                                                                                                                                         That prior to seeing Ms. Hart at Triangle
                                                 Family  Services,                                                                          [respondent]  saw  two
other therapists:    she saw Annie Lang on
January                                          17,                                            2002,  and  on                              .  .  January
22,  2002,  and  for  an  intake  on  February
7,                                               2002,   at   which   time                      [respondent]
indicated  she  had  no  goals,  that  she
already  dealt  with  goals.    Her  case  was
closed  on  April                                1,                                             2002,  after  further
unsuccessful attempts to contact her.
54.                                              That  [respondent]  also  saw  Stan  Yancey,
therapist  at  Triangle  Family  Services,
for a first screening on May 30, 2002, at
which                                            [respondent]  indicated  she  didn’t
know  why  she  needed  to  come.    Her  case
was  closed  as  she  indicated  she  had  no
goals.
55.                                              That Ms. Hart testified that if a client
                                                 has no goals, a treatment case cannot be
opened.




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110. That  this  Court  finds  that  [respondent]
has  made  some  strides  in  complying  with
this  Court’s  orders  in  that  she  has
finished    parenting    classes,    anger
management,  is  pretty  current  in  her
child support, has stable housing and her
employment   is   heading   in   the   right
direction, stabilizing though not stable.
111. That  this  Court  must  also  find  that
[respondent] has made little progress in
complying with the recommendation of the
Psychological  Evaluation  to  engage  in
therapy, and there has been little to no
fulfillment of therapy as recommended and
ordered  for                                                               [respondent].     Therapy  is
what  is  necessary  for                                                   [respondent]  to
learn  to  control  triggers  for  impulsive
behavior.
130. That                                                                  therapy                         is   necessary   for
[respondent]  to  learn  to  control  her
behavior  and  impulses;                                                   [respondent]  has
not  gone  through  therapy  and  has  chosen
not to go through therapy.
Based upon these findings of fact, the trial court concluded that
respondent had willfully left Frazier and Franklin in foster care
for  more  than  twelve  months  without  demonstrating  to  the  trial
court’s  satisfaction  that  she  had  made  reasonable  progress  to
correct  the  conditions  which  led  to  the  removal  of  Frazier  and
Franklin.    The trial court further concluded that poverty was not
the sole reason that respondent was unable to care for Frazier and
Franklin,   and   the   trial   court   subsequently   ordered   that
respondent’s parental rights to Frazier and Franklin be terminated.
We conclude that the trial court did not err in its determination.
Attached to the petition to terminate parental rights was the
trial court’s previous order concluding that Franklin was an abused




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juvenile and that Frazier and Franklin were neglected juveniles in
that respondent had inflicted serious injury upon Franklin and that
Frazier  and  Franklin  did  not  receive  proper  discipline  from
respondent.     Susanne Canoutas (“Canoutas”), a senior practitioner
at Wake County Human Services, investigated Frazier and Franklin’s
case  and  worked  with  respondent.     At  the  termination  hearing,
Canoutas described Franklin’s 25 April 2001 injuries in detail and
identified  pictures  taken  of  Franklin  on                                   25  April                         2001  and
introduced  into  evidence.    Canoutas  further  testified  that  “[o]n
the  incidents  when  we  were  called  into                                    [sic]  investigate,  the
mother did admit that she had hit the children and that it was her
right  to  hit  the  children,  that  that  was  --  and  that  she  did  not
consider  that  abuse.”    Joyce  Wall                                          (“Wall”)  served  as  Canoutas’
supervisor, and although much of her testimony at the termination
hearing focused on allegations of sexual abuse by respondent, Wall
testified  that  after  discussing  discipline  with  respondent,  “she
felt like corporal punishment was what she needed to do and did say
that  was  what  was  --  how  she  was  punished.”    When  asked  whether
respondent had been deficient in complying with court orders, Wall
referred  to  “[t]he  anger  management  piece,  the  classes  have  been
attended but the failure to do homework and the attitude that she
doesn’t understand the impact of the abuse on the children.”   Wall
further testified that
The  second  thing,  a  deficit  I  would  consider
it, would be the counseling and therapy.    For
therapy  to  be  beneficial,  there  needs  to  be
some   indication   that   there’s   a   problem.
[Respondent] doesn’t think she has a problem.
The  fact  the  children  were  in  care  almost  a




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year  before  she  started  any  counseling,  and
when we questioned her -- the children went in
care April 2001.   She started counseling about
February  of                                                                 2002.     When  we  asked  her  about
that,  she  said  she  didn’t  think  that  we  were
serious about the counseling.
Marisha  Hart                                                                (“Hart”),  a  psychotherapist  at  Triangle  Family
Services,  testified  that  at  an  intake  appointment  on  7  February
2002, respondent  “indicated no goals.”    Hart read from the intake
report,  which  said  that  respondent  “stated  she  did  not  have  any
goals  as  she  already  dealt  with  her  difficulties  through  all  the
classes  she  was  required  to  take  and  has  completed.”     After
reviewing the record in the instant case, including the foregoing
testimony, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the trial
court’s findings of fact regarding respondent’s efforts subsequent
to the removal of her children.
Furthermore, we also conclude that the trial court’s findings
of fact support its conclusion of law regarding termination.   Under
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                                                                                                                  §             7B-1111(a)(2),   “[w]illfulness  means  something
                                                                             less  than  willful  abandonment.                                                                                       [and]  does  not  require  a
showing of fault by the parent.”   In re Oghenekevebe, 123 N.C. App.
434,                                                                         439,                                                  473  S.E.2d   393,             398                                (1996)                         (citations  omitted).     In
Oghenekevebe,  this  Court  concluded  that  willfulness  may  be  found
even  where  a  parent  has  made  an  attempt  to  regain  custody  of  a
child but has failed to exhibit “reasonable progress or a positive
response  toward  the  diligent  efforts  of  DSS.”    Id.  at               440,                                                  473
S.E.2d  at  398.    In  the  instant  case,  respondent failed  to  follow
the directives of the trial court and Wake County Human Services,
both  of  which  required  that  respondent  engage  in  therapy  and




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psychological evaluations aimed at educating respondent regarding
proper disciplinary methods and controlling respondent’s impulsive
behaviors.                                                                     Although  there  was  evidence  that  respondent  had
satisfied some of the requirements imposed upon her, we note that
“[e]xtremely  limited  progress  is  not  reasonable  progress”  under
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  7B-1111(a)(2).    In re Nolen,  117 N.C. App.  693,
700, 453 S.E.2d 220, 224-25 (1995).   In Nolen, this Court concluded
that  “[i]mplicit  in  the  meaning  of  positive  response  is  that  not
only must positive efforts be made towards improving the situation,
but  that  these  efforts  are  obtaining  or  have  obtained  positive
results.                                                                       .  Otherwise,  a  parent  could  forestall  termination
proceedings  indefinitely  by  making  sporadic  efforts  for  that
purpose.”    Id.  at  693,  453  S.E.2d  at  225  (citing  In  re  Tate,  67
N.C. App.  89,  94,  312 S.E.2d  535,  539  (1984)).    Thus, we conclude
that the trial court’s findings of fact in the instant case support
its conclusion of law, and therefore we hold that the trial court
did not err in terminating respondent’s parental rights pursuant to
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  7B-1111(a)(2).
IV.
Respondent’s final argument is that the trial court erred by
taking judicial notice of the case file from a previous hearing in
this  matter.    Respondent  asserts  that  the  trial  court  abused  its
authority  by  failing  to  limit  its  judicial  notice  to  those
adjudicatory facts not subject to reasonable dispute.   We disagree.
The  transcript  from  the  termination  hearing  reflects  the
following pertinent exchange during the direct examination of Wall:




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PETITIONER:                                                                  Your Honor, we ask the Court to
take  judicial  notice  of  the
underlying  file  here,                                                      2001-J-
253,  specifically  the  orders
contained   therein   and   the
(inaudible) reports.
TRIAL COURT:    The Court takes judicial notice
of the existence of file  01-J-
253 and its contents.
Following this exchange, petitioner questioned Wall regarding the
parenting and anger management classes respondent was instructed to
complete.    However,  the  record  does  not  reflect  that  respondent
ever objected to the trial court’s decision to take judicial notice
of  the  underlying  file.    N.C.R.  App.  P.  10(b)(1)  (2004)  provides
that
In order to preserve a question for appellate
review,  a  party  must  have  presented  to  the
trial  court  a  timely  request,  objection  or
motion,  stating  the  specific  grounds  for  the
ruling the party desired the court to make if
the  specific  grounds  were  not  apparent  from
the  context.     It  is  also  necessary  for  the
complaining party to obtain a ruling upon the
party’s request, objection or motion.
Accordingly,  we  conclude  that  respondent  has  waived  her  right  to
assert  this  assignment  of  error  on  appeal,  and  thus  we  need  not
address the merits of respondent’s argument.
V.
In light of the foregoing conclusions, the trial court order
terminating respondent’s parental rights is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge HUNTER concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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