S.E. 2d
THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA
In The Supreme Court
In the Matter of Jeffrey
Kim Roberts, Respondent.
Opinion No. 24797
Submitted April 30, 1998 - Filed June 1, 1998
DISBARRED
James C. Anders, of Columbia, for respondent.
Henry B. Richardson, Jr., and Senior Assistant
Attorney General James G. Bogle, Jr., both of
Columbia, Disciplinary Counsel.
PER CURIAM: In this attorney disciplinary matter,
respondent and disciplinary counsel have entered into an agreement under
Rule 21, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR. In the agreement, respondent admits
misconduct and consents to be disbarred from the practice of law. We
accept the agreement.
In July 1997, respondent, while employed as a deputy solicitor
for the Sixth Judicial Circuit, requested or agreed to accept sexual favors
from a female defendant in exchange for dismissing a charge of driving
under the influence. Respondent was indicted by the State Grand Jury for
acceptance of a bribe in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 16-9-220 (1985) in
August 1997. Thereafter, respondent was placed on interim suspension.
In the Matter of Roberts, 327 S.C. 261, 489 S.E.2d 480 (1997). The State
Grand Jury later indicted respondent for three counts of criminal sexual
conduct in the third degree, in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-654
(1985). Respondent subsequently pled guilty to one count of acceptance of
a bribe and one count of criminal sexual conduct in the third degree and
was sentenced.
These crimes are serious crimes as defined by Rule 2(z), RLDE,
since the circumstances of their commission adversely reflect on
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IN THE MATTER OF ROBERTS
respondent's honesty, trustworthiness, and fitness as a lawyer.
Additionally, acceptance of a bribe for the dismissal of criminal charges is
a crime of moral turpitude. See In the Matter of Davis, 270 S.C. 262, 241
S.E.2d 895 (1978) (Court held that magistrate who entered pleas to several
charges including acceptance of a bribe committed crimes of moral
turpitude). Furthermore, we now hold that the commission of criminal
sexual conduct in any degree is a crime of moral turpitude. Cf. State v.
McFarlane 279 S.C. 327, 306 S.E.2d 611 (1983) (criminal sexual conduct
with a minor in any degree is a crime of moral turpitude); State v. Jones,
271 S.C. 287i, 247 S.E.2d 43 (1978) (assault with intent to rape is a crime
of moral turpitude). By being convicted of these serious crimes that are
also crimes of moral turpitude, respondent has committed misconduct
under Rule 7(a)(4), RLDE. Finally, respondent has engaged in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation in violation of
Rule 8.4(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 407, SCACR.
Accordingly, we disbar respondent from the practice of law.
Respondent's request to make this disbarment retroactive to the date of
his interim suspension is denied. Within fifteen days of the date of this
opinion, respondent shall file an affidavit with the Clerk of Court showing
that he has complied with Rule 30, RLDE.
DISBARRED
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