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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA10-778
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:                                                                                          7 December  2010
IN THE MATTER OF:                                                                               Iredell County
S.E.P. and L.U.E.,                                                                              Nos.  02 JT  201,  04 JT  007
Minor Children.
Appeal by respondent-mother from adjudication and disposition
orders  entered                                                                                 24  March                                                     2010  by  Judge  Edward  L.  Hedrick,  IV  in
Iredell  County  District  Court.     Heard  in  the  Court  of  Appeals
15 November  2010.
Lauren   Vaughan,   for   petitioner-appellee   Iredell   County
Department of Social Services.
Robin E. Strickland, for respondent-appellant mother.
Pamela Newell, for Guardian ad Litem-appellee.
MARTIN, Chief Judge.
Respondent-mother appeals from orders terminating her parental
rights to S.E.P. and L.U.E.    We affirm.
On 26 September 2002, the Iredell County Department of Social
Services                                                                                        (“DSS”)  filed  a  petition  alleging  that  S.E.P.  was  a
neglected  and  dependent  juvenile.     See  In  re  S.E.P.  &  L.U.E.,
184  N.C.  App.                                                                                 481,                                                          482,                                            646  S.E.2d   617,   618-19   (2007).   On
26  November  2002,  S.E.P.  was  adjudicated  dependent.    See  id.  at
482,  646 S.E.2d at  619.    On  23 January  2004, DSS filed a petition
alleging  that  L.U.E.  was  a  neglected  juvenile.    See  id.  at  484,




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646 S.E.2d at  619.    On  20 April  2004, the trial court adjudicated
L.U.E.  neglected.     See  id.  at                                        484,                                          646  S.E.2d  at   620.                                       On
20 February  2006, DSS petitioned to terminate respondent-mother’s
parental rights to S.E.P. and L.U.E.   See id. at 486, 646 S.E.2d at
621.                                                                       On                                            16   October      2006,   the   trial   court   terminated
respondent-mother’s parental rights to both S.E.P. and L.U.E.   See
id.  at                                                                    481,                                          486,              646  S.E.2d  at                            617-18,   621.    Respondent-mother
appealed.    See id. at  486,  646 S.E.2d at  621.    This Court vacated
the  trial  court’s  orders  because  the  trial  court  lacked  subject
matter jurisdiction.    See id. at  488,  646 S.E.2d at  622.
On  17  September  2007,  DSS  filed  new  petitions  alleging  that
S.E.P.  and  L.U.E.  were  neglected  and  dependent  juveniles.    DSS
recounted the history of its involvement with respondent-mother, as
well  as  respondent-mother’s  history  of  violence  and  criminal
misconduct, which resulted in multiple incarcerations.   DSS claimed
respondent-mother’s violent and criminal behavior was ongoing based
on her  “accumulat[ion of] several new criminal charges . .  . since
her release” from prison in February 2007.   Thus, DSS alleged that
respondent-mother had “continuously failed to maintain a safe home
environment”  for  the  juveniles.     DSS  additionally  alleged  that
respondent-mother had
in  no  way  contributed  to  the                                          [juveniles]
financially   or   emotionally   due   to   her
continued  poor  decision  making,  continuous
criminal                                                                   charges,                                      and               periods                                    of
incarceration.   She has not inquired regarding
the                                                                        [juveniles’]  situation  or  well-being  or
sent  any  cards  or  letters  to  the  [juveniles]
since   her   release,   and   has   effectively
abandoned                                                                  [the  juveniles]  since                       [they]  came
into care.




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On                                                                            12  February                                                        2008,  S.E.P.  and  L.U.E.  were  adjudicated
neglected and dependent juveniles.   DSS was granted custody of the
juveniles    and    relieved    of    reunification    efforts    with
respondent-mother.    On  18 April  2008, the trial court established
that  the  permanent  plan  for  the  juveniles  was                          “a  sole  plan  of
TPR/Adoption.”
On                                                                            7   July                                                            2009,   DSS   filed   petitions   to   terminate
respondent-mother’s  parental  rights  to  S.E.P.  and  L.U.E.     DSS
alleged  five  grounds  for  termination:                                     (1)  respondent-mother  had
neglected   the   juveniles   within   the   meaning   of   N.C.G.S.
§                                                                             7B-101(15);                                                         (2)   respondent-mother   had   willfully   left   the
juveniles  in  foster  care  for  more  than  twelve  months  without
showing that reasonable progress under the circumstances had been
made  in  correcting  those  conditions  that  led  to  the  juveniles’
removal;                                                                      (3)  respondent-mother,  for  a  continuous  period  of  six
months  immediately  preceding  the  filing  of  the  petitions,  had
willfully  failed  to  pay  a  reasonable  portion  of  the  cost  of  care
for  the  juveniles  although  physically  and  financially  able  to  do
so;                                                                           (4)  respondent-mother  failed  to  demonstrate  her  ability  to
provide  proper  care  and  supervision  of  the  juveniles,  such  that
S.E.P.  and  L.U.E.  were  dependent  juveniles  within  the  meaning  of
N.C.G.S.  §  7B-101(9), and there was a reasonable probability that
such  incapability  would  continue  for  the  foreseeable  future;  and
(5)  respondent-mother  willfully  abandoned  the  juveniles  for  at
least  six  consecutive  months  immediately  preceding  the  filing  of
the petitions.




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After  hearings  were  held  on  the  petitions,  the  trial  court
concluded    that    grounds    existed    pursuant    to    N.C.G.S.
§                                                                          7B-1111(a)(1),                                              (a)(2),   (a)(3)   and   (a)(7)   to   terminate
respondent-mother’s  parental  rights.     The  trial  court  further
concluded  that  it  was  in  the  juveniles’  best  interests  that
respondent-mother’s parental rights be terminated.   Accordingly, on
24  March                                                                  2010,  the  trial  court  terminated  respondent-mother’s
parental rights.    Respondent-mother appeals.
Respondent-mother’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial
court abused its discretion when it determined that it was in the
best interests of the juveniles to terminate her parental rights.
After careful review of the record, briefs, and contentions of the
parties, we affirm.
“The trial court has discretion, if it finds that at least one
of the statutory grounds exists, to terminate parental rights upon
a finding that it would be in the child’s best interests.”    In re
Nesbitt,                                                                   147  N.C.  App.                                             349,      352,           555  S.E.2d               659,   662   (2001).
Factors  the  trial  court  must  consider  in  making  a  determination
regarding the juvenile’s best interests include:
(1)   The age of the juvenile.
(2)   The   likelihood   of   adoption   of   the
juvenile.
(3)   Whether   the   termination   of   parental
rights will aid in the accomplishment of
the permanent plan for the juvenile.
(4)   The  bond  between  the  juvenile  and  the
parent.
(5)   The  quality  of  the  relationship  between
the  juvenile  and  the  proposed  adoptive




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parent,  guardian,  custodian,  or  other
permanent placement.
(6)   Any relevant consideration.
N.C. Gen. Stat.  §  7B-1110(a)  (2009).    The court is to take action
“which  is  in  the  best  interests  of  the  juvenile”  when               “the
interests  of  the  juvenile  and  those  of  the  juvenile’s  parents  or
other  persons  are  in  conflict.”  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                       §                                                           7B-1100(3)
(2009).                                                                      “We  review  the  trial  court’s  decision  to  terminate
parental rights for abuse of discretion.”   In re Anderson, 151 N.C.
App.  94,  98,  564 S.E.2d  599,  602  (2002).
In the instant case, the trial court made extensive findings
regarding  the  respective  relationships  between  the  juveniles  and
their foster parents.    The court also made findings regarding the
age  of  the  children,  their  lengthy  stay  in  foster  care,  and  the
fact  that  they  had  resided  with  their  respective  foster  parents
almost their entire lives.   Furthermore, the court expressly stated
in  its  order  that  it  had  considered  the  factors  set  forth  in
N.C.G.S.  §  7B-1110(a), and found:
29.   That  the  likelihood  of  adoption  is  high
because  these  children  are  currently  in
placements where they have resided for a
great  length  of  time  and  the  foster
parents desire to adopt them.    There are
no known impediments to adoption.
30.   That terminating the Respondent Mother’s
parental    rights    will    aid    in    the
accomplishment  of  the  current  permanent
plan  of  care  for  the  minor  children,
which    is    a    concurrent    plan    of
TPR/adoption   and   guardianship   with   a
court-approved caretaker.
31.   That  the  bond  between  each  of  the  minor
children  and  the  Respondent  Mother  is




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nonexistent;  there  just  is  not  one;  the
minor  children  do  not  even  know  the
Respondent  Mother  as  their  mother  and
have  had  very  little  contact  with  her
32.                                                                         That  the  quality  of  the  relationship
between   the   minor   children   and   the
caretakers is very high  .  .  .; that each
of the foster parents participates in the
minor   children’s   activities   and   they
treat   the   minor   children   as   their
biological children.
33.                                                                         That    other    relevant    considerations
include  the  fact  that  the  Respondent
Mother   is   currently   working   toward
reunification  with                                                         [two  of  her  other
children], and she is currently living in
a  shelter.     That  even  the  Respondent
Mother admits and the Court finds that it
is  very  unlikely  that  she  could  regain
custody  of  the  two  children  at  issue  in
this  TPR  proceeding  within  a  reasonable
time period.
Respondent-mother  claims  that  it  was  impossible  for  her  to
either form or maintain a bond with her children because the trial
court   ceased   her   visitation   with   the   children   in              2007.
Respondent-mother   thus   contends   the   trial   court   abused   its
discretion  by  preventing  her  from  having  a  relationship  with  her
children, and then  “using the resultant lack of a bond as part of
the justification to sever their legal relationship as a parent and
child.”   We are not persuaded.   The unchallenged findings from the
adjudication of respondent-mother’s parental rights establish that
respondent-mother  committed  numerous  criminal  offenses  and  her
“visits with the minor children at issue in this action have been
limited by her incarcerations.”   Moreover, additional unchallenged
findings  indicate  that  respondent-mother  did  not  send  cards,




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letters, or gifts to the children, and did not maintain consistent
contact  with  DSS  in  order  to  inquire  into  the  juveniles’  well-
being.    Therefore, respondent-mother’s lack of visitation and her
resultant  lack  of  bond  with  the  juveniles  was  due  to  her  own
actions.     Consequently,  the  trial  court  committed  no  abuse  of
discretion    by    considering    the    lack    of    bond    between
respondent-mother and the juveniles.
Respondent-mother  additionally  argues  that  the  court  should
have considered the effect severance would have on the juveniles’
relationship with their siblings.    It is within the trial court’s
discretion to consider such factors as family integrity in making
its decision of whether termination is in the best interests of the
children.   See In re Smith,  56 N.C. App. 142, 150,  287 S.E.2d  440,
445, cert. denied,  306 N.C.  385,  294 S.E.2d  212  (1982).    However,
here,  as  respondent-mother  states  and  the  findings  demonstrate,
S.E.P. and L.U.E. have no relationship with their siblings.   Thus,
while  the  court  may  consider  family  integrity  when  determining
whether termination is in the best interests of the juveniles, the
evidence  and  findings  made  by  the  trial  court  demonstrate  that
there is no bond between any of the siblings.    Accordingly, after
considering  the  factors  set  forth  in  N.C.G.S.  §  7B-1110(a),  the
trial court concluded that it was in the juveniles’ best interest
to  terminate  respondent-mother’s  parental  rights.    Based  on  the
findings  of  fact  made  by  the  trial  court  after  an  extensive
termination hearing, we discern no abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.




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Judges McGEE and BRYANT concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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