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An  unpublished  opinion  of  the  North  Carolina  Court  of  Appeals  does  not  constitute
controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance
with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NO. COA08-649
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed:  2 December  2008
IN THE MATTER OF:                                                                               Mecklenburg County
T.P.                                                                                            No.  07 J  583
Appeal by Juvenile from orders entered  7 November  2007 and  7
January 20                                                                                      s in Mecklenburg County District
Court.    Heard in the Court of Appeals  17 November  2008.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Ann
W. Matthews, for the State.
Mary McCull                                                                                     venile-Appellant.
ARROWOOD, Judge.
On 23 June 2007, T.P. was charged in a juvenile petition with
assault with a deadly weapon.    The petition alleged that on  2 May
2007,  T.P.  held  a  small  pocket  knife  to  the  chest  of  a  classmate
and then cut her beneath her left eye.   At trial on 6 November 2007
the  victim,  M.M.,  testified  that  T.P.  sat  behind  her  in  their
fourth  period  high  school  math  class  and  that  the  two  frequently
talked  and  “played  around”  during  class.    On  2  May  2007,  she  and
T.P.  were  “randomly”  talking  in  class  when  T.P.  called  her  name.
She  turned  around  to  face  T.P.  and  he  held  a  pocket  knife  to  her
chest.    M.M.  then  turned  back  around,  and  T.P.  called  her  name  a
second time.    When M.M. turned around a second time, T.P. cut her




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under her eye with either the pocket knife or his fingernail.   M.M.
went  to  the  bathroom  and  later  told  a  friend  about  the  incident,
but  did  not  tell  the  teacher,  her  parents,  or  anyone  else.    At
first, M.M. testified that T.P. did not say anything specific while
holding  the  knife  to  her  chest,  but  on  cross-examination  she
testified that T.P. asked her to have sex with him.
At  some  point  in  time,  M.M.’s  friend  told  an  assistant
principal,  who  then  spoke  to  M.M.  on  or  about  7  May  2007.    M.M.
also  talked  to  Officer  Matt  Dunker,  the  school  resource  officer,
the  same  day.    Officer  Dunker  testified  that  he  noticed  a  scar
about a half-inch long under M.M.’s left eye.   According to Officer
Dunker,  M.M.  reported  that  T.P.  threatened  to  rape  her  as  he  was
holding the knife to her chest.
T.P. testified that he and M.M. were friends and talked during
fourth  period  math.    He  denied  ever  holding  a  knife  to  M.M.  and
denied threatening to rape her.   T.P. testified that he was out of
school  sick  on                                                               2  May                                        2007.     T.P.’s  mother  testified  that  T.P.
missed  three  days  of  school  during  early  May  due  to  the  flu,  but
she could not remember the specific dates.
After hearing all testimony, the trial court adjudicated T.P.
delinquent  for  having  committed  the  offense  of  assault  with  a
deadly  weapon.    The  trial  court  then  proceeded  to  disposition.
T.P.’s delinquency history was  “low,” but the offense, a Class A1
misdemeanor,  was  classified  as  “serious.”    Therefore,  the  trial
court was permitted to sentence T.P. to either a level one or level
two   disposition.                                                             After   hearing   the   court   counselor’s




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recommendation, the trial court imposed a level two disposition: a
sentence  of  twelve  months  supervised  probation,  with  a  suspended
sentence of fourteen days in detention.   In addition to the regular
terms of probation, the trial court ordered T.P. to attend school
each   and   every   day   and   comply   with   a                           7:00   p.m.   curfew.
Furthermore,  the  trial  court  ordered  T.P.  to  comply  with  all
recommended  treatment  programs,  to  cooperate  with  placement  in  a
wilderness  program,  and  to  not  contact  the  victim.     T.P.  gave
written  notice  of  appeal  from  the  adjudication  and  disposition
orders on  12 November  2007.
T.P. filed a motion for review on  3 December  2007 seeking to
modify and/or vacate the adjudication disposition orders based on
counsel’s  alleged  late  receipt  of  T.P.’s  attendance  records  from
the 2006-2007 school year.   The motion alleged that the attendance
records  confirm  that  T.P.  was  absent  from  his  fourth  period  math
class on  2 May  2007.    In the motion, T.P.’s trial counsel claimed
that  she  attempted  to  obtain  T.P.’s  attendance  records  in  August
2007, but did not obtain the pertinent records until T.P.’s mother
requested and received them on  8 November  2007.
On  3 December  2007, the trial court entered an order setting
T.P.’s conditions of disposition pending appeal on 3 December 2007,
but continued the hearing as to T.P.’s motion for review.
On                                                                           7  January              2008,  the  trial  court  held  a  hearing  on  the
motion for review, and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction, based
on the pending appeal of the adjudication and disposition orders.




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T.P.  gave  written  notice  of  appeal  from  the  dismissal  order  on  9
January  2008.
I.
T.P.’s first argument on appeal is that the trial court erred
in  dismissing  his  motion  for  review  on  the  ground  that  it  lacked
jurisdiction.    A  fundamental  rule  of  appellate  practice  is  that
“[w]hen an appeal is perfected as provided by this Article it stays
all  further  proceedings  in  the  court  below  upon  the  judgment
appealed  from,  or  upon  the  matter  embraced  therein.  .  .              .”    N.C.
Gen. Stat.  §  1-294  (2007).   All proceedings in the trial court are
thus  stayed  pending  appeal  absent  a  specific  exception.    In  re
B.D.W.,  175 N.C. App.  760,  764,  625 S.E.2d  558,  562  (2006).    T.P.
claims that N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-2600 and -2605 provide exceptions
giving  the  trial  court  jurisdiction  to  modify  a  juvenile  order
pending appeal.
We therefore examine N.C. Gen. Stat.  §§  7B-2600 and  -2605 to
determine  whether  they  provide  a  basis  for  the  trial  court  to
retain  jurisdiction  pending  appeal.    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.                   §            7B-2600
provides the following:
(a)   Upon motion in the cause or petition, and
after  notice,  the  court  may  conduct  a  review
hearing to determine whether the order of the
court   is   in   the   best   interests   of   the
juvenile,  and  the  court  may  modify  or  vacate
the order in light of changes in circumstances
or the needs of the juvenile.
(b)  In  a  case  of  delinquency,  the  court  may
reduce  the  nature  or  the  duration  of  the
disposition  on  the  basis  that  it  was  imposed
in an illegal manner or is unduly severe with




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reference  to  the  seriousness  of  the  offense,
the   culpability   of   the   juvenile,   or   the
dispositions  given  to  juveniles  convicted  of
similar offenses.
N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  7B-2600(a),(b)  (2007).    The  statute  thus  gives
the trial court authority to modify or vacate a disposition order,
but  it  is  silent  as  to  whether  the  trial  court  may  do  so  pending
appeal.   Therefore, we find that N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2600 does not
provide an exception to the general rule.    Because T.P. sought to
vacate the disposition order after he gave notice of appeal, N.C.
Gen. Stat.  §  7B-2600 is inapplicable to the instant case.
North Carolina General Statute § 7B-2605 provides that “[f]or
compelling reasons which must be stated in writing, the court may
enter a temporary order affecting the custody or placement of the
juvenile”  pending  appeal  of  a  juvenile  order.    N.C.  Gen.  Stat.
§ 7B-2605 (2007) (emphasis added).   It thus allows the trial court
to  enter  a  temporary  order  pending  appeal,  but  limits  such
authority  to  entry  of  an  order  that  affects  the  custody  or
placement of the juvenile.   N.C. Gen. Stat.  § 7B-2605; B.D.W., 175
N.C.  App.  at                                                                  764,                        625  S.E.2d  at   562.    Section   7B-2605  does  not
allow  the  trial  court  to  vacate  an  adjudication  or  a  disposition
order.    Here,  T.P.  sought  to  vacate  the  orders  on  the  basis  of
newly   acquired   exculpatory   evidence.                                      This   purpose   is   not
authorized by the statute.
It  does  not  appear  that  any  other  statute  affords  the  trial
court  authority  to  modify  the  orders  on  the  grounds  sought  in
T.P.’s motion for review.   See B.D.W., 175 N.C. App. at 764-65, 625
S.E.2d at 562 (finding that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to




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enter an order allowing an amendment to a juvenile petition after
the juvenile had perfected his appeal).    Therefore, T.P.’s notice
of   appeal   stayed   the   proceedings   in   the   trial   court.          We
accordingly find no error in the trial court’s dismissal of T.P.’s
motion for lack of jurisdiction.   However, this determination does
not serve as a bar to the Juvenile filing another Motion for Review
on  the  same  grounds  set  forth  in  the  original  motion  once  this
matter is returned to the trial court.
II.
T.P. also contends that the trial court abused its discretion
by  ordering  a  level  two  disposition.                                     Under  the  statutory
framework,  the  trial  court  is  required  to  select  the                  “most
appropriate disposition” which is  “designed to protect the public
and to meet the needs and best interests of the juvenile[.]”   N.C.
Gen. Stat.  §  7B-2501(c)  (2007).    Here, T.P. had a low delinquency
history,  but  was  adjudicated  delinquent  for  having  committed  a
Class A1 misdemeanor, which is classified as “serious.”   Therefore,
under the framework of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2508  (2007), the trial
court had the authority to impose either a level one or level two
disposition.
We have previously held that “choosing between two appropriate
dispositional levels is within the trial court's discretion.”     In
re  Robinson,  151  N.C.  App.  733,  737,  567  S.E.2d  227,  229  (2002).
Additionally,  it  is  within  the  discretion  of  the  trial  court  to
determine  which  dispositional  alternatives  to  impose.     In  re
Ferrell,  162 N.C. App.  175,  176,  589 S.E.2d  894,  895  (2004).           “It




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is  well  settled  that  a  decision  vested  in  the  discretion  of  the
juvenile court will not be disturbed absent clear evidence that the
decision  was  manifestly  unsupported  by  reason.”    In  re  N.B.,  167
N.C. App. 305, 311, 605 S.E.2d 488, 492 (2004) (citation omitted).
Here,  there  is  no  evidence  that  the  trial  court  abused  its
discretion.   Although T.P. suggests that the facts surrounding the
assault  offense  warrant  a  lesser  disposition,  we  note  that  the
trial court is required to take factors other than culpability into
consideration.   Indeed, the trial court is required to consider the
juvenile’s needs and risk assessment when entering the appropriate
disposition.    See  N.C.  Gen.  Stat.  §  2501(c)(5).    Here,  the  court
counselor  recommended  a  level  two  disposition  based  on  T.P.’s
educational problems and diversion history.    Although T.P. had no
previous  delinquency  history,  T.P.  had  previously  entered  two
pretrial  diversion  plans  for  past  offenses.    It  appears  that  the
trial court took the counselor’s recommendation into consideration,
which  is  proper  under  the  statutory  framework.    After  reviewing
T.P.’s needs and risk assessment, we cannot say that this decision
was  “unsupported  by  reason.”    Therefore,  we  hold  the  trial  court
did not abuse its discretion in entering the disposition.
Affirmed.
Judges TYSON and BRYANT concur.
Report per Rule  30(e).

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